\ 


Iflln 


AND.*:' I 


^^^f^%^^. 

^^Mi 

m 

piro 

1^ 

^^^M 

l^^l 

m^.^lf^n!9'"'i^ 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/brieftextbookoflOOcopprich 


A  Brief  Text-Book 

OK 

LOGIC -^' MENTAL  PHILOmy 

By  REV.  CHARLES  COPPENS,   S.  J. 


$  1  , 2  O  •      (Discount  is  allowed  to  Schools.) 


Philadelphia,  Jan.  14, 1893. 
My  Dear  Father  Coppens  : 

I  received  from  your  publisher  your  admirable  work  on  "Log^cand 
Mental  Philosophy  "  It  is  just  the  work  needed  at  the  present  time,  and  I 
earnestly  recommend  its  use  in  our  colleges. 

t  P.  J.  Ryan,  Archbishop  of  Philadelphia. 


Catholic  Publication  Society  Co.: 

I  received  your  note  kindly  sending  to  my  address  the  precious  work 
*'  lyOgic  and  Mental  Philosophy  " I  read  the  work  and  I  consider  it  most  use- 
ful for  our  colleges  as  a  text-book,  and  of  great  advantage  for  those  who  have 
finished  their  studies,  as  well  as  for  Catholics  in  general. 

t  F.  Mora,  Bishop  of  Monterey  and  Los  Angeles. 

Father  Coppens,  we  think,  has  produced  a  book  which  will  meet  all 
the  requirements  of  the  English  student  of  philosophy.  It  embodies  a  thorough 
course  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics,  expressed  in  clear,  concise  language,  and  is 
printed  with  a  care  for  those  details — division  of  questions,  diversity  of  type, 
accentuation  of  paragraphs,  etc.- -which  go  to  maice  up  a  text-book,  and 
cannot  fail  to  arrest  and  fix  the  attention  of  the  reader.  Needless  to  say,  the 
Encyclical  of  the  Holy  Father  has  been  the  inspiration  of  the  learned  author, 
and  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas  permeates  the  whole  work.  We  feel 
assured  it  will  meet  with  a  hearty  welcome  in  all  our  schools  and  colleges.— /Iw 
Maria. 

If  we  were  to  characterize  the  present  work  of  Father  Coppens  in  a  sen- 
tence, we  would  call  it  Philosophy  Simplified ;  for  in  treatment,  style  and 
terminology,  the  technical  is  eschewed  as  far  as  possible  ;  and  we  are  indebted 
to  Father  Coppens  for  some  English  equivalents  to  philosophical  Latin  which 
cannot  fail  to  prove  of  great  service  to  the  reader  of  metaphysical  principles 
in  every  day  discussions.  But  praise  is  superfluous.  Father  Coppens'  work 
supplies  the  need,  and  this  not  only  in  the  class-room  for  advanced  stu- 
dents, but  for  the  general  reader  who  has  stepped  over  the  threshold  of 
jfraduation.— CAwrcA  Progress. 


LOGIC  AND  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


....  Father  Coppens'  book  will  be  a  safe,  a  very  safe  guide,  and  a  very  easy 
one,  considering  the  subject  matter,  for  young  students  of  philosophy.  Theit 
I^tin  text-books  will  be  better  understood  and  appreciated  for  this  help,  of 
which  we  urge  everyone  who  may  begin  the  study  of  philosophy  to  avail 
himself  at  once.  Indeed,  we  have  not  the  slightest  misgiving  that  the  small 
manual  will  prove  a  most  valuable  aid  both  to  those  who  pursue  the  two 
years'  course,  and  much  more  to  others  who  can  devote  only  one  year  to 
it,  or  who,  having  failed  in  the  thorough  mastery  of  a  system  of  philosophy 
heretofore,  are  anxious  to  supply  the  loss  at  the  least  possible  cost  of  time  and 
severe  a.-p^\ica.i\on.— American  Ecclesiastical  Review. 


It  is  almost  impossible  to  read  newspapers  or  magazines  without  encoun- 
tering  articles  on  topics  not  to  be  understood  without  a  knowledge  of  these 
subjects,  and  it  is  well  that  the  young  student  should  be  prepared  to  detect 
their  fallacies.  This  book  will  give  him  the  necessary  knowledge,  and  will 
also  increase  his  pleasure  in  reading  really  able  arguments.— 7%^  IHlot. 


Those  who  are  acquainted  with  Father  Coppens'  text-books  of  "  Rhetoric  " 
and  "Oratorical Composition,"  will  be  prepared  to  find  in  this  new  work  of 
his  a  model  of  order  and  thoroughness,  combined  with  an  attractive  style, 
and  they  will  not  be  disappointed.  The  treatment  of  logic  in  its  dialectic 
side  is  the  best  brief  statement  for  school  use  that  we  have  yet  seen  in 
English.  The  critical  side  of  the  logic  is  compendious,  but  by  no  means 
dry.  The  latter  two-thirds  of  the  work  is  devoted  to  mental  philosophy. 
The  views  of  the  Stonyhurst  Manuals  are  reflected  in  this  book,  only  that 
the  American  Jesuit  has  systematized  the  matter  in  a  way  to  make  all  teachers 
grateful  to  him.  The  work  is  printed  and  set  out  with  the  usual  elegance 
that  has  characterized  the  press-work  of  the  Catholic  Publication  Society 
Company. — Catholic  Review. 

Father  Coppens  has  fully  carried  out  his  aim  to  give  "a  brief  outline  of 
sound  philosophy."  The  only  fault  we  might  point  out  is  that,  in  parts,  it 
would  seem  a  little  too  brief.  Apart  from  this  the  teaching  is  clear,  orderly, 
and  exact ;  and,  what  is  of  great  consequence,  thoroughly  loyal  to  the 
scholastic  ^ocirinc.— Dublin  Review. 


The  aim  of  this  little  volume,  in  the  modest  words  of  the  author,  is  simply 
"to  present  to  pupils  unfamiliar  with  L,atin  a  brief  outline  of  a  sound  philoso- 
phy conformable  to  the  teachings  of  the  schoolmen."  It  is  chiefly  meant  for 
"class use  in  academies  and  similar  institutions"  ;  and  we  will  add,  for  use  in 
our  Catholic  reading  circles,  to  which  we  take  great  pleasure  in  heartily 
recommending  it.  We  conceive  that,  in  the  hands  of  a  good  director,  it  would 
soon  make  logic  and  mental  philosophy  extremely  popular  with  our  young 
men  and  •wora^n.— American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review. 


a.  Ok.  ©.  (5. 


A    BRIEF    TEXT-BOOK 


LOGIC 


Mental  Philosophy. 


REV.    CHARLES    COPPENS,    SJ., 

Author  of  "A  Practical  Introduction  to  English  Rhetoric'^  and  "  The  Art 
Oratorical  Composition.'^ 


"Christ  is  the  Restorer  of  the  Sciences/'     LEO.  XIII. 


UNIVERSITY 

Of 


NEW  YORK 

SCHWAETZ,  KIRWIN"  <fe  FAUSS 
42  Barclat  Street 


mmn 


Copyright,  1891, 

by 

THE  CATHOLIC  PUBLICATION   SOCIETY  CO. 


Tpaauferred  to  CATHOLIC  SCHOOL  BOOK  CO. 


ALL  KICHTS  RBSERVED. 


PREFACE. 


These  pages  are  a  modest  contribution  towards  the  ac- 
complishment of  an  important  purpose.  They  are  written 
in  compliance  with  an  earnest  desire  repeatedly  expressed  in 
the  solemn  utterances  of  our  venerated  Supreme  Pontiff  Leo 
XIII.  "  The  more  active,"  he  says,  "the  enemies  of  religion 
are  to  teach  the  unlearned,  the  young  especially,  what  clouds 
their  intellect  and  corrupts  their  morals,  the  more  should  you 
exert  yourselves  to  establish  not  onlyv  a  well-adapted  and 
solid  method  of  instruction,  but  a  method  in  perfect  con- 
formity with  the  Catholic  faith,  especially  as  regards  Mental 
Philosophy,  on  which  the  right  teaching  of  all  the  other 
sciences  in  a  great  measure  depends — a  Philosophy  which 
shall  prepare  the  way  for  Divine  Revelation  instead  of  aim- 
ing at  its  overthrow." 

Thus  spoke  the  Holy  Father  in  his  Encyclical  "Inscru- 
tabili"  at  the  opening  of  his  Pontificate.  What  this  Phi- 
losophy should  be,  he  soon  after  explained  in  a  special 
Encyclical  "  On  the  Higher  Studies."  It  should  be  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Schoolmen,  the  system  founded  upon  the 
teachings  of  Aristotle,  which  was  carried  to  its  perfection  by 
St.  Thomas  in  the  thirteenth  century,  and  which  has  held  its 
place  in  most  of  the  Catholic  Colleges  and  Universities  to 
the  present  day.  "  Among  the  doctors  of  the  Schools,"  he 
says,  "  St.  Thomas  stands  forth  by  far  the  first  and  master  of 

315265 


4  Preface, 

all To  this  we  must   add,"  the   Encyclical 

continues,  "  that  this  Angelic  Doctor  extended  the  sphere  of 
his  philosophic  conclusions  and  speculations  to  the  very 
reasons  and  principles  of  things,  opening  out  the  widest 
field  for  study,  and  containing  within  themselves  the  germs 
of  an  infinity  of  truths,  an  exhaustless  mine  for  future  teachers 
to  draw  from  at  the  proper  time  and  with  rich  results.  As 
he  used  the  same  intellectual  process  in  refuting  error,  he 
succeeded  in  combating  single-handed  all  the  erroneous  sys- 
tems of  past  ages,  and  supplied  victorious  weapons  to  the 
champions  of  truth  against  the  errors  which  are  to  crop  up  in 
succession  to  the  end  of  time." 

Of  this  Philosophy  there  exist  many  excellent  text-books 
in  the  Latin,  but  very  few  in  the  EngHsh  tongue ;  the  present 
little  volume  does  not  attempt  to  rival  their  perfection.  Its 
aim  is  simply :  to  present  to  pupils  unfamiliar  with  Latin  a 
brief  outline  of  a  sound  Philosophy  conformable  to  the  teach- 
ings of  the  Schoolmen.  It  was  composed  before  the  excel- 
lent Stonyhurst  Series  of  English  Manuals  of  Catholic 
Philosophy  was  published ;  but  it  is  chiefly  meant  for  a  dif- 
ferent purpose,  viz.:  for  class  use  in  Academies  and  similar 
institutions,  for  which  that  collection  of  Manuals  is  too  vo- 
luminous, though  invaluable  as  works  of  reference  for  pro- 
fessors and  pupils.  The  author  sincerely  hopes  that  his 
modest  efforts  will  contribute  to  the  propagation  of  sound 
Philosophic  learning. 

THE  AUTHOR. 
Detroit  College,  August  20, 189 1. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Introduction, 


PAGE 

7 


LOGIC. 


BOOK  I.— DIALECTICS. 


Chapter     I.  Simple  Apprehensions  and  Judgments : 

Article        I.  The  Nature  of  Simple  Apprehensions;   . 
'*  II.  Distinctions  regarding  Ideas  ; 

"         III.  Judgments  and  Propositions. 

Chapter    II.  Reasoning: 

Article        I.  The  Categorical  Syllogism  ; 

$  I.  Constructing  Syllogisms ; 
§  2.  Criticising  Syllogisms ;     . 
Article       II.  The  Hypothetical  Syllogism ; 

'*        III.  Other  Species  of  Demonstrative  Arguments; 
"  IV.  Probable  Reasoning;       .... 

"  V.  Indirect  Reasoning ;        .... 

**  VI.  Fallacious  Reasoning;     .... 

**        VII.  Method  in  Reasoning ;  ... 

"      VIII.  Exercise  in  Reasoning. 
5 


II 
II 
12 

i8 

22 
22 

23 
26 

30 
32 
36 

38 
40 
42 

45 


Contents, 


BOOK  II.    CRITICAL  LOGIC. 

PAGE 

Chapter     I.  The  Nature  of  Certainty :        .        .        .        .        .  48 

Article      I.  Truth  and  Falsity ; 49 

'*        II.  States  of  the  Mind  with  Regard  to  Truth ;        .  51 

"      III.  Elements  that  Make  up  Certainty.     ...  54 

Chapter    IL  The  Existence  of  Certainty 56 

Chapter  III.  Means  of  Attaining  Certainty:         ....  62 

Article      I.  A  Sketch  of  our  Cognoscive  Powers ;         .        ,  62 

"        II.  The  Intellect  in  Particular;        .         .         .        .  65 

%  I.  Consciousness ; 66 

$  2.  Primary  Ideas  ; 68 

$3.  Immediate  Analytical  Judgments;           .  70 

%  4.  Memory ; 72 

%  5.  Reasoning ; 73 

Article  III.  Sensation; 74 

%  I .  The  Inner  Sense ; 75 

%  2.  The  Outer  Senses ;           ....  77 

Article  IV.  Authority; 87 

"         V.  Common  Sense; 90 

Chapter  IV.  The  Ultimate  Criterion  of  Certainty.        ...  94 


INTRODUCTION. 


1.  Philosophy  is  the  science  which  investigates  the  highest 
causes  of  all  things  in  as  far  as  they  are  knowable  by  reason. 
That  portion  of  Philosophy  which  terminates  in  theory  or 
speculative  knowledge  is  called  Theoretical  or  Mental  Phi- 
losophy, or  Metaphysics,  That  portion  which  applies  first 
principles  to  practice,  directing  the  moral  conduct  of  men, 
is  styled  Practical  or  Moral  Philosophy,  or  Ethics. 

2.  Since  reason  is  to  be  our  guide  in  all  these  investiga- 
tions, we  must  begin  by  examining,  (a)  What  process  our 
reason  must  follow  that  it  may  guide  us  with  safety,  and  (b) 
How  far  our  natural  powers  of  mind  can  give  us  unerring 
certainty.  This  double  task  is  the  scope  of  Logic,  which 
science  must  first  be  studied,  because  it  is  the  foundation  of 
the  mental  and  moral  structure.  It  is  as  truly  a  part  of 
Philosophy  as  the  foundation  is  a  part  of  the  building, 

3.  Human  reason  and  Divine  Hevelation  are  two  means 
by  which  truth  is  manifested  to  man ;  they  cannot  contradict 
one  another :  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  which  is  evident  to 
reason  is  never  found  in  conflict  with  Revelation.  Hence 
arises  a  precious  advantage  for  the  Christian  philosopher,  of 
which  he  were  foolish  not  to  avail  himself.  For,  knowing  that 
the  path  of  reason,  often  difficult  to  trace  correctly,  must  run 
parallel  to  the  high  road  of  supernatural  Revelation,  he  will 
be  guarded  by  the   clear  and  infallible   teachings  of   the 


8  Introduction, 


Faith  against  the  vain  pursuit  of  false  theories.  Thus,  Faith, 
far  from  enslaving,  liberates  his  intellect  from  the  shackles 
of  ignorance  and  error.  Philosophy  looks  not  for  novelties, 
^or  does  it  aim  at  originality  of  thought,  but  it  studies  the 
eternal  and  unvarying  principles  of  truth. 

4.  Among  the  purely  human  sciences.  Philosophy  is  the 
noblest  and  most  important ;  for  its  final  purpose  is  the  most 
exalted,  its  process  the  most  intellectual,  and  its  teachings 
secure  the  foundation  of  the  other  sciences.  These  receive 
from  it  their  principles,  the  laws  of  their  investigations,  and 
the  ends  or  purposes  to  which  they  should  be  directed. 


PART  I. 


LOGIC. 


5.  Logic  is  the  science  which  directs  the  mind  in  the  at- 
tainment of  truth.  By  a  science  we  mean  the  knowledge  of 
things  in  connection  with  their  causes.  Logic  is  properly 
called  a  science,  because  it  considers  not  only  the  rules 
which  direct  the  mind  in  the  attainment  of  truth,  but  also 
the  causes  or  reasons  why  they  do  so. 

6.  It  comprises  two  parts.  That  portion  which  considers 
the  modes  or  forms  of  mental  action,  and,  in  particular,  the 
rules  to  be  observed  in  reasoning  or  discussing,  is  called 
Formal  Logic  or  Dialectics  {SiaXiyonaiy  I  discuss) ;  that  por- 
tion which  studies  the  matter  or  truth  attained,  criticising  the 
reliability  of  mental  action,  is  Material  Logic,  also  styled 
Critical  or  Applied  Logic. 


BOOK    L 


DIALECTICS, 


7.  In  treating  of  Dialectics,  the  main  purpose  of  a  text- 
book is  to  teach  pupils  how  to  reason  correctly  themselves, 
and  readily  to  detect  flaws  in  the  false  reasonings  of  others. 
To  this  practical  purpose  we  shall  almost  exclusively  confine 
ourselves.  Setting  aside,  therefore,  all  other  details  usually 
insisted  on  in  works  on  Formal  Logic,  we  shall  here  treat  of 
reasoning  only,  and  of  a  few  such  preliminary  matters  as 
must  be  understood  before  the  reasoning  process  itself  can 
be  properly  explained.  We  shall  therefore  treat,  in  Chapter 
I.,  of  simple  apprehensions  and  judgments,  and,  in  Chapter 
II.,  of  reasoning  itself. 


Of    THE 

UNtVERSITY 


CHAPTER  I. 
SIMPLE  APPREHENSIONS  AND  JUDGMENTS. 

8.  We  shall  consider:  i.  T/ie  nature  of  simple  apprehen- 
sions.  2.  The  most  important  distinctions  regarding  ideas,  and 
3.  Judgments,  together  with  the  expression  of  them  in 
propositions. 

Article  I.    The  Nature  of  Simple  Apprehensions. 

9.  Simple  apprehension  is  the  act  of  perceiving  an  object 
intellectually,  without  affirming  or  denying  anything  concern- 
ing it.  To  apprehend  is  to  take  hold  of  a  thing  as  if  with 
the  hand;  an  apprehension^  as  an  act  of  the  mind,  is  an 
intellectual  grasping  of  an  object.  The  mind  cannot  take 
an  object  physically  into  itself;  but  it  knows  an  object  by 
taking  it  in  intellectually,  in  a  manner  suited  to  its  own  nature, 
forming  to  itself  an  intellectual  image,  called  a  species  of  the 
object.  The  act  of  forming  this  mental  image  is  called  a 
conception,  and  the  fruit  of  it,  the  image  itself,  is  the  concept, 
idea,  or  notion  of  the  object.  The  word  j/w^/*?  added  to 
apprehension  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  apprehension 
neither  affirms  nor  denies  the  existence  of  the  object;  it 
affirms  nothing  and  denies  nothing,  it  simply  conceives  the 
idea  of  the  object. 

10.  This  intellectual  image  should  not  be  confounded  with 
the  sensible  image,  or  phantasm,  which  is  a  material  repre- 
sentation of  material  objects,  and  which  is  formed  by  the 
imagination,  by  means  of  the  material  organ  of  the  brain. 


1 2  Dialectics, 


The  difference  between  these  two  images  is  great,  and  dis- 
tinction between  them  is  of  vital  importance  in  Philosophy. 
For  instance,  I  intellectually  conceive  a  triangle  by  appre- 
hending a  figure  enclosed  by  three  lines  and  thus  having 
three  angles.  My  notion  or  idea  contains  this  and  nothing 
more  J  it  is  very  precise,  and  every  one  who  conceives  a  tri- 
angle conceives  it  exactly  the  same  way.  But  when  I 
imagine  a  triangle,  I  cannot  help  imagining  it  with  sensible 
material  accidents,  as  being  of  such  or  such  a  size  and  shape,  a 
foot  long  at  one  time,  a  mile  long  at  another.  The  picture 
may  be  vague,  various  pictures  of  triangles  may  be  blended 
together  j  but  it  can  never  be  universal,  representing  all  pos- 
sible triangles,  as  my  idea  does.  This  imagination  is  2, phan- 
tasm. True,  phantasms  are  often  called  '  ideas  '  by  English 
writers ;  in  fact,  the  whole  school  of  Berkeley,  Hume,  and 
their  followers  fail  to  trace  any  difference  between  them ;  it  is 
the  fundamental  error  of  their  pernicious  philosophy.  Thus, 
for  instance,  Huxley  maintains  that  God,  the  soul  of  man, 
etc.,  are  unknowable  and  unthinkable,*  because  we  can  form 
no  phantasm  of  them.  This  makes  them  simply  unimagi- 
nable, not  unknowable  nor  unthinkable ;  we  know  what  we 
mean  when  we  speak  of  them.  (On  the  difference  between 
ideas  and  phantasms  see,  further.  Logic ^  by  Richard  Clarke, 
S.J.,  c.  vi.) 

Our  ideas  are  expressed  by  words,  or  oral  terms;  the  ideas 
themselves  are  often  called  mental  terms. 

Article  II.     Distinctions  regarding  Ideas. 

II.  Logicians  go  into  much  detail  on  a  variety  of  dis- 
tinctions with  respect  to  ideas ;  it  will  be  sufficient  for  our 
present  purpose  briefly  to  notice  a  few  of  them. 

*  Essay  on  Science  and  Morals. 


Simple  Apprehensions  and  Judgments.     13 

A  first  distinction  lies  between  abstract  and  concrete  ideas. 
A  concrete  idea  expresses  a  subject,  e.  g.^  *  this  gold.'  *  some 
men/  *  all  flowers';  or  a  quality  as  belonging  to  a  subject, 
e.g.,  'heavy/  'virtuous/  'fragrant.*  An  abstract  idea  ex- 
presses a  quality  by  itself,  drawn  forth,  as  it  were  {abstraho, 
I  draw  away),  from  the  subject  to  be  separately  considered, 
e.  g.y  '  heaviness,'  '  virtue,'  '  fragrancy.' 

12.  A  second  distinction  exists  htt^^on  singular, particular , 
and  universal  ideas.  An  idea  is  singular  if  it  expresses  a 
definite  single  object,  e.g.,  'this  book,*  'that  army/  'that 
gold,'  '  James,'  '  the  Angel  Gabriel,'  '  the  United  States,' 
meaning  this  one  country. 

An  idea  is  particular  if  it  represents  one  or  more  objects 
without  determining  which,  e.  g.^  '  a  man,'  '  an  army,'  '  a 
Nero,'  '  a  spirit,'  ^  three  books,'  '  some  states.' 

An  idea  is  universal  when  it  expresses  a  note  or  notes 
common  to  many  objects,  found  in  each  of  them,  no  matter 
how  much  those  objects  may  differ  in  other  respects ;  e.g., 
'  animal '  and  '  rational '  are  notes  common  to  all  men  ;  they 
are  conceived  in  the  universal  idea  '  man,'  and  each  of  them 
corresponds  to  a  universal  idea.  The  term  note  designates 
anything  knowable  in  an  object. 

13.  All  universal  ideas  can  be  ranked  under  five  heads, 
called  the  five  heads  of  predicables,  because  it  is  always  in 
one  of  these  five  ways  that  a  universal  idea  is  predicated 
of  an  object. 

I.  What  is  apprehended  as  common  to  many  objects, 
found  in  each  of  them,  and  therefore  predicable  of 
them  all  in  exactly  the  same  sense,  may  be  the  whole 
nature,  the  essence  of  those  objects,  /.  e.,  all  that 
without  which  those  objects  cannot  exist  nor  be  con- 
ceived. For  instance,  it  is  the  nature  or  essence  of  all 
men  to  be  '  rational  animals ' :  unless  I  conceive  an 


1 4  Dialectics, 


object  as  being  both  *  rational '  and  *  animal,'  I  do  not 
conceive  a  man  at  all.  This  common  essence  of  a 
class  is  called  a  species.  The  species,  therefore,  is 
defined  as  all  that  constitutes  the  common  nature  or 
essence  of  a  class  of  objects;  e.g.^  *  man,'  'rational 
animal.' 

2.  The  universal  idea  may  express  a  part  only  of  the 
nature  common  to  many  objects.  Thus,  when  I  con- 
ceive *  animal,'  I  conceive  only  a  part  of  man's  nature, 
a  part  found  in  other  species  of  objects  as  well,  viz., 
in  brutes.  *  Rational '  is  the  other  part  of  man's 
nature,  and  it  is  not  found  in  brutes,  but  it  distin- 
guishes man  from  the  brute.  Now,  that  universal 
concept  which  seizes  upon  what  is  common  to  differ- 
ent species  is  the  idea  of  the  genus ;  e.  g,,  *  animal ' 
is  the  genus,  to  which  belong  the  two  species  '  man' 
and  'brute.' 

3.  On  the  other  hand,  the  universal  concept  which  ex- 
presses the  peculiar  note  by  which  one  species  dif- 
fers from  another  species  of  the  same  genus  is  styled 
the  specific  difference;  e.g.,  'rational'  is  the  specific 
difference  of  the  species  man  as  distinguished  from 
the  species  brute. 

4.  When  the  concept  expresses  something  that  flows  or 
results  so  necessarily  from  the  very  essence  that  the 
essence  cannot  exist  without  it,  and  that  note  never 
exists  but  in  such  an  essence,  such  note  is  called 
a  property  or  attribute  of  that  essence.  Thus,  '  the 
power  of  laughing,'  '  the  power  to  express  one's 
thoughts  by  articulate  speech,'  cannot  be  found  but 
in  a  being  that  is  both  animal  and  rational,  and  they 
result  as  natural  consequences  from  its  compound 
nature.     The  use  of  them  may   be   accidentally  im- 


Simple  Apprehensions  and  yudgments.     15 

peded,  as  is  that  of  reason  itself  in   the   infant  and 
the  idiot;  but  they  belong  to  human  nature  as  such, 
as  distinct  from  other  natures,  and  are  therefore  prop- 
erties of  man,  proper  or  peculiar  to  man.     Properties 
need  not  be  conceived   in   order  to    apprehend  the 
nature  from  which  they  flow ;  thus,  to  conceive  man, 
I  need  not  think  of  his  risible  power. 
5.  Lastly,  the  universal  may  express  what  is  found  in 
one  or  many  individuals  of  a  class,  or  even  perhaps 
in  all  of  them,  yet  in  such  a  way  that  it  could  be  ab- . 
sent  without  the  individuals'  ceasing  to  be  of  the  same 
nature.     In  that  case  it  expresses  an  accident  of  the 
species.     For  instance,  a  man  may  be  white  or  black, 
tall  or  small,  gentle  or  fierce,  young   or   old,  a  Eu- 
ropean or  an  American ;  all  these  are  accidental  notes 
of  man.     All  men  are  larger  than  ducks ;  and  yet,  if  a 
dwarf  should  be  born,  who,  when  full-grown,  should 
not  be  so  large,  being  nevertheless  a  rational  animal, 
he  would  be  truly  a  man,  his   particular  size  being 
only  an  accident,  not  a  property  of  his  essence. 
14.  When  we  conceive  a  note  common  to  two  or  more 
genera,  ^.^.,  Miving,'  which  note  belongs  to  animals  and  to 
plants  alike,   we  have   then  a  higher  genus,  of  which  the 
former  genera  may  be  considered   as  the  species.     *  Body ' 
expresses  a  still  higher  genus ;  for  it  is  predicated  not  only 
of  Uving  but  also  of  non-living  substances,  such   as  stones 
and  metals.     '•  Substance'  itself  is  the  highest  genus,  to  which 
not  only  bodies  but  also  spirits  belong. 

Reversing  the  process,  we  may  start  with  the  highest  genus, 
say  *  substance,'  and  call  *  material'  and  *  immaterial '  sub- 
stances, or  '  body '  and  *  spirit,'  its  species.  The  species 
*body  '  becomes  next  a  subordinate  genus,  of  which  'living,' 
or  '  organic,' and  'inorganic'  will  be  the  two  species.     Of 


1 6  Dialectics. 


*  organisms/  as  a  new  subordinate  genus,  the  species  will  be 
'sentient'   and  *  non-sentient/  *  animals  '  and  *  plants.'    Of 

*  animals  '  we  have  two  species,  *  rational '  and  *  irrational,' 
'man*  and  *  brute.'  We  have  various  species  of  *  brutes,' 
but  not  of  *  man '  5  for,"  while  brutes  have  very  different 
natures  or  essences,  and,  flowing  from  these,  very  different 
properties,  all  men  have  the  same  essence  and  the  same  prop- 
erties ;  these  differ  not  in  kind  but  in  accidental  degrees  of 
perfection.  Therefore  'man  '  is  not  a  genus,  but  the  lowest 
species ;  *  animal '  is  his  proximate  or  lowest  genus.  The 
genera  and  species  between  the  highest  and  the  lowest  are 
called  subaltern^  subordinate ,  or  intermediate. 

15.  This  ramification  of  a  highest  genus  into  subaltern 
genera  and  species  is  presented  to  the  eye  in  the  Porphyrian 
tree.  The  trunk  of  the  tree  contains  the  genera  and  the 
species,  the  branches  the  specific  differences,  the  top  exhibits 
individuals.     (See  page  17.) 

16.  In  connection  with  universal  ideas  we  must  explain, 
as  matters  of  the  very  highest  importance  in  Logic,  the 
comprehension  and  the  extension  of  an  idea.  Comprehension 
means  the  total  signification,  all  the  notes  comprehended  or 
contained  in  an  idea ;  thus,  the  concept '  man '  comprehends 
the  notes  *  animal '  and  *  rational ' ;    *  animal '  itself  means 

*  sentient,  living,  material  substance.' 

Extension  means  the  total  number  of  individuals  to  which 
the  idea  extends  or  applies ;  the  extension  of  the  concept 
*■  man  '  is  all  men,  that  of  *  animal '  is  wider  still,  extending 
to  all  men  and  all  brutes.  It  is  thus  apparent  that  the 
greater  the  comprehension  of  an  idea  is^  the  less  is  its  extension^ 
and  vice  versa ;  because  the  more  numerous  the  qualities 
apprehended,  the  fewer  the  individuals  that  will  possess  them 
all ;  thus,  the  genus  *  animal '  has  more  extension  but  less 
comprehension  than  the  species  *  man.'     *  Animal '  has  more 


Simple  Apprehensions  and  Judgments.     17 


/.  e.,  substance  is  corporeal  or  incorporeal;  corporeal  substance,  called 
matter  or  body,  is  organic  or  inorganic  ;  an  organic  body  or  organism 
is  sentient  or  insentient,  etc. 


THE    PORPHYRIAN    TREE. 


1 8  Dialectics. 


extension  than  *  man,'  because  there  are  more  animals  than 
men ;  it  has  less  comprehension,  because  the  term  ^  animal  * 
signifies  fewer  notes  than  '■  rational  animal '  or  *  man.' 

When  a  term  is  taken  in  its  full  or  widest  extension,  it 
is  said  to  be  distributed ;  it  denotes  then  every  one  of  the 
objects  to  which  it  can  apply.  Thus,  when  we  say  '  all  men 
are  creatures,'  we  mean  '  every  man  is  a  creature.'  Terms 
expressing  particular  ideas  (No.  12)  are  undistributed;  e,g.^ 
'gold  is  found  in  California ' — /.  ^.,  '  some  gold.' 

A  distributed  term  is  appHed  to  all  its  objects  in  exactly  the 
same  meaning  or  acceptation.  Now,  many  words  are  capable 
of  two  or  three  different  acceptations  :  i.  When  the  meaning 
of  a  word  is  exactly  the  same,  the  term  is  called  univocal; 
as  when  we  give  the  name  of  *  box  '  to  a  case  or  receptacle 
of  any  size  or  shape.  2.  When  the  meanings  are  entirely 
different,  without  any  connection  between  them,  the  term  is 
styled  equivocal ;  as  when  the  word  '  box '  is  applied,  now  to 
a  case,  then  to  a  blow  on  the  head.  3.  When  the  meanings 
are  different  but  connected  with  one  another,  the  term  is 
analogous  ;  thus  the  same  word  *  box '  may  stand  for  a  case 
and  for  the  wood  out  of  which  cases  used  often  to  be  made, 
the  box-tree. 

Article  III.    Judgments  and  Propositions. 

17.  A  judgment  may  be  defined  as  an  act  of  the  mind 
affirming  or  denying  the  agreement  of  two  objective  ideas. 
The  mind  in  judging  compares  two  ideas,  and  consequently 
the  objects  represented  by  those  ideas,  and  affirms  or  denies 
that  they  agree  with  one  another;  e.g.^  'modesty  is  praise- 
worthy,' *  ebriety  is  not  worthy  of  man.'  If,  as  in  these 
examples,  the  agreement  or  disagreement  is  seen  to  exist  by 
the  mere  consideration  or  analysis  of  the  ideas  compared, 
the  judgment  is  analytic ;    it  is   also   styled   a  priori,  i.  e.^ 


Sijnple  Apprehensions  and  Judgments.     19 

formed  antecedently  to  experience;  ox  pure,  i.  e.,  formed  by 
pure  reason,  not  learned  by  sense-perception;  or  again,  it 
may  be  called  necessary,  absolute,  or  metaphysical,  according  to 
the  obvious  meanings  of  those  terms.  But  if  the  agreement 
or  disagreement  is  discovered  consequently  on  experience, 
e.  g.,  '  gold  is  malleable,'  the  judgment  receives  the  opposite 
appellations  of  synthetic,  a  posteriori,  experimental,  contingent, 
conditional,  and  physical, 

18.  If  a  judgment  of  either  kind  is  arrived  at  by  reason- 
ing, it  is  mediately  evident ;  if  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment is  seen  without  the  aid  of  reasoning,  the  judgment  is 
immediately  evident.  That  'ice  is  cold,'  is  an  immediate 
a  posteriori  judgment;  that  'there  is  nothing  without  a  reason 
for  it,'  is  immediately  known  a  priori ;  that  '  the  sum  of  the 
angles  of  a  triangle  is  equal  to  two  right  angles,'  is  known 
mediately  a  priori  j  the  physical  laws  are  known  mediately 
a  posteriori. 

19.  A  judgment  expressed  in  words  is  called  a  proposition. 
The  subject  a  id  predicate  together  are  its  matter,  and  the 
affirmation  or  negation  its  form ;  the  copula  is  always  the 
verb  *  to  be  '  in  the  present  indicative,  expressed  or  implied  : 
*  I  see '  is  equivalent  to  '  I  am  seeing,'  *  He  said '  to  '  He  is 
one  who  said,'  etc. 

That  a  proposition  be  negative,  it  is  necessary  that  a  nega- 
tive word  affect  the  copula.  Now,  it  often  requires  some 
reflection  to  see  what  word  is  intended  to  be  affected  by  the 
negation  :  '  No  criminal  is  a  happy  man  '  means  '  A  criminal 
is  not  a  happy  man ' ;  '  A  tyrant  has  no  peace '  means  '  A 
tyrant  is  not  one  having  peace.' 

20.  In  propositions  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  for  cor- 
rect reasoning  that  we  carefully  attend  to  the  extension  and 
the  comprehension  af  the  terms  used  and  of  the  ideas  for  which 
they  stand. 


20  Dialectics, 


I.  If  we  consider  the  extension  of  the  subject,  a  proposi- 
tion is  styled  singular ^  particular ,  ot  universal,  according  as  its 
subject  expresses  a  singular,  particular,  or  universal  idea  (No. 
12).  The  form  of  the  term  expressing  that  idea  may  be  mis- 
leading, the  meaning  must  be  carefully  considered.  Thus,  *  a 
man  is  a  creature,'  *  man  is  a  creature,'  '  all  men  are  creatures,' 
'  every  man  is  a  creature,'  '  no  man  is  necessary,'  are  all  uni- 
versal propositions ;  while  *  a  man  was  slain '  is  particular 
(for  here  *  a  man '  means,  not  every  man,  but  '  some  one  man'), 
and  '  that  man  is  generous  '  is  a  singular  proposition. 

II.  If  we  consider  the  extension  and  the  comprehension 
of  the  predicate,  we  have  the  following  rules  : 

1.  In  an  affirmative  proposition  the  predicate  is  taken  in  its 
full  comprehension,  but  not  [except  in  definitions)  in 
its  full  extension.  For  instance,  *  gold  is  a  metal  ^  means 
that  gold  has  all  the  notes  constituting  a  metal,  but  not 
that  it  is  every  metal.  We  say  *  except  in  definitions,' 
for  in  these  the  defining  words,  which  are  the  predi- 
cate, must  have  the  same  extension  as  the  thing  de- 
fined, expressed  in  the  subject;  e.  g.,  *  man  is  a  rational 
animal,'  i.  <f„,  *any  rational  animal.' 

2.  In  a  negative  proposition  the  reverse  holds  true,  i.  e.^  the 
predicate  is  taken  in  its  full  extension,  but  not  in  its  full 
comprehension.  For  instance,  '  a  diamond  is  not  a  metal ' 
denies  that  the  diamond  is  contained  in  the  whole  class 
of  metals ;  but  it  does  not  deny  that  it  has  qualities  in 
common  with  metals,  since  it  is  a  substance,  material, 
lustrous,  etc.,  as  well  as  metals.  The  extension  of  the 
subject  determines  the  quantity  of  a  proposition ;  its 
quality  depends  on  its  form,  i.  e.,  on  its  being  affirma- 
tive or  negative. 

21.  In  reasoning  we  must  distinguish  between  hypothetical 
and  categorical  propositions. 


Simple  Apprehensions  and  Judgments.    21 

The  hjrpothetical  proposition  does  not  affirm  or  deny  the 
agreement  of  subject  and  predicate  absolutely,  but  depen- 
dently  on  some  supposition  or  condition,  or  with  a  possible 
alternative.  It  is  distinguished  from  the  categorical,  which 
directly  affirms  or  denies  the  agreement  between  a  subject  and 
a  predicate  without  any  condition  or  alternative. 

The  hypothetical  may  be  of  three  kinds  : 

{a)  The  conditional,  consisting  of  two  parts,  one  of  which  is 
declared  to  be  the  condition  of  the  other.  The  part  express- 
ing the  condition  is  called  the  condition  or  antecedent,  the  other 
the  conditioned  or  consequent.  If  the  connection  is  true,  the 
proposition  is  true.  Thus,  *  If  you  knew  God  well,  you  would 
love  him,'  is  certainly  true;  *  If  you  get  old,  you  will  be  wise,' 
may  be  false. 

{b)  The  disjunctive,  which  connects  incompatible  clauses 
by  the  disjunctive  particle  '  or '  j  as,  *  A  being  is  either  created 
or  uncreated.'  The  proposition  is  true,  if  it  leaves  no  al- 
ternative unmentioned. 

{c)  The  conjunctive,  which  denies  that  two  things  can  ex- 
ist, or  hold  true,  at  the  same  time ;  as,  *  A  being  cannot  be 
'created  and  independent.' 


CHAPTER    II. 

REASONING. 

22.  Reasonings  is  the  mental  act  or  process  of  deriving 
judgments,  called  conclusions,  from  other  judgments,  called 
premises. 

The  principle  underlying  all  valid  reasoning  is  that  the 
conclusion  is  implicitly  contained  in  the  premises  ;  therefore 
whoever  grants  the  truth  of  the  premises  thereby  really  grants 
the  truth  of  the  conclusion.  For  instance,  in  this  reasoning, 
"  Every  good  son  is  pleased  to  see  his  mother  honored ; 
but  Christ  is  a  good  Son ;  therefore  He  is  pleased  to  see  His 
Mother  honored,"  whoever  grants  the  first  two  propositions 
must  grant  the   third,  since  it  is    contained  in  them. 

Reasoning  is  styled  J>ure,  if  the  judgments  are  analytic 
judgments;  empiric,  if  they  are  synthetic,  and  mixed,  if  one 
premise  is  analytic  and  the  other  synthetic.  Reasoning  ex- 
pressed in  words  is  called  argumentation. 

Article  I.    The  Categorical  Syllogism. 

23.  All  argumentation  may  be  reduced  to  the  categorical 
syllogism.  A  syllogism  is  an  argument  consisting  of  three 
propositions  so  connected  that  from  the  first  two  the  third 
follows.  If  all  the  propositions  are  categorical,  the  syllogism 
is  categorical.  It  will  be  remembered  that  a  proposition  is 
called  categorical  if  it  affirms  or  denies  absolutely  the  agree- 
ment of  a  subject  with  a  predicate.  (No.  21.)  "All  virtues 
are  desirable ;  but  sobriety  is  a  virtue ;  therefore  sobriety  is 


Reasoning.  23 


desirable,"  is  a  categorical  syllogism.  This  conclusion,  "  So- 
briety is  desirable,"  is  implicitly  contained  in  the  first  or 
major  premise,  "  All  virtue  is  desirable  " ;  and  the  second 
or  minor  premise,  "  Sobriety  is  a  virtue,"  points  out  the  fact 
that  it  is  therein  contained.  Such  reasoning  is,  therefore, 
perfectly  valid. 

§  I.     Constructing  Syllogisms, 

24.  To  prove  a  thesis  by  a  syllogism  we  begin  by  finding 
a  proposition  which  really  involves  the  truth  of  the  thesis, 
and  in  a  second  proposition  we  state  that  it  does  so.  Thus, 
if  I  am  to  prove  that  every  one  must  honor  his  father  and 
mother,  I  may  start  with  the  premise,  "  Every  one  must 
do  what  God  commands  " ;  I  add  the  minor  premise,  "  But 
God  commands  to  honor  father  and  mother."  Hence  I 
legitimately  draw  the  conclusion,  "  Therefore  every  one  must 
honor  his  father  and  mother." 

25.  We  must  next  examine  in  what  ways  premises  may 
contain  conclusions.  If  the  major  is  a  universal  proposition, 
it  may  contain  the  conclusion  in  four  different  ways : 

1.  The  proposition  being  universal,  the  subject  is  dis- 
tributed or  taken  in  its  widest  extension  ;  thus,  "  Every 
stone  is  matter,"  means  that  the  predicate  *  matter ' 
appUes  to  everything  that  is  a  *  stone.'  If,  therefore, 
the  minor  states  that  something,  say  *  marble,'  is  a 
stone,  the  conclusion  will  follow  that  marble  is  mat- 
ter. Thus  the  major  affirms  thai  a  predicate  belongs 
to  a  whole  class ;  the  minor  affirms  that  a  certain 
thing  is  of  that  class  ;  the  conclusion  affirms  that  the 
same  predicate  belongs  to  that  certain  thing. 

2.  Similarly,  if  the  major  is  negative,  as,  "  A  stone  is 
not  a  spirit,"  and  the  minor  declares  that  "  Marble 
is  a  stone  of  some  kind,"  the  conclusion  will  be 
that  "Marble  is  not  a   spirit."    That   is:  the   major 


24  Dialectics. 


denies  a  predicate  of  a  whole  class  ;  the  fnifior  affirms 
that  a  certain  being  is  of  that  class ;  the  conclusion 
denies  that  same  predicate  of  that  same  being. 
.  A  third  form  reasons  thus  :  The  major  denies  a  predi- 
cate of  a  whole  class ;  the  minor  affirms  that  a 
certain  being  has  that  predicate;  the  conclusion  denies 
that  said  being  is  of  said  class ;  for  if  it  were  of  that 
class,  it  would  not  have  that  predicate.  Thus,  ''  A 
stone  is  not  a  spirit ;  but  an  Angel  is  a  spirit ;  there- 
fore an  Angel  is  not  a  stone." 
In  the  three  cases  just  explained  the  minor  is  affirm- 
ative. A  fourth  form  of  syllogism  arises  if  the  major 
affirms  some  predicate  of  a  whole  class,  and  the  minor 
denies  that  ^  certain  being  has  that  predicate ;  the  con- 
clusion will  then  be  that  said  being  does  not  belong  to 
said  class ;  since  all  the  individuals  of  that  class  have 
been  affirmed  to  possess  that  predicate.  "  Every 
stone  is  matter;  an  Angel  is  not  matter j  therefore 
an  Angel  is  not  a  stone." 

In  these  four  forms  the  major  is  a  universal  propo- 
sition, and  the  reasoning  is  founded  upon  the  wide 
extension  of  the  subject.  The  major  need  not  be 
universal  in  the  fifth  form,  which  derives  its  validity 
from  the  full  comprehension  of  the  predicate. 
,  The  fifth  form  reasons  thus :  The  major  affirms  that 
a  being  has  a  certain  predicate,  i.  <?.,  that  it  has  all  the 
notes  comprehended  in  that  predicate ;  the  minor  af- 
firms that  a  certain  note  is  comprehended  in  that  predi- 
cate ;  the  conclusion  affirms  that  said  being  has  said 
note.  Thus,  "  This  stone  is  matter;  but  all  matter  is 
extended ;  therefore  this  stone  is  extended."  By  chang- 
ing the  order  of  the  premises,  this  fifth  form  is  re- 
ducible to  the  first. 


Reasoning,  25 


26.  The  first  and  second  of  these  five  forms  are  the  most 
obvious  modes  of  argumentation  and  the  most  constantly 
used.  The  reasoning  so  familiar  in  Mathematics,  A=B,  B=C, 
.  • .  A=C,  is  an  application  of  the  first  form.  The  argument, 
if  expressed  in  full,  would  read  thus :  "  Any  two  things 
equal  to  a  third  thing  are  equal  to  each  other;  but  A  and  C 
are  equal  to  a  third,  B ;  therefore  they  are  equal  to  each 
other."  Similarly,  from  the  second  form  we  have  the  fol- 
lowing reasoning  :  ''  Two  things,  one  of  which  is  equal  to  a 
third  thing  and  the  other  unequal,  are  not  equal  to  each 
other;  bat  A  is  equal  to  B,  and  C  is  not  equal  to  B; 
therefore  A  is  not  equal  to  C. 

27.  In  these  two  special  modes  of  reasoning  the  major 
propositions  are  usually  suppressed,  because  they  are  so 
obvious ;  and  the  arguments  assume  an  abridged  form,  so 
constantly  in  use  and  so  practically  useful,  that  we  must  ex- 
plain it  with  special  care.  In  fact,  many  logicians  reduce  all 
syllogisms  to  these  two  abridged  forms,  which  they  call  the 
affirmative  and  the  negative  syllogism. 

28.  The  affirmative  syllogism,  /.  <r.,  that  in  which  both 
the  premises  are  affirmative,  is  based  on  the  principle  that 
two  things  equal  to  a  third  are  equal  to  each  other :  A=B, 
B=C;   therefore  A=C 

The  negative  syllogism,  /.  ^.,  that  in  which  one  premise  is 
negative,  is  based  on  the  principle  that  two  things^  one  oj 
which  is  equal  and  the  other  unequal  to  a  thirds  are  unequal 
to  each  other:  A=B  ;  B  is  not  equal  to  C  ;  therefore  A  is  not 
equal  to  C. 

29.  The  purpose  of  comparing  A  with  B,  and  B  with  C, 
in  the  premises  is  to  bring  A  and  C  together  in  the  conclu- 
sion, as  equal  or  unequal  to  each  other.  A  and  C  are  to 
be  brought  together ;  they  are  therefore  called  the  extreme 
terms,  and  B,  which  brings  them  together,  is  the  middle 


26  Dialectics. 


term.  The  subject  of  the  conclusion  is  styled  the  minor 
extreme ;  its  predicate,  the  major  extreme.  The  premise 
containing  the  major  extreme  is  the  major  premise^  and 
that  containing  the  minor  extreme  is  the  minor  premise  ; 
still,  practically  the  first  expressed  is  usually  called  the 
major,  and  the  second  the  minor  premise.  All  the  prop- 
ositions together  are  the  matter  of  the  syllogism;  the 
proper  connection  between  them  is  its  form  or  sequence, 
a  term  not  to  be  confounded  with  consequent  or  con- 
clusion. 

30.  A  syllogism  is  valid  when  both  the  matter  and  the 
form  are  without  a  flaw.  The  following  is  materially  true, 
formally  false  :  "  All  virtue  is  good ;  intemperance  is  not  a 
virtue ;  therefore  intemperance  is  not  good."  The  following 
is  materially  false,  formally  true :  "  Gloomy  things  are 
hateful;  but  virtue  is  a  gloomy  thing;  therefore  virtue  is 
hateful."* 

§  2.     Criticising   Syllogisms. 

31.  In  the  mathematical  formula,  A=B,B=C,.'.A=C,  there 
is  no  danger  of  error ;  but  when  we  substitute  ideas  for  the 
letters,  there  is  need  of  great  care  to  avoid  mistakes.  Thus, 
suppose  that  for  A  I  substitute  "  silver,"  for  B  "a  certain 
metal,"  for  C  **  yellow,"  and  instead  of  the  formulas,  A=B, 
B=C,  .*.  A=C  I  write:  ''  Silver  is  a  certain  metal;  but  a  cer- 
tain metal  is  yellow ;  therefore  silver  is  yellow,"  the  conclu- 
sion is  not  legitimate ;  for  *  a  certain  metal '  is  taken  in  two 
different  significations,  and  consequently  'silver'  and  *  yellow' 
are  not  compared  to  one  thing,  but  to  different  things.    To 

*  Exercises  like  the  following  will  be  found  to  be  of  great  advantage  :  Construct 
syllogisms  proving  the  following  theses:  The  Saints  deserve  to  be  honored,  No  man  is 
to  be  hated  by  his  fellow-man,  Theft  should  be  punished,  Good  books  are  valuable 
treasures,  Bad  books  are  injurious,  Riches  are  not  lasting  possessions,  The  study  of 
music  should  be  encouraged,  Jealousy  cannot  please  God,  No  time  is  useless. 


Reasoning.  27 


avoid  and  to  discover  errors  in  syllogistic  reasoning,  the  fol- 
lowing eight  rules  must  be  applied : 

1.  The  terms  are  only  three,  to  this  attend  ; 

2.  Nor  let  the  consequent  a  term  extend. 

3.  Conclusions  ne'er  the  middle  term  admit ; 

4.  At  least  one  premise  must  distribute  it. 

5.  Two  negatives  no  consequent  can  show, 

6.  From  affirmations  no  negations  flow. 

7.  A  universal  premise  you'll  provide, 

8.  And  let  conclusions  take  the  weaker  side. 

32.  Rule  I.  The  terms  are  only  three ^  to  this  attend. 
There  must  be  three  terms,  representing  three  ideas,  and 
only  three  terms  and  ideas ;  this  is  the  most  important  rule 
of  all :  it  virtually  contains  most  of  the  other  rules.  We 
evidently  need  three  terms,  that  two  things  may  be  com- 
pared with  a  third;  and,  as  each  term  must  occur  twice, 
there  is  no  room  for  a  fourth  term.  This  rule  is  often  vio- 
lated by  using  one  of  the  terms  in  two  different  meanings, 
especially  the  middle  term ;  as  : 

Chewing  is  a  bad  habit; 

But  chewing  is  necessary  to  man ; 

Therefore  a  bad  habit  is  necessary  to  man. 

Rule  2.  Nor  let  the  consequent  a  term  extend.  Let  no 
term  have  a  wider  meaning  in  the  conclusion  than  in  the 
premises ;  else  there  would  really  be  more  in  the  conclusion 
than  is  contained  in  the  premises ;  as : 

You  are  not  what  I  am; 

I  am  a  man; 

Therefore  you  are  not  a  man. 

'A  man'  is  distributed  in  the  consequent;  for  it  stands 
for  ^  any  man  at  all,'  ^  you  are  not  any  man  at  all ' ;  but 
*  man  '  is  particular  in  the  minor  ;  it  means  '  a  certain  man,' 
*some  man.' 


28  Dialectics. 


Rule  3.  Conclusions  ne'er  the  middle  term  admit.  This 
rule  is  evident,  as  the  conclusion  has  nothing  to  do  but  to 
compare  the  extremes.     We  could  not  argue: 

Lincoln  was  President; 
Lincoln  was  of  Illinois; 
Therefore  Lincoln  was  President  of  Illinois. 

Rule  4.  At  least  one  premise  must  distribute  it.  The 
middle  term  must  be  used  ifi  its  widest  meaning  in  at  least 
one  of  the  premises.  If  the  middle  term  were  taken  twice 
in  a  particular  meaning,  it  might  denote  different  objects;  as  : 

Some  monks  were  very  learned ; 

Luther  was  a  monk; 

Therefore  Luther  was  very  learned. 

Notice  that  a  singular  term  is  taken  in  its  widest  mean- 
ing, as  *  Cicer^,'  *  Columbus,'  *  the  Eternal  City,'  etc.;  e.  g., 
"  Columbus  discovered  America ;  but  Columbus  was  dis- 
graced; therefore  the  discoverer  of  America  was  disgraced." 

Rule  5.  Two  negatives  no  consequent  can  show.  From 
the  fact  that  two  things  are  not  equal  to  a  third,  it  does 
not  follow  that  they  are  equal  to  each  other,  nor  that  they 
are  unequal. 

Rule  6.  From  affirmations  no  negations  flow .  If  the  two 
premises  are  affirmative,  they  declare  that  two  things  are 
equal  to  a  third;  whence  it  follows  that  they  are  equal,  not 
unequal,  to  each  other. 

Rule  7.  A  universal  premise  youUl  provide.  If  both  prem- 
ises are  particular,  no  conclusion  will  follow.  For  their  sub- 
jects are  particular  (No.  20),  and  if  both  are  affirmative, 
their  predicates  are  particular  (No.  20);  thus  all  their  terms 
are  particular,  and  the  middle  term  is  not  distributed  as  it 
should  be  by  Rule  4.  If  one  is  negative,  its  predicate  is 
distributed  (No.  20),  but  that  is  not  enough ;  we  need  then 


Reasoning.  29 


two  universal  terms,  one  for  the  middle  term  and  one  for 
the  predicate  of  the  conclusion.  For  that  conclusion  will 
be  negative  (Rule  8),  and  therefore  must  have  a  universal 
predicate  (No.  20).     We  cannot  reason  thus : 

Some  Inquisitors  were  cruel; 
Some  good  men  were   Inquisitors ; 
Therefore  some  good  men  were  cruel. 

Rule  8.  And  let  conclusions  take  the  weaker  side.  The 
meaning  is  that,  if  one  of  the  premises  is  negative,  the  con- 
clusion is  negative;  if  one  is  particular,  the  conclusion  is 
particular.  The  first  assertion  is  evident :  it  regards  the 
negative  syllogism  explained  above  (No.  28).  As  to  the 
second,  if  one  premise  is  particular,  two  cases  may  occur : 
I.  If  both  are  affirmative,  they  can  contain  only  one  dis- 
tributed term,  since  one  subject  and  both  predicates  are 
particular.  The  distributed  term  must,  of  course,  be  their 
middle  term,  for  the  middle  term  must  be  at  least  once 
distributed  ;  and  therefore  the  subject  of  the  conclusion  must 
be  particular.  2.  If  one  premise  is  negative,  there  may  be 
two  distributed  terms  in  the  premises,  viz.,  the  subject  of  the 
universal  proposition,  and  the  predicate  of  the  negative — one 
of  these  is  needed  for  the  middle  term,  and  one  for  the 
predicate  of  the  negative  conclusion;  thus  the  subject  of 
the  conclusion  will  again  be  particular.* 

33.  These    same    rules    apply   to    all    syllogisms    having 

*  £xercise.     Criticise  the  following  syllogisms  : 

1.  "  The  beings  conjured  up  by  spiritists  are  spirits ; 
But  the  souls  of  the  dead  are  spirits  ; 

Therefore  the  beings  conjured  up  by  spiritists  are  the  souls  of  the  dead." 

2.  "  Blessed  are  the  poor  in  spirit ; 
The  Apostles  are  blessed  ; 

Therefore  the  Apostles  are  poor  in  spirit." 

3.  "  Scientists  deal  with  physical  laws ; 
But  Huxley  and  Darwin  are  scientists  ; 
Therefore  they  deal  with  nothing  but  physical  laws." 


30  Dialectics, 


categorical  premises,  even  though  the  premises  be  compound 
propositions.  The  rules  may  seem  at  first  sight  to  be  vio- 
lated, but  they  will  be  found,  on  careful  inspection,  to  be 
observed  in  all  correct  reasoning  of  this  kind.  Attend  espe- 
cially to  that  part  of  the  compound  premises  in  which  the 
stress  of  the  argument  lies.  Thus,  when  we  say,  "  God  alone 
is  eternal,  but  Angels  are  not  God ;  therefore  they  are  not 
eternal"  the  term  '  eternal '  is  distributed  in  the  conclusion, 
while  it  seems  to  be  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative  proposi- 
tion in  the  major  premise.  But  the  major  is  compound, 
and  contains  a  negative  part,  "  Whatever  is  not  God  is  not 
eternal."     Hence  the  rule  is  not  violated. 

Article  II.    The  Hypothetical  Syllogism. 

34.  A  hypothetical  syllogism  is  one  whose  major  is  a 
hypothetical  proposition  (No.  21);  and  such  it  always  is 
when  the  syllogism  is  not  categorical.  We  have  seen  that 
there  are  three  kinds  of  hypothetical  propositions :  the  con- 
ditionalj  the  disjunctive^  and  the  conjunctive.  Hence  there  are 
three  species  of  hypothetical  syllogisms. 

35.  I.  Conditional  syllogisms  derive  their  force  from  an 
affirmed  connection  between  a  condition  and  a  consequent; 
so  that,  if  a  certain  condition  is  verified,  a  certain  consequent 
must  be  admitted.  Therefore,  if  the  consequent  does  not 
exist,  the  condition  is  thereby  known  not  to  be  verified. 
Hence   this   argument   may  validly   conclude  in  two  ways  : 

4.  "  Monopolists  are  rich ; 
Some  rich  men  are  proud ; 
Therefore  monopolists  are  proud." 

5.  "  Many  men  are  rich : 
Many  men  oppress  the  poor; 
Therefore  the  rich  oppress  the  poor." 

6.  "  The  free-traders  wish  to  reduce  the  tariff; 
Mr.  C.  wishes  to  reduce  the  tariff: 
Therefore  Mr.  C.  is  a  free-trader." 


Reasoning,  31 


1 .  Affirmatively  :   The  condition  being  affirmed^  the  consequent 
must  be  affirmed ;  but  not  vice  versa.     Thus  we  say  rightly; 

"  If  the  sun  shines,   it  is  day ; 
But  the  sun  shines  ; 
Therefore  it  is  day." 

But  if  the  minor  were  "  It  is  day,"  it  would  not  follow- 
that  the  sun  shines.  Or,  2.  Negatively  :  The  consequent  being 
denied^  the  condition  must  be  denied;  but  not  vice  versa. 

*'  If  the  sun  shines,  it  is  day; 
But  it  is  not  day ; 
Therefore  the  sun  does  not  shine." 

If  the  minor  were  "  The  sun  does  not  shine,"  it  would 
not  follow  that  it  is  not  day. 

These  and  all  other  conditional  syllogisms  can  be  reduced 
to  the  categorical  form.     For  instance,  we  can  reason  thus: 

**  All  times  of  sunshine  are  day ; 
But  this  is  a  time  of  sunshine  j 
Therefore  it  is   day." 

36.  II.  The  disjunctive  syllogism  has  a  disjunctive  major 
premise;  e.  g.,  '^  Either  the  father,  or  the  mother,  or  the  child 
is  the  natural  head  of  the  family."  It  is  supposed  that  the 
disjunction  is  complete,  /.  e.,  that  no  fourth  a;lternative  is 
possible.     From  this  major  we  may  reason  in  three  ways  : 

1.  The  minor  may  deny  one  member  of  the  disjunction,  and 
the  conclusion  affirm  the  other  me7nbers  disjunctively, 

''But  the  child  is  not  the  natural  head  of  the  family; 
Therefore  either  the  father  or  the  mother  is  such." 

2.  The  minor  may  affirm  one  of  the  members,  the  conclusion 
deny  the  other  members  copulatively  : 

"  But  the  father  is  the  natural  head ; 

Therefore  neither  the  mother  nor  the  child  is  such." 


32  Dialectics, 


3.  The  minor  may  deny  all  the  members  but  one,  the  con- 
clusion affirm  that  one  : 

**  But  the  mother  and  the  child  are  not ; 
Therefore  the  father  is." 

37.  III.  The  conjunctive  syllogism  has  a  conjunctive 
major  premise ;  as :  "  No  one  can  love  God  and  hate  his 
neighbor."  From  this  premise  we  can  reason  validly  by  af- 
firming one  of  the  incompatible  predicates  in  the  minor,  and 
denying  the  other  in  the  conclusion  :  "  But  the  Martyrs  loved 
God;  therefore  they  did  not  hate  their  neighbor,'^  or  '^But 
Nero  hated  his  neighbor,  therefore  he  did  not  love  God." 

Article  III.     Other  Species  of  Demonstrative* 
Arguments. 

38.  I.  The  Enthymeme,  as  now  usually  understood,*  is  an 
eUiptical  syllogism,  one  of  the  premises  being  understood 
(iv  Ov^w,  in  the  mind) ;  e.  g.y  "  The  world  displays  a  wonder- 
ful adaptation  of  means  to  an  end ;  therefore  it  is  the  work 
of  an  intelligent  Maker."  The  major  is  understood,  viz., 
"  Whatever  displays  a  wonderful  adaptation  of  means  to  an 
end  is  the  work  of  an  inteUigent  maker."  To  criticise  the 
validity  of  an  enthymeme  we  have  only  to  supply  the  omitted 
premise,  and  then  apply  the  ordinary  rules  of  the  syllogism. 

39.  2.  The  sorites  {doopo^,  a  heap)  is  an  abridged  series  of 
syllogisms ;  it  is  an  argument  consisting  of  more  than  tliree 
propositions  so  connected  that  the  predicate  of  the  first  be- 
comes the  subject  of  the  second,  the  predicate  of  the  sec- 
ond the  subject  of  the  third,  etc.,  till  the  conclusion  joins 
the  subject  of  the  first  with  the  predicate  of  the  last  premise. 
"  Man  is  accountable  ;  whoever  is  accountable  is  free ;  who- 
ever  is  free  is  intelligent;  whoever  is  inteUigent  cannot  be 
mere  matter;  therefore  man  cannot  be  mere  matter." 

•  The  word  was  differently  derived  and  explained  by  Aristotle. 


Reasoning,  2)2) 


40.  To  test  such  reasoning,  it  should  be  resolved  into 
connected  syllogisms,  thus : 

"Whoever  is  accountable  is  free;    but  man  is  accountable;  therefore 

man  is  free." 
"Whoever  is  free  is  intelligent j   but  man  is   free;    therefore  man  is 

intelligent." 
"  Whoever  is  intelligent  cannot  be  mere  matter;   but  man  is  intelligent ; 

therefore  man  cannot  be  mere  matter." 

41.3.  The  dilemma  {8ti-XTJ/xii<x^  a  twofold  assumption)  is  an 
argument  which  offers  an  adversary  the  choice  between  two 
or  more  alternatives,  from  each  of  which  a  conclusion  is 
drawn  against  his  position.  The  alternatives  are  called  the 
horns  of  the  dilemma.  Such  was  the  reasoning  of  one  whom 
a  Protestant  parent  was  preventing  from  becoming  a  Catholic. 
He  answered  :  "  Either  Protestantism  or  Catholicity  is  right. 
If  Protestantism  is  right,  every  one  must  be  guided  by  his 
own  judgment  in  religious  matters,  and  you  should  not  pre- 
vent me  from  judging  for  myself.  If  Catholicity  is  right,  you 
ought  not  only  not  to  prevent  me,  but  even  to  follow  my 
example." 

42.  To  be  conclusive,  the  dilemma  must  leave  no  escape 
from  the  alternatives  presented  ;  thus,  the  dilemma  just  quot- 
ed would  not  be  conclusive  against  a  Pagan ;  for  he  would 
deny  the  major.  Besides,  the  partial  inferences  must  follow 
strictly  from  their  respective  premises ;  else  the  argument  may 
often  be  retorted.  A  young  man,  striving  to  dissuade  his 
sister  from  devoting  herself  to  the  exclusive  pursuit  of  holi- 
ness, argued  thus  :  "  Either  you  have  still  a  long  or  but  a  short 
life  before  you :  if  a  long  life,  you  will  forego  countless  pleas- 
ures ;  if  a  short  life,  you  cannot  get  far  on  the  path  of  holi- 
ness.'' She  retorted :  *^  If  a  short  life,  I  shall  forego  few 
pleasures ;  if  a  long  one,  I  can  get  far  on  the  path  of  holi- 
ness." 


34  Dialectics. 


43.  4.  When  proofs  of  the  premises  or  of  one  of  them  are 
inserted  in  a  syllogism,  the  argument  is  called  an  epichirema 
{kiti  x^ipi  a<^  hand,  ready  for  use),  which  is  rather  an  orator- 
ical form  of  the  syllogism  than  a  distinct  species  of  reason- 
ing ;  e.  g.,  "  Education  should  promote  moraHty  ;  but  it  fails 
to  do  so  when  severed  from  religious  teachings,  since  morality 
derives  all  its  force  from  religious  convictions ;  therefore 
education  should  be  religious." 

44.  5.  Induction  requires  careful  consideration,  on  account 
of  its  constant  application  to  the  Physical  Sciences.  It  fol- 
lows a  process  the  reverse  of  the  syllogistic;  for  it  argues  not 
from  universals  to  particulars,  but  from  particulars  to  univer- 
sals.  It  may  be  defined  as  an  argument  in  which  we  con- 
clude that  what  is  found  by  experience  to  hold  true  of  single 
objects  of  a  class  holds  true  of  the  whole  class.  Induction 
may  be  complete  or  incomplete. 

45.  Complete  induction  examines  every  single  object  of  a 
class,  and  then  enunciates  universally  that  all  ^e  class  has  cer- 
tain properties;  for  instance,  after  exploring  every  zone  of  the 
earth,  we  may  conclude,  "  All  the  zones  of  the  earth's  surface 
are  capable  of  supporting  human  life."  Complete  induction 
vests  for  its  validity  on  this  syllogism :  "  Whatever  is  true  of 
every  individual  of  a  class  is  true'  of  the  whole  class ;  but  a 
certain  proposition  is  true  of  every  individual  of  a  class;  there- 
fore it  may  be  predicated  of  the  whole  class." 

46.  Incomplete  induction,  the  ordinary  process  of  Physical 
studies,  does  not  examine  every  single  object  of  a  class,  but  a 
sufficient  number  of  such  objects,  and  under  sufficiently  varied 
circumstances,  to  make  it  certain  that  the  property  or  actio, 
observed  cannot  be  owing  to  any  accidental  cause,  but  must 
be  due  to  the  very  nature  of  the  objects,  and  therefore  must 
always  accompany  them,  even  in  such  cases  as  have  not  been 
examined.     As  long  as  any  doubt  remains  whether,  perhaps, 


Reasoning,  35 


the  peculiarity  constantly  observed  may  not  be  owing  to  some 
accidental  circumstances,  induction  cannot  give  truly  scien- 
tific certainty ;  but  when  all  such  doubt  is  excluded,  the  argu- 
ment is  conclusive.  It  rests  then  upon  this  clear  syllogistic 
reasoning :  "  Whatever  property  or  action  flows  from  the  very 
nature  of  objects  must  always  accompany  those  objects ;  but 
a  certain  property  or  action  is  known  by  a  sufficient  variety 
of  experiments  to  flow  from  the  very  nature  of  certain  objects; 
therefore  it  must  always  accompany  them."  For  instance, 
heavy  bodies  when  left  unsupported  have  been  found  in  most 
varied  circumstances  to  fall  to  the  earth,  and  therefore  we 
judge  without  fear  of  error  that  this  tendency  must  be  due  to 
their  very  nature,  and  we  formulate  the  natural  law :  "  Heavy 
bodies  when  unsupported  fall  to  the  earth." 

47.  The  only  danger  is  that  scientists,  in  their  eagerness 
to  formulate  general  laws,  will  not  always  examine  a  sufficient 
variety  of  cases  to  exclude  all  doubt  as  to  the  real  cause  of 
the  phenomena  observed.  Thus,  Laplace  laid  it  down  as  a 
natural  law  that  all  the  parts  of  the  solar  system  revolve 
from  west  to  east ;  while  it  is  now  known  that  some  of  the 
solar  planets  and  their  satellites  perform  motions  in  the  op- 
posite direction. 

48.  It  is  evident  that  no  conclusion  is  valid,  except  in  as 
far  as  it  is  contained  in  the  premises  from  which  it  is  derived. 
Therefore  the  fact  that  an  assertion  is  found  to  hold  in  ninety- 
nine  cases  is  no  certain  proof  that  it  will  hold  true  in  the  hun- 
dredth case,  since  this  hundredth  case  is  not  contained  in  the 
cases  observed.  Incomplete  induction,  therefore,  cannot  by 
itself,  without  resting  on  a  syllogism,  furnish  a  scientific  proof. 
But  we  have  scientific  proofs  of  many  things.  Hence  it  is 
evident  that  Materialists  and  Positivists  (/.  e.,  those  pretended 
philosophers  who  admit  nothing  but  matter  and  sensible  phe- 
nomena)  are  entirely  mistaken  when  they  teach  that  the 


36  Dialectics, 


mind  has  no  knowledge  of  any  universal  propositions  what- 
ever, except  as  far  as  it  has  observed  and-  generaHzed  indi- 
vidual facts ;  that  all  reasoning,  therefore,  is  only  the  general- 
izing of  facts,  or  that  all  the  elements  of  our  knowledge  are 
only  inductive,  without  any  universal  proposition  on  which 
their  certainty  rests.  Some  of  these  philosophers  maintain 
that  we  do  not  even  know  that  a  circle  must  be  round,  but 
only  that  it  is  always  known  to  be  so  on  this  earth,  while 
elsewhere  it  may,  for  all  we  know,  be  square.  But  the  propo- 
sition, "  A  circle  is  round,^*  is  self-evident,  independently  of 
observation  and  induction.  A  system  is  known  to  be  false 
if  it  leads  logically  to  absurd  consequences,  as  their  system 

does. 

Article  IV.     Probable  Reasoning. 

49.  In  all  the  forms  of  argumentation  so  far  explained,  the 
process  is  every  way  reliable  and  the  conclusion  certain; 
such  reasoning  is  called  demonstrative;  to  distinguish  it 
from  probable  reasoning,  which  fails  to  remove  all  prudent 
fear  of  error. 

A  syllogism  one  or  both  of  whose  premises  are  only  proba- 
ble will,  of  course,  yield  only  a  probable  conclusion;  it  is 
called  dialectic,  /.  <f.,  open  to  discussion  {pla\Eyo^lal,  I 
discuss).  We  shall  here  consider  two  important  species  of 
probable  arguments.  Analogy  and  Hypothesis,  both  of  frequent 
appHcation,  chiefly  in  the  Physical  Sciences. 

50.  I.  Analogy  {avaXoyo<>,  parallel  reasoning)  is  an  argu- 
ment by  which  we  conclude  that  a  certain  line  of  reasoning  will 
hold  in  one  case  because  it  is  known  to  hold  in  a  similar 
case.  Thus,  because  we  see  that  the  actions  of  brutes  are 
to  a  great  extent  similar  to  those  of  men,  and  in  men  they 
are  prompted  by  certain  feelings,  we  conclude,  with  very 
strong  probability,  that  in  brutes  also  they  are  prompted  by 
similar  feelings. 


Reasoning,  37 


51.  The  principles  underlying  analogical  reasonings  are 

such  as  these :  "  Similar  causes  are  apt  to  produce  similar 
effects/'  "Similar  properties  suggest  similar  essences,'' 
'^Things  similarly  constructed  appear  to  be  governed  by 
similar  laws,"  etc.  Sometimes  the  probability  thus  obtained 
is  very  strong ;  at  other  times  the  argument  is  deceptive,  be- 
cause, though  alike  in  many  other  ways,  the  two  cases  may 
differ  on  the  very  point  in  question.  Such  are  many  of  the 
analogies  urged  in  support  of  the  Evolution  of  Species.  "  The 
vile  grub  is  evolved  into  a  beautiful  butterfly ;  why  may  not 
a  hawk  be  developed  into  an  eagle  ?  "  asks  the  popular  scien- 
tist. But  from  the  egg  of  the  butterfly  comes  the  vile  grub 
again,  and  the  species  remains  ever  the  same.  Varieties  of 
type  within  the  same  species  of  animals  are  numberless,  but 
no  single  case  of  an  evolution  from  one  species  into  another 
has  ever  been  scientifically  established. 

52.  The  argument  of  analogy  is  more  useial  to  the  orator 
than  to  the  philosopher.  It  supplies  the  former  with  the 
topics  of  Simihtude  and  Example.  It  suggests  much  effect- 
ive reasoning  a  majori^  a  minori,  and  a  pari. 

In  scientific  investigations  analogy  is  often  suggestive  of 
solutions,  which  may  afterwards  be  proved  demonstratively  to 
be  correct ;  till  they  are  so  proved,  they  are  called  hypotheses. 

53.  II.  Apt  hypothesis  {yTt6^E6i^,  a  supposition)  is  a  prop- 
osition provisionally  assumed  as  if  true,  because  it  accounts 
plausibly  for  many  facts.  For  instance,  it  was  formerly  sup- 
posed that  light  consisted  of  particles  emitted  by  luminous 
bodies ;  the  present  hypothesis  explains  the  phenomena  of  ^ 
Hght  more  plausibly  by  the  vibrations  or  undulations  of  ether. 
When  an  hypothesis  is  so  far  confirmed  by  experience  that  it 
leaves  no  reasonable  doubt  as  to  its  correctness,  it  ceases  to 
be  an  hypothesis  a  id  becomes  a  thesis. 

That  an  hypothesis  may  be  probable  and  truly  scientifiCi 


38  Dialectics. 


it  is  necessary:  i.  That  it  explain  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  facts  in  question.  2.  That  it  do  not  certainly  contradict 
any  well-established  truth ;  for,  as  two  contradictories  cannot 
both  be  true,  whatever  hypothesis  contravenes  a  well-estab- 
Hshed  truth  is  thereby  known  to  be  false.  Numerous  impor- 
tant discoveries  have  been  made,  especially  in  the  Physical 
Sciences,  by  means  of  ingenious  hypotheses.  On  the  other 
hand,  science  has  often  been  much  retarded  by  false  hypotheses, 
which  led  investigations  into  wrong  directions.  To  point  out 
such  false  assumptions  is  to  render  most  important  services  to 
the  cause  of  progress.  For  one  Copernican  theory  retarded 
a  while  till  supported  by  stronger  proofs,  numerous  wild  vaga- 
ries have  been  discountenanced  by  the  Roman  tribunals,  and 
the  energies  of  the  learned  diverted  from  wasting  themselves 
in  the  pursuit  of  idle  fancies. 

Article  V.     Indirect  Reasoning. 

54.  Reasoning,  whether  demonstrative  or  probable,  is  styled 
indirect  when,  instead  of  proving  the  thesis,  it  simply  aims 
at  clearing  away  objections  against  it,  or  at  establishing  some 
other  proposition  from  which  the  truth  of  the  thesis  may  be* 
inferred.     Indirect  reasoning  may  assume  various  forms  : 

1.  The  self-contradiction,  or  reductio  ad  absurdum,  is 
a  form  of  argument  showing  that  the  denial  of  the 
theses  leads  to  absurd  consequences ;  thus  we  argue 
the  necessity  of  admitting  certainty  from  the  fact  that 
the  denial  of  all  certainty  leads  a  man  to  stultify  him- 
self. 

2.  The  negative  argument  points  out  the  absence  of 
all  proof  from  an  opponent's  assertions.  "  Mere  as- 
sertions go  for  nothing,"  "  Quod  gratis  asseritur  gratis 
negatur^^  are  received  axioms  of  discussion. 

nt,.  The  instance   or  example   adduces  a  test  case    in 


Reasoning.  39 


which  the  assertion  or  the  reasoning  of  an  opponent 
is  shown  to  be  at  fault.  Thus,  if  one  asserted  that  all 
history  is  unreliable,  we  might  instance  our  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  as  an  undeniable  fact  of  history. 

4.  An  argumentTiin  ad  hominem  draws  from  an  oppo- 
nent's principles,  true  or  false,  a  conclusion  against 
him;  e.  g.,  when  a  Fatalist  philosopher  was  about  to 
flog  his  slave  for  the  crime  of  theft,  the  latter  argued 
that  he  could  not  be  justly  punished  for  a  crime  which 
he  -wa.^  fated  to  commit. 

5.  A  retort  turns  an  adversary's  argument  or  some  por- 
tion of  it  against  himself;  as  when  the  same  philoso- 
pher answered  that  he  likewise  was  fated  to  flog  the 
slave. 

6.  We  evade  an  argument  when,  without  discussing 
his  proofs,  we  call  on  an  adversary  to  explain  what  he 
is  unwilling  or  unable  to  explain ;  thus  many  a  spe- 
cious theorizer  is  silenced  by  summoning  him  to  explain 
the  consequences  of  his  theories. 

7.  The  argument  ad  ignorantiam  shows  that  an  oppo- 
nent is  unable  to  prov^e  his  point  or  answer  our  objec- 
tions. 

8.  The  argument  ad  invidiam  makes  an  adversary's 
thesis  or  his  proofs  odious  or  ridiculous. 

55.  In  answering  objections  we  should  attend  with  spe- 
cial care  to  distinguish  what  is  true  from  what  is  false  in  the 
arguments  of  our  opponents. 

Most  objections  contain  some  element  of  truth ;  for  falsity, 
as  such,  is  not  plausible  :  it  is  the  truth  blended  with  falsity 
that  gives  plausibility  to  an  objection.  To  separate  the  one 
from  the  other,  by  drawing  clear  lines  of  demarcation,  is  the 
keenest  test  of  logical  skill,  and  the  direct  road  to  complete 
victory.     To  facilitate  for  the  student  this  task  of  neatly  dis- 


40  Dialectics, 


tinguishing  the  true  from  the  false,  we  shall  now  point  out 
the  chief  forms  which  fallacious  arguments  are  apt  to  assume. 

Article  VI.     Sophisms  or  Fallacies. 

56.  A  sophism  or  fallacy  is  an  argument  which,  under 
the  specious  appearance  of  truth,  leads  to  a  false  conclusion. 
The  deception  is  caused  either  by  some  ambiguity  in  the  ex- 
pression, or  by  some  confusion  in  the  thoughts  expressed. 

57.  I.  The  fallacies  arising  from  ambiguity  in  the  expres- 
sion are  chiefly  two : 

1.  The  equivocation,  or  ambiguous  middle,  uses  a  mid- 
dle term  in  two  different  meanings;  e,  g.,  "  The  soul  is 
immortal ;  but  a  brute  animal  has  a  soul ;  therefore  a 
brute  animal  has  something  immortal."  We  answer 
by  distinguishing  the  two  meanings  of  the  word 
*  soul.'  In  the  major  it  denotes  the  human  soul,  in 
the  minor  the  principle  of  life  in  any  animal :  there 
are  four  terms. 

2.  The  fallacy  of  composition  and  division  confounds 
what  holds  of  things  separate  with  what  holds  of  them 
united ;  e.  g.,  "  It  is  absolutely  impossible  that  the 
dead  should  live  "  is  true  in  the  sense  that  they  cannot 
live  and  be  dead  at  the  same  time,  i.  e.,  in  the  sense 
of  composition  ;  but  it  is  not  true  in  the  sense  of  divi- 
sion: those  now  dead  can,  by  the  power  of  God,  be 
made  to  live  again. 

58.  II.  Fallacies  result  from  confusion  of  thought  in  six 
ways,  chiefly : 

I.  The  fallacy  of  the  accident  confounds  an  essential 
with  an  accidental  property;  e.  g.,  "  We  buy  raw  meat, 
and  we  eat  what  we  buy ;  therefore  we  eat  raw  meat." 


Reasoning,  41 


What  we  eat  has  the  same  essence  as  what  we  buy, 
but  not  the  same  accident  of  rawness. 

2.  What  is  true  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  ^simplici- 
ter^  is  often  confounded  with  what  is  true  in  a  qualified 
sense  or  under  a  certain  respect  {secundum  quid) ; 
€,  g.^  "  A  sea-captain  who  willingly  throws  his  cargo 
overboard  ought  to  indemnify  the  owner ;  but  A  did 
so;  hence  A  ought  to  indemnify  the  owner."  The 
major  would  be  true,  if  the  captain  were  absolutely 
willing  to  destroy  the  cargo  entrusted  to  him ;  but  not 

•  if  he  is  willing  in  a  way  only,  /.  e.,  as  a  necessary 
means  to  save  vessel  and  crew. 

3.  An  irrelevant  conclusion,  ignoratio  elenchi^  or  missing 
the  point,  proves  what  is  not  in  question,  refutes  what 
is  not  objected ;  as  when  Evolutionists  prove  elabo- 
rately that  the  body  of  man  resembles  in  various  ways 
the  bodies  of  brutes — a  fact  which  no  sensible  man 
denies. 

4.  The  petitio  principii,  or  begging  the  question,  con- 
sists in  taking  for  granted  the  point  which  is  to  be 
proved ;  when  this  very  point  is  used  as  a  premise  in 
the  reasoning,  the  fallacy  is  called  a  vicious  circle. 

5.  The  fallacy  of  the  false  consequence,  often  called  a 
non-sequitur,  or  want  of  sequence,  is  used  when  a  con- 
clusion is  drawn  which  is  not  contained  in  the  prem- 
ises; e.  g.y  "  There  exists  a  wonderful  gradation  in  the 
perfection  of  plants  and  animals;  therefore  the  more 
perfect  are  evolved  firom  the  less  perfect." 

6.  The  undue  assumption,  or  false  cause,  non  causa  pro 
causa,  assumes  as  a  cause  what  is  not  a  cause ;  as 
when  the  Reformation  is  assumed  to  be  the  cause  of 
scientific    progress.      This  fallacy   often   arises   fi-om 


42  •^  Dialectics. 


the  fact  that  mere  priority  in  time  is  mistaken  for 
causality  ;  post  hoc  ;  ergo  propter  hoc* 

Article  VII.     Method   in   Reasoning. 

59.  Order  is  a  proper  arrangement  of  parts  for  any  purpose 
whatever,  theoretical  or  practical ;  method  is  a  suitable  arrange- 
ment of  parts  with  a  view  to  a  practical  end.  In  reasoning, 
the  end  is  the  acquisition  or  the  communication  of  knowledge. 

60.  All  reasoning  must  begin  with  undoubted  premises, 
which  themselves  need  not  to  be  supported  by  reasoning :  no 
science  is  expected  to  prove  its  first  principles.  Thus,  Geom- 
etry starts  out  with  a  number  of  axioms,  from  which  the  whole 
science  is  derived  by  logical  reasoning.  Such  axioms  are  not 
blindly  or  arbitrarily  taken  for  granted;  but  they  are  self- 
evident,  they  need  no  proof.  Thus,  too,  in  Philosophy  the 
first  principles  are  self-evident  and  need  no  proof. 

61.  As  the  mind  must,  of  course,  apprehend  the  premises 
before  it  draws  conclusions  fi-om  them,  we  say  that  in  the 
logical  order,  i.  e.,  in  the  order  of  thought,  the  premises  are 
always  prior  to  the  conclusions.  But  in  the  ontological  order, 
/.  e.,  in  the  order  of  being,  a  truth  stated  in  the  premises  may 
be  really  posterior  to  the  truth  expressed  in  the  conclusion. 
Such  is  the  case  whenever  we  reason  from  an  effect  to  its 

*  Exercise.    Point  out  the  fallacies  contained  in  the  following  arguments: 

1.  "  Liberty  is  desirable;    but  the    laws  restrict  liberty;    therefore  the  laws  restrict 
what  is  desirable." 

2.  "The  liberty  of  the  press  is  a  blessing;    but  blessings  should  not  be  restricted; 
therefore  the  liberty  of  the  press  should  not  be  restricted." 

3.  "The  Inquisition   was  the  cause  of  much  cruelty;  but  the  Popes  approved  the 
Inquisition  ;  therefore  the  Popes  approved  the  cause  of  much  cruelty." 

4.  "  The  Spanish  Inquisitors  were  often  cruel  ;  but  St.  Peter  Arbues  was  a  Spanish 
Inquisitor;   therefore  the  Saints  are  often  cruel." 

5.  "  Galileo  was  condemned  by  a   Roman  tribunal ;    therefoie  the  Pope   is    not  in- 
fallible." 

6.  "The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United    States  is  a   fallible  tribunal ;    therefore  its 
decisions  are  not   to  be   regarded." 


Reasoning,  43 


cause,  say  from  a  beautiful  picture  to  the  skill  of  the  painter; 
for  the  effect  is  posterior  to  the  cause,  is  dependent  on  the 
cause. 

62.  Reasoning  thus  from  effect  to  cause  is  reasoning 
a  posteriori,  and,  vice  versa,  reasoning  from  cause  to  effect  is 
called  a  priori,  since  causes  are  ontologically  prior  to  their 
effects. 

63.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  terms  a  priori  and  a  posteriori 
have  not  exactly  the  same  meaning  when  applied  to  reasoning 
and  when  apphed  to  judgments.  A  judgment  a  priori,  as 
explained  above  (No.  17),  is  one  formed  independently  of 
experience,  while  a  reasoning  a  priori  is  one  proceeding  from 
a  cause  to  its  effect. 

64.  While  in  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  reasonings  we  con- 
sider relations  between  two  things,  one  of  which  is  ontologi- 
cally prior  to  the  other,  in  analytical  and  synthetical  reason- 
ings we  consider  only  one  thing,  studying  the  relations  between 
the  whole  being  and  its  parts,  between  a  substance  and  its 
qualities.  If  we  are  first  acquainted  with  the  whole  being 
and  from  the  study  of  it  strive  to  discover  its  parts,  we  are 
said  to  analyze  the  subject  {dvaXvaa^  I  take  apart) :  we 
then  proceed  analytically.  But  if  we  know  the  parts  first, 
and  put  them  together  to  find  the  whole,  we  proceed  syn- 
thetically {6vvHE6L<i,  a  putting  together).  The  chemist 
analyzes  a  mineral  to  discover  its  simple  ingredients;  the 
apothecary  combines  simples  into  compounds.  The  synthetic 
geometrician  puts  together  lines  and  angles  to  find  the  prop- 
erties of  surfaces  and  solids;  while  the  analytical  geometri- 
cian finds  the  particular  mathematical  relations  imphed  in  a 
general  formula. 

65.  The  metaphysician  considers  an  idea  as  a  whole,  and 
the  notes  of  it  as  its  parts.  For  instance,  knowing  that  an 
oak  is  a  tree,  he  examines  the  notes  involved  in  the  concept 


44  Dialectics. 


*tree,'  and  finds  analytically  that  an  oak  is  a  substance, 
material,  vegetable,  etc.  On  the  other  hand,  seeing  that  the 
human  body  is  a  substance,  extended,  living,  sensitive,  he  con- 
cludes synthetically  that  it  is  of  an  animal  nature.  Now,  it  is 
obvious  that  the  idea  analyzed  is  less  extended  than  the  notes; 
e.  g.y  *  tree '  is  less  extensive  than  '  substance,'  for  every  tree 
is  a  substance,  but  not  every  substance  is  a  tree.  Therefore, 
when  we  reason  analytically,  we  proceed  from  the  particular 
to  the  universal,  and  vice  versa  we  reason  synthetically  ^^w 
the  universal  to  the  particular. 

dd.  A  science  may  use  either  analysis  or  synthesis,  or  now 
the  one  and  thin  the  other.  Thus,  in  this  treatise  on  Dialec- 
tics, while  first  explaining  ideas,  next  the  union  of  ideas  into 
judgments,  then  the  combination  of  judgments  into  argu- 
ments, we  have  used  synthesis ;  and,  in  analyzing  the  nature 
of  reasoning  to  discover  the  rules  that  must  guide  it,  we  have 
used  analysis.  This  latter  process  is,  in  most  studies,  better 
suited  for  the  investigation  of  truth,  synthesis  for  the  impart- 
ing of  truth  to  others. 

67.  While  treating  of  scientific  methods,  it  is  proper  to 
speak  of  the  distinctions  existing  between  various  sciences. 
These  are  distinguished  according  to  their  objects ;  thus.  As- 
tronomy is  evidently  distinct  from  Botany,  because  it  treats 
of  a  different  class  of  objects.  When  sciences  treat  of  the 
same  object,  as  do  Geology,  Geometry,  and  Geography,  all  of 
which  study  the  earth,  tliey  view  that  object  differently;  and 
the  view  they  take  of  their  objects  is  called  their  formal  ob- 
ject, the  object  itself  being  called  the  material  object.  Sciences 
are  therefore  more  correctly  said  to  be  specified  by  their  for- 
mal objects.  It  naturally  follows  that  a  science  is  esteemed 
as  more  or  less  noble  in  proportion  as  its  formal  object  is 
more  or  less  worthy  of  man.  Theology  is  therefore  the 
noblest  of  all,  since  it  views  all  its  objects  as  they  are  known 


Reasoning.  45 


by  the  highest  light,  viz.,  by  the  supernatural  light  of  Divine 
Revelation.  Philosophy  is  the  noblest  of  the  merely  human 
sciences,  since  its  formal  object  is  what  is  most  intellectual  in 
all  things,  viz.,  their  very  essences  and  their  relations  to  the 
highest  good. 

(i%.  The  true  teachings  of  any  science  can  never  come  into 
conflict  with  the  true  teachings  of  any  other  science ;  for  truth 
objectively  considered  is  something  absolute,  not  merely  rela- 
tive ;  it  is  that  which  is.  In  the  case  of  an  apparent  con- 
flict between  two  sciences,  it  will  always  be  found  that  one  of 
the  conflicting  teachings  is  not  demonstrated  nor  capable  of 
demonstration. 

Article  VIII.     Exercise  in  Reasoning. 

•  69.  The  most  useful  exercise  in  philosophic  studies  is  the 
manner  of  discussion  called  The  Circle.  We  shall  here  ex- 
plain it  at  some  length  : 

One  pupil  is  appointed  to  defend  on  a  given  day,  during 
about  half  an  hour,  any  thesis  that  has  been  explained  in  the 
class;  two  others  are  appointed  to  object;  and  the  whole 
discussion  is  to  be  conducted  in  strict  syllogistic  form.  The 
discussion  is  opened  by  the  first  objector,  who  challenges  the 
defender  to  prove  the  thesis.  The  latter  begins  by  explain- 
ing the  exact  meaning  of  the  thesis ;  he  next  gives  the  proof 
in  a  formal  syllogism,  adding,  if  necessary,  the  proof  of  the 
major  or  the  minor,  or  both.  The  objector  then  attacks  the 
thesis  or  its  demonstration :  he  off"ers  a  syllogism  the  conclu- 
sion of  which  is  contradictory  to  the  thesis  or  to  the  validity 
of  the  proof.  The  defender  repeats  the  objection  in  the  very 
words  of  the  opponent;  next,  he  repHes  separately  to  each 
of  its  propositions. 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  third  thesis  of  Critical  Logic — the 
theory  of  universal  scepticism  is  self-contradictory  (No. 


46  Dialectics. 


94) — is  the  subject  of  discussion.  The  defender,  at  the  sum- 
mons of  the  first  objector,  explains  and  proves  the  thesis., 
Then  the  first  objector :  "That  is  not  self-contradictory  which 
does  not  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing ;  but  the  theory  of 
universal  scepticism  does  not  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing; 
therefore  it  is  not  self-contradictory."  The  defender  repeats 
the  objection  word  for  word,  and  then  adds:  "The  major, 
'  That  is  not  self-contradictory  which  does  not  affirm  and  deny 
the  same  thing,'  I  grant.  The  minor,  *  The  theory  of  univer- 
sal scepticism  does  not  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing,'  I 
deny."  Objector :  "  I  prove  the  minor:  that  does  not  affirm 
and  deny  the  same  thing  which  affirms  nothing  whatever; 
but  the  theory  of  universal  scepticism  affirms  nothing  whatever; 
therefore  it  does  not  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing."  The 
defender  repeats  the  syllogism,  and  adds :  "  The  major,  '  That 
does  not  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing  which  affirms  noth- 
ing whatever,'  I  grant.  The  minor,  'The  theory  of  universal 
scepticism  aflfirms  nothing  whatever,'  I  deny."  Objector :  "I 
prove  my  new  minor :  the  theory  which  doubts  of  everything 
affirms  nothing  whatever ;  but  the  theory  of  universal  scepti- 
cism doubts  of  everything ;  therefore  it  affirms  nothing  what- 
ever." Defender,  after  repeating  the  syllogism,  adds :  "  The 
major,  *  The  theory  which  doubts  of  everything  affirms  noth- 
ing whatever,'  let  that  pass.  The  minor,  '  The  theory  of  uni- 
versal scepticism  doubts  of  everything,'  I  deny."  Objector: 
"  I  prove  the  last  minor :  universal  scepticism  is  defined  as 
the  theory  which  doubts  of  everything;  therefore  universal 
scepticism  doubts  of  everything."  Defender  repeats  the 
enthymeme,  and  adds  :  "  The  antecedent,  '  Universal  scepti- 
cism is  defined  as  the  theory  which  doubts  of  everything,'  I 
distinguish  :  as  the  theory  which  pretends  to  doubt  of  every- 
thing, I  grant ;  as  the  theory  which  really  doubts  of  every- 
thing,   I    deny;     and    therefore    I    deny  the    consequent." 


Reasoning, 


Objector :  "  But  the  sceptic  really  doubts  of  everything ;  there- 
fore the  distinction  is  of  no  avail."  Defender  repeats,  and 
adds :  "  The  antecedent,  *  The  sceptic  really  doubts  of  every- 
thing,' I  deny."  Objector :  "  May  I  ask  your  reason  for  deny- 
ing it  ?  "  Defender :  "  I  deny  it  because  no  man  can  really 
doubt  of  everything ;  even  his  own  existence ;  the  fact  that 
he  is  reasoning,  speaking,  etc."  Objector:  "But  the  sceptic 
sincerely  affirms  that  he  doubts  of  everything."  Defender  : 
"  Then  he  affirms  something,  and  thereby  contradicts  him- 
self." 

The  Second  Objector :  "  That  should  not  be  maintained  as 
a  thesis  which  cannot  be  validly  proved;  but  it  cannot 
be  validly  proved  that  universal  scepticism  is  an  absurd 
theory;  therefore  it  should  not  be  maintained  as  a  thesis." 
The  defender  repeats,  then  adds  :  "  The  major,  *  That  should 
not  be  maintained  as  a  thesis  which  cannot  be  validly  proved,' 
I  will  let  that  pass  for  the  present.  The  minor,  *  It  cannot 
be  validly  proved  that  universal  scepticism  is  an  absurd 
theory,'  I  deny,  and  therefore  I  deny  the  conclusion."  Objec- 
tor:  "  I  prove  the  minor:  that  proof  is  not  vahd  which  takes 
for  granted  what  cannot  be  proved ;  but  the  proof  of  this 
thesis  does  so ;  therefore  it  is  not  valid."  Defender  repeats, 
and  adds :  "  '  That  proof  is  not  valid  which  takes  for  granted 
what  cannot  be  proved,'  I  distinguish  that  major:  if  that 
which  is  takfen  for  granted  needs  proof,  I  grant ;  if  it  needs 
no  proof,  I  deny.  As  to  the  minor :  '  But  the  proof  of  this 
thesis  takes  for  granted  what  cannot  be  proved,'  I  distinguish 
this  the  same  way :  it  takes  for  granted  what  is  evident,  and 
therefore  needs  no  proof,  I  grant ;  it  takes  for  granted  that 
which  needs  proof,  I  deny.  And  therefore  I  deny  the  con- 
clusion, etc.,  etc." 


BOOK    II. 


CRITICAL  LOGIC 


70.  We  have  studied,  in  Dialectics,  the  laws  which  govern 
the  form  of  reasoning ;  in  Critical  Logic  we  are  to  examine 
the  certainty  of  the  propositions,  /.  <?.,  of  the  matter  of  rea- 
soning, and  the  vaHdity  of  the  reasoning  process  itself.  For 
this  purpose  we  are  to  consider:  i.  The  nature  of  certainty  j 
2.  The  existence  of  certainty  ;^  3.  The  means  of  attaining  cer- 
tainty ^  and  4.  The  ultimate  test  or  criterion  of  certainty. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  NATURE  OF  CERTAINTY. 

71.  Certainty  is  defined  as  that  state  of  mind  in  which  we 
firmly  adhere  to  a  truth,  on  account  of  motives  that  exclude 
all  fear  of  error.  To  study  its  nature,  we  must  examine :  {a) 
The  nature  of  truth  and  of  its  opposite,  falsity  j  [b)  The  vari- 
ous states  of  our  minds  with  regard  to  truth,  and  (c)  The 
elements  that  make  up  certainty. 

48 


The  Nature  of  Certainty,  49 

Article  I.    Truth  and  Falsity. 

72.  Truth  denotes  cnnfnrmity  hetinefin.  a  mind  and  an  ob^. 
This  conformity  may  be  differently  viewed  : 

1.  When  we  consider  the  knowledge  of  the  mind  as 
conformable  to  the  object  known,  we  have  logical 
truth;  thus  we  speak  of  *true  judgments,'  *a  true 
understanding  of  a  fact  or  of  a  theory,'  etc. 

2.  When  we  consider  an  object  as  cognoscible,  /.  e,,  as 
conformable  to  real  or  possible  knowledge,  we  have 
metaphysical  truth.  In  this  sense  the  truth  of  an 
object  is  really  identical  with  the  very  being  of  the 
object,  for  an  object  is  cognoscible  inasmuch  as  it  has 
being ;  therefore  all  things  have  metaphysical  truth. 

3.  When  we  consider  language  as  conformable  to  the 
knowledge  of  him  who  uses  it,  we  have  moral  truth  j 
thus  we  say  :  *  a  true  account,'  *  a  true  statement,'  etc. 

Logic  treats  of  logical  truth. 

73.  Falsity  is  the  opposite  of  truth.  The  mere  absence 
of  truth  is  sometimes  called  negative  falsity  ;  but  this  is  not 
falsity  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word.  We  never  speak  of 
metaphysical  falsity,  for  all  things  have  metaphysical  truth: 
even  a  false  coin  is  truly  what  it  is,  and  cognoscible  as  such ; 
when  we  call  it '  false,'  we  use  a  figure  of  speech  by  which  we 
mean  *  calculated  to  deceive.'  Logical  falsity  exists  when 
there  is  something  in  the  intellect  which  is  not  conformable 
to  the  object;  moral  falsity,  or  falsehood,  exists  when  there 
is  something  in  the  expression  not  conformable  to  what  is  in 
the  mind. 

74.  Logical  falsity  may  occur  in  a  judgment  in  three 
ways; 

I.  The  intellect  may  affirm  something  which  is  not  in 
the  object ;  as  when  it  affirms  that  matter  can  think, 
or  it  counts  six  stars  where  there  are  but  five. 


\# 


\ 


50  Critical  Logic, 


2.  It  may  affirm  as  real  what  is  only  apparent;  e.  g.^  that 
the  sun  moves  around  the  earth. 

3.  It  may  deny  what  really  is,  e.  g.,  the  motton  of  the 
earth. 

75.  The  terms  'true'  and  'false'  are  chiefly  applied  to 
judgments  and  propositions.  Still,  a  mere  apprehension  or 
idea  may  also  be  called  true;  for  it  contains  conformity  be- 
tween the  mind  and  an  object.  But  a  mere  apprehension  is 
never  called  '  a  truth ' ;  this  expression  is  confined  to  a  judg- 
ment or  a  proposition. 

76.  Thesis  I.  A  mere  apprehension^  as  such,  cannot  be  false. 
Proof.  A  mere  apprehension,  as  such,  is  merely  a  mental  image 
of  something  real  or  possible  (for  we  cannot  have  an  image 
of  something  absolutely  impossible,  ^.  ^.,  of  a  square  circle^ 
nor  of  a  mere  nothing) ;  but  every  image,  as  such,  i,  e.,  in  as  far 
as  it  is  an  image,  is  necessarily  conformable  to  that  of  which 
it  is  the  image ;  else  it  would  not  be  the  image  of  it.  There- 
fore, inasmuch  as  it  is  an  image  at  all,  it  is  true,  not  false. 
A  portrait  may  not  resemble  the  person  who  sat  for  it,  but  it 
represents  what  it  represents,  and  so  far  it  is  a  true  image. 

77.  If  it  be  objected  that  we  may  have  a  wrong  idea  or 
notion  of  a  thing,  e.  g.y  of  a  spirit,  conceiving  it  as  a  being 
composed  of  thin  air,  we  answer  that  our  concept  of  a  being 
composed  of  thin  air  is  a  true  idea;  for  such  a  being  is 
possible ;  but,  if  we  go  on  to  judge  that  such  a  being  is  what 
is  called  a  spirit,  we  do  more  than  conceive  an  idea — we  join 
two  ideas,  we  pronounce  a  judgment.  It  is  not  then  the 
mere  apprehension  but  the  judgment  which  is  false. 

But  can  we  not  have  an  idea  to  which  no  possible  being 
corresponds,  e.  g.,  of  a  '  square  circle  '  ?    We  have  ideas  of 
'  square  '  and  of  *  circle ' ;  but  we  cannot  either  imagine  or  * 
conceive  a  square  circle.     If  we  proceed  to  form  a  judgment 
that  these  ideas  are  compatible  with  each  other,  the  error  is 


The  Nature  of  Certainty.  51 


in  our  judgmsnt,  not  in  our  apprehensions.  We  do  not 
deny  that  many  men  have  wrong  ideas,  e.  g.,  of  reUgion,  of 
the  CathoHc  Church,  of  indulgences,  of  literary  excellence, 
of  honor,  etc. ;  but  the  falsity  in  those  ideas  is  due  to  the  false 
jadgments  which  those  ideas  implicitly  contain,  not  to  the 
ideas  as  ideas.  For  instance,  a  man  conceives  of  an  indul- 
gence as  '  leave  to  commit  sin,'  and  he  judges  that  this  is  the 
meaning  of  the  word  in  Catholic  doctrine. 

Article  II.     States  of   the  Mind  with  Regard  to 
Truth. 

78.  I.  Ignorance  is  the  state  of  a  mind  to  which  the  truth 
is  not  presented  at  all ;  thus,  we  are  all  ignorant 
whether  the  number  of  the  stars  is  odd  or  even.  Igno- 
rance is  vincible  if  it  is  in  our  power  to  remove  it; 
else  it  is  invincible. 

2.  Doubt  is  the  state  of  a  mind  hesitating  whether  to 
assent  to  a  truth  or  not.  K  positive  diOxl\i\.  sees  reasons 
for  and  against  assent ;  a  negative  doubt  sees  no  rea- 
sons for  either  side ;  it  comes  to  the  same  as  ignorance. 
A  mere  doubt  inclines  the  mind  to  neither  side ;  but 
doubt  may  be  accompanied  by  suspicion  or  opinion. 

3.  Suspicion  is  the  state  of  a  mind  which  has  more  lean- 
ing to  one  judgment  than  to  its  contradictory,  but 
still  pronounces  no  judgment. 

4.  Opinion  is  the  state  of  a  mind  pronouncing  a  judg- 
ment, but  not  without  fear  of  error.  The  motives  for 
assenting  are  called  the  probability  of  a  judgment. 
Probability  is  said  to  be  intrinsic  when  the  motives 
for  assent  are  drawn  from  the   consideration   of  the 

*  matter ;  extrinsic,  when  they  are  drawn  from  the  state- 

ments of  other  persons. 


52  Critical  Logic, 


5.  Certainty  is  the  state  of  a  mind  assenting  to  a  truth 
without  fear  of  error.  If  this  fear  of  error  is  excluded 
by  motives  which  leave  no  room  for  reasonable  doubt, 
we  have  certainty  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word; 
if  the  fear  of  error  is  excluded  without  such  motives, 
we  have  certainty  improperly  so  called.  In  the  latter 
case,  the  fear  of  error  is  excluded  by  the  free  action  of 
the  will,  which  turns  away  the  intellect  from  consider- 
ing all  reasons  of  doubt. 

79.  It  is  useful  to  distinguish  speculative  from  practical 
judgments :  the  former  regard  the  certainty  of  knowledge, 
e.g.^  "  The  bread  before  me  is  not  poisoned";  the  latter,  the 
prudence  of  action,  e.  g.,  "  I  may  eat  that  bread  without  fur- 
ther examination."  We  act  prudently  when  we  look  for  the 
best  guidance  of  reason  that  circumstances  allow ;  strict  cer- 
tainty cannot  be  had  concerning  every  step  of  daily  conduct. 

80.  Since  prudence  is  not  inconsistent  with  a  possibility  of 
error,  there  may  be  invincible  error  connected  with  prudent 
practical  judgments;  but  all  error  is  inconsistent  with  strict 
certainty,  and  there  can  be  no  invincible  error  connected  with 
judgments  which  are  strictly  certain. 

81.  Error  in  judgments  of  any  kind,  speculative  or  practical, 
is  always  traceable  to  free  will.  It  cannot,  of  course,  be 
caused  by  the  objective  truth ;  nor  can  the  intellect  be  neces- 
sitated to  judge  falsely,  since  its  very  essence  consists  in  the 
power  of  knowing,  i.  <?.,  grasping,  truth.  There  remains  only 
one  possible  cause  of  error,  viz.,  man's  freedom  to  embrace 
a  proposition.  The  free  will  of  man  can  often  bend  the  intel- 
lect so  to  fix  its  attention  on  the  probabilities  of  a  proposition 
as  to  overlook  all  reasons  to  doubt,  and  thus  form  a  false  judg- 
ment, firmly  adhering  to  it  without  fear  of  error :  this  is  not 
certainty,  however,   in   the  proper  sense  of  the  word  (No. 

78-  s^ 


The  Nature  of  Certainty,  53 

82.  Error  or  falsity  cannot  strictly  be  predicated  of  igno- 
rance^ doubt,  or  suspicion  ;  for  these  states  of  the  mind  neither 
affirm  nor  deny  anything  whatever.  Ignorance  may  be  cul- 
pable, doubt  may  be  unreasonable,  suspicion  unfounded  and 
rash ;  but  none  of  these  is  properly  called  false.  Error  can 
be  predicated  of  nothing  but  opinion  and  certainty  improperly 
so  styled,  /.  <f.,  of  that  state  of  mind  which  excludes  the  fear 
of  error  by  the  force  of  the  will. 

Z^i'  While  the  will  is  the  ultimate  source  of  all  error,  there 
are  various  proximate  sources ;  the  chief  are  : 

1.  Prejudices,  i.  ^.,  judgments  formerly  assented  to  without 
proper  examination. 

2.  Imperfect  teaching  or  false  information  regarding  facts 
and  principles. 

3.  Confusion  of  ideas,  whether  resulting  from  dulness, 
/.  <f.,  slowness  to  distinguish  between  things  similar,  or 
from  present  inattention,  owing  to  fatigue,  negligence, 
multiplicity  of  cares,  etc. 

4.  Passion,  i.  e.,  violent  desire  or  aversion,  which  prompts 
our  will  to  accept  as  true  what  is  pleasing  to  us. 

5.  Impatience  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion,  either  because  we 
are  eager  to  act,  or  too  conceited  to  doubt  our  judg- 
ment, or  too  vain  to  acknowledge  our  ignorance.  From 
all  this  it  is  evident  that  virtue  is  favorable  to  the 
acquisition  of  sound  knowledge. 

6.  Another  frequent  source  of  erroneous  judgments 
in  many  persons  is  a  diseased  condition  of  the  nerv- 
ous system  or  a  portion  of  it.  This  abnormal  state 
of  the  body  may  give  rise  to  a  variety  of  phantasms 
so  vividly  presented  to  the  mind  as  to  prevent  calm 
consideration  of  the  reasons  for  or  against  the  forma- 
tion of  a  judgment. 


54  Critical  Logic. 


Article  III.   The  Elements  that  Make  up  Certainty. 

84.  We  have  defined  certainty  proper  as  the  state  of 
mind  in  which  we  firmly  adhere  to  truth,  on  account  of 
motives  which  exclude  all  fear  of  error.  Several  elements 
are  here  combined:  i.  Subjectively,/.^.,  considering  the 
acts  of  the  mind,  we  have  a  firm  adhesion  (a  positive  ele- 
ment), and  the  exclusion  of  all  fear  of  error  (a  negative  ele- 
ment). 2.  Objectively,  /.  <?.,  considering  the  object  known, 
we  have  such  a  manifestation  of  a  truth  as  is  sufficient  to  ex- 
clude all  fear  of  error.  The  subjective  adhesion  is  caused  by 
the  objective  manifestation  of  truth.  It  is  called  subjective 
certainty^  the  manifestation  of  the  truth  being  designated  as 
objective  certainty. 

85.  When  the  mind  reflects  on  the  fact  that  it  has  this  firm 
adhesion,  its  certainty  is  called  reflex ;  when  it  does  not  re- 
flect on  this  fact,  its  certainty  is  direct.  Philosophical 
certainty  does  not  differ  from  ordinary  reflex  certainty  except 
in  this,  that  it  notices  distinctly  and  scientifically  the  motives 
of  adhesion  to  a  truth. 

2i(i.  If  we  examine  objective  certainty  still  further,  we  find 
that  the  truth  manifested  may  be  of  three  species,  which  give 
respectively  three  different  names  to  certainty ;  viz. : 

1.  Certainty  is  called  metaphysical  when  the  mind  sees 
that  a  proposition  is  essentially  true  because  its  con- 
tradictory would  be  absurd ;  in  such  a  case  an  excep- 
tion is  absolutely  impossible ;  e.  ^.,  "  Virtue  is  praise- 
worthy," *'  A  triangle  has  three  sides." 

2.  Certainty  is  physical  when  a  fact  is  seen  to  be  so  nec- 
essary, according  to  the  laws  of  material  nature,  that  no 
one  but  the  Author  of  those  laws  can  make  an  excep- 
tion ;  e.  g.,  "  The  dead  do  not  return  to  life." 

3.  Certainty  is  moral  when  the  mind  sees  that  something 


The  Nature  of  Certainty,  55 

is  constantly  and  universally  true  in  the  conduct  of 

men,  although  dependent  on  their  free  choice ;   e.  g., 

"  Serious  men  do  not  tell  a  falsehood  on  important 

points  without  weighty  motives." 

87.  The   term  '  moral  certainty '  is  often  used   in  a  looser 

senss  to  denote  a  strong  probability ;  e.  g.,  I  have  a  moral 

certainty  that  this  house  is  not  on  fire  just  now,  though  I 

have  no  real  certainty  on  the  subject. 

Btdt.  Subjectively  considered,  all  kinds  of  certainty  are  alike 
in  the  negative  element,  /.  e.,  all  exclude  fear  of  error;  but 
the  positive  element,  i.  ^.,  the  intensity  of  the  mind's  adhe- 
sion to  the  truth,  may  be  more  or  less  firm :  in  some  cases, 
as  in  axioms,  and  generally  in  all  that  is  immediately  evi- 
dent, the  mind  cannot  doubt  the  agreement  of  subject  and 
predicate.  Thus,  we  cannot  help  seeing  that  a  whole  is 
greater  than  its  parts,  that  some  bodies  exist,  that  virtue  and 
vice  differ  from  each  other,  etc.  Even  in  many  things  that 
are  only  mediately  evident  we  cannot  entertain  a  doubt;  e.  g., 
no  well-informed  man  can  doubt  that  ancient  Rome  existed. 
In  many  matters,  however,  we  can  refuse  to  admit  the  object- 
ive truth ;  and  in  others  we  even  find  it  difficult  to  steady 
our  attention  sufficiently  on  the  object  to  exclude  all  doubt. 
Metaphysical  certainty  admitting  no  possible  exception 
is,  as  such,  nobler  than  the  other  kinds;  still,  it  is 
not  always  stronger  in  a  given  case;  thus,  I  am  more 
intensely  convinced  of  Caesar's  death,  which  is  a  matter  of 
moral  certainty,  than  of  many  theses  in  Mathematics  or  Phi- 
losophy,  which  rest  on  metaphysical  principles. 


CHAPTER  II. 
THE  EXISTENCE  OF  CERTAINTY. 

89.  Scholastic  Philosophy  begins,  as  the  Physical  Sciences 
pretend  to  do,  by  ascertaining  and  examining  undeniable 
facts;  in  this  particular  it  differs  strikingly  from  many  false 
systems  in  Philosophy  which  commence  with  theories  di- 
rectly contradictory  to  all  experience.  When  entering  on  the 
subject  of  the  existence  of  certainty,  we  are  at  once  brought 
face  to  face  with  a  patent  fact  which  may  be  stated  thus :  All 
mefi  having  the  full  use  of  reason  exhibit  a  direct  and  nat- 
ural adhesion  to  many  truths  as  objectively  certain. 

90.  We  are  not  yet  maintaining  that  those  truths  are 
objectively  certain;  we  are  only  stating  the  undeniable  fact 
that  all  men  adhere  to  them  as  objectively  certain.  We  call 
this  adhesion  direct^  i.  <?.,  antecedent  to  reflection  and  to  philo- 
sophic analysis.  For  instance,  all  men  consider  their  own 
existence,  the  existence  of  bodies,  the  connection  between 
cause  and  effect,  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  as 
objectively  certain.  (See  Balmes's  Fundamental  Philosophy^ 
cc.  I,  2,  3;  Kleutgen's  Philosophies  3d  Treatise.)  No  fact 
on  which  any  physical  science  relies  is  more  undeniable. 
We  have  called  this  adhesion  natural^  because  in  science  we 
call  any  effect  natural  if  it  is  found  constantly  and  universally 
to  attend  a  given  cause.  Now,  this  adhesion  is  constantly 
and  universally  found  in  man ;  therefore  it  must  be  natural 
to  man. 

91.  Thesis  II.  This  direct  and  natural  adhesion  of  all  men 


The  Existence  of  Certainty,  57 

to  many  truths  as  objectively  certain  is  {a)  certainty  properly  so 
called;  {b)  not  indeed  philosophical  certainty ^  but  [c]  capable 
of  becoming  such. 

Proof :  (a)  Certainty  properly  so  called  is  a  firm  adhesion 
to  a  truth,  on  account  of  motives  which  exclude  all  fear 
of  error.  But  the  adhesion  here  spoken  of  is  such ;  therefore 
it  is  certainty  properly  so  called.      We  prove  the  minor: 

1.  //  is  firm  j  in  fact,  man  cannot  rid  himself  of  it.* 

2.  //  excludes  fear  of  error ;  i,  e.,  we  do  not  mistrust 
these  judgments. 

3.  This  fear  of  error  is  excluded  by  the  evidence  of  the 
objective  truth.  As  St.  Thomas  expresses  it :  "  It  is  the 
property  of  first  principles  that  they  not  only  are  neces- 
sarily true,  but  also  manifest  themselves  evidently  as 
objectively  true."  If  this  fear  of  error  were  not  ex- 
cluded by  the  evidence  of  the  objective  truth,  it  would 
be  excluded  either  by  the  free  will  of  man  or  by  a 
blind  necessity  compelling  man  to  judge  wrongly.  But 
it  is  not  excluded  by  our  will,  for  we  adhere  to  the 
truth  even  against  our  will.  Nor  by  a  blind  necessity 
to  judge  falsely ;  for  then  our  intellect  would  be  no  in- 
tellect at  all,  since  an  intellect  is  a  power  to  see  the 
truth,  not  a  power  to  act  blindly. 

{b)  This  direct  adhesion  is  not  itself  philosophic  certainty; 
for  it  is  antecedent  to  reflection  and  analysis,  while  philo- 
sophic certainty  is  subsequent  to  both. 

{c)  It  is  capable  of  becoming  philosophic  certainty  ;  for,  when 
reflected  on  and  analyzed,  it  is  distinctly  seen  to  contain 
motives  sufficient  to  exclude  all  fear  of  error,  and  thus  the 

*  The  sceptic  Pyrrho,  when  laughed  at  for  fleeing  from  a  falling  stone  with  as  much 
earnestness  as  if  he  had  no  doubt  of  its  reahty,  replied  ingenuously:  ''  It  is  hard  entirely 
to  throw  off  human  nature."  If  any  votary  of  philosophy  should  begin  to  have  any 
real  doubts  of  the  existence  of  certainty,  he  would  need  rest  of  mind  and  healthy  exer. 
gisc  of  body,  not  abstract  reasoning,  to  convince  him  of  objective  certsunty. 


58  Critical  Logic, 


element  is  supplied  which  constitutes  the  accidental  difference 
between  ordinary  certainty  and  philosophic  certainty,  viz.,  the 
distinct  perception  of  the  motives  for  adhesion  to  truth  (No. 
8$). 

92.  Objections ;  i.  This  reasoning  supposes  several 
things  that  have  not  yet  been  demonstrated;  e.  g., 
that  we  have  understanding.  Answer,  It  does  not 
suppose  anything  that  needs  demonstration  or  that 
could  reasonably  be  doubted. 

2.  Some  judgments  in  which  all  men  concurred  were 
false  ;  e.  g.,  that  the  sun  moved  round  the  earth.  An- 
swer. All  men  judged  that  the  sun  moved  around  the 
earth,  we  distinguish ;  they  judged  about  the  scientific 
question  whether  it  was  the  earth's  or  the  sun's  motion 
that  caused  the  phenomena  perceived,  we  deny ;  few 
men  gave  this  question  any  thought,  and  those  who 
did  would  naturally  judge  that  the  motion  appeared  to 
be  in  the  sun.  If  any  judged  that  it  was  in  the  sun, 
they  erred  freely.  All  judged  that  the  sun  was  seen 
in  different  directions  successively,  we  grant.  They 
called  that  change '  motion,'  and  so  do  even  the  learned 
to-day,  when  they  speak  of  the  sun  as  rising  and  setting, 
and  they  distinguish  apparent  from  real  motion,  rela- 
tive from  absolute  motion. 

93.  The  only  escape  from  the  thesis  just  proved  is  that 
attempted  by  the  Sceptics,  i.  e.^  by  those  few  philosophers  who 
pretend  that  man  can  really  be  certain  of  nothing.  Sceptics 
are  of  two  kinds  :  universal  or  subjective  Sceptics,  who  refuse 
to  admit  any  certainty  at  all,  even  that  of  their  own  existence ; 
zxid  partial  or  objective  Sceptics,  who  admit  their  own  existence 
and  nothing  or  very  little  more. 

94.  Thesis  III.  The  theory  of  Universal  Scepticism  is  self- 
contradictory.       Proof     That    theory    is    self-contradictory, 


le  Existence  of  Certainty.  59 

which  affirms  and  denies  the  same  thing;  but  such  is  the 
theory  of  universal  Scepticism.  Therefore  it  is  self-contradict- 
ory. We  prove  the  minor :  Scepticism  denies  that  there  is  any 
certainty  at  all ;  at  the  same  time  it  implicitly  affirms  several 
things  as  certain ;  ^.  ^.,  that  certainty  is  something  different 
from  doubt,  that  the  words  used  have  certain  meanings,  that 
those  using  them  exist,  etc.  If  the  Sceptic  should  plead  that 
he  does  not  hold  even  those  points  as  certain,  he  must  then 
grant  that,  for  all  he  knows,  he  may  be  saying  and  even 
meaning  just  the  contrary  of  what  he  teaches,  which  would 
be  an  absurd  theory ;  but  even  this  would  implicitly  affirm 
that  the  Sceptic  exists,  speaks,  etc. 

95.  In  connection  with  Scepticism,  we  must  consider  thv. 
Methodic  Doubt  recommended  by  X>escartes,  who,  under  the 
Latinized  name  of  Cartesius,  wrote  in  the  middle  of  the  sev- 
enteenth century.  He  was  not  a  Sceptic ;  but  he  traced  out 
a  false  system  of  studying  the  existence  of  certainty  :  destroy- 
ing the  solid  basis  of  Philosophy,  he  substituted  for  it  a  weak 
fabric  of  his  own  invention,  and  left  Httle  in  the  minds  of  his 
followers  but  ruin  and  confusion.  He  maintained,  {a)  That 
every  philosopher  should  begin  his  speculations  by  doubt- 
ing of  everything,  {b)  Next,  the  philosopher  will  find  that  he 
cannot  help  granting  the  fact  of  his  own  thought,  and  he 
will  conclude  from  it  his  own  existence :  Cogifo,  ergo  sum — 
"  I  think,  therefore  I  am."  [c)  Hence  the  would-be  phi- 
losopher will  infer  the  general  rule  that  whatever  is  clearly 
perceived  is  true,  {d)  Then  finding  that  he  clearly  perceives 
the  idea  of  God,  he  thence  concludes  to  the  existence  of  God. 
(e)  From  the  veracity  of  God  he  infers  the  reliability  of  his 
own  faculties.  (/)  Thence,  at  last,  he  reasons  to  the  certainty 
of  his  knowledge. 

96.  Thesis  IV.  Descartes'  Methodic  Doubt  is  absurd.  Proof. 
That  is  absurd  which  affirms  and  denies  the  same  thing ;   but 


6o  Critical  Logic, 


the  doubt  in  question  does  so.  For  in  it  the  philosopher 
begins  by  denying  the  reliabiHty  of  reason,  and  at  once  im- 
plicitly affirms  its  reliability  by  using  it  to  prove  his  own 
existence :  "  I  think,  therefore  I  am."  He  pretends  to  doubt 
all  his  faculties,  and  still  he  treats  the  guidance  of  those  same 
faculties  as  reliable.  Besides,  Descartes  moves  in  a  vicious 
circle :  he  proves  the  rehability  of  our  faculties  by  the  veracity 
of  God,  and  the  veracity  of  God  by  the  reliability  of  our 
faculties,  etc. 

97.  The  error  of  Sceptics  arises  from  their  false  supposition 
that  nothing  is  certain  which  is  not  demonstrated  by  discursive 
reasoning.  Now,  the  science  of  Mathematics  begins  by  the 
admission  of  axioms  which  are  self-evident;  e.  g.,  that  "  the 
whole  is  greater  than  a  part,"  that  "  two  things  equal  to  a 
third  are  equal  to  each  other,"  etc.  The  science  of  Philoso- 
phy must  follow  a  similar  process :  it  must  draw  its  first  con- 
clusions fi-om  premises  which  are  evident  without  proof.  Be- 
sides, like  Mathematics  and  all  other  sciences,  it  must  admit 
without  proof  the  reliability  of  the  reasoning  process.  If  the 
first  premises  and  the  reliabiHty  of  reason  required  proof,  man 
could  never  make  the  first  start  in  scientific  studies ;  in  fact,  he 
would  be  incapable  of  reasoning  at  all :  he  would  not  be  a 
rational  being. 

98.  Every  philosopher,  therefore,  must,  on  entering  the  field 
of  science,  affirm  with  certainty :  i.  His  own  existence;  called 
the  first  fact.  2.  The  principle  of  contradiction,  viz.,  that  a 
thing  cannot  *  be  and  not  be '  at  the  same  time ;  called  the  first 
principle.  3.  The  power  of  the  intellect  to  know  truth ;  called 
the  first  condition.  These  truths  are  not  blindly  admitted: 
they  are  seen  to  be  objectively  evident.  There  is  no  alternative 
between  admitting  them  and  admitting  the  self-contradiction 
of  universal  Scepticism. 

99.  Tp  refute  partial  Scepticism,  we  must  prove  the  reli- 


The  Existence  of  Certainty,  6i 

ability  of  the  various  means  by  which  certainty  may  be 
attained,  as  we  shall  do  in  the  following  chapter.  Still,  the 
arguments  which  we  shall  adduce  will,  in  many  cases,  be  rather 
scientific  explanations  than  strict  proof s :  scientific  explanations, 
because  they  will  show  distinctly  what  causes  or  reasons  we 
have  for  firm  adhesion  to  the  truths  \  not  strict  proofs,  because 
the  reliability  of  the  means  in  question  is  in  several  cases 
proved  while  taking  their  reliability  for  granted,  as  having  no 
need  of  demonstration. 


CHAPTER  III. 

MEANS   OF  ATTAINING   CERTAINTY. 

100.  The  means  at  our  disposal  to  attain  certainty  are, 
directly,  our  own  cognoscive  powers  or  faculties,  viz.,  intellect 
and  sensation,  and,  indirectly,  the  authority  of  other  men.  To 
explain  these  clearly  we  must  treat:  i.  Oi  our  cognoscive  pow- 
ers in  general  j  2.  Of  Intellect  in  paxt[cvila.r ;  ^.  Of  sensation  y 
4.  Of  authority.  To  all  this  we  shall  add  a  chapter  on  common 
sense,  which,  though  proceeding  from  the  intellect,  requires 
for  the  discussion  of  its  certainty  the  previous  understanding 
of  the  reliability  of  intellect,  sensation,  and  authority. 

Article  I.     A  Sketch  of  our  Cognoscive    Powers. 

1 01.  I.  The  outer  senses.  Our  first  step  in  the  acquisition 
of  knowledge  is  the  perception  of  material  objects  by  means 
of  material  instruments  which  are  parts  of  ourselves,  and  are 
called  the  organs  of  sense. 

102.  An  organ  is  a  part  of  a  living  body  peculiarly  con- 
structed by  the  Creator  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  a  func- 
tion of  life.  Living  bodies  are  made  up  of  such  organs.  In 
man,  and  in  the  higher  animals  generally,  five  of  these  organs 
are  intended  for  the  perception  of  exterior  bodily  objects; 
these  are  called  the  organs  of  the  five  outer  or  exterior  senses, 
viz.,  of  the  sight,  hearing,  smell,  taste,  and  touch* 

*  Physiologists  now  split  up  the  touch  into  two  senses,  the  tactual  or  skin  sense  and 
the  muscular  sense;  the  former  perceives  heat  and  cold,  roughness  and  smoothness, 
etc. ;  the  latter  perceives  resistance,   exteriority,   and  extension.       President  McCosh 

62 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  63 

103.  II.  The  inner  sense.  There  is,  besides,  an  internal  or 
inner  sense,  whose  organ  is  some  portion  at  least  of  the  nerv- 
ous system ;  it  perceives  interior  modifications  of  the  animal 
body,  such  as  cause  the  feelings  of  hunger,  thirst,  fatigue, 
pain,  comfort,  etc.  It  also  perceives  the  actions  and  affections 
of  the  various  external  senses ;  for  an  animal  not  only  sees, 
hears,  tastes,  etc.,  but  it  dXso  feels  that  it  sees,  hears,  tastes,  etc 
This  inner  sense,  in  as  far  as  it  takes  cognizance  of  what  is  done 
by  the  outer  senses,  is  often  called  the  common  sense,  and  its 
organ  is  styled  the  common  sensory ;  but  the  term  common 
sense,  without  the  definite  article  *  the,'  stands  for  a  very  differ- 
ent idea,  viz.,  for  the  common  judgment  of  men  on  matters 
of  universal  importance  to  mankind. 

104.  The  inner  sense  does  not  perceive  the  causes  of  the 
affections  which  it  perceives,  but  only  the  fact  that  those 
affections  exist.  As  both  the  objects  of  sensation  and  its 
organs  are  material,  the  action  of  all  sensation  is  material, 
organic,  and  is  common  to  man  and  brute.  But  the  organ 
is,  of  course,  not  dead  but  living  matter ;  it  is  one  substance 
with  the  soul,  /.  e.,  with  the  principle  of  life ;  hence  the 
actions  of  any  sense  are  actions  of  the  living  compound  soul 
and  body. 

105.  III.  The  imagination.      When  an  animal  perceives 

describes  it  thus,  quoting  Wundt's  Beitrage  zur  Theorie  der  Sinttesivahmek- 
mung:  "When  we  move  our  members  we  come  upon  external  resistances. 
We  observe  that  these  resistances  sometimes  give  way  before  our  pressure;  but 
we  find  at  the  same  time  that  this  takes  place  with  very  different  degrees  of  facility, 
and  that,  in  order  to  put  different  bodies  in  motion,  we  must  apply  very  different  degrees 
of  muscular  force ;  but  to  every  single  degree  of  the  contraction-force  there  corresponds 
a  determined  degree  in  intensity  of  the  muscular  sensations.  With  these  muscular 
sensations,  the  sensations  of  the  skin  which  cover  our  members  of  touch  so  continually 
mingle,  that  the  intensity  of  these  touch-sensations  goes  parallel  to  the  intensity  of  the 
accompanying  muscular  sensations.  We  succeed  in  this  way  in  connecting  the  degree 
of  intensity  of  the  muscular  sensations  in  a  necessary  manner  with  the  nature  of  the 
resistances  which  set  themselves  against  our  movement"  (Defence  of  Fundamental 
Truth,  p.  173). 


64  Critical  Logic, 


material  objects,  it  forms  and  retains  of  them  material  images 
or  representations,  called  phantasms.  The  organ  used  for 
these  purposes  is  the  brain.  The  imagination  is  the  power  of 
forming  and  retaining  those  images,  of  recalling  them  on 
occasions,  and  of  combining  them  in  wonderful  varieties,  thus 
forming  new  phantasms  which  in  turn  may  be  recorded  and 
retained,  etc.  We  should  not  suppose  those  images  to  be 
pictures,  for  we  can  have  no  picture  of  taste,  smell,  etc.;  they 
are  modifications  of  some  kind. 

1 06.  IV.  The  sensile  memory.  This  name  denotes  that 
portion  of  the  imaginative  power  which  retains  and  recalls 
the  phantasms,  but  it  adds  a  further  function,  viz.,  that  of 
recognizing,  not  intellectually  however,  present  sense-percep- 
tions and  present  phantasms  as  identical  with  former  phan- 
tasms and  former  sense-perceptions.  By  this  faculty  "  The 
ox  knoweth  his  owner,  and  the  ass  his  master's  crib,"  as  Holy 
Writ  expresses  it.  The  inner  sense,  the  common  sense,  the 
imagination,  and  the  sensile  memory  need  not  be  considered 
as  distinct  faculties,  but  rather  as  various  functions  of  the 
same  faculty,  which  may  be  generally  designated  as  the  inner 
sense. 

107.  V.  The  intellect,  understanding,  or  mind,  in  the 
proper  meaning  of  this  term,  is  an  entirely  different  faculty;  it 
does  not  confine  its  perceptions  to  the  material  qualities  of 
objects,  as  all  sense-action  does,  but  it  penetrates  into  the 
very  essences  of  things  material  and  immaterial  {intus  legit,  it 
reads  within),  and  it  forms  concepts  or  ideas  representing 
essences,  e.  g.j  of  *  plant,'  '  tree,'  *  spirit,'  etc.  Even  when  it 
considers  mere  accidents,  e.  g.,  *  color,'  *  shape,'  *  size,'  it  need 
not  simply  consider  this  individual  color,  shape,  or  size,  as 
material  faculties  must  do,  but  it  can  consider  the  essence  of 
color,  shape,  and  size ;  so  that,  by  a  power  peculiar  to  itself^ 
ft  forms  ideas  representing  qualities  as  abstract — /.  <?.,  drawn 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  65 

forth,  as  it  were,  from  the  subjects  in  which  they  are  found 
and  thus  stripped  of  their  individuaHty. 

108.  VI.  The  judgment.  Besides  conceiving  ideas,  the 
intellect  judges ;  i.  ^.,  it  compares  two  ideas  together  and  pro- 
nounces on  their  agreement  or  disagreement.  This  act  of  the 
intellect  is  cdW^di  judgment ;  it  was  explained  in  Dialectics 
(No.  17). 

109.  VII.  Reason  is  not  a  faculty  distinct  from  the  intel- 
lect and  the  judgment ;  it  is  the  intellectual  act  or  process  of 
deriving  judgments  from  other  judgments;  it,  too,  was  suffi- 
ciently explained  above  (No.  22). 

no.  VIII.  The  intellectual  memory  is  another  function  of 
the  intellect ;  it  enables  us  to  perceive  and  reproduce  ideas, 
judgments,  and  reasonings  formerly  elicited,  and  to  recognize 
identity  or  difference  between  present  and  former  objects  of 
knowledge.  The  intellectual  memory  is  greatly  assisted  in 
its  action  by  the  sensile  memory,  which  associates  phantasms 
with  mental  concepts. 

111.  IX.  Consciousness  is  the  intellectual  power  of  per- 
ceiving our  own  internal  acts,  whether  of  intellect  and  will  or 
of  our  interior  sense ;  it  will  be  more  fully  explained  in  the 
following  article. 

Article  II.   The  Intellect  in  Particular. 

112.  The  intellect  or  understanding  may  be  called  the 
universal  means  by  which  certainty  is  to  be  acquired;  for 
certainty  is  a  state  of  the  mind  or  intellect,  and  therefore  it 
cannot  be  reached  except  by  the  intellect.  That  the  intellect 
may  begin  to  act,  it  must  be  excited  by  sensation ;  and  there- 
fore those  whose  senses  are  very  imperfect  remain  idiotic. 
But  sense,  no  matter  how  perfect,  can  never  elicit  a  judgment. 
StiU,  sense  is  a  means  by  which  the  human  intellect  is  brought 
into  communication  with  many  objects  of  knowledge,  and 


66  Critical  Logic, 


the  reliability  of  sense-perception  will  be    examined  in  the 
next  article. 

113.  We  are  just  now  concerned  with  the  certainty  of  in- 
tellectual knowledge  as  such.  We  must  begin  this  study 
by  recalling  to  mind  that  the  first  condition  for  the  attaining 
of  all  certainty  is  the  capacity  of  the  intellect  to  reach  truth. 
We  need  not,  then,  prove  the  rehability  of  our  intellect.  But 
we  must  here  examine  what  is  involved  or  included  in  this 
capacity  of  the  intellect  to  know  truth,      ' 

It  involves  the  certainty,  i.  Of  consciousness  y  2.  Of  our 
primary  ideas ;  3.  Of  immediate  analytical  judg?nents ;  4.  Of 
the  intellectual  memory  j  5.  Of  the  reasoning  process.  We 
shall  examine  the  reliability  of  these  functions  of  the  intellect 
in  detail ;  in  doing  so,  we  shall  scientifically  explain  rather 
than  prove  our  theses ;  for  the  first  condition  of  certainty 
needs  no  proof. 

§  I.    Consciousness, 

114.  Consciousness  is  the  reflex  perception  of  our  own  acts, 
/.  ^.,  of  ourselves  as  acting.  We  not  only  think  and  feel,  but, 
when  we  reflect,  our  mind  perceives  that  we  think  and  feel. 
This  reflection  consists,  as  the  word  indicates  {refiectere,  to 
bend  back),  in  the  bending  back  of  the  mind  upon  itself,  upon 
its  own  acts.  Reflection  is,  of  course,  not  the  beginning  of 
our  knowledge ;  for  we  must  first  think  and  feel  before  we 
can  perceive  that  we  think  and  feel.  But  when  we  scrutinize 
our  own  knowledge,  this  reflection  on  self  is  the  first  act  to  be 
examined  in  the  process  of  our  study. 

115.  This  reflection  should  not  be  confounded  with  re- 
flection in  the  sense  of  remembrance.  Nor  should  conscious- 
ness be  mistaken  for  the  inner  sense,  explained  above  (No. 
103).  It  differs  firomit :  {a)  In  the  subject  that  elicits  the  act : 
consciousness  is  elicited  by  the  simple  intellect,  sensation  by 
the  human   compound;  {b)  In  the  object  perceived:    con- 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  67 

sciousness  perceives  both  simple  and  organic  actions,  the 
inner  sense  organic  actions  only ;  {c)  In  the  manner  of  per- 
ception; the  perception  of  sense  terminates  in  phantasms, 
that  of  consciousness  in  ideas  and  judgments,  affirming  that 
the  facts  exist,  /.  <f.,  that  we  really  think  or  feel  as  we  are  con- 
scious we  do.  But  consciousness  is  not  the  function  which 
perceives  what  are  the  causes  of  our  feelings,  e.  g.^  the  causes 
of  pain  or  comfort  experienced;  such  causes  are  made  known 
to  us  by  reasoning  and  repeated  observation  united,  /'.  e,,  by 
induction. 

116.  Thesis  V.  The  reliability  of  consciousness  is  included 
in  our  capacity  to  know  truth. 

Explanation.  We  are  not  proving  our  capacity  to  know 
truth;  this  capacity  needs  no  proof  (Nos.  97,  98);  but  we 
maintain  here  that  this  same  capacity  of  our  intellect  to  know 
truth  could  not  exist  unless  our  consciousness  were  reliable. 

Proof.  That  is  included  in  our  capacity  to  know  truth,  with- 
out which  we  could  never  know  whether  we  know  or  noti 
but  without  the  rehability  of  consciousness  we  could  never 
know  whether  we  know  or  not.     Therefore — 

We  prove  the  minor.  It  is  only  through  consciousness  that 
we  know  our  own  intellectual  acts ;  therefore,  if  conscious- 
ness were  not  rehable,  we  could  not  really  know  whether  we 
are  eliciting  acts  of  knowledge. 

117.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  field  of  consciousness  covers 
the  following  objects  of  knowledge:  i.  Our  own  existence; 
for  we  perceive  ourselves  as  being  the  subjects  of  our  intellect- 
ual acts  and  of  our  sensations.  2.  The  existence  of  our  in- 
tellectual acts.  3.  The  existence  of  our  internal  sense  and  of 
its  acts. 

118.  It  may  be  objected :  i.  We  are  not  conscious  of  all 
our  internal  acts.  We  answer  :  We  claim  certainty  for 
those  only  of  which  we  are  conscious. 


68  Critical  Logic. 


2.  Many  persons  are  conscious  of  affections  which  do 
not  exist;  e,  g.,  that  they  are  ill  when  they  are  not  ill. 
We  answer:  They  are  conscious  of  certain  feelings, 
from  which  they  infer  by  faulty  reasoning  that  they  are 
iU.  Consciousness  reveals  only  the  existence  of  the 
feelings,  not  their  causes. 

3.  Lunatics  are  conscious  of  being  kings,  princes,  etc. 
Answer.  They  are  conscious  of  judging  themselves  to 
be  kings,  etc.,  and  they  do  judge  so  owing  to  their 
diseased  imagination.  For  lunacy  supposes  an  inabil- 
ity to  distinguish  between  imaginations  and  real  per- 
ceptions; but  the  consciousness  of  even  a  lunatic  is 
reliable. 

4.  No  one  can  know  that  his  certainty  is  not  owing  to  a 
diseased  imagination.  Answer.  If  so,  universal  Scep- 
ticism would  follow,  and  the  intellect  would  be  inca- 
pable of  knowing  truth. 

5.  The  proof  takes  for  granted  the  rehabihty  of  our 
consciousness,  the  point  to  be  proved.  Answer.  We 
are  not  giving  a  strict  proof,  but  only  a  scientific  ex- 
planation ;  for  the  first  truths  cannot  be  strictly  proved 
and  need  no  demonstration. 

§  2.     Primary  Ideas. 

119.  By  primary  ideas  we  do  not  mean  inborn  ideas;  for 
no  ideas  are  inborn  in  us :  we  have  no  ideas  antecedently  to 
sense-perception.  But  whereas  by  sense  we  form  phantasms 
or  matenal  images  of  bodies  observed,  we  form  by  our  intel- 
lect ideas  or  immaterial  images  of  what  is  cognoscible  in  those 
bodies ;  ^.  ^.,  of  *  being,'  *  substance,'  *  size,'  <  color,'  etc.  The 
objects  of  sense  are  necessarily  individual,  extrinsic,  and  con- 
crete qualities ;  the  proper  objects  of  the  intellectual  idea  are 
universal  and  abstract  notes. 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  69 

120.  We  call  primary  ideas  those  of '  being,'  *  truth,'  *  sub- 
stance,' '  cause,'  '  effect,'  etc.;  all  those,  namely,  that  are  in- 
volved in  our  commonest  perceptions.  Of  these  we  assert 
that  they  have  objective  truth,  and  that  their  objective  truth  is 
implied  in  the  very  capacity  of  our  intellect  to  understand 
truth.  Kant  makes  them  subjective  for7ns  only,  to  which 
nothing  objective  corresponds. 

121.  Thesis  VI.  Our  primary  ideas  are  objectively  true,  i.e., 
conformable  to  objects  really  existing. 

Proof.  If  these  ideas  were  not  objectively  true,  not  conform- 
able to  objects  really  existing,  our  commonest  knowledge 
would  be  but  an  illusion ;  if,  for  instance,  *  being,'  *  truth,' 

*  substance,'  etc.,  were  mere  figments  of  the  imagination  or 
of  the  intellect,  we  could  never  know  anything.  Therefore 
they  are  objectively  true. 

122.  It  must  be  carefully  noticed,  however,  that  the  object 
of  a  universal  idea  does  not  really  exist  as  a  universal  object: 
everything  that  really  exists  is  an  individual  thing.  Likewise, 
the  object  of  an  abstract  idea  does  not  really  exist  as  an  ab- 
stract object :  every  existing  being  is  concrete.  For  instance, 
there  exists  no  real  abstract  or  universal  cause,  nor  any  real 
abstract  and  universal  effect,  substance,  being,  etc.,  just  as 
there  exists  no  real  abstract  or  universal  animal,  which  would 
be  neither  rational  nor  irrational,  but  simply  have  the  qualities 
that  make   up  the  genus  animal.     How,  then,   is  the  idea 

*  animal'  objectively  true?  Because  the  qualities  expressed 
by  the  term  '  animal '  really  exist  in  every  individual  animal. 
Nothing,  then,  in  nature  exists  in  the  abstract ;  but  anything 
may  be  viewed  in  the  abstract  by  the  intellect,  and  abstract 
notes  are  the  distinctive  objects  of  intellectual  cognition. 

123.  Now,  the  abstract  idea  is  the  same  as  the  universal 
idea :  the  word  *  abstract '  denotes  the  manner  in  which  such 
an  idea  is   formed,   while  the  word   universal   denotes  its 


70  Critical  Logic, 


applicability  to  many  objects.  Thus,  I  form  the  abstract  idea 
*  animal '  by  attending  to  the  notes,  which  I  perceive  in  any 
individual  animal,  viz.,  '  a  material  substance  endowed  with 
life  and  feeling ' ;  these  notes  I  draw  forth,  or  abstract  {ab- 
straho),  for  separate  consideration,  or,  if  you  wish,  I  withdraw 
my  attention  from  the  other  qualities  of  that  same  individual 
animal  which  I  am  considering.  Since  these  same  notes 
conceived  are  common  to  all  animals,  my. concept  of  '  ani- 
mal '  is  a  universal  concept,  i.  e,,  it  is  predicable  of  a  whole 
:lass.  In  as  far  as  my  idea  '  animal '  denotes  only  the  quali- 
ies  or  notes  that  make  up  its  co?nprehension,  it  is  called  a 
direct  universal ;  but  when  I  reflect  besides  that  the  idea 
is  applicable  to  many  beings,  i.  e.,  when  I  consider  also  its 
extension,  the  idea  is  then  called  a  reflex  universal. 

124.  Philosophers  have  warmly  disputed  upon  the  nature 
of  these  reflex  universals :  the  Nominalists  call  them  mere 
names f  which  are  given  to  a  confused  collection  of  individuals, 
but  to  which  no  concepts  correspond;  the  Conceptualists 
call  them  concepts,  but  they  suppose  those  concepts  to  be  mere 
figments  of  the  intellect  to  which  no  real  objects  correspond; 
the  Exaggerated  Realists  supposed  that  u?iiversal  beings 
really  exist  corresponding  to  the  universal  concepts;  the 
Moderate  Realists  maintain  that  some  reality  in  objects  cor- 
responds to  the  abstract  idea,  yet  that  such  reality  does  not 
exist  objectively  as  an  abstract  or  universal  being  without 
individualizing  notes,  but  it  exists  concretely  in  each  individual 
object.  The  explanation  we  have  given  in  the  two  preced- 
ing numbers  is  that  of  the  moderate  realists ;  but  the  scien- 
tific proofs  of  our  doctrine  and  the  refutation  of  other  systems 
belong  to  Psychology. 

§  3.     Immediate  Analytical  Judgments. 

125.  Analytical  judgments,  as  explained  above  (No.  17), 
axe  those  judgments  in  which  the  agreement  or  disagreement 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  71 

of  the  subject  and  predicate  is  perceived  by  the  mere  analysis 
of  their  meaning,  without  the  aid  of  experience.  If  this 
agreement  or  disagreement  is  perceived  at  once,  without 
reasoning,  the  judgments  are  said  to  be  immediate. 

126.  Thesis  VII.  Immediate  analytical  judgments  can  never 
be  false. 

Proof  I.  That  such  judgments  cannot  be  false  is  made 
evident  by  considering  their  very  nature ;  for  they  consist  in 
affirming  or  denying  explicitly  what  the  very  idea  of  the  sub- 
ject contained  or  excluded  implicitly;  e.  g.^  when  I  conceive 
*  a  part,'  I  conceive  something  as  distinct  from  '  the  whole,' 
and  distinct  from  it  by  being  less.  Thus  all  immediate  ana- 
lytical judgments,  e.  g.,  'The  part  is  less  than  the  whole,'  do 
no  more  than  affirm  or  deny  explicitly  what  the  subject  of 
them  contained  or  excluded  implicitly  before  the  judgment 
was  formed. 

Proof  2.  Our  intellect  has  the  power  to  know  truth  (No. 
98).  Therefore  that  can  give  us  real  certainty  which  is  im- 
plied in  the  capacity  of  our  intellect  to  know  truth,  or  which 
must  be  objectively  true  if  the  intellect  can  know  truth  at  all. 
But  such  are  these  judgments.  For  if  our  intellect  could  not 
be  relied  on  in  these  judgments,  e.  g,,  that '  a  circle  is  round,' 
that  *  a  part  is  less  than  the  whole,'  etc.,  then  the  intellect 
could  never  be  relied  on  in  any  judgments  ;  for  none  are  more 
evident.  Therefore  it  can  be  relied  on  in  these  :  they  give 
us  real  certainty. 

127.  Objections;    i.  This  thesis  cannot  be  demonstrated. 
Answer.    It  need  not  be;  for  it  is  evident. 

2.  Some  of  the  judgments  are  false,  e.  g.,  *'  The  whole  is 
greater  than  the  part " ;  for  the  whole  Blessed  Trinity 
is  not  greater  than  any  of  the  Persons.  Answer.  The 
Divine  Persons  are  not  parts  of  God ;  each  of  them 
is  the  infinite  God  whole  and  entire. 


72  Critical  Logic, 


3.  Another  of  these  judgments  is  false,  viz.,  "  Out  of 
nothing  nothing  can  be  made  "  \  for  the  world  was 
made  out  of  nothing.  Answer,  This  analytical  judg- 
ment means  that  nothingness  cannot  be  a  material  out 
of  which  a  thing  can  be  made,  while,  in  creating,  God 
made  the  world  without  using  any  material ;  He  did 
not  make  nothingness  the  material  of  His  creation. 

4.  All  our  judgments  are  empirical ;  for  they  presuppose 
sensation.  Answer.  They  presuppose  sensation  before 
we  can  conceive  the  ideas,  we  grant;  they  compare 
the  ideas  by  attending  to  experience  and  sensation,  we 
deny.  Now,  the  latter  is  required  for  empiric  judg- 
ments.    (No.  17.) 

5.  No  judgments  are  certain ;  for  to  err  is  natiu-al  to 
man.  Answer,  To  err  sometimes  in  his  opinions,  yes; 
to  err  in  his  certain  judgments,  no. 

6.  Analytical  judgments  are  useless;  for  their  predicates 
are  contained  in  their  subjects,  even  though  no  judg- 
ments be  elicited.  Answer.  They  formally  and  ex- 
plicitly discover  and  express  what  predicates  are  im- 
plicitly contained  in  tneir  subjects. 

§  4.     Memory. 

128.  Memory  is  the  power  of  retaining  and  re-awaking 
former  knowledge,  and  of  recognizing  it  as  former  knowledge. 
It  is  twofold : 

I.  The  sensile  memory  retains  and  re-awakes  phan- 
tasms— e.  g.^  of  a  whip  formerly  seen  or  heard  and  of 
a  pain  felt — and  it  perceives  a  connection  or  asso- 
ciation between  those  phantasms.  In  this  way  brutes 
remember  as  well  as  men.  (No.  106.) 
3.  The  intellectual  memory  retains  and  re-awakes  ideas 
- — e.  g.y  of  what  we  formerly  saw,  felt,  read,  thought,  01 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty.  ']i 

willed — and  it  judges  that  the  objects  of  those  ideas 
were  formerly  perceived.  In  man  the  sensile  and  the  in- 
tellectual memory  work  together  and  assist  each  other. 

129.  The  memory  acts  voluntarily  when  it  recalls  the 
past  at  will ;  spontaneously,  when  the  will  has  no  share  in 
the  act.  To  act  spontaneously,  the  memory  must  be  aroused 
by  a  perception  in  some  way  associated  with  a  former  percep- 
tion ;  e.  g.,  the  fragrance  of  a  fruit  may  recall  its  taste ;  the 
idea  of  eternity  may  recall  the  shortness  of  this  present  life. 

130.  Thesis  VIII.  The  reliability  of  our  memory  is  con- 
tained in  our  power  to  know  truth. 

Explanation.  We  do  not  maintain  that  we  can  recall  all 
our  former  perceptions ;  but  simply  that,  when  our  memory 
does  recall  a  former  perception,  and  judges  with  certainty 
that  the  object  now  recalled  is  identical  with  an  object  per- 
ceived before,  it  is  reliable  in  such  a  judgment,  and  that  this 
rehabihty  of  the  memory  is  contained  in  the  power  of  our  in- 
tellect to  know  truth. 

Proof.  That  is  included  in  the  intellect's  power  to  know 
truth,  without  which  all  connected  thought  and  all  expression 
of  thought  would  be  impossible.  But  the  reliabihty  of  our 
memory  is  such.  For,  unless  our  memory  were  reliable,  we 
could  not  think  connectedly,  since  one  judgment  would  be 
forgotten  before  another  could  be  compared  with  it ;  and  no 
thought  could  be  expressed,  because  no  words  could  be 
remembered  to  express  them. 

131.  If  it  be  objected  that  our  memory  often  deceives  us, 
we  answer :  Not  when  it  gives  us,  on  careful  consideration, 
positive  testimony,  excluding  all  fear  of  error.  But  men  are 
often  too  careless,  impatient,  or  presumptuous  to  examine 
their  recollections  properly. 

§  5.     Reasoning. 

132.  When  we  attempt  to  reason  in  order  to  prove  the 


74  Critical  Logic, 


reliability  of  reasoning,  we  evidently  do  not  pretend  to  give  a 
strict  proof;  we  simply  give  a  scientific  explanation,  show- 
ing why  it  is  that  a  conclusion  logically  derived  from  true 
premises  must  be  as  certain  as  the  premises  themselves. 

133.  Thesis  IX.  Whoever  grants  the  premises  of  logical 
reasoning  cannot  deny  the  coficlusion. 

Proof.  All  logical  reasoning,  as  explained  above  (Nos.  22, 
etc.),  is  based  on  this  principle,  that  the  conclusion  is  im- 
plicitly contained  in  the  premises.  Hence,  he  who  would 
grant  the  premises  and  deny  the  conclusion  would  thereby 
affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing ;  but  one  cannot  deny  what 
he  affirms.  Therefore  whoever  grants  the  premises  of  logical 
reasoning  cannot  deny  the  conclusion. 

134.  Objections:  i.  Iftheconclusion  were  contained  in  the 
premises,  nothing  new  would  be  learned  by  reasoning. 
Answer.  The  knowledge  of  the  conclusion  is  new  to 
us;  for,  although  the  conclusion  was  implicitly  con- 
tained in  the  premises,  we  did  not  know  this  conclu- 
sion in  particular  till  we  arrived  at  it  by  reasoning. 
Thus,  all  the  theorems  of  Geometry  are  derived  from 
the  preceding  theorems  and  ultimately  from  the 
axioms. 

2.  Reasoning  leads  men  into  many  errors.  Answer, 
Not  when  it  is  materially  and  formally  correct. 

3.  The  proof  given  holds  only  for  the  syllogism.  An- 
swer. All  reasoning  is  reducible  to  the  syllogistic. 
(See  Nos.  35,  etc.;  in  particular,  for  induction,  No. 
46.) 

Article  III.      Sensation. 

135.  The  faculty  of  sensation  distinguishes  all  animals 
from  all  vegetable  substances ;  for  '  sentient '  is  the  difference 
which,  added  to  the  genus  '  living  material  substance,'  con- 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  75 

stitutes  the  species  *  animal.'  By  saying  man  is  an  *  animal ' 
we  mean  exactly  this,  that  he  is  a  living  material  substance 
endowed  with  sense. 

136.  Now,  sense  is  a  cognitive  power,  i.  e.,  a  power  of 
knowing;  its  action,  or  knowledge,  is  elicited  by  a  living 
material  substance,  and  its  organs  consist  of  the  living 
material  nerves.  It  is  a  clear  and  certain  principle  that  no 
action  can  be  superior  to  the  agent,  else  the  effect  would 
exceed  the  cause ;  therefore,  as  sense  is  a  material  power, 
it  can  know  nothing  higher  than  material  objects. 

137.  Besides,  any  matter  is  a  concrete  individual  portion 
of  matter;  both  the  organs  and  the  objects  of  sense  are  such, 
and  therefore  every  sense-action  will  be  a  concrete  individual 
modification  of  a  concrete  individual  portion  of  matter.  But 
it  is  evident  that  a  concrete  individual  modification  of  a  con- 
crete individual  portion  of  matter  can  picture  or  represent  by 
its  own  nature  nothing  but  a  concrete  and  individual  modi- 
fication of  matter ;  now,  perception  of  sense  consists  in  such 
representation,  hence  sense  can  perceive  nothing  but  concrete 
and  individual  modifications  of  matter. 

138.  When  sense  perceives  the  material  modifications  that 
take  place  within  its  own  animal  body,  it  is  called  inner  sense ; 
when  it  perceives  the  material  modifications  that  take  place 
outside  of  its  animal  body,  it  is  called  outer  sense.  Inner 
sense  was  more  fully  explained  above  (Nos.  103,  104). 

§  I.     The  Inner  Sense. 

139.  The  inner  sense  does  not  testify  to  the  causes  of  our 
feelings  or  affections ;  for  by  our  inner  sense  we  merely  feel 
a  certain  affection  called  pain  or  comfort ;  by  our  animal  in- 
stinct we  are  prompted  to  seek  relief  of  the  pain  or  increase 
of  the  comfort ;  but  it  is  only  by  a  process  of  inductive 
reasoning  that  we  have  learned  intellectually  to   refer  this 


y6  Critical  Logic, 


certain  feeling  to  a  special  cause.  Thus  we  have  learned  by 
long  experience  that  a  peculiar  feeUng  of  discomfort  arises 
from  want  of  food,  another  from  want  of  drink,  etc. 

140.  Thesis  X.  Inner  sense  is  reliable  in  its  perceptions ; 
i.  e.,  the  material  modifications  perceived  by  it  really  exist. 

Proof.  To  say  that  the  inner  sense  is  not  reliable  in  itr 
perceptions,  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  those  identical  affec  • 
tions,  or  inner  modifications  of  the  animal  body,  which  are 
perceived,  do  not  really  exist.  But  this  cannot  be  said  with- 
out absurdity ;  for  '  to  be  perceived '  means  '  to  be  that  which- 
is  perceived 'or  *to  exist  as  the  object  of  perception.'  If, 
then,  those  affections  did  not  really  exist,  they  would  *  exist 
and  not  exist ' ;  which  is  absurd. 

141.  Objections:  i.  The  inner  sense  sometimes  testifies  to 
the  feeling  of  a  pain  in  an  amputated  limb.  Answer. 
It  testifies  to  the  feeling  of  a  pain,  we  grant,  and  there 
really  is  a  pain ;  but  it  does  not  testify  to  the  exact 
cause  of  that  pain.  The  feeling  experienced  now  may 
be  similar  to  that  experienced  before  the  limb  was  am- 
putated. Then  the  feeling  of  pain  arose  from  some 
lesion  in  that  limb ;  and  now,  the  imagination  repro- 
ducing this  former  relation,  affords  us  an  occasion  for 
judging  that  the  present  sensation  is  again  owing  to  the 
limb  which  is  no  longer  there.  We  feel  a  lesion,  which 
we  may  be  inclined,  by  the  force  of  habit,  to  locate  in 
the  amputated  limb,  whereas  the  nerves  are  affected 
elsewhere,  namely  at  their  extremity,  which  is  exposed 
and  very  sensitive. 

2.  The  inner  sense  fails  to  report  all  affections.  Answer. 
We  simply  maintain  that  those  affections  exist  which 
it  does  report. 

3.  The  proof  supposes  that  the  inner  affections  are  really 
felt  and  therefore  must  really  exist ;  but  perhaps  we 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  yj 

only  imagine  that  we  feel  them.  Answer.  W«  know 
by  consciousness  that  we  can  imagine  a  certain  pain, 
for  instance  the  pain  of  burning,  and  that  we  can  feel 
that  pain,  but  that  there  is  a  vast  difference  between 
these  two  acts  * 

§  2.     The  Outer  Senses. 

142.  We  stated  before  (No.  102)  that  we  perceive  objects 
outside  of  us  by  the  five  outer  senses  of  sight,  hearing,  smell, 
taste,  and  touch.  Two  very  different  questions  present  them- 
selves on  this  subject:  i.  How  far  is  the  testimony  of  our 
external  senses  reliable  ?  2.  How  do  the  senses  work  so  as  to 
give  us  reliable  testimony  ?  The  full  treatment  of  the  latter 
question  belongs  to  Psychology,  that  of  the  former  to  our 
present  study  of  Critical  Logic.  We  are  absolutely  certain 
of  many  facts,  though  we  cannot  satisfactorily  explain  how 
they  are  brought  about :  a  man  exhausted  with  hunger  and 
fatigue  is  absolutely  certain  of  the  pleasure  and  the  restora- 
tion of  strength  which  he  derives  from  a  wholesome  meal, 
although  he  cannot  explain  the  exact  process  by  which  the 
senses  and  the  digestive  power  contribute  to  these  results; 
similarly,  all  men  are  certain  that  the  outer  senses  often  give 
reliable  information,  though  few  are  able  to  describe  the 
manner  in  which  this  is  accomplished. 

143.  The  obvious  facts  in  the  case  are  these:  {a)  We  have 
various  sensations  of  outer  objects  in  and  by  our  external 
senses  j   [b)  We  Judge  the  cause  of  these  to  exist  in  bodies,  i.  <?., 

*  The  objective  reality  of  both  sense-perception  and  intellectual  perception  is  well 
expressed  in  the  following  words  of  Very  Rev.  I.  T.  Hecker  {Cath.  World,  Oct., 
1887,  p.  6)  :  "  To  see,  if  one  is  not  a  fool  or  a  lunatic,  is  to  see  something.  To  act 
on  any  oiher  view  of  human  life,  is  to  tend  to  imbecility.  This  law  of  objective 
reality  applies  to  the  entire  realm  of  human  activity.  Life  is  real.  '  Wherefore,' 
says  St.  Augustine  on  the  Trinity  (book  ix  ),  'it  must  be  clearly  held  that  everything 
whatsoever  that  we  know  begets  in  us  the  knowledge  of  itself,  for  knowledge  is 
brought  forth  from  both,  from  the  knower  and  the  thing  known.'  " 


78  '  Critical  Logic, 

in  substances  distinct  from  our  mind,  having  extension  and 
peculiar  powers  of  action ;  {c)  We  adhere  to  this  judgment 
firmly  without  fear  of  error.  We  maintain  that  our  firm 
adhesion  to  this  judgment  is  due  to  the  objective  existence  of 
bodies,  and  that  therefore  our  external  senses  are  reliable  m 
their  sensations  of  outward  objects. 

144.  But  some  philosophers  argue  that  we  do  not  know 
bodies  except  by  means  of  phantasms  and  ideas,  which  are 
subjective  in  us,  and  which,  for  all  we  know,  may  have  no 
objective  reality  corresponding  to  them.  These  philosophers 
are  called  Idealists.  They  are  divided  into  two  schools:  i. 
Fichte,  the  leader  of  the  subjective  school,  maintains  that 
there  exists  nothing  but  his  own  mind  which  is  ever  imagin- 
ing unrealities:  "The  Ego  posits  itself."  2.  Berkeley,  the 
leader  of  the  objective  school,  makes  God  the  direct  cause  of 
our  phantasms  and  ideas. 

145.  Such  speculations,  instead  of  resting  on  solid  facts,  as 
all  sciences  should  do,  are  in  direct  conflict  with  all  known 
facts  and  with  the  firmest  judgments  of  all  mankind.  Every 
sound  mind  knows  for  certain  the  difference  between  real 
perceptions  and  mere  imaginations  ;  and  unsoundness  of 
mind  consists  precisely  in  the  inability  of  some  men  to  dis- 
tinguish between  objective  realities  and  mere  phantasms. 
But  there  is  no  likelihood  that  any  philosopher  of  note  ever 
doubted  the  existence  of  bodies.  Such  as  pretended  to  doubt 
did  violence  to  their  own  good  sense  in  order  to  support  some 
pet  theory,  by  which  they  earned  the  name  of  original 
thinkers.* 

*  Hume  writes  in  his  Treatise  on  Human  Nature:  "  I  dine,  I  play  a  game  of  back< 
gammon,  I  converse  and  am  happy  with  my  fnends  ;  and  when,  after  three  or  four 
hours  of  amusement,  I  would  return  to  these  speculations,  they  appear  so  cold,  so 
strained,  and  so  ridiculous  that  I  cannot  find  it  in  my  heart  to  enter  into  them  any 
farther"  (vol.  i.  p.  467).  Why  did  Hume  and  Fichte  write  books  if  they  really  be« 
lieved  that  no  readers  existed  ? 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  79 

146.  Thesis  XI.  By  our  external  senses  we  really  perceive 
bodies^  i.  e.,  substances  distinct  from  our  mind^  extended  and 
resisting. 

Proof.  Nothing  exists  without  a  reason  for  it;  but  there 
exist  in  us,  as  we  know  by  consciousness,  {a)  Sensations  \  (b) 
Irresistible  judgments  that  those  sensations  are  caused  by 
bodies,  /.  e.,  by  substances  distinct  from  our  mind,  extended 
and  resisting ;  therefore  a  reason  must  exist  for  those  sensa- 
tions and  for  those  irresistible  judgments.  But  that  reason 
can  be  none  other  than  bodies  really  existing ;  therefore  they 
really  exist. 

We  prove  the  last  minor :  If  that  reason  were  not  in  the 
bodies,  it  would  be  either,  i.  In  our  minds,  as  Fichte  main- 
tains; or,  2.  In  God,  as  Berkeley  supposes.  No  other  reason 
is  assigned  by  our  opponents.  Now,  it  is,  i.  Not  in  our  minds. 
If  it  were,  we  should  produce  those  sensations  and  judgments 
necessarily  or  freely ;  but  we  do  neither :  {a)  Not  freely,  for 
we  see,  hear,  feel,  etc.,  many  things  which  we  are  totally 
unwiUing  to  see,  hear,  feel,  etc. ;  {b)  Not  necessarily ;  for  if 
we  were  so  constituted  that  we  necessarily  elicited  false  judg- 
ments, our  intellect  would  be  essentially  unreHable ;  it  would 
be  a  power,  not  of  knowing  truth  but  of  deception  and  falsi- 
fication. 2.  Not  in  God.  Those  who  admit  the  existence  of 
God  at  all,  as  Berkeley  and  his  followers  do,  admit  that  He  u 
the  infinitely  perfect  Being ;  but  a  perfect  being  is  essentially 
truthful  and  cannot  be  the  source  of  a  universal  deception, 
as  He  would  be  if  He  produced  those  phantasms  and  gave  us 
at  the  same  time  an  irresistible  impulse  to  judge  falsely  of 
their  cause. 

147.  Objections:  i.  An  evil  genius  could  produce  the 
deception.  Answer.  We  deny  this ;  for  the  deception, 
if  such  it  were,  would  be,  not  accidental,  but  natural 
and  essential  to  man,  and  therefore  it  would  be  essen- 


8o  Critical  Logic. 


tial  to  man  to  judge  falsely;  and  thus  universal  Scep- 
ticism would  become  reasonable. 

2.  God  would  not  be  omnipotent  if  he  could  not  directly 
produce  on  us  all  the  effects  that  bodies  can.  Answer. 
He  cannot  give  us  an  irresistible  propensity  to  judge 
falsely;  this  would  be  against  His  own  perfect  nature, 
and  it  would  leave  us  incapable  of  having  certainty,  of 
knowing  truth. 

3.  God  does  so  in  visions,  e,  g.,  when  He  made  Tobias 
see  an  Angel.  Answer.  The  Angel  had  assumed  a 
material  body. 

4.  Sometimes  a  vision  is  merely  subjective.  Answer. 
Then  the  intellect  sees  reason  to  suspect  the  truth. 

5.  In  dreams  we  judge  irresistibly  that  we  perceive  real 
objects.  Answer.  In  dreams  we  do  not  examine  the 
certainty  of  our  judgments ;  we  have  not  that  reflex 
certainty  which  we  are  here  considering.  Besides,  in 
dreams  we  are  not  in  the  normal  state  of  rational 
beings. 

6.  Those  suffering  of  mania  apotu  cannot  rid  themselves, 
even  on  reflection,  of  the  perception,  as  they  suppose 
it  to  be,  of  snakes,  demons,  etc.  Answer.  From  the 
fact  that  a  disordered  mind  cannot  know  the  truth,  it 
does  not  follow  that  a  sound  mind  cannot ;  besides, 
they  no  doubt  perceive  their  own  abnormal  condition 
and  see  reasons,  when  they  reflect  at  all,  to  doubt 
their  visions. 

7.  From  any  act  which  is  only  subjective  we  cannot 
infer  the  existence  of  the  objective  reality ;  but  sensa- 
tion is  only  subjective.  Answer.  Our  sensation  is  not 
merely  subjective ;  for  it  is  a  perception,  and  a  percep- 
tion is  the  subjective  act  of  taking  in  an  object :  a  per- 
ception without  an  object  perceived  is  a  self-contra- 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  8i 

diction :  there  can  be  no  taking  in  of  nothing.     Besides, 
we  invincibly  judge  that  our  perceptions  are  due  to 
objects  (Nos.  143,  etc.) 
148.  To  understand  how  far  the  reliability  of  our  senses 
extends,   we  have  only  to  examine  on  what  points  sensa- 
tion prompts  us  irresistibly  to  elicit  judgments.     As  this  is 
a  question  of  great  importance,  we  shall  consider  it  with  some 
detail.* 

1.  We  may  see  a  painting  in  the  distance  and  judge  it  to 
be  a  statue ;  we  may  judge  a  sound  to  come  from  a 
greater  distance  than  it  does.  Do  our  senses  deceive 
us  on  those  occasions  ?  Not  at  all :  in  fact,  the  sight, 
as  such,  does  not  inform  us  whether  all  the  parts  of  the 
object  seen  are  equally  near,  as  in  a  painting,  or 
unequally,  as  in  a  statue.  Neither  sight  nor  hearing, 
as  such,  tell  about  distances :  sight  deals  with  color 
and,  consequently,  with  the  outlines  of  colored  objects; 
hearing  deals  with  sound,  of  which  we  perceive  count- 
less varieties.  Each  sense  has  thus  its  own  proper 
object  of  sense-perception  (sensibile  proprium).  The 
proper  object  of  sight  is  color ;  of  hearing,  sound;  of 
smell,  odor ;  of  taste,  flavor  j  of  touch,  temperature 
and  resistance.  The  perception  of  resistance  enables 
us  to  distinguish  between  varieties  of  surfaces,  some 
of  which  are  noticed  to  be  yielding  or  soft,  others 
unyielding  or  hard;  some  are  even  or  smooth;  some 
uneven  or  rough;  some  are  bounded  by  straight, 
others  by  curved  lines;  some  extend  over  a  large, 
others  over  a  small  space,  etc. 

2.  As  extension,  outline  or  figure,  number,  etc.,  are  per- 
ceptible by  touch  and  sight,  they,  and  in  general  all 

*See  The  Old  Philosophy  and  Relativity  of  Knowledge,  by  Henry  Brown.     (J'ht 
Month,  September,  1888.) 


82  Critical  Logic, 


those  qualities  of  bodies  which  are  perceptible  by- 
more  than  one  sense,  are  called  the  commoii  objects  of 
sense-perception  {sensibile  commune). 

3.  Sense  does  not  perceive  color,  sound,  resistance,  etc., 
in  the  abstract;  but  it  perceives  something  colored, 
sounding,  resisting,  etc.,  in  the  concrete. 

4.  While  by  our  senses  we  perceive  some  concrete  body 
as  colored,  resisting,  etc.,  our  intellect,,  by  its  power  of 
abstraction,  abstracts,  or  considers  apart,  various  notes 
or  marks  of  that  body,  such  as  'color,'  'resistance,' 
'existence,'  Equality,'  'substance,'  etc.,  and  thus  forms 
abstract  ideas;  next,  by  its  power  of  judging,  it  com- 
pares these  ideas  and  the  objects  perceived  together, 
and  pronounces  judgments,  such  as  'this  substance  is 
colored,'  '  something  resisting  exists,'  etc. 

5.  The  senses  usually  assist  each  other :  the  eye  be- 
holds what  the  hand  touches ;  the  ear  perceives  the 
sound,  the  eye  the  figm-e  of  the  rattle  or  the  string 
which  the  fingers  move.  Thus  from  earliest  infancy 
we  have  learned  by  practice  to  associate  our  sense- 
perceptions  with  one  another  and  with  our  intellectual 
acts ;  we  have  perfected  our  associations  of  phantasms 
by  inductive  reasoning,  till  we  have  acquired  great 
readiness  to  judge  of  the  qualities  revealed  to  one 
sense  by  the  proper  object  of  another  sense.  For  in- 
stance, on  hearing  a  familiar  human  voice  we  know 
the  presence  and  the  very  expression  of  countenance 
of  a  well-known  person ;  from  the  firagrance  of  a  fruit 
we  can  tell  its  taste ;  from  the  aroma  we  judge  the 
form  of  a  flower. 

6.  We  see  many  reasons  to  judge,  and  on  many  points 
no  reason  to  doubt,  that  the  senses  of  brute  animals 
work  in  the  same  way  as  our  own.     Brutes  perceive 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  83 

the  proper  and  the  common  objects  of  sense ;  and,  as 
their  organs  and  their  instincts  are  often  more  perfect 
than  ours,  brutes  may  associate  phantasms,  derived 
from  various  senses,  more  readily  and  perfectly  than 
we  do,  as  is  well  exemplified  in  the  scent  of  the  dog 
and  the  cunning  ways  of  the  fox. 

7.  Sense  does  not  perceive  substance  as  such;  /.  ^.,  as 
distinct  from  quality ;  but  still,  by  perceiving  the  con- 
crete quaHties,  it  puts  us  into  relation  with  substance. 
What  is  thus  intellectually  perceived  on  account  of 
sense,  is  said  to  be  indirectly  sensible  {sensibile  per 
accidens).  Brutes  do  not  judge  at  all,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word ;  they  merely  associate,  e.  g.j  the 
stone  thrown  with  the  man  who  throws  it,  and  they 
do  not  always  do  even  that :  the  dog  will  often  bite  the 
stone  itself.  The  Creator,  in  His  wisdom,  has  given 
brutes  as  perfect  a  power  of  associating  phantasms  as 
is  beneficial  to  themselves  and  to  man,  for  whose  ad- 
vantage they  are  evidently  intended. 

8.  Man  both  associates  and  judges ;  for  he  has  instinct 
and  reason.  It  is,  however,  only  on  occasions  of 
some  importance  that  we  stop  to  consider  whether  our 
judgments  are  well  enough  founded  to  exclude  all 
doubt.  We  find  them  to  be  such  when,  on  careful 
examination,  we  perceive  that  they  give  us  evidence 
of  the  objective  truth.  That  they  may  do  so  with  re- 
gard to  our  sense -perceptions,  the  following  conditions 
must  be  fulfilled :  {a)  We  must  be  conscious  that  we 
are  in  a  normal  or  healthy  condition ;  else  we  can  see 
reason  to  suspect  the  testimony  of  our  senses.  (^)  We 
must  be  aware  that  our  surroundings  appear  normal ; 
e.  g.j  it  all  around  us  looked  yellow,  we  should  see 
reason  to  suspect  that  oiu:  eyes  were  jaundiced,     (c) 


84  Critical  Logic, 


We  must  find  that  our  senses  are  concordant  with  one 
another  and  constant  in  their  testimony ;  <f.  ^.,  if  a 
passing  glance  makes  me  perceive  an  unusual  appear- 
ance, I  look  again  with  care,  I  shift  my  position  to 
dispel  all  possible  illusion  of  the  sight ;  or  I  even  apply 
my  hands  to  touch  what  excites  my  surprise. 

149.  Thesis  XIL  The  external  senses^  acting  under  proper 
conditions^  are  reliable  with  regard  to  their  proper  and  their 
common  objects  of  sensation. 

The  proper  conditions  here  spoken  of  have  just  been 
explained.  This  thesis  defines  the  extent  to  which  the  outer 
senses  are  perfectly  reUable. 

Proof.  The  senses  are  reliable  in  their  testimony  if  they 
perceive  nothing  but  the  objective  truth;  but  such  is  the 
case.  For,  being  physical  powers,  they  work  necessarily,  and 
therefore  they  can  only  perceive  the  objects  presented  to 
them ;  else  they  would  perceive  what  does  not  exist ;  i,  e.^ 
that  which  does  not  exist  would  be  an  object  of  perception; 
which  is  absurd. 

150.  We  do  not,  then,  claim  certainty  for  every  judgment 
that  is  formed  on  occasion  of  sense-perception,  but  only  for 
what  the  senses  really  report,  /.  ^.,  the  existence  of  those 
sensible  qualities  which  are  the  proper  and  the  common 
objects  of  sensation.  The  substance  itself  in  which  those 
sensible  qualities  exist  is  not  apprehended,  by  the  senses,  as 
distinct  from  those  qualities.  From  the  knowledge  of  the  qual- 
ities perceived  by  sense,  the  intellect  judges  the  nature  of  the 
substance  in  which  those  qualities  inhere.  In  forming  its  esti- 
mate of  that  substance,  the  intellect  may  often  be  mistaken ; 
e.  g.f  it  may  judge  that  to  be  an  orange  which  is  a  lump  of 
wax  ;  it  may  mistake  a  picture  for  a  body.  But  even  in  such 
cases  the  intellect  is  not  led  necessarily  into  error,  but  it  can 
suspend  its  judgment  till  all  fear  of  error  has  been  removed. 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty.  85 

151.  Obj  ections :  i .  The  senses  tell  us  that  sugar  is  sweet,  fire 
hot,  etc.,  while  Descartes  and  others  prove  that  these 
qualities  are  not  in  the  bodies  perceived,  but  in  the 
senses.  Answer.  When  we  say  that  sugar  is  sweet, 
fire  hot,  etc.,  we  mean  that  those  bodies  have  real 
qualities  which  produce  in  us  corresponding  sensations 
of  sweetness,  heat,  etc. ;  both  the  qualities  that  are  in 
those  bodies  and  the  sensations  that  are  in  us  are  de- 
nominated by  the  same  terms  analogically.  Certainly 
sugar  and  fire  have  real  qualities  which  are  causes  of 
our  sensations. 

2.  We  know  by  science  that  the  sun  is  not  exactly  there 
where  we  see  it;  here  the  sight  deceives  us.  An- 
swer. We  know  by  the  sight  nothing  but  the  color  of 
the  sun ;  its  place,  size,  etc.,  are  inferred  by  inductive 
reasoning. 

3.  But  even  the  color  of  the  sun  is  not  such  as  we  see  it 
when  modified  by  the  atmosphere.  Answer.  We  do 
not  claim  certainty  except  for  what  we  perceive ;  now, 
we  perceive  by  the  sight  the  color  such  as  it  is  when  it 
reaches  our  eyes ;  with  anything  else  the  sense  of  sight 
has  nothing  to  do. 

4.  But  the  sight  distorts  its  objects ;  thus,  a  square  tower 
appears  round  in  the  distance.  Answer.  The  sight 
reports  only  the  colors  of  the  different  parts  of  the 
^ower;  all  inference  as  to  its  shape,  size,  etc.,  are  con- 
clusions of  inductive  reasoning,  which  is  often  too  im- 
perfect to  give  certainty. 

5.  By  admitting  that  the  senses  must  be  concordant  and 
constant  in  their  testimony,  we  imply  that  each  sense 
singly  can  be  mistaken  in  certain  cases,  at  least  for 
a  while.  Answer.  All  we  imply  is  that  the  senses 
give  no  sufficient  ground  for  certainty  till  we  have 


86  Critical  Logic. 


examined  whether   all   the  conditions   are   complied 
with. 

6.  When  I  see  a  stick  plunged  into  water,  I  see  it  broken 
where  it  touches  the  surface ;  here  my  sight  deceives 
me.  Answer.  My  sight  reports  the  truth,  viz. :  that 
the  stick  appears  as  if  broken. 

7.  Then  our  senses  can  report  appearances  only ;  e.  g.^ 
that  I  see  the  appearance  of  a  man,  not  that  I  see  a 
man.  Answer.  Sense  apprehends  appearances  only ; 
but  our  intellect  understands  that  appearances  are 
accidents  which  naturally  exist  in  substances.  When 
I  see  the  appearance  of  a  man,  I  understand  there 
must  be  a  cause  for  that  appearance ;  and,  by  attending 
to  all  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  my 
mind  soon  forms  a  judgment,  often  absolutely  certain, 
that  on  the  present  occasion  the  appearance  of  the 
man  is  due  to  the  reality  of  his  presence. 

8.  That  our  senses  may  be  relied  on,  we  must  first  know 
that  the  order  of  nature  is  constant ;  but  we  cannot 
learn  this  except  fi^om  the  testimony  of  the  senses; 
therefore  we  cannot  reason  on  this  subject  except  in 
a  vicious  circle.  Answer.  We  deny  the  major  and  the 
supposition  that  we  need  to  reason  at  all  in  order  to 
see  the  evidence  of  the  common  and  the  proper  objects 
of  sense,  when  the  required  conditions  are  attended 
to.  We  see  color,  we  feel  heat  and  resistance  imme- 
diately. 

9.  A  color,  odor,  taste,  etc.,  may  please  one  man  and 
displease  another ;  therefore  different  men  must  appre- 
hend objects  differently ;  therefore  all  do  not  appre- 
hend them  correctly.  Answer.  The  apprehensions 
are  the  same,  but  they  do  not  suit  all  alike.  As  the 
organs  of  men  are  substantially  alike  in  structure,  with 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  87 

only  accidental  differences,  we  reasonably  judge  that 
the  apprehensions  of  all  men  by  sense  are  substantially 
the  same,  with  only  accidental  differences.  But  the 
pleasure  arising  from  colors  and  sounds  is  mostly  due 
to  associations  of  phantasms  and  sentiments;  thus, 
orange  and  green  please  persons  of  different  parties. 
Odors  and  tastes,  being  intended  by  the  Creator  to 
guide  us  in  the  selection  of  suitable  food  according 
to  our  varying  bodily  conditions,  though  identical  in 
kind,  will  often  please  one  and  displease  another,  ac- 
cording to  our  several  needs,  thus  displaying  the 
wonderful  wisdom  with  which  Providence  adapts 
means  to  an  end. 

10.  In  the  Holy  Eucharist  the  senses  are  deceived. 
Answer,  They  apprehend  the  appearances  which 
really  exist,  and  thus  there  is  no  deception  of  the  senses. 

11.  Persons  who  are  color-blind  misjudge  colors.  An- 
swer. Rather,  they  are  unable  to  distinguish  colors 
sufficiently  to  judge  with  certainty. 

Article  IV.    Authority. 

152.  Consciousness  and  intellect  put  us  into  direct  com- 
munication with  objective  truth,  of  which  they  see  the  evi- 
dence. Their  perceptions  are  called  intuitions,  /.  ^.,  visions 
of  truth.  It  is  the  same  with  our  sense-perceptions  of  the 
proper  and  the  common  objects  of  sense :  they,  too,  give  us 
intuitions  or  immediate  evidence.  Reasoning  brings  evidence 
to  us  in  a  more  circuitous  way ;  it  gives  mediate  evidence. 
Such,  too,  is  the  evidence  of  sense-perceptions  with  regard  to 
all  testimony  that  implies  the  process  of  induction ;  e.  g.^\ 
have  only  mediate  evidence  by  my  sight  of  the  distances  of 
objects;  for  any  judgment  I  pronounce  on  that  subject  is 
derived  from  observation  and  induction  united. 


88  Critical  Logic. 


153.  Authority  gives  us  certainty  in  a  still  more  circuitous 
way;  for  it  brings  us  into  communication  with  truth  by 
means  of  the  statements  of  other  persons.  The  truth  thus 
reached  is  said  to  be  believed^  and  authority  is  called  an 
extrinsic  motive  of  certainty.  Belief,  or  faith,  is  Divine  or 
human,  according  as  the  authority  on  which  it  rests  is  Divine 
or  human.  In  Philosophy  we  are  concerned  with  human 
faith ;  and  the  question  to  be  now  considered  is,  whether  the 
authority  of  human  witnesses  can  be  relied  upon  to  give 
perfect  certainty. 

154.  Thesis  XIII.  The  testimony  of  men^  under  proper  con- 
ditions, can  give  perfect  certainty. 

The  conditions  required  are:  i.  That  the  facts  testified  to 
are  sufficiently  open  or  accessible  to  observation;  2.  That 
they  are  of  great  moment;  else  they  might  not  be  noticed 
carefully;  3.  That  the  witnesses  are  sensible  men;  4.  That 
they  are  either  undoubtedly  sincere,  or,  if  not,  that  they  are 
many,  of  sufficiently  different  characters,  opinions,  parties, 
interests,  etc.,  to  exclude  all  reasonable  suspicion  of  collusion 
in  the  support  of  false  statements.  Proof.  That  testimony 
gives  perfect  certainty  which  convinces  us  beyond  all  reason- 
able doubt  that  the  witnesses  could  not  have  been  deceived 
themselves  and  did  not  wish  to  deceive  us.  But  such  is  the 
testimony  which  fulfils  the  conditions  just  stated. 

For :  I .  The  witnesses  could  not  have  been  deceived,  since : 
{a)  The  facts  are  supposed  to  be  open,  accessible  to  observa- 
tion ;  {b)  They  are  of  great  moment,  so  as  to  invite  careful 
examination;  [c]  The  witnesses  are  sensible  men,  who  do  not 
act  rashly  and  are  not  easily  imposed  upon ;  and,  besides,  they 
are  of  different  opinions,  characters,  etc.,  so  as  not  to  make  a 
mistake  in  common. 

2.  They  do  not  wish  to  deceive  us ;  since  either  they  are 
known  for  certam  to  be  sincere,  and,  of  course,  such  men  do 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  89 

not  wish  to  deceive;    or,  if  not  certainly  sincere,  they  are 
supposed  to  be  many,  of  different  characters,  opinions,  parties, 
interests,  etc.     Now,  sensible  men  do  not  lie  wantonly,  espe- 
cially on  matters  of  importance ;  and,  least  of  all,  would  they 
combine  to  propagate  an  important  falsehood,  unless  some 
common  grave  interest  led  them  into  so  disgraceful  a  crime. 
But  they  are  supposed  to  have  no  such  interest  in  common. 
There  is,  consequently,  no  reason  to  doubt  tjhieir  testimony. 
155.  Objections:    i.  Each  witness  gives  only  probability, 
and  no  number  of  probabilities  can  make  up  certainty. 
Answer.  Even  one  witness  who  is  certainly  intelligent, 
prudent,  and  sincere  may  give  perfect  certainty;  but 
if  the  testimony  of  one  or  several  still  leaves  special 
reasons  to  doubt,  the  testimony  of  others  may  show 
that  the  doubt  is  unfounded  in  the  present  case ;  cer- 
tainty is  thus  attained,  not  by  an   accumulation  of 
probabihties,  but  by  the  elimination  of  all  motives  for 
reasonable  doubt. 

2.  Every  witness  is  free  to  deceive.  Answer.  We  can 
know  from  the  conditions  laid  down  that,  in  a  given 
case,  there  was  no  actual  attempt  at  deceit.  Every 
man  is  free  to  commit  suicide,  and  still  it  is  certain 
that  they  will  not  all  do  so. 

3.  History  contains  many  falsehoods.  Answer.  We  do 
not  defend  all  history. 

4.  At  least,  we  cannot  be  certain  of  events  long  since 
past,  because  traditions  are  gradually  changed.  An- 
swer. We  can  often  be  certain  of  such  events,  viz., 
when  we  know  that,  in  a  given  instance,  the  tradition 
was  not  changed ;  e.g.,  we  know  for  certain  that  Christ 
died  on  a  cross ;  that  He  rose  again ;  that  His  dis- 
ciples preached  His  Resurrection ;  that  they  had  no 
motive  to  do  so  if  He  had  not  risen;  that  they  laid 


90  Critical  Logic. 


down  their  lives  in  testimony  of  their  sincerity,  etc. 
(See  this  argument  more  fully  treated  in  Schouppe's 
Course  of  Religious  Instruction,  p.  6.) 

5.  At  least,  no  amount  of  testimony  can  make  miracles 
certain;  for  it  is  physically  certain  that  they  never 
occurred,  while  it  is  at  most  only  morally  certain 
that  they  did.  Answer.  It  is  not  physically  certain 
that  they  never  occurred ;  all  that  is  physically  certain 
is  that  nature  has  no  power  to  produce  them,  but  the 
Lord  of  nature  has ;  and  it  is  morally  certain  that  they 
have  occurred. 

6.  Still,  plain  men  could  not  assure  us  that  any  particular 
miracle  was  performed;  for  they  are  not  fit  judges  of 
what  is  miraculous.  Answer.  Sensible  men,  even 
though  unlearned,  can  give  reliable  testimony  about 
obvious  facts,  of  which  learned  men  will  judge  whether 
they  were  natural  or  beyond  all  natural  power. 

Article  V.     Common  Sense. 

156.  There  are  many  unwavering  judgments  or  convictions 
common  to  all  men  of  sound  minds ;  all  these  may  in  a  wider 
meaning  be  called  dictates  of  common  sense,  /.  <?.,  of  that 
sense  or  intellect  which  belongs  in  common  to  all  men.  Some 
of  these  judgments  proceed  from  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness, others  from  the  immediate  intuitions  of  identity  between 
two  ideas,  others  from  intellect  and  sense-perceptions  combined, 
others  are  the  obvious  deductions  of  reason  from  intuitive 
piinciples  and  from  the  perceptions  of  the  senses.  But  the 
term  common  sense,  when  considered  as  a  special  motive  of 
certainty,  is  taken  in  a  more  restricted  meaning ;  it  comprises 
those  judgments  only,  common  to  all  sensible  men,  which  are 
not  immediately  or  intuitively  evident,  and  which  arc  con- 
cerned with  the  direction  of  moral  conduct. 


Means  of  Attaining  Certainty,  91 


157.  The  following  are  examples  of  common-sense  judg- 
ments :  "  There  is  a  sovereign  Lord  and  Master  of  all  things," 
"  His  Providence  directs  human  affairs,"  "  We  must  reverence 
Him,"  "  We  must  obey  His  laws,"  "  He  is  the  rewarder  of 
good  and  evil,"  "  Our  soul  will  survive  our  body,"  "  There 
are  rewards  and  punishments  after  death,"  "  Children  must 
honor  and  obey  their  parents,"  "  Friends  must  help  each 
other,"  "  Brutes  may  be  killed  for  the  use  of  man,"  "  Men 
cannot  be  killed  without  just  cause,"  etc. 

158.  To  find  how  far  the  judgments  of  common  sense  are 
rehable,  we  must  carefully  consider  whence  they  proceed  and 
what  evidence  they  give  us  of  the  objective  truth.  We  should 
not  suppose  that  they  proceed  from  the  universal  consent  of 
men;  men  agree  because  each  of  them  individually  forms  the 
same  judgments,  but  each  one  separately  does  not  form  them 
because  all  agree :  universality  is  a  character,  not  a  cause 
of  them. 

159.  True,  we  may  accept  a  judgment  on  the  authority  of 
men  if  their  united  testimony  is  known  to  us ;  but  we  are 
then  influenced  by  another  motive  of  certainty,  viz.,  common 
consent.  Thus,  we  may  beheve  that  man  is  fallen  from  an 
originally  happier  condition,  because  most  nations  have  tradi- 
tions to  that  effect ;  but  the  judgments  of  common  sense  are 
very  different,  being  formed  by  each  one  independently  of  the 
consent  of  others. 

160.  Nor  should  we  suppose  that  the  judgments  of  com- 
mon sense  proceed,  as  Reid  and  his  followers  of  the  Scottish 
School  maintain,  from  a  mere  instinct  to  believe  certain 
truths.  These  writers  wished  to  refute  the  Scepticism  of 
Hume  by  the  weapon  of  common  sense  ;  but  they  failed  to 
establish  the  reliability  of  common  sense  by  making  it  a  mere 
blind  instinct. 

161.  Whence,  then,  do  the  judgments  of  common  sense 


92  Critical  Logic, 


derive  their  validity  ?  From  the  evidence  of  the  objective^ 
truth,  which  is  presented  with  sufficient  clearness  to  every 
sound  mind.  The  objective  truth  in  such  cases  is  not  intui- 
tively beheld;  we  do  not  see  immediately  God's  existence^ 
nor  the  action  of  His  providence;  nor  the  soul  as  surviving  the- 
body,  nor  one  being  called  virtue  and  another  vice;  but, 
starting  with  premises  supplied  by  sense-perceptions  and 
intellectual  action,  we  go  through  an  obvious  process  of  rea^ 
Boning,  of  which  the  evident  conclusions  are  the  dictates  of 
common  sense.  For  instance,  my  senses  seize  upon  the  fact 
of  the  world's  existence,  my  intellect  sees  there  must  be  a 
reason  for  its  existence ;  and,  not  finding  that  reason  in  the 
world  itself,  my  mind  concludes  by  an  obvious  process  of 
reasoning  that  there  is  a  first  cause  of  the  world,  distinct 
fi-om  it ;  besides,  since  we  also  understand  that  a  thing  made 
belongs  to  its  maker,  we  conceive  the  Cause  of  this  world  as 
the  Sovereign  Lord  and  Master  of  all  things,  etc.  The  judg- 
ments of  common  sense,  therefore,  are  reliable,  because  they 
are  evident  conclusions  derived  from  evident  premises. 

162.  This  motive  of  certainty  is,  then,  not  entirely  distinct 
from  the  motives  already  considered;  but  it  has  a  special 
advantage,  viz.,  that  it  furnishes  us  with  a  summary  proof  of 
many  most  important  propositions,  the  detailed  study  of 
which  would  require  lengthy  explanations. 

163.  Thesis  XIV.  The  judgments  of  common  sense  art 
true. 

Proof.  According  to  the  principles  that  underlie  inductive 
reasoning  (No.  47),  any  constant,  uniform,  and  unvarying 
effect  produced  by  any  class  of  objects  must  proceed  from  the 
very  nature  of  those  objects;  but  these  judgments  are  con- 
stant, uniform,  and  unvarying  in  man ;  therefore  they  have 
for  cause  the  ve-y  nature  of  man  :  in  other  words,  it  is  natural 
or  essential  to  man  to  form  these  judgments.     Now,  it  cannot 


Means  of  Attaining    Certainty.  93 

be  natural  or  essential  to  man  to  form  false  judgments ;  else  uni- 
versal doubt  would  follow,  which,  however,  has  been  proved 
to  be  absurd  j  therefore  these  judgments  are  not  false,  but  true 
164.  Objections:  i.  Such  judgments  may  have  come  from 
tradition,  education,  prejudices,  human  laws,  etc.    An- 
swer,   The  effect  cannot  exceed  the  cause :  all  these 
causes  are  variable  among  men,  except  just  so  far  as 
they  can  be  traced  to  the  very  nature  of  man.     Be- 
sides, mere  traditions,  etc.,  would  not  impose  on  the 
consciences  of  all  so  stem  a  sense  of  duty  as  belongs 
to  the  dictates  of  common  sense. 

2.  These  judgments  might  come  from  the  passions  of 
men.  Answer.  On  the  contrary,  our  passions  would 
rather  prompt  us  to  deny  these  very  judgments. 

3.  Huxley  says  that  religion  has  been  developed  from 
men's  instinctive  belief  in  ghosts.  Answer.  Huxley's 
theory  is,  as  usual  with  him,  a  mere  theory  unsupported 
by  valid  proof.  The  very  fact  that  so  determined  and 
able  an  opponent  of  religion  cannot  adduce  any  more 
plausible  theory  to  account  for  the  conviction  of  man- 
kind, is  a  strong  presumption  in  favor  of  our  thesis. 

4.  Ignorant  men  cannot  reason  well  enough  to  form 
such  judgments;  therefore  they  only  receive  them 
from  others.  Answer.  The  reasoning  in  question  is 
not  difficult,  but  easy  and  obvious ;  though  it  is  not 
pretended  that  every  mind  can  give  a  philosophic 
account  of  its  own  reasonings. 

5.  Even  great  geniuses  do  not  always  see  those  conclu- 
sions. Answer.  Geniuses  often  strive  after  original- 
ity of  thought  more  than  after  truth,  in  order  to  make 
themselves  a  name ;  proud  minds  disdain  to  follow  the 
beaten  path,  simply  because  it  is  the  beaten  path. 
(See  further  Metaphysics^  No.  225.) 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE  ULTIMATE  CRITERION   OF   CERTAINTY. 

165.  The  various  sources  of  certainty,  examined  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  furnish  us  motives  of  certainty^  i.  e.,  reasons 
which  move  our  intellect  to  elicit  firm  undoubting  judgments. 
But  these  several  sources  do  not  give  certainty  except  when 
properly  applied  to  their  proper  objects;  e.g.,  our  senses  are 
not  reliable  except  under  the  proper  conditions.  Hence,  to- 
have  philosophic  certamty  in  any  given  case,  we  must  exam- 
ine whether  in  that  case  all  the  necessary  conditions  have  been 
complied  with,  and  whether  no  reason  remair.s  to  entertain 
any  further  doubt.  For  this  purpose  we  need  a  rule  or  test 
by  which  to  judge  our  very  judgments;  to  ascertain  beyond 
the.  possibility  of  error  that  they  are  conformable  to  the 
objective  truth.  This  rule  to  judge  by  is  called  a  criterion 
{upivooy  I  judge)  of  certainty. 

166.  We  maintain  that  the  ultimate  and  universal  crite- 
rion of  certainty  is  the  evidence  of  the  objective  truth.  By 
calling  it  ultimate,  or  last,  we  mean  that,  when  this  criterion 
is  applied,  it  leaves  no  room  for  further  inquiry  concerning 
the  existence  of  certainty ;  the  ultimate  criterion  answers  the 
last  question  that  we  can  or  need  ask  in  examining  the  relia- 
bility of  our  knowledge.  For  instance,  if  I  question  myself 
how  I  know  that  bodies  exist,  I  answer  that  I  see  and  feel 
them,  that  by  my  senses  I  perceive  their  existence,  and  I 
cannot  perceive  that  which  does  riot  exist  as  an  object  of 
perception;    in  other  words,  their  existence  is  made  evident 

94 


The  Ultimate  Criterion  of  Certainty.       95 

to  me.  If  asked  why  I  am  certain  that  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  occurred  in  the  United  States,  I  answer  that 
I  have  learned  it  from  reliable  witnesses.  And  why  do  I 
believe  these  witnesses?  Because  tny  reason  convinces 
me  that  their  testimony  is  reliable.  But  why  do  I  rely 
on  my  reason?  Because  it  gives  me  evident  conclusions 
from  certain  premises.  I  can  question  no  further,  because  I 
can  wish  for  nothing  more  evident  than  evidence. 

By  calling  evidence  the  universal  criterion  of  certainty,  we 
mean  that  evidence  is  the  crucial  test  in  all  cases  of  natural 
certainty;  for  it  is  with  natural  certainty  alone,  not  with 
supernatural  Faith,  that  Philosophy  is  concerned. 

167.  What,  then,  is  evidence  ?  It  is  important  to  under- 
stand it  well,  since  all  certainty  is  ultimately  to  be  tested  by 
this  criterion.  As  stated  above  (No.  84),  in  the  analysis  of 
certainty  we  find  that  tne  firm  adhesion  of  our  mind  to  a 
truth,  excluding  all  fear  of  error,  is  the  subjective  element  of 
certainty;  and  the  manifestation  of  the  truth  to  the  mind 
producing  this  firm  adhesion,  is  the  objective  element.  Now, 
such  manifestation  is  the  evidence  of  that  truth.  Evidence 
is  to  the  mind  what  the  visibility  of  a  body  is  to  the  eye. 
That  I  may  see  a  body,  i.  It  must  exist;  2.  It  must  give 
forth,  or  at  least  reflect,  rays  of  light;  3.  By  that  light  it 
must  impress  itself  pn  my  eye.  So,  likewise,  that  a  truth  may 
be  evident  to  me,  i.  It  must  exist;  2.  It  must  shine  forth  by 
its  intelligibility,  as  all  truth  does,  for  ontological  truth  is  the 
intelligibility  of  a  thing  ;  3.  Its  light  or  intelligibility  must  be 
so  presented  as  to  force  itself  upon  my  intellect,  making  me 
see  that  the  thing  is  so  and  must  be  so,  cannot  be  otherwise. 
Hence  a  usual  and  correct  definition  of  evidence  is  "  such  a 
manifestation  of  a  truth  as  makes  us  see  that  the  thin^  is  so 
and  cannot  be  otherwise,"  or,  more  briefly,  "  the  manifest 
necessity   of  a   truth."      We  do   not    mean   here   that   the 


g6  Critical  Logic, 


objective  truth  is  absolutely  necessary,  but  only  that,  if  I  see 
it,  it  muslhe^  else  I  could  not  see  it;  the  truth  is  hypotheti- 
cally  necessary. 

1 68.  Before  Descartes'  time,  the  fact  that  evidence  is  the 
ultimate  criterion  of  certainty  was  scarcely  disputed ;  but  this 
writer  has  so  confused  the  question  of  certainty  that  many 
modem  philosophers  have  assigned  and  defended  false  criteria. 
Descartes  himself  considers  clear  ideas  as  the  great  test  or 
principle  of  certainty ;  while  Reid,  and  the  Scottish  School 
generally,  rely  ultimately  upon  what  they  call  common  sense, 
by  which  they  mean  a  blind  instinct  to  consider  a  thing 
as  true.  But  they  should  prove  that  such  ideas  or  such  an 
instinct  is  necessarily  a  pledge  of  the  objective  truth.  In  fact, 
these  criteria  are  all  internal ;  now,  no  merely  internal  test 
can  settle  the  question  whether  the  external  things  exist,  since 
it  is  not  necessarily  connected  with  the  objective  truth. 

Others  look  for  the  criterion  in  a  merely  external  rule. 
Thus,  De  Lamennais,  indignant  that  human  reason  had  been 
adored  in  France  during  the  Reign  of  Terror,  strove  to  dis- 
credit reason  and  to  show  that  we  cannot  trust  our  reason, 
but  must  test  its  reliability  by  comparing  its  judgments  with 
the  common  consent  of  men.  But  how  can  we  know  that  men 
are  agreed  upon  any  point,  unless  we  can  rely  on  our  senses 
and  oar  reason  to  ascertain  whether  men  exist  and  what  they 
say  ?  No  merely  external  test  can  be  ultimate;  for  we  need 
a  further  criterion  to  judge  of  its  existence  and  its  reliability. 

169.  Thesis  XV.  The  evidence  of  the  objective  truth  is  the 
ultimate  and  universal  criterion  of  certainty. 

Proof.  It  is  such  if  it  fulfils  the  following  conditions  :  i.  To 
be  a  reliable  test  of  truth,  the  criterion  must  be  inseparable 
from  the  truth,  so  that  it  cannot  exist  without  the  truth. 
2.  To  be  ultimate,  it  must  leave  no  doubt  to  be  removed  by 
a  further  test.     3.  To  be  universal^  it  must  be  applicable  to 


The  Ultimate  Criterion  of  Certainty,      97 

every  motive  of  natural  certainty.  Now,  the  evidence  of  the 
objective  truth,  and  it  alone,  fulfils  all  these  conditions  :  i.  It 
cannot  exist  without  the  truth,  since  it  is  the  intelligibihty  of 
the  truth  itself  made  manifest  to  us.  2.  It  leaves  no  doubt  to 
be  removed  by  a  further  test,  since  it  enables  the  mind  to  see 
the  necessity  of  the  truth  manifested  to  it.  3.  It  is  universal, 
for  in  no  case  have  we  real  certainty  unless  we  see  that  the 
truth  is  so  and  cannot  be  otherwise;  but  this  supposes  the 
evidence  of  the  objective  truth,  and  is  nothing  else  than  the 
perception  of  that  evidence.  Therefore  this  evidence  is  the 
ultimate  and  universal  criterion  of  certainty. 

170.  Objections  :  i.  We  cannot  be  certain  of  anything  un- 
less we  know  that  others  agree  with  us.  Answer.  We 
deny  this.  In  fact,  we  could  not  know  that  others 
agree  with  us  if  our  own  faculties  were  not  reliable, 
capable  of  seeing  the  evidence  of  that  agreement. 

2.  We  cannot  know  that  we  are  not  insane  except  by 
ascertaining  that  others  agree  with  us.  Answer.  This, 
too,  we  deny.  Besides,  even  an  insane  man  cannot 
err  when  he  has  evidence ;  but  he  has  not  evidence  in 
the  matters  wherein  he  is  insane;  for  evidence  is  a 
manifestation  of  the  truth.  It  must,  besides,  be  re- 
membered that  we  claim  certainty  for  man  in  his 
normal  state,  not  for  crazy,  drunken,  or  sleeping  men ; 
and  the  very  reason  why  .these  cannot  be  certain  is 
because  they  cannot  reflect  sufficiently  to  examine  their 
judgments  :  they  imagine  that  things  are  so,  but  they 
cannot  see  that  things  cannot  be  otherwise. 

3.  Evidence  is  only  in  our  minds.  Answer.  True  evi- 
dence is  the  light  of  objective  truth  perceived  by  our 
minds;  that  which  is  not  cannot  be  perceived. 

4.  We  cannot  be  certain  that  we  have  evidence.  An- 
swer.  We  can,  as  our  consciousness  testifies. 


98  Critical  Logic, 


5.  Every  man  is  fallible.  Answer.  Not  about  matters 
that  are  evident. 

6.  We  have  no  infallible  knowledge  except  through 
Revelation.  Answer.  We  have;  and  we  could  not 
rationally  trust  a  Revelation  if  we  had  no  evidence 
that  it  was  made :  those  who  attack  the  rehability  of 
our  reason  thereby  attack  the  foundation  of  Faith. 

7.  God  is  the  ultimate  motive  of  certainty.  Answer, 
He  is  the  first  being  existing  and  knowing,  but  not  the 
first  being  known  to  me :  His  existence  is  first  onto- 
logically,  not  logically,  with  regard  to  me. 

8.  Consciousness  is  the  ultimate  criterion  of  certainty;  for  it 
answers  the  last  question  asked  about  the  motives  of  cer- 
tainty. Answer.  We  trust  our  consciousness  because  it  is 
evidently  reliable,  thus  evidence  is  the  ultimate  criterion. 

9.  Evidence  itself  requires  attention  and  examination. 
Answer.  As  motives  of  assent,  no ;  as  necessary  con- 
ditions for  the  existence  of  subjective  evidence,  yes. 

10.  Evidence  does  not  reach  all  kinds  of  truth;  for 
instance,  we  have  no  evidence  of  what  we  learn  from 
witnesses.  Answer.  We  have  no  intrinsic  evidence 
of  it,  but  extrinsic,  /.  e ,  we  have  evidence  that  the 
witnesses  could  not  deceive  us. 

11.  An  evident  conclusion  may  be  false.  Answer.  Not 
if  the  whole  reasoning  is  evident,  premises  and  sequence. 

12.  It  is  the  part  of  Protestantism  to  make  one's  own 
judgment  the  criterion  of  all  certainty.  Answer.  Prot- 
estantism errs  in  making  private  judgment  the  criterion 
of  supernatural  certainty. 

13.  Many  truths  are  certain,  but  not  evident.  Answer, 
Of  natural  truths  all  that  are  certain  are  either  intrinsi- 
cally or  extrinsically,  directly  or  indirectly,  evident  to 
man's  natural  powers. 


MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Introduction, 


PAQB 

5 


MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


BOOK  I.— GENERAL  METAPHYSICS,  OR  ONTOLOGY. 

Chapter     I.  The  Nature  of  Being : 7 

Article      I.    Meaning  of  the  Term '*  Being"  ;          ...  7 

"          XL   Possible  Being ; 12 

"        III.   Essence  and  Existence  of  Beings ;       .         .         .17 

''        IV.   The  First  Principles  Derived  from  Being.    ,         ,  20 

Chapter    II.  The  Transcendental  Attributes  of  Being.         ,         .  21 

Chapter  III.  The  Categories : 28 

Article      I.   Substance; 29 

"          II.   The  Intrinsic  Accidents ; 32 

**        III.   The  Extrinsic  Accidents 36 

Chapter  IV.  Cause  and  Effect 42 

Chapter    V.  The  Chief  Perfections  of  Being 50 

BOOK  II.— COSMOLOGY. 


Chapter      I.  The  Origin  of  the  World. 
Chapter    II.  Purpose  and  Perfection  of  the  World. 
Chapter  HI,  The  Laws  that  Govern  the  World. 
Chapter  IV.  The  Constituent  Elements  of  Matter. 
Chapter    V.  The  General  Properties  of  Bodies. 


55 

66 

71 
79 
85 


Contents, 


BOOK  III.— PSYCHOLOGY. 

PAOB 

Chapter     I.  The  Specific  Nature  of  Plants  and  Animals.    .        .  90 

Chapter    II.  Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition  :           ...  106 

Article      I.  Sensitive  Cognition ;......  106 

**         II.  Rational  Cognition 112 

Chapter  III.  Sensitive  and  Rational  Appetite 123 

Chapter  IV.  The  Nature  of  the  Human  Soul 129 

Chapter    V.  Origin  and  Destiny  of  the  Human  Soul.          .        .  136 


BOOK  IV.—NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

Chapter      I.  The  Existence  of  God 145 

Chapter    II.  The  Essence  of  God : 154 

Article      I.  Physical  and  Metaphysical  Essence  of  God ;        .  154 

<<  II.  The  Perfect  Simplicity  of  God.     .         .         .         .158 

Chapter  III.  The  Quiescent  Attributes  of  God.            .        .        .  162 

Chapter  IV.  The  Operative  Attributes  of  God:            ...  169 

Article      I.  The  Knowledge  of  God; 169 

<■'         II.  The  Will  of  God ; 171 

"       III.  The  Power  of  God 175 


INTRODUCTION. 


1.  The  word  Physics  means  etymologically  the  study  of 
nature  ((pv6t5,  nature ) ;  but  even  the  ancient  Greeks  re- 
stricted the  meaning  of  the  term  to  the  sensible  or  phenom- 
enal properties  of  the  material  world.  At  present  the 
meaning  of  Physics  is  still  more  limited:  it  now  denotes 
that  branch  only  of  the  Natural  Sciences  which  explains  the 
sensible  properties  of  dodtes  in  general^  and  the  causes  (  such 
as  gravitation,  heat,  light,  magnetism,  etc.)  which  modify 
those  properties.  It  is  thus  distinguished  from  the  sciences 
of  Astronomy,  Chemistry,  Biology,  etc.,  which  deal  specially 
with  the  sensible  properties  of  only  certain  classes  of  bodies. 

2.  Metaphysics  is  the  science  of  whatever  is  not  sensible, 
of  what  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  the  senses,  as  far  as  it  is 
cognoscible  by  human  reason.  It  belongs  to  the  genus 
science, — /.  e.,  the  certain  and  evident  cognition  of  things  by 
their  causes ;  and  it  is  the  highest  among  the  purely  human 
sciences,  for  it  traces  its  knowledge  to  the  highest  causes 
accessible  to  human  reason.  Its  specific  difference  lies  in 
dealing  with  whatever  is  beyond  the  reach  of  the  senses,  the 
non-sensible  being  its  formal  object ;  whether  this  be  found 
in  spiritual  beings,  totally  beyond  the  reach  of  sense,  or  in 
material  things  in  as  far  as  these  do  not  affect  the  senses. 

3.  What  sensation  cannot  perceive  is  the  formal  object 
of  our  mind  or  intellect,  the  special  functions  of  which  are 

5 


Introduction, 


abstraction  and  generalization ;  therefore  abstract  and  univer^ 
sal  knowledge,  as  such,  is  the  formal  object  of  Metaphysics. 
Hence  this  science,  being  distinctively  intellectual,  is  also 
denominated  *  Intellectual  Philosophy/  or  *  Mental  Phi- 
losophy ' ;  while  the  application  of  these  abstract  truths  to 
the  moral  conduct  of  men  is  styled  'Ethics/  or  'Moral 
Philosophy/ 

4.  Metaphysics  is  divided  into  two  parts:  i.  General 
Metaphysics  studies  the  non-sensible  in  general,  its  princi- 
pal object  is  'being/  as  such;  it  is  therefore  called  Ontology, 
or  the  science  of  being  ( ovra,  beings ).  2.  Special  Meta- 
physics studies  what  is  peculiar  to  special  classes  of  beings; 
it  comprises  Cosmology,  which  treats  of  the  material  world 
(  Hodjuoi,  the  world  ) ;  Natural  Theology,  which  treats  of  the 
knowledge  of  God  {  ©£05,  God  ),  as  far  as  He  is  knowable  by 
merely  natural  means;  and  Psychology,  which  treats  of  living 
things  ( Ti)vxr]y  the  vital  principle ),  especially  of  the  human 
soul.  Metaphysics  does  not  treat  professedly  of  the  Angels, 
because  their  existence  is  not  known  to  us  except  by  Revela- 
tion. Some  modern  Metaphysicians,  confining  Psychology 
to  the  study  of  the  human  soul,  treat  separately  of  organic 
bodies  under  the  title  of  'Organology,'  or  'Biology'  {ftio^, 
life).  Others  consider  all  that  is  peculiar  to  man  under  the 
head  of '  Anthropology.'  The  division  which  we  have  given 
above  is  the  oldest  and,  even  now,  the  most  commonly 
adopted. 


BOOK    I. 


GENERAL  METAPHYSICS ;  OR  ONTOLOGY, 


5.  Ontology  is  the  science  of  'being.*  It  examines:  i. 
The  nature  of  being.  2.  The  transcendental  attributes  of 
being.  3.  The  Categories,  or  highest  genera  of  beings.  4. 
The  most  important  link  that  unites  all  classes  of  beings,  viz., 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  5.  The  most  important 
perfections  of  beings. 


CHAPTER  I. 
THE   NATURE   OF  BEING. 

6.  We  shall  consider:  i.  The  meaning  of  the  term 
*  being.'  2.  Possible  being  in  particular.  3.  The  essence  and 
the  existence  of  beings.  4.  The  primary  philosophical  princi- 
ples derived  from  the  study  of  being. 

Article  I.    The  Meaning  of  the  Term  *  Being.* 

7.  The  term  being,  when  used  as  a  participle,  is  a  synonyme 
of  *  existing  * ;  as  a  substantive  it  expresses  the  one  mark  or 
note  common  to  all  that  can  become  the  object  of  thought. 
It  is  not,  then,  confined  to  actual  being,  but  it  includes  also 
possible  being;  for  we  can  think,  e,  g.y  of  golden  stars,  and 

7 


8         General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology, 

other  things  only  possible.  It  is  not  confined  to  substances, 
but  is  also  applicable  to  accidents  and  relations ;  e,  ^.,  we 
can  think,  not  only  of  a  tree,  but  also  of  its  vitality,  its 
color,  its  age,  etc.  Even  a  mere  negation,  e.  g.,  darkness,  may 
be  called  being,  because  we  can  think  of  it.  Yet,  because 
we  cannot  think  of  it  except  by  way  of  negation  of  some- 
thing else — darkness  denoting  the  absence  of  light — such  an 
object  of  thought  is  not  called  a  real  being.  But  we  call 
a  real  being  whatever  may  be  known  or  thought  of  posi- 
tively and  by  itself,  whether  it  is  actually  existing  or  only 
possible, — /.  e.f  capable  of  existing.  That  which  is  not  a  real 
being,  but  the  absence  of  a  real  being,  is  a  mere  figment 
of  reason,  or  ^ns  rationis,  as  it  is  called  by  the  Schoolmen. 
This  same  term  is  applied  to  whatever  is  intrinsically  impos- 
sible, e,  g,,  a  square  circle. 

8.  Real  being,  viewed  as  such,  is  the  formal  object  of 
Metaphysics.  In  English,  the  word  *  thing  *  is  used  as  an 
exact  synonyme  for  real  being,  except  when  it  is  taken  in  a 
special  sense  as  opposed  to  persons,  as  when  we  say  *  persons 
and  things.'  Thus,  we  say  a  tree  is  a  thing,  its  size  is  some- 
thing, its  t'ertility  is  something;  blindness  is  not  a  real  thing, 
but  the  absence  of  something  real,  etc. 

9.  Being  is  called  a  transcendental,*  /.  <f.,  a  note  common 
to  all  things,  and  thus  transcending  any  genus  or  species. 
Still,  it  must  be  noticed  that  when  we  say  *  a  tree  is  a  being,' 
<  its  color  is  a  being,'  *  its  age  is  a  being,'  etc.,  we  evidently 
take  the  word  *  being  '  in  senses  somewhat  different  from  one 
another;  the  term  being  is  not  taken  univocally  but 
analogously. 

10.  The  analogy  in  this  case  is  not  that  of  mere  propor- 
Hon  or  resemblance;   for  there  is  more  than  resemblance 

♦Kant  attached  a  new  meaning  to  the  terra  '  transcendental,'  viz.:  Whatever  is  beyond 
the  reach  of  experience.     He  has  thus  created  a  confusion  of  ideas  in  many  minds. 


The  Nature  of  Being, 


between  the  meanings  of  being ;  there  is  identity  to  a  certain 
extent;  it  is  the  analogy  oi attribution.  It  is  called  intrinsic^ 
because  the  note  expressed  by  *  being '  is  contained  in  every 
being,  and  not  merely  attributed  to  one  owing  to  some  ex- 
trinsic relation  with  another  being.  But  the  mere  ens  rationis 
is  called  being  by  an  analogy  of  proportion  only,  not  of 
intrinsic  attribution. 

11.  We  must  also  distinguish  between  a  physical  and  a 
logical  being.  Both  may  be  real  beings,  but  analogously. 
Logical  being  is  being  viewed  as  a  mere  object  of  knowl- 
edge, and  therefore  it  can  exist  in  the  mind  only,  e.  g.^  all 
universals,  all  abstract  ideas.  Physical  being  can  exist  out 
of  the  mind,  e.  g,,  this  house,  two  houses,  the  Angel  Gabriel, 
etc.  Still  the  mind  itself  has  also  physical  being,  and  so 
have  its  acts,  viewed  as  modifications  of  the  mind ;  but  the 
terms  of  its  acts,  mental  terms,  have  only  logical  being.  All 
physical  being  is  real  being ;  a  logical  being  is  real  when  it 
is  not  an  ens  rationis. 

Logical,  as  distinct  from  physical  being,  is  the  object  of 
Logic. 

12.  A  third  distinction  lies  between  actual  and  possible 
being ;  actual  here  means  *  existing,'  and  possible  means 
*  capable  of  existing.'  Both  actual  being  and  possible  being 
are  real  being,  provided  they  be  not  negative. 

13.  Thesis  I.  The  term  being  does  not  express  a  genus  of 
which  the  different  classes  of  beings  are  the  species.  Proof  i . 
A  genus  is  univocally  predicable  of  all  its  species ;  but  be- 
ing is  not  univocally  predicable  of  all  classes  of  beings,  as 
we  have  explained  (  No.  9 ) ;  therefore  being  is  not  a  genus 
of  which  the  different  classes  of  beings  are  the  species. 
Proof  2.  If  we  examine  with  care  how  individuals  are  classi- 
fied into  species,  and  these  into  a  genus,  we  shall  perceive 
that  the  note  which  constitutes  the  difference  between  the 


lo       General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology, 

species  is  a  something  added  to  the  genus,  and  not  included 
in  the  notes  which  constitute  that  genus,  e,  g.,  '  rational,'  which 
marks  the  difference  between  rational  and  irrational  animals, 
fs  not  contained  in  the  genus  animal,  but  added  to  it  in  man 
and  not  added  in  the  brute.  Therefore,  if  '  being '  were  a 
genus,  the  difference  that  would  be  added  to  it  in  order  to 
make  a  species  would  be  something  distinct  from  it,  some- 
thing not  being.  But  there  is  nothing  which  is  not  being. 
Therefore  no  such  difference  can  be  added.  Therefore  being 
is  not  a  genus ;  it  may  at  most  be  called  a  quasi-genus^  as 
bearing  some  resemblance  to  a  genus. 

14.  Since  being  is  not  a  genus,  different  classes  of  beings, 
e.  g.^  substance  and  accident,  finite  and  infinite  being,  etc., 
are  not  species  of  beings ;  but  they  are  called  determinations 
of  being, — /.  e.,  when  I  thinfe  of  a  substance,  I  do  not  think 
of  a  being  with  something  else  added  to  it,  but  of  a  being 
more  clearly  or  less  vaguely  understood.  As  when  a  man 
looks  through  a  telescope  and  vaguely  discerns  something,  he 
knows  not  what;  then,  after  focussing  his  instrument  and 
looking  again,  he  sees  the  same  thing,  recognizing  it  to  be  a 
ship,  and  such  an  individual  ship ;  so  when  we  see  being  as 
substance,  we  see  no  more  than  being,  but  we  see  it  more 
distinctly ;  in  short,  being  has  not  received  an  addition  but 
a  determination.  ( See  this  matter  fully  explained  in  the 
excellent  work  of  Rev.  Thomas  Harper,  S.J.,  The  Meta- 
physics of  the  Schools^  vol.  i..  Props.  IV.,  V.) 

15.  Thesis  II.  The  idea  of  being  in  general  is  not  the 
idea  of  the  Infinite  Being. 

Explanation,  This  thesis  is  a  most  important  application 
of  the  abstract  truths  so  far  considered.  It  strikes  at  the 
root  of  a  philosophic  system  advocated  by  the  Ontologists, 
whom  we  shall  refute  more  directly  in  our  treatise  on  Psy- 
chology (Nos.  187,  188). 


The  Nature  of  Being,  1 1 

Proof  I.  The  idea  of  being  in  general  is  very  indefinite, 
that  of  the  Infinite  Being,  or  God,  is  very  definite ;  for  the 
former  denotes  any  being,  no  matter  how  imperfect,  the 
latter  the  union  of  all  perfection  in  one  Being. 

Proof  2.  Being  in  general  is  an  abstraction,  having  only  a 
logical  entity ;  for  no  being  can  have  physical  existence  ex- 
cept as  a  singular  concrete  being.  Now,  the  Infinite  Being 
has  physical  and  concrete  existence,  existing  not  in  general, 
but  in  an  individual  nature. 

Proof  3.  Being  is  not  even  predicated  univocally  of  God 
and  of  any  creature,  but  only  analogically ;  because  the  be- 
ing of  all  other  things  is  distinct  from  their  actual  existence, 
for  other  beings  may  be  actual  or  possible ;  whereas  in  God 
it  is  not  distinct  from  existence,  for  a  possible  God  would 
be  no  God  at  all. 

True,  the  scholastic  term  ens  simplicifer,  '  simply  being,'  is 
predicated  of  God  and  of  being  in  general,  but  in  different 
significations ;  God  is  simply  being,  /.  e.,  being  without  any 
non-being;  being  in  general  is  simply  being,  L  ^.,  being  with- 
out specification. 

How,  then,  do  we  get  the  idea  of  infinity  ?  We  perceive 
beings  which  have  a  certain  amount  of  perfection  and  no 
more;  we  distinguish  between  perfection  and  limit,  or  the 
absence  of  further  perfection  ;  next,  by  our  power  of  abstract- 
ing, we  mentally  remove  all  limit,  and  thus  conceive 
abstractedly  perfection  without  limit,  t.  e.^  infinity. 

16.  Objections : 

I.  The  idea  of  God  is  the  first  idea,  but  the  idea  of 
being  in  general  is  the  first  idea  which  our  mind 
conceives ;  therefore,  the  idea  of  God  and  that  of 
being  in  general  are  the  same.  Answer.  Our  idea 
of  God  is  our  idea  of  the  first  being,  but  it  is  not 
our  first  idea :    God  is  first  in  the  order  of  being  or 


12       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology, 

ontologically,   but   He    is   not  first   revealed   to  our 
knowledge,  not  first  logically. 

2.  God  is  the  first  truth.  Answer,  In  Himself,  yes ;  the 
first  truth  known  to  us,  no. 

3.  From  the  finite  we  could  never  form  the  idea  of  the 
infinite:  therefore  we  see  the  infinite  directly. 
Answer,  From  the  finite  we  could  not  form  the  in- 
tuitive perception  of  the  infinite;  but  we  can,  by 
mentally  removing  all  limits,  form  the  abstract  con- 
cept or  idea  of  the  infinite. 

4.  We  could  not  understand  what  finite  means  unless 
we  first  understood  the  meaning  of  infinite;  for  the 
finite  is  only  the  negation  of  the  infinite.  Answer. 
The  finite  is  not  the  negation  of  the  infinite  ;  it  is  the 
complex  notion  of  '  being  with  limits';  now  we  see 
both  '  being '  and  *  limits '  all  about  us,  we  have  only 
to  conceive  and  unite  those  two  notes  in  order  to 
conceive  the  idea  of  finite. 

5.  If  God  is  not  admitted  to  be  our  first  idea,  we  can- 
not prove  the  objective  reality  of  our  knowledge. 
Answer.  In  Critical  Logic,  the  objective  reality  of  our 
knowledge  is  proved  without  such  admission. 

Article  II.     Possible  Being. 

17.  A  being  is  possible  if  it  can  exist.  Possibility  is  two- 
fold :  intrinsic  and  extrinsic.  A  thing  is  intrinsically  or  in- 
ternally possible  if  the  notes  of  which  it  consists  do  not 
exclude  one  another;  thus  a  mountain  of  jewels  is  possible, 
but  a  square  triangle  is  impossible. 

A  thing  is  externally  or  extrinsically  possible  when  there 
exists  a  power  that  can  produce  it ;  now,  because  the  power 
of  God  is  infinite,  everything  that  is  intrinsically  possible  is 
also  extrinsically  possible  to  God. 


The  Nature  of  Being,  13 

18.  That  which  can  be  produced  by  no  created  power  is 
said  to  be  physically  impossible.  We  call  an  act  morally 
impossible  when  it  might,  indeed,  be  done  by  man,  but, 
considering  the  uncommon  difficulty  of  the  act  and  the 
weakness  of  man,  it  would  scarcely  ever  be  done.  Thus,  it 
is  morally  impossible  for  a  man  to  be  always  so  careful  as 
never  to  make  any  mistakes. 

19.  We  get  our  knowledge  of  what  is  possible  from  the 
consideration  of  what  is  actual.  Our  imagination  can  com- 
bine various  phantasms  of  material  things  perceived  into 
new  phantasms  of  things  imaginable.  Our  intellect  can 
combine  notes  of  actual  things  which  have  become  known 
to  us,  and  form  from  them  new  concepts  of  merely  possible 
things ;  but  neither  the  imagination  nor  the  intellect  can 
combine  elements  that  contradict  each  other ;  thus,  we  can 
neither  imagine  nor  conceive  a  triangular  circle. 

20.  God's  knowledge  of  possible  creatures  is  not  derived 
from  the  consideration  of  actual  creatures ;  but,  understand- 
ing His  own  essence  adequately,  He  saw  from  eternity  how 
it  could  be  imitated,  or  represented,  by  an  endless  variety 
of  creatures.  His  infinite  wisdom  thus  formed  in  itself  the 
exemplars  of  all  possible  things,  in  a  manner  analogous  to 
that  in  which  an  architect  conceives  the  plans  of  various 
structures  which  he  can  erect.  Thus,  all  things  have  not 
only  their  existence  from  God  when  they  are  created,  but 
even  their  intelUgible  nature  before  creation ;  for  God's  in- 
tellect plans  them. 

21.  We  do  not  intuitively  behold  the  exemplars  as  they 
are  in  the  mind  of  God ;  but,  when  we  conceive  possible  things, 
our  concepts  are  conformable  to  those  exemplars,  except, 
of  course,  when  our  concepts  imply  a  false  judgment.  The 
reason  is  that  both  God's  concepts  and  ours  are  founded  upon 
the  same  truth,  viz. :  that  the  notes  which  make  up  a  possible 


14       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology, 

being  can  exist  together.  Various  false  views  have  been 
taken  of  these  possibles  by  various  philosophers,  whom  we 
shall  now  refute. 

22.  Thesis  III.  The  internal  possibility  of  things  does  not 
formally  depend  on  the  power  nor  on  the  will  of  God. 

Proof  To  say  that  the  internal  possibility  of  things  depends 
formally  on  the  power  or  on  the  will  of  God  would  mean  that 
God's  power  as  such,  or  His  will  as  such,  determined  the  dif- 
ference between  what  is  possible  and  what  is  impossible.  But 
this  cannot  be. 

1.  Qo^^ power  cannot  determine  the  difference  between 
possible  and  impossible ;  else  certain  things  would  be 
impossible  simply  and  formally  because  the  power  of 
God  did  not  extend  to  them,  and  thus  the  power  of 
God  would  be  limited. 

2.  God's  will  cannot  determine  this  difference,  else  He 
could  will  the  impossible  to  be  possible;  He  could  will 
that  notes  which  contradict  each  other  should  never- 
theless exist  together,  e.  g.,  that  a  circle  should  be  square, 
that  a  truth  should  be  false,  that  a  thing  could  *  be  and 
not  be'  at  the  same  time;  thus  all  certainty  would 
vanish  and  universal  scepticism  would  result. 

23.  Objections: 

1.  If  God  cannot  make  the  impossible  possible,  He  can- 
not do  all  things.  Answer.  This  we  deny;  an  absurd- 
ity is  not  a  thing,  a  real  being;  e.g.,  a  triangular  square 
would  be  a  square  that  is  not  a  sqware,  but  this  is  not 
thinkable,  not  intelligible,  not  a  real  being  (No.  7). 

2.  Then  God  in  creating  would  not  be  independent,  He 
would  depend  on  the  possibles.  Answer.  The  possibles 
themselves  depend  on  His  wisdom,  and  thus  His 
dependence  would  not  be  on  any  existing  being  except 
Himself,  for  the  possibles  have  no  existence. 


The  Nature  of  Being,  15 

3.  Then  God  would  not  create  things  out  of  nothing,  but 
out  of  their  possibihty.  Answer.  He  creates  things  out 
of  nothing,  actual  or  pre-existing ;  for  the  possibility 
is  nothing  actual,  nothing  existing. 

4.  If  possibles  have  no  existence,  how  can  God  know 
them  ?  Answer.  From  eternity  He  knows  His  existing 
essence  as  capable  of  being  imitated  by  beings  which 
do  not  exist  from  eternity. 

5.  If  it  were  not  for  the  power  and  will  of  God,  nothing 
were  possible ;  therefore  the  possibles  depend  on  His 
power  and  will.  Answer.  Nothing  would  then  be 
externally  possible ;  we  grant  that  the  external  possi- 
bility of  things  depends  on  God's  power  and  will. 

24.  Thesis  IV.  The  internal  possibility  of  things  depends  on 
the  intellect  of  God. 

Proof  The  internal  possibility  of  a  thing  consists  in  the 
agreement  between  its  notes ;  not  an  actual  agreement  between 
actual  or  existing  notes,  but  a  merely  logical  agreement  be- 
tween notes  considered  as  possible.  Now,  whatever  is  merely 
logical  being  depends  on  an  intellect  which  conceives  the 
notes  and  the  agreement  between  them ;  therefore  the  inter- 
nal possibility  of  a  thing  depends  on  an  intellect;  and  since 
all  things  internally  possible  were  so  from  eternity,  their  pos- 
sibility depends  on  an  eternal  intellect,  /.  <?.,  on  the  intellect 
of  God. 

25.  Objections: 

1.  Even  if  we  supposed  that  God  did  not  exist,  a  round 
circle  would  still  be  internally  possible.  Answer,  {a) 
From  an  absurd  supposition  it  is  no  wonder  if  we  get 
any  consequence,  {b)  Nothing  would  be  internally 
possible  if  there  were  no  mind  to  conceive  notes  and 
associate  them. 

2.  We  can  think  of  possibles  without  thinking  of  God  ,• 


1 6       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology, 

therefore  they  do  not  depend  on  God.  Answer.  We 
cannot  fully  understand  them  without  referring  them 
to  the  intellect  of  God.  From  the  fact  that  we  do  not 
always  think  of  them  as  dependent  on  God,  it  does 
not  follow  that  they  are  not  dependent  on  Him,  but 
simply  that  we  view  them  imperfectly. 

26.  Thesis  V.  The  internal  possibility  of  things  depends  on 
the  essence  of  God. 

Proof  God,  being  infinitely  perfect,  cannot  be  dependent 
for  the  knowledge  of  His  intellect,  except  on  Himself,  on 
His  own  essence;  but  He  knows  all  possible  things;  there- 
fore, He  must  know  them  in  His  essence;  but  He  does  not 
know  them  as  existing  in  His  essence;  therefore,  He  can 
only  know  them  as  having  their  source  in  His  essence,  as 
dependent  on  His  essence  ;  therefore,  they  depend  on  it. 

Are,  then,  the  possibles  the  Divine  essence?  No;  the 
possibles,  as  such,  or  formally  considered,  have  no  actual 
entity,  and  therefore  they  cannot  be  the  Divine  essence, 
which  has  actual  entity.  But  whatever  foundation  there  was 
from  eternity  for  the  formation  of  these  logical  concepts,  that 
foundation  must  have  been  something  actual,  and,  therefore, 
identical  with  the  essence  of  God. 

27.  Objections: 

1 .  God  must  then  have  an  infinite  number  of  these  con- 
cepts; but  an  infinite  number  of  existing  things  is 
absurd.  Answer.  God  understands  all  things  by  one 
concept,  which  embraces  all  that  is  knowable.  Even 
we,  in  one  concept  of  a  line,  embrace  any  number 
of  parts  into  which  it  may  be  divided.  The  possibles 
are  numberless  ( see  No.  38);  and  they  are  not  exist- 
ing things,  as  the  objection  supposes  them  to  be. 

2.  This  explanation  makes  all  things  part  of  God's 
essence,  and    thus   leads  to   Pantheism.     Answer.  It 


The  Nature  of  Being.  17 

makes  all  things  finite  imitations  of  God's  infinite 
essence. 
3.  Knowledge  supposes  its  objects  and  does  not  make 
them ;  hence  the  Divine  intellect  supposes  the  possi- 
bles and  does  not  form  them.  Answer.  The  knowl- 
edge of  the  architect  supposes  his  knowledge  of  the 
materials  which  he  is  to  combine  in  his  plans ;  thus, 
also,  the  intellect  of  God  sees  all  perfections  in  His 
own  essence,  and  understands  how  imitations  of  those 
perfections  can  be  variously  combined  in  finite  beings. 

Article  III.     Essence  and  Existence  of  Beings. 

28.  The  essence  of  a  being  is  that  collection  of  notes 
which  must  be  conceived  to  understand  that  being,  because 
they  make  it  what  it  is  and  distinguish  it  from  every  being 
of  another  species :  the  essence  ( from  esse^  to  be )  answers 
the  question,  *  What  is  it  ?  '  '  Quid  est  ?  '  and  is  also  called 
the  *  quiddity.'  For  instance,  the  essence  of  a  syllogism  is 
"  an  argument  consisting  of  three  propositions  so  connected 
that  from  two  of  them  the  third  follows."  If  any  one  of 
these  notes  is  wanting,  we  have  no  syllogism,  and  if  any 
of  them  is  not  apprehended,  we  do  not  apprehend  the 
syllogism. 

29.  In  its  widest  sense,  the  term  essence  is  applied  to 
anythiiig,  be  it  substance,  property,  or  accident ;  for  every- 
thing has  notes  which  make  it  what  it  is,  and  about  every- 
thing we  can  ask,  *  What  is  it  ? '  e.  g.^  What  is  color?  what  is 
figure  ?  what  is  time  ?  etc.  But  in  a  stricter  sense,  essence 
is  said  of  substance  only,  and  expresses  the  species  to  which 
that  substance  belongs;  e.  g.,  the  essence  of  man  is  rational 
animal,  or  a  being  composed  of  body  and  soul. 

30.  The  essence  of  a  substance  may  be  viewed  in  two 


1 8        General  Metaphysics  ;    or  Ontology. 

ways:  i.  The  real  or  physical  essence  Is  the  essence  as  it 
exists  in  the  substance  independently  of  our  way  of  con- 
ceiving it.  We  conceive  the  physical  essence  when  we 
conceive  a  being  as  composed  of  those  elements  which  are 
really  distinct  in  that  being;  and  we  express  that  physical 
essence  by  mentioning  the  parts  really  distinct,  as  body  and 
soul  in  man.  2.  The  notional  or  metaphysical  essence  is 
the  essence  conceived  as  made  up  of  parts  which  are  not 
really,  but  only  logically  distinct.  It  is  expressed  by  men- 
tioning qualities  which  do  not  correspond  to  distinct  parts; 
as  when  we  call  a  man  a  rational  animal.  For  we  must 
not  suppose  that  the  animal  and  the  rational  are  two 
distinct  parts  that  make  up  man,  as  body  and  soul  do,  but 
the  animal  itself  is  rational ;  and  if  the  rational  part  of  man 
be  taken  away,  there  remains  not  an  animal  but  an  inanimate 
body. 

31.  Are  essences  eternal  and  immutable?  In  their 
physical  existence,  essences  are  not  eternal,  but  created  in 
time;  but  they  may  be  called  immutable,  inasmuch  as 
they  remain  while  the  substance  lasts,  for  the  accidents 
alone  are  changed.  In  their  logical  entity  or  intelligibiHty, 
essences  are  eternal  and  immutable,  inasmuch  as  it  ever 
is  and  ever  was  true,  e.  g.,  that  an  intellect  supposes  a  sim- 
ple substance,  that  a  part  is  less  than  the  whole,  etc. 

32.  It  is  clear  that  we  know  the  essences  of  the  things 
which  we  make  or  invent  ourselves,  as  of  a  watch,  a  table, 
etc.  We  also  know  the  essences  of  many  things  in  nature, 
as  of  a  fruit,  a  tree,  an  animal,  the  intellect,  etc.;  else,  we 
could  have  no  science  about  such  things,  since  science  treats 
not  of  singular  things  but  of  the  essences  of  things.  Still 
there  are  many  natural  agents  of  which  we  do  not  know 
the  specific  essences,  e,  g.,  heat,  electricity,  magnetism,  etc.; 
we  know  what  they  do,  but  not  what  they  are.    We  define 


The  Nature  of  Being,  19 

such  things  by  mentioning  a  genus  to  which  they  are  known 
to  belong,  and,  as  the  difference,  we  mention  the  effects 
which  are  pecuhar  to  them  j  thus,  we  know  that  electricity 
has  the  power  to  produce  certain  effects,  but  we  do  not  know 
whether  it  is  a  distinct  substance  or  a  modification  of  a 
substance ;  if  it  is  a  distinct  substance,  we  do  not  know 
whether  it  is  simple  or  compound. 

33.  Existence  is  a  simple  and  primary  concept,  which, 
therefore,  cannot  be  defined;  the  word  is  said  to  come  from 
ex-sisteniia,  a  standing  forth  out  of  its  causes.  By  receiving 
existence,  a  possible  being  becomes  actual ;  e.  g.^  Plato  was 
possible  and  became  actual.  Are,  then,  existence  and  actual 
essence  the  same  ?  This  question  is  usually  answered  thus : 
'*  Between  actual  essence  and  its  existence  there  is  no  real 
distinction,  but  only  a  logical  distinction  founded  on  reality." 
( See  Harper's  Metaphysics  of  the  Schools^  vol.  i..  Prop. 
XVI.) 

34.  The  essence  considered  as  the  principle  of  actions  is 
called  the  nature  of  a  being.  If,  therefore,  the  actions  of  a 
being  are  sufficiently  known,  and  are  found  to  be  uniform 
and  constant,  we  can  safely  infer  attributes  belonging  to  the 
nature  and  essence  of  that  being ;  thus,  from  the  intellectual 
acts  of  man  we  infer  the  simplicity  of  his  soul.  The  knowl- 
edge thus  acquired  is  true  and  certain,  for  it  rests  on  the  evi- 
dent principle  that  there  must  be  a  proportion  between  an 
effect  and  its  cause.  Therefore  Locke  and  the  positive  philos- 
ophers are  entirely  mistaken  when  they  teach  that  we  know 
nothing  but  phenomena  or  sensible  facts ;  we  know  that  those 
facts  can  only  proceed  from  proportionate  causes,  and  thus 
from  their  effects  we  know  something  of  the  natures  and 
essences  of  these  causes. 


20        General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology, 

Article  IV.  The  First  Principles  Derived  from  Being. 

35.  From  the  very  concept  of  being  we  derive  analytically 
three  primary  judgments  or  first  principles  of  reason,  viz. : 

1.  The  principle  of  identity  :  *  That  which  is,  is,'  or  *  the 
being  is.' 

2.  The  principle  of  contradiction:  'A  thing  cannot  be 
and  yet  not  be,'  or  *  Being  is  not  non-being.' 

3.  The  principle  of  the  excluded  middle  :  '  A  thing  either 
is  or  is  not.' 

It  is  a  disputed  question  whether  the  principle  of  identity 
or  that  of  contradiction  should  be  called  the  first  principle. 
The  two  are  inseparable,  and,  when  properly  understood, 
imply  each  other;  for  when  we  say,  '  That  which  is,  is,'  we 
imply  that  it  cannot  not  be,  and  when  we  say  that  being  is  not 
non-being  we  imply  that  it  is  being.  There  is  no  judgment 
prior  in  nature  to  these  two,  for  every  possible  judgment  con- 
tains these,  and  these  imply  no  other  judgments. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  TRANSCENDENTAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  BEING. 

36.  An  attribute  or  property,  strictly  so  called,  is  some 
note  which  is  not  the  essence  but  still  necessarily  flows  from 
the  essence.  Now,  it  is  evident  that  from  the  essence  *  being^ 
nothing  can  flow  which  is  not  itself  *  being ';  therefore  *  being ' 
cannot  have  attributes  or  properties  in  the  strict  sense  of  these 
terms. 

But  in  a  wider  sense  we  may,  by  analogy,  give  the  name 
of  attribute  or  property  to  any  special  view  taken  of  being, 
provided  such  view  can  be  taken  of  all  and  every  being. 
Now,  three  such  views  are  possible :  i^d)  We  may  deny  of 
every  being  that  it  is  divided  in  itself;  we  do  so  by  saying 
that  it  is  one;  oneness  or  unity  is  intrinsic  to  every  being, 
and  since  it  denies  division  it  is  a  negative  attribute,  [fi) 
Considering  a  being  extrinsically,  or  as  related  to  other  beings, 
we  may  view  it  as  conformable  to  knowledge,  and  call  it  true  ; 
truth  is  an  extrinsic  positive  attribute,  [c]  We  may  also 
view  every  being  as  proportionate  to  an  appetite  or  desire, 
and  call  it  good  j  goodness  is  therefore  also  an  extrinsic  posi- 
tive attribute.  We  shall  find  no  other  property  which  is 
common  to  all  beings  and  is  not  identical  with  one  of  these 
three.  These,  then,  are  the  only  three  transcendental  prop- 
erties of  being ;  we  shall  examine  them  separately. 

37.  I.  Every  being  is  one.  The  term  *  one '  adds  nothing 
positive  to  the  being  of  which  it  is  predicated,  but  it  excludes 
the  idea  of  many  or  of  division  into  many ;  that  therefore  is 
called  *  one '  which  is  not  many,  which  is  not  divided  in  itsel£ 


2  2        General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology, 

It  differs  from  '  alone,'  which  term  has  reference  to  something 
else,  denying  the  existence  of  another  being  of  the  same  kind. 
Still,  unity  is  not  always  taken  in  its  transcendental  sense. 
When  not  taken  in  a  transcendental  meaning,  but  as  a  predic- 
able,  unity  may  be  differently  considered. 

1.  It  is;«(f%5/^;;i"/^^/whenthebeingisnot  only  undivided, 
but  also  incapable  of  division,  as  a  spirit. 

2.  Physical,  when  nature  unites  real  or  separable  parts 
into  one  whole,  as  in  a  tree,  a  man,  a  stone. 

3.  Artificial,  when  the  parts  are  united  by  human  skill,  as 
a  table,  a  clock,  a  book ;  this  unity  may  be  material  or 
mental.  Thus,  a  history  in  several  volumes  is  an  in- 
tellectual or  mental  unit. 

4.  Moral,  when  persons  are  united  by  a  moral  bond,  as 
a  family,  a  state. 

5.  Accidental,  when  the  union  is  a  mere  aggregation  with- 
out a  bond,  as  a  heap  of  stones.  A  being  may  have 
one  of  these  unities  without  having  the  others.  Meta- 
physical and  physical  unity  make  a  being  one  in  the 
proper  sense  of  the  word ;  the  other  unities  make  a 
thing  one  after  a  fashion,  secundum  quid. 

38.  The  opposite  of  *  one '  is  '  many ' ;  the  opposite  of  unity 
is  multiplicity.  Many  taken  together  constitute  a  multitude. 
A  multitude  measured  by  the  unit  is  called  a  number.  To 
number  a  multitude  we  must  conceive  three  things  s  i.  One- 
ness, for  number  is  formally  a  collection  of  units.  2.  Distinc- 
tion, or  division  between  the  units.  3.  Some  similarity  be- 
tween them.  If  that  similarity  is  generic  or  specific,  we 
have  a  concrete  number,  as  five  animals,  twenty  men,  etc. 
If  the  similarity  is  only  transcendental,  we  have  an  abstract 
number,  as  five,  twenty,  etc.,  /.  e.,  so  many  beings.  Thus, 
also,  five  men,  four  plants,  and  five  senses  make  fourteen 
things.    When  we  have   no  definite  unit   to  start  with,  we 


The  Transcendental  Attributes  of  Being.   23 

can  get  no  number;  thus  the  arcs  contained  in  a  circum- 
ference are  numberless.  Since  oneness,  distinction,  and  simi- 
larity are  conceived  by  means  of  abstraction,  and  abstraction 
requires  an  intellect,  none  but  intelligent  beings  can  count. 
Brutes  may  perceive  many  things,  but  they  cannot  perceive 
them  as  making  a  number. 

39.  The  unity  which  a  being  has  with  itself  or  with  another 
is  called  identity  or  sameness.  When  a  being  is  viewed  as 
the  same  with  itself  individually,  it  is  said  to  be  numerically 
identical ;  when  as  the  same  in  species  with  another  being,  it 
is  specifically  identical ;  when  as  the  same  in  genus,  it  is  gen- 
erically  identical.  Thus  we  say  that  two  stone  houses  are  of 
the  same  material  (generically),  two  houses  built  of  granite 
are  of  the  same  material  (specifically),  and  when  a  house  is 
taken  down  another  may  be  built  of  the  same  material  (indi- 
vidually). 

When  a  thing  ceases  to  be  physically  the  same,  but  re- 
mains the  same  in  the  estimation  of  men,  we  denominate  the 
sameness  as  moral  identity ;  thus,  a  house  might  be  called  the 
same  building,  though  all  the  parts  one  after  another  have 
been  renewed. 

40.  To  identity  is  opposed  distinction,  which  means  that 
one  thing  is  not  another.  All  distinction  is  either  real  or 
logical.  I.  The  real  distinction  is  between  the  things  them- 
selves, independently  of  the  manner  in  which  the  mind  appre- 
hends them.  It  is  called  a  major  or  greater  distinction  when 
it  is  between  species,  as  between  man  and  brute ;  or  between 
individual  substances,  as  between  Caesar  and  Cicero ;  or  be- 
tween parts  that  can  exist  separately,  as  soul  and  body.  The 
distinction  between  a  substance  and  its  accidents,  as  between 
a  tree  and  its  size ;  or  between  the  accidents,  as  between  the 
color  and  the  taste  of  an  apple,  is  by  some  called  major,  by 
others  minor.    The  minor,  or  lesser  distinction,  also  called 


24        General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology. 

modal^  exists  between  an  entity  and  its  mode.  Now,  by  a 
mode  we  mean  a  manner  of  being  that  cannot  possibly  exist 
without  something  of  which  it  is  the  mode;  e,g.,  figure,  for 
there  can  be  no  figure  without  some  quantity  that  has  that 
figure.  2.  The  logical  or  mental  distinction  is  between  two 
ideas.  It  vs^  purely  logical  when  the  ideas  are  exactly  equiva- 
lent, as  between  a  definition  and  the  thing  defined.  The 
logical  distinction  is  said  to  be  virtual,  or  to  have  a  foundation 
in  the  reality,  when  the  concepts  are  not  exactly  equivalent, 
as  when  I  distinguish  the  reason  from  the  intellect  of  man, 
the  mercy  from  the  justice  of  God. 

41.  Under  the  head  of  unity  we  must  also  explain  individ- 
uality. It  is  that  unity  of  a  being  which  makes  it  precisely 
this  or  that  being.  But  what  is  it  that  thus  individualizes  a 
being  ?  It  is  not  the  accidents ;  thus,  a  man,  for  instance, 
remains  the  same  individual  throughout  his  life,  though 
his  accidents  are  constantly  changing,  and  two  grains  of 
sand  exactly  alike  are  yet  not  the  same  individual  grain. 
St.  Thomas  puts  the  principle  of  individuation  in  matter,  be- 
cause "  matter  is  incapable  of  being  shared  by  several  beings" 
[De  Ente  et  Ess.,  c.  v.) ;  and  he  adds  that  angels,  or  sepa- 
rated forms,  as  he  calls  them,  are  not  individualized  except  by 
their  specific  notes,  so  that  every  Angel  is  a  species  by  him- 
self. Suarez,  on  the  other  hand,  puts  the  principle  of  indivi- 
duation in  the  form.  Father  Harper  suggests  that  everything, 
be  it  matter  or  form,  or  compound  of  both,  is  intrinsically 
individualized  by  its  own  actual  entity,  and  needs  no  other 
note;  and  thus  that  everything  physically  existing,  or  proxi- 
mately apt  to  be  brought  into  existence,  is  thereby  individu- 
alized without  needing  any  further  principle  to  give  it  individ- 
uality.    (Harper's  Metaph.,  vol.  i.  pp.  208  to  290.) 

42.  IL  Truth,  viewed  as  one  of  the  transcendental 
properties   of  being,  is    metaphysical   or   ontological  truth* 


The  Transcendental  Attributes  of  Being.  25 

(Crit .  Log.^  c.  i.  a.  i.)  It  means  cognoscibility,  or  conformity 
of  being  to  knowledge.  As  the  form  of  a  building  is  deter- 
mined by  the  mind  of  the  architect,  so  all  creatures  have  their 
being  and  cognoscibility  from  God's  intellect.  The  knowl- 
edge of  God  is  therefore  the  norma,  or  measure,  by  which 
all  created  things  are  measured ;  while  we  derive  our  knowl- 
edge from  creatures,  and  therefore  these  are  the  measure  to 
which  our  knowledge  must  be  compared  in  order  to  be  true. 
Since  God  cannot  fail  of  creating  what  He  wants  to 
create,  the  creature  is  conformable  to  His  knowledge,  and 
thus  there  can  exist  no  metaphysical  falsity.  Things  are 
called  false  only  by  analogy,  inasmuch  as  some  circum- 
stance connected  with  them  is  apt  to  produce  logical  falsity 
in  our  mind.  While  truth  is  predicated  both  of  knowledge 
and  of  being,  still  it  must  be  primarily  attributed  to  knowl- 
edge; in  other  words,  logical  truth  is  the  principal  analogue. 
But  logical  truth  is  not  a  transcendental,  since  many  judg- 
ments are  not  true. 

43.  III.  Goodness  is  being  viewed  in  reference  to  some 
desire ;  it  is  that  which  is  desired  or  may  be  desired.  The 
goodness  of  a  being  is  founded  in  its  perfection.  Now,  a 
being  is  perfect  Yf\iGn  it  has  all  the  constituents  that  its  nature 
requires,  and  all  the  power  needed  to  act  for  the  attain- 
ment of  its  end ;  if  anything  requisite  be  wanting,  the  being 
is  imperfect.  Its  perfection  is  the  reason  of  its  goodness, 
and  both  are  its  very  being;  for  anything  is  desirable  in  as 
far  as  it  can  perfect  the  being  that  desires  it,  and  it  can  do 
so  in  as  far  as  it  has  being;  thus,  every  being  is  good  inas- 
much as  it  is  a  being.  Still,  perfection  is  logically  distinct 
from  goodness;  for  perfection  regards  the  being  itself,  and 
goodness  regards  it  in  relation  to  the  being  that  desires  it. 

44.  Goodness  is  of  three  kiids : 

I.  Becoming,  fit,  ox  proper,  i,  e.,  conformable  to  right  rea- 


26        General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology, 

son.  This,  when  taken  in  a  stricter  sense,  is  moral 
good,  /.  ^.,  conformity  to  reason  as  regulating  free 
acts;  in  a  wider  sense,  it  also  includes  natural  or 
physical  good,  i.  e.,  whatever  perfects  the  nature  of  a 
subject,  as  health,  knowledge,  etc. 

2.  Pleasurable,  i.  <?.,  apt  to  give  pleasure,  to  give  satisfac- 
tion to  an  appetite. 

3.  Useful,  i.  e,,  conducive  to  the  attaining  of  some  other 
good. 

True  good  is  that  which  meets  the  principal  longing  of 
a  being,  or  which  meets  a  secondary  longing  without  in- 
jury to  the  principal;  apparent  good  meets  a  secondary 
longing  to  the  injury  of  the  principal  longing;  thus,  sensual 
delights,  when  they  control  a  man's  reason,  are  to  him  not 
true  but  only  apparent  good,  since  they  withdraw  him  from 
the  pursuit  of  duty  and  eternal  happiness. 

45.  Evil  consists  in  the  privation  of  some  due  perfection ; 
hence  it  is  not  real  being,  but  the  absence  in  a  being  of 
something  which  is  due ;  no  beinaj  can  therefore  be  all  evil 
or  unmixed  evil,  for  then  it  would  be  no  being  at  all. 

The  privation  of  some  physical  good  is  physical  evil^  that 
of  some  moral  good  is  moral  evil,  or  sin ;  the  latter  supposes 
a  free  agent  who  departs  from  moral  goodness.  The  ab- 
sence of  further  perfection  is  called  by  Leibnitz  metaphysi- 
cal evil;  incorrectly,  for  it  may  be  no  evil  at  all,  since  evil  is 
a  privation  of  some  good  that  is  due,  and  the  perfection 
wanting  may  not  be  due  to  the  creature.  It  may  be  asked 
what  good  there  can  be  in  physical  suffering  or  pain.  Pain 
can  answer  the  purpose  of  punishment,  of  trial,  of  warning, 
etc.,  e.  g.,  if  fire  did  not  hurt  animals  it  might  destroy  parts 
Oi  their  bodies  without  promptmg  them  to  protect  themselves. 
Moral  suffering,  or  grief,  is  chiefly  an  incentive  to  virtuous 
action,  e.  g.,  grief  for  the  sufferings  of  others  prompts  us  to 
relieve  them. 


The  Transcendental  Attributes  of  Being.    27 

46.  Am^ng  the  good  things  that  are  of  the  agreeable  of 
delectable  kind,  the  most  elevated  is  beauty.  Beauty  is  the 
perfection  of  an  object  viewed  as  a  source  of  pleasure  to 
whoever  beholds  it.  Since  it  is  an  object  of  desire,  it  is  a 
kind  of  goodness ;  but  taken  in  a  stricter  sense  it  is  distinct 
from  goodness ;  good  things  deHght  the  possessor,  beautiful 
things  the  beholder.  We  say  the  '  beholder,'  because  beauty 
is  primarily  predicated  of  objects  seen  or  beheld :  quce.  visa 
placenta  says  St.  Thomas.  Still  the  word  is  also  by  analogy 
applied  to  the  objects  of  other  sense-perceptions,  e,  g.^  to 
sound,  and  even  to  the  objects  of  intellectual  actions,  e.  g., 
to  virtue.  Physical  beauty  is  the  perfection  of  natural  objects, 
intellectual  beauty  is  that  displayed  by  the  intellect,  or  ex- 
hibited by  intellectual  objects,  fnoral  beauty  is  that  of  virtue, 
artistic  beauty  that  of  art. 

47.  Since  perfection  as  such  cannot  be  perceived  but  by 
the  intellect,  beauty  in  its  proper  sense  can  be  appreciated 
by  none  but  intellectual  beings.  And  because  the  perfec- 
tion of  an  object  implies  a  certain  unity  combining  all  its  parts 
in  proper  proportion  for  the  attaining  of  its  one  end,  there- 
fore many  consider  the  very  essence  of  beauty  to  consist  in 
proportion  or  symmetry,  and  others  in  unity  amid  variety;  but 
the  essence-  of  the  beautiful  is  more  correctly  expressed  by 
the  terms  'manifest  perfection/  ^  striking  excellence,' i^/^;/^/^r 
veri,  '  the  brightness  of  truth.' 

True  perfection  is  true  beauty  ;  that  false  appearance  of 
perfection  which  cannot  stand  the  test  of  sound  criticism  is 
false  beauty.  The  more  perfect  an  object  is,  the  more  beauti- 
ful it  is  in  itself,  /.  ^.,  the  more  capable  it  is  of  delighting 
the  beholder;  thus,  God  is  infinitely  beautiful;  and,  if  He 
does  not  please  us  above  all  things,  it  is  only  because  we 
know  Him  so  imperfectly. 


CHAPTER    III. 
THE    CATEGORIES. 

48.  We  have  so  far  explained  what  is  common  to  all  be- 
ing; we  must  next  consider  various  classes  of  beings. 
Aristotle  has  pointed  out  ten  highest  classes  under  which 
all  beings  can  find  a  place;  these  are  known  as  the 
categories  or  predicaments  [Karrjyope'iv,  to  predicate),  be- 
cause all  that  can  be  predicated  of  any  being  is  found  to 
belong  to  these  ten  categories.  Such  predicates  are 
found  in  the  answers  to  the  following  ten  questions :  What 
is  the  being  ?  How  great  ?  What  qualities  has  it  ?  Whose 
is  it  ?  What  does  it  do  ?  What  is  done  to  it  ?  Where  is  it  ? 
In  what  posture  ?     When  ?     How  equipped  ? 

49.  When  we  ask  what  a  thing  is,  the  answer  will  be, 
either  it  is  a  substance,  i.  e.,  something  existing  by  or  in  it- 
self, or  it  is  something  added  to  substance ;  it  must  be  one 
or  other.  Substance  is  the  first  category.  If  a  thing  is  not 
a  substance,  it  is  called  an  accident,  /.  ^.,  something  added 
to  a  substance.  Here  accident  is  not  taken  in  the  same 
meaning  in  which  it  occurs  in  Logic.  The  logical  accident  is 
distinguished  from  the  genus,  species,  difference,  and  attri- 
bute; the  metaphysical  accident  now  spoken  of  is  a  mere 
negation  of  that  special  manner  of  existence  which  belongs 
to  substance.  Accident  does  not  constitute  a  genus  of 
which  the  nine  classes  of  accidents,  i.  e.,  the  nine  remaining 
categories,  would  be  the  species;  because  the  ^  being  '  which 
is  predicated  of  each  accident  is  not  taken  univocally ; — e.  ^., 

28 


The  Categories.  29 


qualities,  relations,  time,  place,  etc.,  are  accidents  of  sub- 
stance, but  so  different  from  one  another  that  they  have 
nothing  strictly  in  common  which  is  not  identical  with  that 
which  is  peculiar  to  each ;  and  the  mere  negation  of  sub- 
stantiality cannot  constitute  a  genus ;  still,  accident  may  be 
called  a  quasi-genus. 

50.  An  accident  affects  the  substance  intrinsically  or  ex- 
trinsically : 

1.  Intrinsically^  it  may  affect  the  substance  absolutely  or 
respectively,  {a)  Absolutely,  it  may  affect  the  sub- 
stance by  reason  of  the  matter,  viz.,  quantity;  or  it 
may  affect  it  by  reason  of  the  form,  viz.,  quality, 
{b)  Respectively,  it  affects  one  thing  as  connoting 
another,  viz.,  relation. 

2.  Extrinsically,  it  may  denominate  the  substance  by 
reason  of  something  else  which  affects  it,  viz.:  its  action^ 
passion  J  place  ^  time^  posture,  and  habiliment.  Each  of 
the  categories  requires  further  explanation. 

We  shall  treat:    i.  Of  substance.    2.  Of  the  intrin- 
sic accidents.    3.  Of  the  extrinsic  accidents. 

Article  I.    Substance. 

5T.  By  our  senses  we  perceive  things  in  the  concrete, 
substance  and  accidents  united.  By  our  intellectual  power 
of  abstraction  we,  from  the  first  dawn  of  reason,  distinguish 
the  quantity,  the  qualities,  etc.,  of  an  object  from  the  object 
itself,  e.  g.,  the  size  and  the  color  of  an  apple  from  the  sub- 
stance of  the  apple.  We  conceive  the  object  as  existing  in 
or  by  itself,  but  the  quantity,  etc.,  as  existing  in  the  object. 
Philosophy  is  only  the  systematic  teaching  of  common 
sense.  Speaking  philosophically,  we  say  that  a  substance 
i^sub-stans,  standing  under)  is  that  which  exists  in  or  by  itself, 


30       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology. 

and  whatever  does  not  thus  exist  we  call  an  accident.  An 
accident,  therefore,  is  that  which  cannot  exist  in  or  by  itself, 
but  exists  in  some  substratum;  accidents  are  said  to  inhere 
in  their  subject. 

52.  When  we  say  that  substances  exist  in  or  by  them- 
selves ( per  se ),  we  do  not  mean  that  they  have  no  cause, 
that  they  exist  by  their  own  power  (a  se).  This  was  a  lead- 
ing error  of  Spinoza,  who,  by  making  all  substances  thus 
self-existing,  made  them  all  necessary,  and  therefore  identi- 
fied all  things  with  God. 

53.  Hume  has  fallen  into  another  error,  by  teaching  that 
we  perceive  nothing  but  qualities,  and  that  what  we  call 
substance  is  only  an  unreal  bond  imagined  as  holding  those 
qualities  together;  his  theory  contradicts  the  intuitions  of 
all  men,  and  leads  directly  to  skepticism.  Leibnitz  makes 
substance  a  force  or  power;  but  a  power  is  a  quality  of 
some  being  that  has  the  pow-er.  Locke  does  not  deny  that 
qualities  exist  in  something  else,  which  he  calls  a  substra- 
tum^ but  he  adds :  "  Of  this  supposed  something  we  have  no 
clear,  distinct  idea  at  all  "  {Human  Underst.y  b.  ii.  c.  23, 
§  37).  McCosh,  on  the  other  hand,  appears  to  accept  the 
Scholastic  and  common-sense  doctrine  when  he  says: 
"  Now  I  give  up  the  idea  of  an  unknown  substratum 
behind  the  qualities.  I  stand  up  only  for  what  I  know. 
In  consciousness  we  know  self,  and  in  sense-perception  we 
know  the  external  objects  as  existing  things  exercising  quali- 
ties. In  this  is  involved  what  we  reckon  the  true  idea  of 
substance.  We  can  as  Httle  know  the  qualities  apart  from 
an  object  exercising  them,  as  we  can  an  object  apart  from 
qualities.  We  know  both  in  one  concrete  act,  and  we  have 
the  same  evidence  of  the  one  as  of  the  other''  {Agnos- 
Hcism  of  Hume  and  Huxley). 

54.  Substances   are   distinguished :     i.  Into  simple,  /.  ^., 


The  Categories,  31 


such  as  have  no  parts,  and  compound,  /.  e.^  such  as  have 
parts.  2.  Into  complete  and  incomplete.  The  incomplete 
is  destined  by  nature  to  constitute  with  some  other  being  a 
substantial  unit;  thus,  the  human  soul  needs  the  body  to 
constitute  man.  The  complete  is  not  destined  to  such 
union,  e,  g.^  an  angel,  a  plant ;  it  is  therefore  the  complete 
principle  of  all  its  natural  actions. 

55.  A  complete  substance  is  called  a  snpposit ;  a  supposit 
endowed  with  intellect  is  a  person.  As  a  human  soul  is 
not  a  complete  substance,  it  is  not  a  person.  The  Infinite 
Being,  since  it  is  complete  and  intelligent,  is  of  course  a 
personal  being. 

Since  accidents  exist  in  their  substance,  actions,  which  are 
accidents,  belong  to  their  supposit ;  the  supposit  it  is  which 
acts,  actiones  sunt  suppositorum  ;  the  parts  and  powers  of  the 
supposit  are  not  so  properly  said  to  act  as  to  be  the  instru- 
ments by  which  the  supposit  acts.  Thus  we  say  '  A  man  walks,* 
not  *  His  feet  walk  ' ;  'I  am  thinking,'  rather  than  '  My  mind 
is  thinking ' ;  '  We  see  with  our  eyes,  feel  with  our  hands,'  etc. 

56.  Since  actions  properly  belong  to  the  person,  and  the 
person  who  assumed  human  nature  in  the  mystery  of  the 
Redemption  is  the  Second  Person  of  the  Blessed  Trinity,  all 
the  acts  which  He  performed  in  His  assumed  human  nature 
are  really  the  acts  of  a  Divine  person,  of  God ;  they  are  Divine, 
and  therefore  of  infinite  merit.  In  becoming  man  He  took 
upon  Himself  a  complete  individual  human  nature,  /.  e.,  a 
soul  and. a  body  like  ours,  but  not  a  human  personality  ;  He 
is  not  a  human  person,  for  person  is  the  vX^SmdX^  substratum  of 
an  intellectual  nature.  If,  therefore,  the  ultimate  substratum 
or  person  in  Christ  were  human,  then  we  could  not  say  with 
truth  what  all  Christians  profess  who  recite  the  Apostles' 
Creed,  viz.,  that  the  ''  only  Son  of  God  was  born  of  the  Virgin 
Mary,  suffered,    .    .    ..    was  crucified ;  died,  and  was  buried," 


32       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology. 

etc.,  nor  could  St.  John  have  written  in  his  Gospel,  "  The 
Word  was  made  flesh  and  dwelt  amongst  us." 

57.  Personal  identity  consists  in  the  permanence  of  the 
intellectual  supposit,  not  in  the  continuity  of  his  conscious- 
ness ;  for  even  when  we  are  totally  unconscious  we  are  still 
the  same  individual  persons.  Mankind  has  never  believed 
that  a  man  on  losing  consciousness  ceases  to  be  a  person  or 
becomes  another  person.  On  this  point  Locke,  like  many 
other  philosophers,  has  written  much  that  common  sense 
does  not  support.  He  considers  person  to  be  merely  a 
*  forensic  term,'  and  personal  identity  to  be  nothing  but  con- 
sciousness. ''  It  (person)  is  a  forensic  term  appropriating 
actions  and  their  merit.  .  .  .  This  personality  extends 
itself  beyond  the  present  existence  to  what  is  past  only  by 
consciousness,  whereby  it  becomes  concerned  and  account- 
able," etc.  [Human  Underst,  b.  ii.  c.  28,  §  27).  This  doc- 
trine would  make  us  no  longer  accountable  for  acts  which 
we  have  forgotten,  of  which  we  are  no  longer  conscious. 

Article  II.    The  Intrinsic  Accidents. 

58.  We  have  defined  an  accident  as  a  being  which  cannot 
exist  in  or  by  itself,  but  needs  a  substratum  or  substance  to 
exist  in.  By  saying  that  accidents  cannot  exist  by  themselves 
we  mean  that  they  cannot  do  so  as  nature  is  now,  or  accord- 
ing to  the  actual  physical  laws.  It  is  not,  however,  impossible 
for  the  Creator  to  maintain  certain  accidents  in  existence 
without  a  substance.  God  can  do  all  that  involves  no  con- 
tradiction J  therefore  He  can  keep  in  existence  without  in- 
hesion in  a  substance  such  accidents  as  only  imply  a  ten- 
dency, an  exigency  to  inhere,  and  do  not,  in  the  very  con- 
cept of  them,  imply  the  act  of  inhering,  or  actual  inhesion 
in  a  subject.     As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Church  teaches  that 


The  Categories.  33 


after  the  consecration  of  the  bread  and  wine  at  Holy  Mass 
the  substances  of  the  bread  and  wine  cease  to  exist,  and  still 
their  accidents  of  quantity,  color,  taste,  etc.,  are  preserved 
in  existence  by  the  supernatural  action  of  the  Divine  will.  In 
this  doctrine  there  is  nothing  against  reason.  For  the  acci- 
dents have  being  or  entity  which  is  really  distinct  from  the 
entity  of  the  substance,  since  it  may  be  changed  while  the 
substance  remains  the  same.  The  substance  supports  that 
entity,  but  God  can  keep  it  in  existence  by  His  will  directly 
without  using  the  substance  to  produce  that  effect.  For  it 
is  clear  that  whatever  effects  God  can  produce  through 
second  causes,  /. «?.,  through  His  creatures,  He  can  produce 
the  same  directly  by  His  mere  will  whenever  the  effect  is 
not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  imply  a  created  cause.  Now» 
although  the  accidents  of  bread  and  wine  naturally  inhere 
in  those  substances,  still  human  reason  cannot  see  that  quan- 
tity, color,  taste,  etc.,  essentially  imply  a  substance  to  exist  in. 
A  full  treatment  of  this  question  does  not  belong  to  a  brief 
compendium  of  philosophy. 

59.  There  are  two  classes  of  accidents  which  in  their 
very  concept  involve  inherence  in  something  else,  viz.:  i. 
Vital  acts,  such  as  those  of  will  and  intellect;  and  2,  Modal 
accidents,  /.  e.y  accidents  of  accidents,  e.  g.,  figure,  which  is  a 
mode  of  quantity ;  for  every  quantity,  by  the  very  fact  that  it 
has  limits,  has  necessarily  some  shape  or  figure,  /.  ^.,  some 
mode  or  manner  of  limitation.  Those  accidents  which  essen- 
tially imply  only  a  tendency  to  inhere  are  often  called 
absolute  accidents,  to  distinguish  them  from  modal  accidents 
and  vital  acts.  But,  as  explained  above,  the  term  '  absolute 
accident'  is  also  used  in  contradistinction  to  the  relative 
accident  or  relation. 

60.  The  intrinsic  accidents  are  three :  quantity^  quality^ 
and  relation. 


34       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology. 


I.  Quantity,  in  its  widest  sense,  is  predicated  of  all  that 
can  be  more  or  less.     Thus  taken,  it  is   predicated : 

I.  Of  degrees  of  perfection^  as  when  we  say  that  a  man  has 
a  greater  quantity  of  perfection  than  a  plant.  2.  Oi  degrees 
of  efiergy  or  power,  e.  g.,  a  man  has  more  intellect  than 
a  child.  In  a  stricter  sense,  taken  as  one  of  the  categories, 
quantity  means  the  amount  there  is  of  a  substance;  it  im- 
plies divisibihty  into  parts  of  the  same  species  as  the  whole, 
as  of  water  into  drops,  not  into  gases.  It  is  predicated: 
I.  Of  multitude,  which  is  called  discrete  quantity,  because 
its  parts  are  considered  as  separate  from  one  another  \dis- 
cretus,  viewed  apart).  2.  Oi  the  extension  of  material  sub- 
stances, which  is  called  continuous  quantity,  because  its 
parts  are  considered  as  not  separate  [continere,  to  hold  to- 
gether), the  end  of  one  part  being  the  beginning  of  another. 
The  quantity  of  bodies  has  three  dimensions :  length,  breadth, 
and  depth;  these,  considered  as  existing  in  given  bodies, 
are  called  concrete  quantities,  but  when  separately  viewed, 
i.e. J  only  in  their  properties,  as  they  are  in  mathematics, 
they  are  abstract  quantities. 

61.  II.  The  term  quality  cannot  be  strictly  defined,  since  it 
is  a  category,  containing  no  genus  and  difference.  It  is  that 
which  denominates  a  substance  as  such  or  such  and  not  other- 
wise ;  not  as  such  a  substance,  say  iron  or  gold,  but  such  iron 
or  such  gold.  Quality  is  often  described  as  "  any  note  that 
completes  or  perfects  a  substance  in  itself  or  in  its  action." 

There  are  four  species  of  qualities  : 

1.  Those  disposing  the  subject  well  or  ill  in  itself  or  to- 
wards something  else.  Such  qualities  if  transient  are 
called  dispositions, d".^.,  well,  ill,  ready,  unready,  etc.; 
if  permanent,  they  are  called  habits,  e.g.,  science, 
health,  virtue,  vice,  etc. 

2.  Powers,  /.  e.,  qualities  which  enable  a  subject  to  do 


The  Categories,  35 


certain  acts,  whether  such  quaHties  belong  to  the  very 
nature  of  the  substance,  e.g.,  intellect,  will,  etc.,  which 
belong  to  every  man ;  or  are  accidental  to  it,  e.  g., 
talent  to  learn  fast. 

3.  Sen^ble  qualities,  i.  <?.,  those  which  affect  the  senses, 
e.  g.,  sweetness,  sourness,  warmth,  cold,  white,  black, 
etc. 

4.  Figure,  /.<?.,  qualities  regarding  the  arrangement  of 
material  parts,  e.  g.,  square,  round,  straight,  etc. 

Kpassioft,  when  denoting  a  passing  organic  affection,  such 
as  anger,  hunger,  desire,  etc.,  is  not  called  a  quality,  but  it  is 
the  accident  or  category  called  passion,  for  it  means  that  a 
substance  is  acted  upon ;  when  denoting  an  abiding  inclina- 
tion to  any  affection,  it  is  a  quality  of  the  first  kind,  e.  g.y 
irascibility,  gluttony,  etc. 

62.  III.  Relation  is  the  accident  denominating  one  thing 
as  referred  to  another  which  it  connotes,  e.  g,  parent,  greater, 
double,  like,  etc.;  for  there  can  be  no  parent  unless  there  be 
a  child,  etc.  Every  relation  supposes  three  things :  (a)  A 
subject  which  is  related,  {b)  A  term  to  which  it  is  related,  {c) 
K  foundation  of  the  relation  ;  e.g.,  when  we  say  "  virtue  is  more 
precious  than  gold,"  virtue  is  the  subject  of  the  relation,  *  gold' 
is  the  term  to  which  it  is  related,  and  *  precious  ^  expresses 
the  foundation  of  the  relation,  viz.,  price  or  value.  A  relation 
is  real,  logical,  or  mixed:  {a)  It  is  real  when  the  foundation 
of  the  relation  is  in  the  things  related,  independently  of  our 
mind,  e.g.,  between  cause  and  effect ;  if  that  foundation  is 
found  in  each  term,  the  relation  is  called  mutual,  {b)  It  is 
logical  when  its  only  foundation  is  in  our  mind,  as  when  I 
say  that  the  essence  of  God  is  the  reason  of  His  existence; 
for  there  is  only  a  mental  distinction,  and  therefore  only  a 
mental  relation  between  His  existence  and  His  essence,  {c) 
It  is  mixed  when  the  relation  is  real  in  one  of  the  things 


36       General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology. 

related,  and  not  real  but  only  logical  in  the  other ;  thus,  a 
contingent  being  implies  relation  to  the  necessary  being,  but 
a  necessary  being  can  exist  without  a  relation  to  a  contin- 
gent being. 

The  category  of  relation  is  confined  to  the  real  relation ; 
for  all  the  categories  express  special  manners  in  which  things 
exist.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  mind  cannot  consider  any 
relation  without  abstracting  the  foundation  of  that  relation. 
Now,  brutes  have  no  power  of  abstracting,  therefore  they 
cannot  apprehend  relations,  but  only  the  things  related. 

Article  III.    The  Extrinsic  Accidents. 

63.  The  extrinsic  accidents  are  six:  action,  passion,  the 
where  J  the  when,  posture,  and  habiliment.  They  are  extrinsic 
because  in  each  of  them  we  advert  primarily  to  something 
distinct  from  the  subject  spoken  of;  e.  g.,  an  action  is  de- 
nominated according  to  its  term  or  effect,  as  *  to  eat,'  *  to 
walk,'  *to  read,'  etc. 

64.  I.  Action  signifies  that  accident  which  denotes  a 
thing  as  proceeding  from  something  else ;  thus,  '  to  think ' 
denotes  thought  as  proceeding  from  a  thinking  principle. 

65.  II.  Passion  is  the  receiving  of  an  action.  Action 
and  passion  are  the  two  terms  of  the  same  motion ;  as  when 
one  strikes  and  the  other  is  struck,  one  loves  and  the  other 
is  loved,  etc. 

An  action  is  said  to  be  immanent  ( in-manere,  to  remain 
in)  if  its  term  remains  within  the  same  faculty  whence  it 
proceeds;  thus,  *  to  feel,' *  to  know,' ^  to  will,'  etc.,  are  im- 
manent acts.  If  the  term  does  not  remain  within  the 
eliciting  faculty,  the  action  is  transient  ( transire,  to  pass 
over ) ;  as  *  to  push,'  '  to  pull,'  *  to  cut,'  etc.  The  term 
<  transient,'   /.   e.,   '  passing    over,'    should    not   lead   us   to 


The  Categories,  37 


imagine  that  a  modification  of  the  subject  passes  over  to  the 
object ;  but  the  subject  by  its  action  so  afiects  the  object  as 
to  make  a  new  modification  arise  in  it. 

66.  III.  The  where  is  the  accident  which  determines 
material  substances  to  a  place.  A  place  is  the  inner  sur- 
face of  the  surrounding  body  considered  as  immovable ;  for 
bodies  may  move,  but  places  remain.  Thus,  the  place  of  a 
rock  is  the  inner  surface  of  ihe  air  or  earth  that  surrounds  it 
on  all  sides.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  the  '  where '  is  an  ex- 
trinsic accident.  The  distance  between  the  surfaces  of  a  body 
is  called  its  intrinsic  place.  A  body  is  naturally  so  related  to 
place  that  each  part  of  the  body  occupies  a  part  of  the 
place ;  this  is  meant  by  saying  that  a  body  is  circumscribed 
by  the  place.  A  spirit,  having  no  parts,  cannot  thus  be 
circumscribed,  but  is  whole  and  entire  in  the  place  and  in 
every  part  of  the  place;  it  is  said  to  be  limited  to  the 
place  to  which  its  power  is  restricted.  Spirits  are  not  directly 
related  to  place  by  their  own  nature,  but  indirectly  and  ac- 
cidentally, inasmuch  as  their  power  either  is  being  exerted 
or  may  be  exerted  on  certain  bodies,  and  those  bodies  are 
in  a  place.  Thus,  a  spirit  is  truly  in  a  place ;  for  where  it 
is  not,  it  cannot  act ;  yet  place  does  not  belong  to  spirits  in 
the  same  sense  as  to  bodies, 

67.  Thesis  VI.  Limitless  vacant  space  is  not  a  real  being 
existing  independently  of  our  minds. 

Explanation.  Space,  as  far  as  our  observation  goes,  is  not 
vacant,  but  filled  with  matter,  at  least  with  ether,  /.  <f.,  with 
some  imponderable  substance,  the  vibrations  of  which  trans- 
mit light  even  from  the  most  remote  points  of  the  universe. 
Probably  there  is  no  perfect  void  anywhere  in  the  world 
But,  outside  of  the  material  world,  space  is  still  imagined 
to  extend ;  we  also  imagine  that,  before  matter  was  created, 
there  was  a  limitless  vacant  space.     Now,  we  assert  that  this 


38       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology, 

vacant  space  is  nothing  really  existing  out  of  the  mind ;  we 
merely  conceive  a  possible  capacity,  the  absence  of  bodily 
substances. 

Proof,  If  it  were  a  real  being  existing  out  of  the  mind,  it 
would  have  real  quantity,  for  it  has  parts  outside  of  parts ; 
its  quantity  would  be  finite,  or  infinite,  or  indefinite.  But  it 
cannot  be  finite,  else  there  would  be  other  space  around  it ; 
nor  indefinite,  for  whatever  exists  really  exists  definitely,  since 
indefinite  means  actually  finite  but  capable  of  increase ;  nor 
infinite,  for  it  will  be  proved  hereafter  that  an  infinite  quantity 
actually  existing  is  absurd  ( No.  93 ).  Hence  it  is  nothing 
real. 

68.  It  may  be  asked  :  i.  Cannot  space  be  the  immensity 
of  God  ?  We  answer,  by  no  means ;  for  space  has 
parts  outside  of  parts,  and  God's  immensity  has  not ; 
for  it  is  God  Himself,  who  is  perfectly  simple. 

2.  What  is  beyond  the  universe  ?  Vacant  space,  /.  <r., 
nothing  actual. 

3.  What  existed  before  the  creation?  Nothing  but 
God, 

4.  If  all  substances  in  a  vessel  were  removed,  would 
there  be  space  in  it?  Yes,  there  would  be  vacant 
space;  vacant  inasmuch  as  it  contains  no  substance, 
yet  real  space  inasmuch  as  the  sides  of  the  vessel  are 
really  related  to  each  other. 

5.  How,  then,  is  space  defined  ?  All  space  is  conceived 
in  reference  to  extension  and  relation  between  ex- 
tended things.  Real  or  actual  space  is  the  relation  of 
place  between  real  bodies,  e,g.,  between  the  sides  of  a 
vessel;  possible  or  imaginary  space  is  the  imagined 
relation  of  place  between  possible  bodies ;  mathemati- 
cal space  is  extension  considered  in  the  abstract; 
vacant  space  is  possible  or  imaginary  space  coupled 


The  Categories.  39 


with  the  negation  of  a  substance  being  there.  Other 
authors  designate  as  physical  space  all  that  we  mean 
by  actual  and  possible  space  united,  and  they  define  it 
as  capacity  to  contain  extended  substances. 

69.  Objections:  i.  If  there  were  no  bodies,  space  would 
still  have  real  quantity  out  of  our  mind ;  for  it  would 
be  really  extended,  having  the  dimensions  of  length, 
breadth,  and  depth.  Answer.  It  would  be  only 
abstract  or  logical  quantity;  for  it  would  be  imag- 
ined as  the  possible  quantity  of  possible  bodies,  and 
thus  have  only  logical  entity. 

2.  If  all  bodies  but  one  were  annihilated,  and  that  one 
were  moving,  owing  to  its  inertia  it  would  keep  on 
moving.  But  it  could  not  move  unless  real  space 
actually  existed.  Answer.  It  is  enough  for  motion 
that  there  be  possible  space ;  real  space  is  a  relation 
between  real  bodies,  and  it  is  clear  that  this  is 
neither  necessary  nor  actual  when  there  is  only  one 
body. 

3.  But  it  would  really  move,  and  real  motion  requires 
real  space.  Answer.  We  grant  it  would  really  move ; 
but  motion  may  be  taken  in  two  meanings :  {a)  As  ex- 
trinsic to  the  moving  body,  /.  <?.,  as  a  change  of  places, 
and  such  there  could  not  be,  since  place  supposes 
a  surrounding  body,  [h]  As  intrinsic  to  that  body, 
as  a  mode  of  its  being,  opposed  to  rest,  and  such 
motion  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  relation  which 
constitutes  real  space. 

70.  IV.  The  when  is  the  accident  which  regards  suc- 
cession in  time.  To  understand  succession  we  must  under- 
stand duration,  /.  ^.,  permanence  in  being.  Now,  a  being 
ean  be  permanent  in  three  ways :  {a)  If  it  remains  per- 
fectly immutable,  its  duration  is  called  eternity,      {b)  If  its 


40       General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology. 

nature  is  devoid  of  changes,  but  its  accidents  are  suscepti- 
ble of  them,  as  is  the  case  with  the  Angels,  its  duration  is 
called  aevum  by  the  Schoolmen,  for  which  term  we  have 
no  English  equivalent,  {c)  If  its  very  nature  is  subject  to 
changes,  as  is  the  nature  of  bodies,  its  duration  is  said  to 
be  in  time.  Such  durations  succeeding  each  other  can  be 
counted,  and  their  number  or  measure  constitutes  time.  In 
this  kind  of  duration  alone  the  *  when '  of  the  categories 
finds  its  place. 

71.  Time,  therefore,  is  the  measure  of  succession  in 
changeable  beings ;  it  is  ever  flowing,  as  the  *  now,'  or  present 
moment,  is  ever  moving  onward,  separating  the  past  and 
the  future.  The  *  now '  is  the  indivisible  limit  between 
them.     From  this  explanation  of  time  it  is  clear : 

1.  That  there  was  no  time  before  the  creation,  as  there 
were  no  changeable  beings. 

2.  That  some  unit  is  needed  in  order  to  measure  time; 
the  apparent  motion  of  the  sun  around  the  earth  is 
a  unit  accepted  by  all  nations. 

3.  Since  time  impHes  a  relation  between  the  measure 
and  the  measured,  brutes  cannot  apprehend  time  as 
such  (see  No.  62);  they  apprehend  the  phenomena 
only,  which  happen  in  time. 

4.  Since  the  successions  measured  are  objective  realities, 
time  exists  outside  of  the  mind ;  and  it  is  absurd  to 
maintain  with  Kant  that  time  is  merely  a  subjective 
concept,  by  which  the  mind  puts  order  into  the 
objects  of  its  knowledge. 

72.  V.  Posture  is  the  manner  in  which  the  parts  of  a  body 
are  disposed  with  regard  to  an  adjacent  body ;  e.  g.^  when  a 
man  is  standing  on,  lying  on,  leaning  against  a  material 
object.     Posture  may  remain  the  same  though  every  part  of 


The  Categories,  41 

the  space  occupied  should  change,  as  when  a  person  travels 
in  a  sitting  or  standing  posture. 

73.  VI.  Habiliment  is  the  accident  by  which  one  bodily 
substance  is  furnished  with  another,  as  its  dress,  protection, 
ornament,  etc. 

The  last  two  categories,  just  explained,  are  of  minor  im- 
portance ;  but  they  are  needed  by  the  philosopher  in  order 
that  there  may  be  no  manner  of  being  which  cannot  find  its 
place  under  one  of  the  highest  genera. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

CAUSE    AND    EFFECT. 

74.  A  cause  is  anything  which  influences  the  existence  of 
another  thing ;  the  latter  is  called  the  effect. 

A  principle  or  principiant  is  that  from  which  a  being  pro- 
ceeds or  originates  in  any  way.    It  may  proceed  from  it : 

1,  Logically^  as  the  conclusion  does  from  the  premises  in 
reasoning. 

2.  Physically,  by  deriving  physical  being  from  the  prin- 
cipiant. It  may  do  so  in  two  ways :  {a)  The  prin- 
cipiant may  produce  it,  <?.  ^.,  a  tree  producing  fruit. 
{b)  The  principiant  may  be  one  of  its  constituent  ele- 
ments, as  a  wheel  is  of  a  clock. 

A  principiant  is  always  prior  to  that  which  proceeds  from 
it,  in  one  of  two  ways :  {a)  In  time,  by  existing  sooner,  {b) 
By  nature  only,  when  one  being  produces  or  constitutes  an- 
other without  existing  before  it ;  thus,  flame  is  a  principiant 
of  light,  roundness  of  a  circle.  These  two  ways  of  procession 
and  priority  do  not  embrace  the  peculiar  procession  by  origin 
only,  viz. :  when  the  principiant  and  what  proceeds  from  it 
are  one  identical  being.  This  priority  does  not  exist  except 
in  the  Blessed  Trinity,  God  the  Father  being  the  principiant 
of  God  the  Son,  and  these  two  Persons  together  the  prin- 
cipiant of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

75.  It  will  be  readily  inferred  from  these  definitions  : 

I.  That  the  terms  cause  and  effect  always  denote  two 
distinct  beings,  while  the  term  principiant  may  denote 
the  same  being  with  that  which  proceeds  from  it. 


Cause  and  Effect,  43 

2.  That  procession  does  not  necessarily  denote  succession 
in  time. 

3.  That  mere  succession  in  time  does  not  constitute  pro- 
cession ;  thus,  the  night  succeeds  the  evening,  but  does 
not  proceed  from  it. 

4.  That  therefore  the  terms  principiant  and  beginning 
are  not  synonymous ;  the  principiant  has  an  intrinsic 
and  necessary  connection  with  whatever  proceeds 
from  It,  while  the  beginning  may  have  only  an  extrin- 
sic and  accidental  connection  with  what  'follows  it. 

76.  When  a  cause  is  viewed  as  producing  the  effect,  it  is 
taken  formally  as  a  cause ;  else  it  is  materially  a  cause. 
Thus,  Columbus  was  from  his  boyhood  the  discoverer  of  the 
new  world  materially,  not  formally.  This  distinction  between 
being'  materially  and  formally  a  cause  should  not  be  con- 
founded with  the  other  distinction  which  is  next  to  be  ex- 
plained. 

77.  There  are  five  kinds  of  causes:  the  material  cause,  the 
formal^  \hQ  final,  the  exemplary,  and  the  efficient, 

1.  The  material  cause  is  the  matter  out  of  which  a  thing 
is  made ;  thus,  steel  is  the  material  cause  of  a  watch- 
spring;  the  distinction  between  matter  and  form  will 
be  explained  further  on  (No.  127).  Speaking  analogi- 
cally, philosophers  often  apply  the  name  of  matter, 
or  material  cause,  to  anything  out  of  which  another  is 
produced ;  thus,  they  call  the  faculty  of  the  will  the 
matter,  and  an  act  of  the  will  a  form. 

2.  The  form,  or  formal  cause,  is  that  which  specifies  the 
matter,  /.  ^.,  which  makes  the  matter  be  of  one  species 
rather  than  another.  The  form  is :  {a)  Substafitialy  if 
it  goes  to  make  the  very  nature  of  the  substance  and 
cannot  be  removed  without  changing  that  nature  ;  e.g., 
the  vital  principle  in  all  plants  and  animals ;  for  when 


44       General  Metaphysics ;    or  Ontology, 

it  ceases  to  be  or  departs,  the  substance  or  nature  of 
the  plant  or  animal  is  no  more,  {b)  Accidental^  if  it 
can  be  destroyed  without  affecting  the  nature  of  the 
substance ;  e.  g.y  the  shape  of  a  hat. 
3.  The  final  cause  is  the  end  or  purpose  intended  in  an 
action ;  e.  g.,  when  a  man  exerts  himself  to  acquire 
riches,  the  acquisition  of  riches  is  a  true  cause  of  his 
exertion.  The  object  itself  aimed  at,  /.  ^.,  riches,  is 
the  final  cause  materially  considered ;  the  acquisition 
of  riches  is  the  final  cause  formally  considered. 

78.  Thesis  VII.    All  action  is  directed  to  some  end  or  purpose. 
Proof.  Every  action  is  either  done  with  intelligence  or  not; 

if  done  intelligently,  the  agent  has  some  motive  for  his  action ; 
he  is  aiming  at  some  result  or  other ;  he  acts  for  an  end.  If 
an  action  is  not  done  with  intelligence  in  the  agent,  then  it 
proceeds  from  an  impulse  of  nature ;  it  is  then  the  effect  of 
a  physical  cause.  But  physical  causes  act  according  to  the 
laws  by  which  the  Creator  governs  the  universe — /.  e.,  by 
which  a  wise  God  directs  all  things  to  proper  ends.  There- 
fore all  action  is  directed  to  some  end. 

79.  Objections:  i.  A  man  often  acts  without  a  purpose. 
Answer.  He  then  acts  upon  an  impulse  of  his  nature, 
and  all  such  action  is  directed  to  some  end  by  the 
Author  of  nature. 

2.  If  he  acted  upon  a  natural  impulse  his  action  would 
•        be   good,  since  it  would  come  from  God;   but  such 

actions  are  often  evil.  Answer.  As  far  as  his  impulses 
are  physical  or  purely  natural  they  are  not  evil ;  but 
«,s  far  as  he  freely  neglects  to  control  his  natural  im- 
pulses according  to  the  law  of  reason,  they  are  evil. 

3.  Many  actions  are  merely  accidental.  Answer.  Every 
act  proceeds  from  a  cause,  necessarily  or  freely,  and 
therefore  no  action  can  be  accidental ;  but  an  action 


Cause  and  Effect.  45 

may  have  effects  not  intended  by  the  agent,  and  these 
may  be  said  to  be  accidental  with  regard  to  him, 
though  they,  too,  have  a  definite  cause,  which  acts  for 
a  definite  end. 

80.  IV.  The  exemplary  canse  is  the  model  conceived  by 
an  intelligent  agent  to  the  likeness  of  which  he  directs  the 
eftect  of  his  work.  It  may  be  some  pattern  extrinsic  to  the 
agent  which  he  wishes  to  imitate ;  thus,  an  artist  sketches  a 
real  scene.  Or  it  may  be  an  original  image  intrinsic  to  the 
agent's  mind,  such  as  the  plan  conceived  by  a  painter  of  the 
ideal  scene  which  he  wishes  to  represent. 

81.  V.  The  efficient  cause  is  the  agent  that  does  the  action. 
Every  agent  acts  by  its  powers  or  faculties.  The  power  itself 
is  called,  in  the  terminology  of  the  Schoolmen,  the  actus 
primus^  or  potential  act ;  the  exercise  of  the  power  is  the  actus 
secundus,  or  elicited  act.  The  potentiality  itself  is  remote ^  or 
proximate;  e.  g.^  an  infant,  from  the  very  fact  that  it  is  a 
human  being,  has  the  power  of  reasoning,  but  remotely,  /.  <?., 
not  in  a  condition  fit  for  use  ;  a  grown  person  has  the  same 
power  proximately,  /.  <?.,  fit  for  use. 

82.  The  requisites  for  the  exercise  of  a  power  are  called 
conditions ;  these  are  not  properly  causes,  since  they  do  not 
bring  about  an  action,  but  only  remove  what  might  prevent 
action.  For  instance,  citizenship  is  usually  a  condition  re- 
quired for  voting,  but  it  does  not  as  such  induce  one  to  vote. 

A  circumstance  which  is  apt  to  induce  an  agent  to  act, 
though  he  might  also  act  without  it,  is  called  an  occasion ; 
thus,  a  time  of  political  excitement  is  an  occasion  apt  to  induce 
many  to  vote.  If  occasions  influence  actions  they  are  real 
causes. 

83.  Several  further  distinctions  apply  to  the  efficient  cause  : 
I.  If  it  depends  on  no  other  cause,  it  is  called  the  first 

cause ;  such  is  God  alone  j  all  others  are  second  causes 


46       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology, 

2.  It  is  properly  {per  se)  the  cause  of  the  effect  intended 
and  of  such  other  effects  as  are  natural  consequences 
of  the  action  donej  thus,  the  surgeon  is  properly  the 
cause  of  the  pain  he  inflicts  and  of  the  cure  he  works. 
It  is  accidentaUy  the  cause  of  effects  which  were  nei- 
ther intended  nor  naturally  to  be  expected,  as  when 
the  surgeon  causes  death. 

3.  A  principal  cause  is  that  to  which  the  effect  is  chiefly 
attributable ;  an  instrumental  cause  is  that  used  by  a 
principal  cause  j  as  when  a  lancet  is  used  by  a  sur- 
geon to  open  a  sore  with.  The  instrumental  cause  is 
always  made  to  extend,  by  him  who  uses  it,  to  some 
effect  beyond  its  own  competency  j  e.  g.y  the  lancet 
could  not  cut  skillfully  without  the  skill  of  the  surgeon. 

4.  A  free  cause  can  determine  its  own  actions,  a  necessary 
cause  cannot  do  so. 

5.  A  moral  cause  is  one  to  which  an  effect  is  justly  im- 
puted, because  it  induces  another  agent  to  act  5  it  does 
so  by  command,  advice,  threats,  provocation,  etc.,  as 
when  a  naughty  boy  provokes  a  man  to  anger. 

84.  Since  a  cause  is  that  which  produces  an  effect,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  it  must  in  some  manner  contain  the  effect  j  for  as  the 
axiom  expresses  it,  Nemo  dat  quod  non  habet — "  No  one  gives 
what  he  has  not."  Now,  a  cause  may  contain  an  effect,  or 
rather  the  perfection  which  it  communicates  to  the  effect,  in 
three  ways : 

1.  Formally^  when  the  cause  and  effect  are  of  the  same 
species  j  thus,  a  plant  produces  a  plant,  clouds  bring 
rain,  etc. 

2.  Eminently^  when  the  cause  is  specifically  superior  to 
the  effect  and  contains  the  perfection  of  the  effect  in  a 
higher  manner  of  existence ;  thus,  God  contains  all  the 
perfection  of  creatures. 


Cause  and  Effect  47 

3.  Virtually  or  equivalenily,  when  the  cause  possesses  a 
superior  perfection  which  can  produce  the  effect ;  thus, 
an  artist  may  produce  a  painting  much  fairer  than 
himself;  he  does  not  possess  its  beauty  eminently,  but 
he  possesses  an  intellect  which  can  conceive  and  a 
skillful  hand  which  can  express  ideal  beauty. 
When  a  cause  contains  an  effect  formally,  it  is  called  a 
nnivocal  cause ;  else  it  is  an  equivocal  cause. 

Since  an  effect  is  contained  in  its  cause,  it  is  evident  that 
no  effect  can  be  more  perfect  than  its  cause. 

85.  We  must  notice  two  important  limits  to  causality : 

I.  A  finite  cause  can  only  modify  an  existing  subject, 

iwat  not  produce  a  substance  from  nothing. 
/.  Nv,  cause  can  act  at  a  distance,  /.  ^.,  where  it  is  in  no 
way  present;  for  where  it  is  not,  there  it  is  nothing, 
and  nothing  can  do  nothing.    Still  it  suffices  that  the 
cause  be  mediately  present  to  its  effect^  as  when  the 
sun,  by  the  vibrations  of  ether,  gives  light  and  heat  to 
the  earth. 
Sceptics  have  denied  the  reality  of  causes  and  effects ;  but 
it  is  evident :  (a)  That  all  men  distinguish  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  from  that  of  mere  succession  in  time,     {b)  That  all 
men  judge  causes  and  effects  to  be  realities,  on  which  all 
legislation,  all  commercial  and  professional  pursuits,  as  well 
as  all  trades,  are  based,     (c)  That  all  languages  proclaim  this 
reality,  e.  g.^  in  the  use  of  such  verbs  as  '  to  make,'  '  to  pro- 
duce,' *  to  push,'  '  to  pull,'  etc.,  and  of  such  particles  as  *  why,' 
'because,'   *  therefore,'    etc.     (d)  That  we  are  conscious  of 
exercising  effects,  e,  g.y  of  raising  our  hands  at  will,  of  speak- 
ing, walking,  etc. 

86.  The  study  of  principiants  and  causes  obviously  suggests 
two  important  principles  of  certain  knowledge,  viz. :  {a)  The 
principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  expressed  thus  :   "  There  is 


48       General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology, 


nothing  without  a  sufficient  reason  for  it."  (3)  The  principle 
of  causality,  expressed  thus :  <<  Nothing  is  made  or  begins  to 
exist  but  by  a  cause," 

87.  Thesis  VIII.  The  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason  and 
that  of  causality  are  absolutely  certain. 

Proof.  I.  The  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason  is  an 
analytical  judgment  so  obviously  evident  that  we 
cannot  rationally  deny  or  even  doubt  it  without 
thereby  implicitly  affirming  it;  for  rationally  to  deny 
or  doubt  it  we  should  see  some  reason  for  so  doing ; 
and  thus  we  admit  the  validity  of  the  principle,  deny- 
ing it  because  we  see  a  reason  for  so  doing. 

2.  The  principle  of  causality  flows  from  the  preceding; 
for  when  anything  begins  to  exist,  there  must  be  a 
sufficient  reason  for  this  beginning.  That  reason  must 
be  either  in  the  object  itself  that  begins  to  exist  or  in 
something  else.  It  cannot  be  in  the  object  itself; 
neither  in  the  acts  of  that  object,  for  it  cannot  act 
before  it  exists;  nor  in  its  nature,  for  then  the  object 
would  be  necessary,  but  a  necessary  being  is  so  from 
eternity  and  has  no  beginning.  Therefore,  the  reason 
of  its  beginning  to  exist  must  be  in  another  being; 
but  this  means  that  it  has  a  cause. 

88.  Objection:  All  our  knowledge  comes  through  our 
senses ;  now,  causality  does  not  come  to  us  through  our  senses ; 
we  see  facts  only  as  succeeding  one  another,  not  as  causing 
one  another.  Answer,  This  objection  refutes  itself;  we 
know  what  causality  means,  yet,  it  says,  this  knowledge  is  not 
conveyed  to  us  by  sensation ;  therefore,  it  follows  we  do  not 
get  all  our  knowledge  by  sense  only.  It  is,  however,  correct 
to  say  that  all  our  knowledge  begins  in  sensation.  The  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect  is  not  perceived  by  sense,  but  by  the 
intellect  on  occasion  of  sense-perception  (see  Nos.  178,  etc.); 


Cause  and  Effect,  49 

e.  g.y  I  understand  that  my  sensations  are  caused  by  myself 
as  the  eUciting  subject,  and  by  the  bodies  perceived  as  the 
determining  object  of  my  perceptions. 

89.  Corollaries.  From  all  these  explanations  it  is  evident: 
I.  That  nothing  can  be  its  own  cause.  2.  That  two  things 
cannot  cause  each  other.  3.  That  the  principle  of  causality 
IS  not  acquired  by  induction,  but  is  a  priori,  and  only  veri- 
fied by  experience.  Children  show  that  they  have  begun  to 
reason  when  they  ask,  "  Why  is  this  ?  "  (what  is  the  sufficient 
reason  ?)    "  Who  made  this  ?  "  (what  is  its  cause  ?),  etc. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  CHIEF  PERFECTIONS  OF  BEING. 

90.  The  chief  perfections  of  being  are  simplicity^  infinity.^ 
necessity^  and  immutability, 

I.  Simplicity  is  that  perfection  which  makes  a  being 
identical  with  everything  that  constitutes  it ;  it  is  a  positive 
perfection,  but  it  is  conceived  by  us  in  a  negative  way,  viz. : 
by  the  exclusion  of  all  composition.  A  being  is  absolutely 
simple  if  it  excludes  all  manner  of  composition. 

91.  Composition  implies  a  want  of  identity  among  the 
parts  of  a  whole  or  unit.  The  whole  and  its  divisions  are 
called  actual,  if  there  is  outside  of  the  mind  a  true  junction  or 
combination  of  parts.  If  the  parts  can  exist  separately,  e.  g.y 
^  soul '  and  '  body,'  the  actual  unit  is  called  physical :  if  they 
cannot,  it  is  metaphysical.  Thus  man's  *animality*  and 
'  rationality '  are  metaphysical  parts  of  a  metaphysical  whole, 
for  they  cannot  exist  separately ;  take  away  from  a  man  the 
principle  of  his  rationality,  the  soul,  and  you  have  left,  not  an 
animal,  but  a  dead  body.  It  will  be  noticed  the  metaphysical 
division  regards  the  comprehension  of  an  idea.  The  whole 
and  the  division  are  called  potential  when  the  parts  are  not 
united  outside  the  mind,  but  are  capable  of  being  classed  to- 
gether as  realizing  the  same  idea.  For  instance,  *  animal ' 
expresses  a  potential  whole  if  we  consider  its  extension — /.  «f., 
the  class  of  individuals  to  which  it  is  applicable.  This  is 
often  called  the  whole  of  extension^  and  also  a  logical  whole^ 
because  the  union  of  the  individuals  is  not  in  nature  but 

50 


The  Chief  Perfections  of  Being.  51 

in  the  mind  only,  which  apprehends  them  all  by  their  com- 
mon nature,  and  forms  of  them  a  mental  unit.  The  latter 
division  is  the  one  which  logic  properly  deals  with;  for  it 
breaks  up  larger  classes  into  smaller,  and  these  into  smaller 
again. 

92.  II.  The  Infinite  is  the  perfection  which  contains  all 
entity  so  that  none  be  wanting ;  it  is  a  most  positive  perfec- 
tion, though  conceived  in  a  negative  way,  viz. :  by  denying 
all  limitation.  But,  since  limitation  is  itself  a  negation  of 
further  perfection,  the  absence  of  limitation  in  a  being,  /.  <?., 
its  infinity,  is  a  negation  of  a  negation,  and  therefore  an 
aflSrmation. 

The  Potential  Infinite  is  the  finite  conceived  as  capable 
of  constant  increase ;  it  is,  therefore,  not  truly  infinite  but 
indefinite,  though  in  mathematics  it  is  usually  called  infinite. 
The  infinite  cannot  be  measured  or  counted ;  because  meas- 
ure and  number  express  a  limit,  and  the  infinite  has  no 
limit.  It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  no  amount  of  finite 
additions  can  ever  make  the  finite  become  infinite. 

93.  Thesis  IX.    No  existing  quantity  can  be  infinite. 
Proof.  Since  the   essence  of  quantity  implies   divisibility, 

any  existing  quantity  may  be  divided,  at  least  mentally. 
Let  us,  then,  cut  off  a  small  portion  from  the  quantity  which 
was  supposed  to  be  infinite;  what  remains  will  be  finite; 
and  that  finite  remainder  increased  by  the  small  portion 
cut  off  will  be  infinite.  But  this  is  absurd,  viz.,  that  a 
finite  quantity  should  differ  from  the  infinite  by  a  small  por- 
tion. Besides,  suppose  we  add  to  the  finite  remainder  a 
portion  greater  than  that  cut  off;  we  should  then  have  a 
quantity  greater  than  infinite,  which  is  impossible.  An  infi- 
nite body  would  measure  an  infinite  number  of  yards,  and 
more  than  an  infinite  number  of  feet. 

94.  Objections:     i.  The  multitude  of  possibles  is  infinite; 


52        General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology. 

for  there  is  no  limit  to  the  things  that  God  can 
create.  Answer.  The  possibles  are  not  existing ;  the 
thesis  regards  existing  quantity. 

2.  The  acts  of  creatures  will  go  on  increasing  in  multi- 
tude for  ever.  Answer,  The  number  of  past  acts  will 
always  be  actually  finite,  though  capable  of  constant 
increase — /.  e.,  the  multitude  of  future  acts  is  indefinite. 

3.  It  cannot  be  indefinite;  for  God  knows  all  future 
acts  of  His  creatures  distinctly,  and  therefore  definiiely. 
Answer.  God's  knowledge  is  conformable  to  the  real- 
ity— /.  e.^  to  the  object  of  that  knowledge ;  now,  that 
object  is  a  series  of  acts,  all  distinct  from  one  another, 
ever  continuing,  but  never  being  an  existing  infinite 
series.  Besides,  distinctness  of  knowledge  is  opposed 
to  vagueness  of  knowledge,  and  need  not  imply  limi- 
tation of  the  things  known. 

4.  Any  extended  body  contains  an  infinite  multitude  of 
parts.  Answer.  The  number  of  ultimate  particles 
into  which  a  body  can  physically  be  divided  is  finite; 
but  the  extension  of  the  body  can  be  mathematically 
divided  without  end — /.  e.^  it  is  potentially,  not  really, 
infinite  in  its  divisibility. 

95.  It  may  be  asked  how  we  acquire  the  idea  of  the 
infinite.  We  do  so,  not  by  intuition  of  the  Infinite  Being, 
or  God,  nor  by  mentally  adding  perfections  to  perfections, 
for  finite  things  added  together  can  never  give  the  infinite ; 
but  seeing  finite  things  we  distinguish  in  them,  by  abstraction, 
perfection  and  limitation;  next,  by  denying  limitation  we 
form  the  abstract  concept  of  unlimited  perfection,  /.  e.,  of  the 
Infinite  Being.  The  idea  thus  formed  is  of  a  positive  object ; 
objectively  considered,  it  is  not  negative,  but  most  positive; 
but  subjectively  considered,  it  implies  affirmation  and  nega- 
tion.    The  idea  of  the  finite,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  a  mere 


The  Chief  Perfections  of  Being.  53 

negation  ;  for  it  is  the  affirmation  of  something  and  no  more 
— /'.  <?.,  it  affirms  one  thing  and  denies  anything  beyond. 

96.  III.  A  necessary  being  is  one  whose  non-existence  is 
impossible.  It  is  hypotheiically  necessary,  if  its  non-existence 
is  impossible  under  a  certain  hypothesis  or  supposition ;  it  is 
absolutely  necessary,  if  its  non-existence  is  impossible  under 
any  supposition.  Now,  this  cannot  be  the  case  unless  its  very 
nature  impHes  existence,  unless  the  being  be  self-existent.  If 
such  a  being  exists  it  must  have  always  existed,  and  cannot 
cease  to  exist,  else  its  non-existence  would  not  be  absolutely 
impossible;  it  is  therefore  eternal — i.  e.,  without  beginning 
and  without  end. 

97.  Any  being  which  is  not  absolutely  necessary  is  said  to 
be  contingent — /.  e.,  it  may  be  or  not  be,  it  is  not  self-existing. 
If  it  exists  and  yet  has  not  in  itself  the  reason  of  its  existence? 
it  must  then  have  that  reason  in  another  being ;  but  to  have 
the  reason  of  one's  existence  in  another  is  to  have  a  cause; 
therefore  every  contingent  being,  if  it  exists,  must  have  a  cause. 

98.  IV.  Immutability  is  the  necessity  of  remaining  the  self- 
same, the  impossibility  of  changing.  A  change  is  a  transition 
from  one  state  of  being  to  another.  It  implies  three  things  : 
(a)  A  former  state  which  is  abandoned,  {b)  A  latter  state 
which  is  assumed,  (c)  A  subject  that  abandons  the  one  state 
and  assumes  the  other. 

99.  The  change  may  occur  variously:  i.  A  substance  may 
be  changed  from  one  species  to  another  by  losing  an  old  and 
acquiring  a  new  substantial  form,  as  when  metals  are  oxidized. 
2.  The  subject  may  acquire  or  lose  some  substance  without 
change  of  its  species,  as  when  a  sand-bank  grows  larger  or 
smaller.  3.  It  may  acquire  or  lose  a  quality,  as  when  iron 
gets  hot  or  cold.  4.  It  may  pass  from  local  motion  to  rest, 
or  from  rest  to  local  motion.  5.  It  may  assume  a  new 
arrangement  of  parts,  as  when  water  freezes.     6.  Supematu- 


54        General  Metaphysics ;   or  Ontology. 

rally,  one  substance  may  be  substituted  for  another  while  the 
accidents  remain,  as  when  the  bread  and  wine  are  changed 
into  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ.  But  in  this  case  the  word 
change  is  taken  analogically  for  transubstantiation.  A  change 
of  relation  between  one  being  and  another  is  called  an 
extrinsic  change.  This  may  occur  though  one  of  the  two 
beings  remains  absolutely  immutable,  as  when  God  became 
a  Creator  without  undergoing  any  intrinsic  change,  simply 
because  the  creatures  began  to  exist,  and  thus  a  new  relation 
was  established  toward  God  which  had  not  existed  before. 


BOOK    II. 


COSMOLOGY, 


loo.  Cosmology  is  the  first  part  of  Special  Metaphysics 
(  No.  4  ) ;  it  is  the  study  of  the  visible  world  in  connection 
with  its  highest  causes.  We  mean  by  the  world,  or  the 
universe,  the  total  collection  of  all  material  objects  knowa- 
ble  by  mankind. 

In  studying  the  visible  world,  we  are  to  consider:  i.  Its 
origin.  2.  Its  purpose  and  its  perfection.  3.  The  laws  that 
govern  it.  4.  The  constituent  elements  of  matter.  5.  The 
general  properties  of  bodies. 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WORLD. 

loi.  The  origin  of  the  world  is  obviously  one  of  the  most 
important  questions  discussed  in  Philosophy.  The  ancients 
were  divided  among  various  opinions  on  the  subject,  i. 
Plato  maintained  that  the  matter  which  composes  the  world 
was  necessary,  and  therefore  eternal,  but  that  it  was  properly 
arranged  by  an  intelligent  Being,  who  is  God.  2.  Aristo- 
tle supposed    that  both   the  matter  and  the   order  of  the 

55 


56  Cosmology, 


universe  were  necessary  and  independent  of  any  cause.  3. 
Pythagoras  held  the  theory,  revived  in  the  Middle  Ages  by 
the  eccentric  Scotus  Erigena,  that  the  world  has  come 
forth  from  the  Divine  Substance  by  an  outward  emanation, 
an  outpouring  or  outputting  of  the  Divinity.  4.  Another 
explanation,  not  unknown  to  the  ancients,  was  scientifically 
developed  in  the  seventeenth  century  by  the  Jewish  philoso- 
pher Spinoza,  who  taught  that  there  exists  only  one  sub- 
stance, necessary,  self-existent  and  infinite,  endowed  with 
the  two  attributes  of  extension  and  thought.  These  attri- 
butes he  supposed  to  be  necessarily  in  constant  action  ;  the 
evolutions  of  its  extension  producing  the  various  bodies  of 
the  world,  and  the  different  series  of  its  thoughts  being  the 
minds  of  men ;  thus,  the  whole  universe  would  be  nothing 
but  a  succession  of  constantly  varying  phases  assumed  by 
the  infinite  substance.  This  system  has  been  called  an  in- 
ternal emanation  of  the  Infinite  Being ;  it  is  really  Pantheism 
( Ttdv  Qe6%^  everything  God ),  for  it  makes  all  things  mere 
modifications  of  the  Divine  nature. 

102.  Idealism  is  a  modern  system  of  Philosophy,  taught 
chiefly  by  Fichte,  which,  instead  of  explaining  the  origin  of 
the  material  universe,  prefers  to  deny  the  existence  of  all 
bodies,  and  to  maintain  that  there  exists  nothing  but  the 
J'go^  whose  ever-changing  phantasms,  like  a  sick  man's 
dreams,  are  mistaken  for  objective  realities.  This  vagary  is 
refuted  in  Critical  Logic,  because  it  denies  the  reliability 
of  sense-perceptions.  The  true  doctrine,  conformable  alike 
to  reason  and  to  Revelation,  is  that  "In  the  beginning  God 
created  heaven  and  earth  "  (Gen.  i.  i). 

103.  Pantheism,  if  not  expressly  taught,  is  at  least  im- 
plied in  the  speculations  of  many  modem  infidels;  the 
Agnostic  school  inculcates  the  same  error  in  a  milder  form, 
teaching  that,  for  all  we  know,  the  visible  world  may  be  the 


The  Origin  of  the  World.  57 

sum  total  of  actual  being,  the  existence  of  a  God  distinct 
from  this  world  being  classed  among  unknowables. 

Thesis  I.  Pantheism  and  Agnosticism  are  systems  destruc- 
tive of  all  religion^  of  morality,  and  of  human  society. 

Proof.  If  Pantheism  or  Agnosticism  were  true,  each  of  us 
would  be,  or  at  least  might  be,  for  all  we  know,  a  part  of 
the  infinite  substance ;  in  fact,  the  worst  men  in  the  world 
would  or  might  be  self-existent,  and  therefore  independent 
of  a  Maker  and  Supreme  Master,  a  part  of  God,  as  Divine 
and  necessary  as  God  Himself.  If  so,  no  one  could  or 
should  worship  a  Superior  Being,  hence  no  religion  ;  no  one 
need  obey  a  higher  law-giver  that  would  bind  his  conscience, 
hence  no  morality ;  without  morality  no  restraint  on  man's 
selfishness,  a  mere  struggle  of  might,  whence  would  soon 
result  a  state  of  mere  barbarism,  the  destruction  of  society. 

104.  Thesis  II.  Neither  the  world  nor  the  matter  of  which 
it  is  composed  can  possibly  be  self-existent. 

Proof  I.  A  self-existent  being  is  immutable;  for,  if  it  must 
necessarily  exist,  it  must  also  necessarily  be  such  as  it  is; 
else  why  is  it  such  as  it  is  ?  If  it  was  necessarily  a  certain 
thing,  no  other  being  could  make  it  anything  else.  In  other 
words,  whatever  gives  an  object  existence  gives  it  a  definite 
existence;  for  it  could  not  give  it  an  indefinite  existence. 
Now,  the  world  and  the  matter  of  which  it  consists  are  not 
immutable,  but  subject  to  constant  changes,  as  is  evident  to 
our  senses.    Therefore  they  are  not  self-existent. 

Proof  2.  The  world  and  all  matter  are  finite,  for  all  matter 
is  divisible,  and  as  such  has  quantity;  but  whatever  has 
quantity  cannot  be  infinite,  as  was  proved  in  Ontology 
(No.  93).  Therefore  both  matter  and  a  world  consisting  of 
matter  are  finite.  Now,  a  self-existent  being  cannot  be  finite, 
it  cannot  have  limits,  for  those  limits  would  be  self-imposed, 
but  no  being  can  impose  limits  on  its  own  nature :    {a)  Not 


58  .  Cosmology, 


freely y  for  a  being  must  first  exist  in  a  definite  nature  before  it 
can  act  freely,  {b)  Not  necessarily,  for  this  would  mean  that 
the  perfections  of  that  being  exclude  all  further  perfections; 
but  no  perfection  can  be  exclusive  of  any  further  perfection, 
since  all  perfection  is  positive,  and  there  can  be  no  contra- 
diction except  between  a  negative  and  a  positive.  Hence 
a  self-existent  being  has  no  limits  j  it  is  infinite,  and  there- 
lore  neither  the  world  nor  its  matter  is  self-existent. 

Proof  3.  i^A)  The  world  is  not  self-existent,  for  whatever  is 
such  must  have  existed  from  eternity,  without  a  beginning, 
since  nothing  can  begin  to  exist  without  a  cause  (No.  87). 
But  the  world  cannot  have  existed  without  a  beginning  (see 
Thesis  IV.,  No.  109).    [B)  Matter  is  not  self-existent. 

Who  would  persuade  himself  that  every  particle  of  dust  is 
a  necessary  being,  having  the  reason  of  its  existence  in  its  own 
nature  ?  Every  particle  of  matter  bears,  as  it  were,  the  trade- 
mark of  a  manufactured  article.  The  proof  may  be  thus  pro- 
posed : 

If  the  elements  of  matter  were  self-existent,  they  would  con- 
stitute a  finite  or  an  infinite  multitude,  but  they  could  do 
neither.  We  prove  the  major :  {a)  They  would  constitute  a 
multitude,  for  any  definite  collection  of  units  constitutes  ^ 
a  multitude.  Now,  the  elements  of  matter  would  be  a  "^^ 
collection  of  units,  for  each  of  them  is  a  unit,  {b)  This 
multitude  would  be  finite  or  infinite,  for  nothing  can  exist 
indefinitely;  when,  for  instance,  we  speak  of  an  indefinite 
quantity,  we  mean  a  quantity  actually  finite,  but  capable  of 
further  increase — finite  as  far  as  it  exists.  Hence  the  ele- 
ments would  constitute  a  multitude,  and  that  multitude  would 
be  finite  or  infinite. 

We  prove  the  minor :  The  elements  of  matter  cannot  con- 
stitute a  finite  nor  an  infinite  multitude  :  i.  Not  an  infinite 
multitude,  for  no  existing  quantity  can  be  infinite,  as  proved 


The  Origin  of  the  World.  59 

before  (No.  93).  2.  Nor  can  it  be  a  finite  multitude ;  for  if 
a  million  particles,  say  of  gold,  existed  necessarily,  then  it 
would  be  either  by  accident  or  for  some  sufficient  reason  that 
thex'e  should  be  just  a  million,  and  not  one  more  or  less  ;  but 
it  q^an  be  neither  :  {a)  Not  by  accident,  for  accident  means 
a  result  without  a  reason  for  it,  and  there  is  nothing  without 
a  reason  for  it,  therefore  the  number  of  particles  cannot  be 
determined  by  accident,  {b)  Nor  can  there  be  a  sufficient 
reason  in  the  particles  why  they  are  just  one  million  in  num- 
ber, since  the  fact  that  a  million  exist  cannot  be  a  reason 
why  there  could  not  be  one  more,  for  there  is  no  more  con- 
tradiction in  a  million  and  one  than  in  a  million  particles. 
105.  Objections  :  i.  Matter  is  indestructible,  therefore  it  is 
necessary.  Answer,  It  is  not  indestructible  by  the 
power  of  God. 

2.  The  substance  of  matter  might  be  immutable,  though 
its  accidents  are  known  to  be  changeable.  Answer, 
{A)  Not  only  its  accidents,  but  its  very  substance  is 
changeable,  e.  g.,  when  a  plant  dies,  when  iron  rusts, 
etc.  (B)  If  matter  being  unchangeable,  its  accidents 
were  changeable,  they  would  have  been  changing  from 
eternity,  since  necessary  matter  would  have  existed  from 
eternity ;  and  thus  there  would  either  {a)  have  been,  by 
this  time,  an  infinite  quantity  of  changes ;  but  an  in- 
finite series  can  never  be  gone  through,  and  so  the 
most  recent  change  could  never  have  been  arrived  at ) 
{b)  or  if  the  number  of  changes  were  finite,  then  the 
matter  must  at  first  have  been  changeless ;  and  if  so, 
the  first  change  could  never  have  begun,  for  it  was  not 
necessary,  and  nothing  begins  by  accident,  /.  e.,  with- 
out a  cause,  and  thus  matter  motionless  from  eternity 
could  never  have  begun  to  move. 

3.  Though  the  elements  be  singly  unnecessary,  the  wnole 


6o  Cosmology, 


collection  of  them  may  be  necessary.     Answer,  By  no 
means ;  a  collection  of  unnecessary  things  is  not  and 
cannot  be  an  absolutely  necessary    collection,  for  a 
collection   is  nothing  else  than  the  sum  total  of  the 
things  collected. 
4.  The  world  is  infinite,  for  it  fills  all  space,  and  space  is 
infinite.    Answer.  It  does  not  fill   all  possible  space, 
but   only  all  actual  or  real  space,  and  this  is  finite 
(No.  68). 
106.  Thesis  III.     Matter  could  not  have  originated  but  &y 
creation. 

Explanation.  By  creation  we  understand  the  making  of  a 
substance  out  of  nothing.  Now,  we  maintain  that,  though 
some  species  of  matter  may  arise  from  other  species  of  matter, 
e.  g.,  water  from  the  chemical  combination  of  oxygen  and 
hydrogen,  still  ultimately  the  first  matter  in  existence  must 
have  been  made  out  of  nothing,  /.  <f.,  by  creation. 

Proof.  To  be  created  is  to  be  made  out  of  nothing ;  but 
matter  was  made  out  of  nothing ;  hence  it  was  created.  We 
prove  the  minor:  1.  ^  It  was  made^  i.  e.,  it  received  its  existence 
from  another  being,  for  there  is  nothing  without  a  sufficient 
reason.  This  reason  must  be  either  in  the  being  itself  or  in 
another  being.  Now,  the  sufficient  reason  of  matter  is  not  in 
matter  itself,  else  matter  would  be  self-existent,  and  we  have 
just  proved  that  it  is  not  so.  Therefore  the  reason  of  its 
existence  must  be  in  another  being,  i.  e.^  it  is  made.  2.  '  Out 
of  nothing^'  for  if  it  were  made  out  of  something  pre-existing, 
that  something  would  be  mutable,  else  nothing  new  could 
have  been  made  out  of  it ;  but  what  is  mutable  is  not  self- 
existent  (No.  103);  hence  it,  too,  must  have  been  made, 
either  out  of  something  else  or  out  of  nothing.  If  out  of 
nothing,  then  our  proposition  is  proved ;  if  out  of  something 
else,  the  same  difficulty  will  always  return,  until  we  arrive  at 


The  Origin  of  the  World.  6i 

some  matter  that  was  not  made  out  of  anything  else.  The 
only  way  to  evade  this  argument  is  to  suppose  an  infinite 
series  of  transformations  that  matter  has  undergone ;  but  an 
infinite  series  could  never  have  been  passed  through  ;  besides, 
it  would  be  infinite  and  still  not  infinite,  but  increasing ;  there- 
fore there  was,  or  is,  a  first  matter  made  out  of  nothing. 

107.  Objections!  i.  Scientists  object  that  it  is  unscientific 
to  trace  natural  effects  to  a  supernatural  cause.  Answer. 
Scientists  do  say  so,  but  the  only  scientific  way  is  to 
trace  effects  to  their  true  causes  by  whatever  name  you 
call  these.  Now,  the  only  true,  the  only  possible 
cause  of  matter  is  creation,  as  we  have  proved. 

2.  But  creation  is  impossible,  for  out  of  nothing  nothing 
can  be  made.  Answer.  It  is  true  that  nothingness 
cannot  become  a  material  out  of  which  things  are 
made.  But  that  is  not  the  meaning  of  creation ;  it 
means  simply  that  God,  by  His  Almighty  will,  without 
using  any  material,  has  made  that  to  exist  which 
would  not  exist,  either  in  its  present  state,  or  in  its 
elements,  or  in  any  way  whatever,  but  for  the  mere 
fact  that  He  wills  it  to  exist. 

3.  But  the  cause  must  contain  the  effect,  and  God  did 
not  contain  matter.  Answer.  God  contained  all  per- 
fection of  matter  without  its  imperfections — /.  ^.,  He 
contains  matter  eminently.  For  instance,  matter  is 
something  that  can  exercise  certain  powers.  God  can 
exercise  all  those  powers — /.  e.^  He  can  produce  all 
those  effects  ;  and  thus  there  is  nothing  in  matter  that 
does  not  find  its  prototype  in  God.  He  also  contains 
matter  virtually — /.  ^.,  He  can  produce  it,  for  He  is 
Almighty. 

4.  The  very  idea  of  matter  contains  extension,  but  there 


62  Cosmology. 


is  no  extension  in  God,  Answer.  It  contains  exten- 
sion in  the  object  of  the  idea,  not  in  the  subjective 
idea.  As  to  the  minor,  extension  is  not  formally  in 
God,  but  eminently — /'.  <f.,  as  far  as  it  implies  no  imper- 
fections. 

1 08.  A  further  question  is  often  discussed  with  regard  to 
the  origin  of  the  world,  viz. :  Is  it  certain  that  its  creation 
could  not  absolutely  have  been  from  eternity,  that  the  world 
must  have  had  a  beginning,  that  matter  itself  must  have  had 
a  beginning  ?  Though  it  would  seem  that  the  very  essence 
of  creation  implies  a  transition  from  non-existence  to  exist- 
ence, and  therefore  a  beginning  of  the  creature,  still  St. 
Thomas,  and  many  of  the  most  distinguished  philosophers,  say 
that  a  creation  from  eternity  cannot  be  conclusively  proved 
to  be  absurd,  because  it  is  not  so  :  {a)  On  the  part  of  the 
Creator,  Who  was  from  eternity  Almighty,  [b)  Nor  on  the 
part  of  the  creature,  which  was  from  eternity  capable  of  being 
created,  [c]  Nor  on  account  of  the  necessary  subordination 
of  creature  to  Creator,  for  that,  too,  would  be  secured.  But 
though  creation,  as  such,  may  perhaps  be  possible  without  a 
beginning,  there  is  something  special  in  the  nature  of  the 
world  which  shows  that  it  cannot  have  existed  from  eternity. 

109.  Thesis  IV.    The  world  cannot  have  existed  from  eternity. 
Proof,  The  world  contains  a  series  of  changes.     If  it  had 

existed  from  eternity,  there  would  have  been  an  infinite  series 
of  changes  before  any  particular  change  could  have  taken 
place,  e,  g.y  before  vegetation  began;  but  an  infinite  series  can 
never  be  passed,  nor  can  anything  infinite  be  further  extended. 
Therefore  the  world  cannot  have  existed  from  eternity. 

no.  Objections:  i.  St.  Thomas  and  many  others  admit 
the  possibility  of  creation  from  eternity.  Ansiver,  St. 
Thomas  admits  that  the  proofs  of  this  proposition  are 


The  Origin  of  the  World.  6^^ 

not  absolutely  conclusive;  many  other  great  minds 
think  they  are  conclusive,  and  they  are  certainly  very 
powerful,  far  more  so  than  any  objection  brought 
against  them.  St.  Thomas  did  not  wish  to  rest  our 
belief  in  creation  on  a  mere  reasoning  about  which 
logicians  might  quibble,  because  it  rests  on  the  firmer 
basis  of  Divine  Revelation.     [Summa,  i.  q.  46,  art.  ii.) 

2.  The  world  might  have  been  changeless  at  first.  An- 
swer, A  material  creation  absolutely  at  rest  would  be 
useless. 

3.  The  creative  act  was  from  eternity,  therefore  its  effect 
also.  Answer.  It  was  eternal  subjectively,  /.  e.j  in 
God;  not  objectively,  /.  <?.,  on  the  part  of  the  creature. 

4.  When  the  cause  exists  the  effect  must  exist.  An- 
swer. If  the  cause  acts  necessarily,  yes ;  not  if  it  acts 
freely  and  by  one  single  act  which  extends  from 
eternity  to  eternity  (see  Nos.  243,  244). 

5.  But  God  is  a  necessary  cause.  Answer.  He  is  a 
necessary  being,  but  a  free  cause. 

6.  The  act  of  creation  would  have  produced  a  change  in 
God.     Answer.  Yes,  if  it  were  not  subjectively  eternal. 

7.  From  not  being  a  Creator  He  would  have  become  a 
Creator.  Answer.  The  change  was  extrinsic  to  Him 
and  intrinsic  to  the  world,  leaving  Him  as  He  was. 

8.  God  always  does  what  is  best,  but  to  create  from 
eternity  is  best.  Answer.  God  can  never  do  for  a 
creature  what  is  absolutely  best,  for  He  could  always 
do  better  still ;  the  finite  cannot  exhaust  the  infinite 
fund  of  power  and  goodness. 

9.  Motion  cannot  have  had  a  beginning,  for  every  mo-, 
tion  must  come  from  a  preceding  motioa     Answer, 


64  Cosmology. 


Philosophers  often  call  any  act  motion,  and  it  is  true 
that  there  must  have  been  activity  of  some  kind  with- 
out a  beginning.  But  the  first  activity  is  not  in  material 
things;  it  is  in  God,  Who  is  all  activity  from  eternity, 
not  by  a  succession  of  acts,  but  He  is  one  infinite  act, 
or,  as  it  is  technically  called,  a  pure  act,  actus  purus. 
III.  As  to  the  question  how  long  the  world  has  really 
existed,  we  are  left  in  considerable  darkness.     The  extrinsic 
argument  of  authority  is    that   of   the  Mosaic  Revelation. 
It  gives  the  ages  at  which  the  patriarchs  begot    their   old- 
est  sons ;  whence  we  calculate  that  mankind  did  not  exist  or 
earth   more    than  6,000    years   before   the  birth  of  Christ. 
But    how   long  did  the    material    universe  exist  before  the 
creation  of  man  ?     The  inspired  account  of  Moses,  evidently 
not  intended  to  teach  us  chronology,  is  capable  of  various 
interpretations,  and  has  been,  from  remote    periods  of  the 
Christian  era,  variously  understood  by  the  learned.     Some 
suppose  that  an  unknown  period  of  time,  which  may  have 
been  of  any  length,  elapsed  before  the  first  day  began ;  and 
this  appears  to  be  the  obvious  meaning  of  the  second  verse 
of  Genesis.     Some  interpret  the  six  days  as  six  periods  of 
unknown  duration.     Others  prefer  to  understand  the  Mosaic 
account  in  the  most  literal  and  most  restricted  sense ;  these 
must  suppose  that  the    Lord   created  the  earth  with  many 
marks  of  old  age  upon  it.     This  is  indeed  possible,  but  there 
is  no  proof  of  it. 

It  is  the  part  of  Philosophy  to  trace  effects  to  appropria*^** 
causes,  and  therefore  physical  effects  to  physical  causes, 
whenever  it  can  do  so  without  contradicting  any  certain 
teaching  of  Revelation.  By  a  priori  reasoning  we  cannot 
prove  either  the  recent  or  the  remote  period  of  the  crea- 
tion. Reasoning  a  posteriori^  Geology,  though  still  most  im- 
perfect as  a  science,  makes  it  appear  probable  that  the  earth 


The  Origin  of  the  World,  65 

had  been  in  existence  for  a  long  period  of  time  before  the 
creation  of  man.  [  See  both  the  theological  and  the  scien- 
tific arguments  treated  with  much  leammg  and  logical 
accuracy  in  Geology  and  Revelation,  by  Rev.  Gerald 
Molloy  (Part  II.) ;  also,  Cardinal  Mazzella's  De  Deo  Creante 
(Disp.  III.,  art.  iv.)  and  Schanz's  Christian  Apology  (voL 
i.  c.  XV.)  ] 


CHAPTER    11. 

THE  END  OR  PURPOSE  AND  THE  PERFECTION 
OF   THE    WORLD. 

112.  To  understand  the  end  or  purpose  for  which  any- 
thing has  been  made,  we  must  distinguish  between  the 
purpose  of  a  work  and  the  purpose  of  the  workman  who 
produced  the  work.  For  instance,  the  purpose  of  a  watch  is 
to  show  the  time,  the  purpose  of  the  watch-maker  may  be 
to  earn  money.  We  must,  therefore,  consider  two  questions 
with  regard  to  the  world :  i.  What  purpose  did  God  intend 
in  His  own  creative  act  ?  2.  What  purpose  is  the  world 
to  accomplish? 

113.  What  purpose  did  God  intend  in  His  creative  act? 
He  cannot  be  Said  to  have  acted  without  any  purpose ;  for 
it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  act  for  an  end  and  even  for  a 
worthy  end.  Now,  God  alone  is  worthy  of  Himself :  there- 
fore He  created  for  Himself 

Had  God,  then,  anything  to  gain  by  creating  ?  He  had, 
of  course,  to  exercise  His  free  will ;  but  He  could  do  this 
equally  well  by  choosing  to  create  or  by  choosing  not  to 
create.  Why  did  He  prefer  to  create  ?  He  had  nothing  to 
gain  for  Himself;  for  He  possessed  all  perfection.  But  He 
could  benefit  others  by  creating,  and  thus  exercise  His  good- 
ness or  bounty.  It  was  not  necessary  for  Him  to  do  good 
to  others ;  yet  it  was  worthy  of  Him.  In  this  double  sense, 
therefore,  God  created  for  Himself,  viz.:  to  exercise  His 
liberty  and  His  bounty.     This  purpose  of  God  cannot,  how- 

66 


The  End  and  the  Perfection  of  the  World,  6^ 

ever,  be  called  the  final  cause  of  His  action ;  for  a  cause 
produces  an  effect  which  is  really  distinct  from  itself,  while 
in  God  there  is  no  real  distinction  of  any  kind ;  His  bounty 
is  His  will,  not  the  cause  of  His  will ;  yet  it  may  be  called 
the  reason  or  motive  of  His  choice.  Inasmuch  as  God 
wished  to  exercise  His  bounty,  He  created  in  order  to  bestow 
happiness  on  His  creatures;  but  He  intends  this  end  as 
worthy  of  Himself,  and  thus  the  happiness  of  the  creatures 
is  subordinate  to  the  exercise  of  His  bounty,  which  is  truly 
God's  ultimate  purpose. 

1 14.  What  is  the  purpose  of  the  work  ?  Or  what  pur- 
pose is  the  world  meant  to  accomplish  ?  Since  it  was 
created  to  exercise  God's  bounty,  the  world  is  certainly  in- 
tended to  make  creatures  happy,  especially  the  chief  crea- 
tures, /.  ^.,  rational  creatures.  But  this  is  not  its  ultimate 
purpose.  For  to  know  the  ultimate  end  for  which  anything 
is  intended  by  a  wise  maker,  we  have  only  to  consider  the 
highest  good  which  it  is  capable  of  accomphshing,  and  not 
some  inferior  good  which  it  may  also  attain.  Thus,  a  watch 
may  indeed  be  used  as  a  mere  toy  or  an  ornament  of  dress ; 
but  it  is  fit  for  something  better,  viz. :  to  indicate  the  time, 
and  this  is  its  primary  end.  Now,  the  world  is  capable  of 
doing  more  than  making  creatures  happy ;  it  can  glorify  the 
Creator ;  and  this  is,  therefore,  its  ultimate  or  primary 
purpose. 

115.  Glory  is  the  recognition  of  exalted  excellence.  God 
recognizes  all  excellence  in  Himself,  and  this  recognition  con- 
stitutes God's  intri?isic  glory.  The  world  manifests  to  intelli- 
gent creatures  the  goodness,  power,  wisdom,  etc.,  of  the 
Creator;  their  recognition  of  God's  perfection  constitutes 
His  extrinsic  glory.  It  is  the  highest  purpose  that  this  world 
can  answer;  it  is  therefore  the  primary  purpose  for  which 
the  world  exists,  the  happiness  of  men  being  subordinate  to 


68  Cosmology. 


it,  as  an  inferior  end  must  ever  be  subordinate  to  a  superior 
end. 

While  the  happiness  of  men  is  truly  and  proximately  in- 
tended by  the  Creator,  it  is  fitting  that  the  happiness  of 
intelHgent  creatures  should  be  made  to  depend  on  their  own 
free  choice.  Therefore  men  are  left  free  to  work  out  their 
own  happiness;  and,  as  a  natural  consequence,  they  are 
free  to  fail  in  that  choice  by  preferring  something  else ;  thus 
moral  evil  is  possible,  though  not  intended  by  the  Creator. 
But  it  is  not  fit  that  the  work  of  an  all-wise  God  should 
fail  to  attain  the  primary  purpose  that  it  was  created  to 
accomplish,  which  is  the  extrinsic  glory  of  God.  Therefore 
free  creatures  cannot  deprive  God  of  His  extrinsic  glory. 
Man  can  only  choose  his  own  manner  of  glorifying  God ; 
either  he  can  reach  happiness,  and  thus  glorify  His  bounty, 
as  God  invites  him  to  do  \  or  he  may  spurn  this  invitation 
and  command  of  his  Master,  and,  by  incurring  deserved 
punishment,  glorify  the  justice  of  the  Creator. 

1 1 6.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  God's  will  to  punish  a 
guilty  creature  is  consequent  on  the  free  acts  of  that  crea- 
ture ;  it  is  therefore  called  God's  consequent  will ;  but  His 
will  to  make  all  men  happy  is  antecedent  to  their  free 
choice,  and  is  called  His  antecedent  will.  Hence  it  is  also 
clear  that  the  doctrine  which  maintains  that  God  predestines 
some  men  to  eternal  loss  is  as  directly  opposed  to  Philoso- 
phy as  it  is  to  Revelation. 

117.  Thesis  V.  The  world  is  not  absolutely  but  relatively  perfect. 
■  Proof.  1st  Fart,  JVot  absolutely  perfect.  A  thing  is  abso- 
lutely perfect  if  it  attains  perfectly  the  best  possible  end; 
but  the  end  which  the  world  attains  is  not  the  best  possi- 
ble; for  it  manifests  God's  perfections  in  a  finite  degree, 
and  its  end  would  be  better  if  it  manifested  those  perfections 
in  a  higher  degree.     Therefore  it  is  not  absolutely  perfect. 


The  End  and  the  Perfection  of  the  World.  69 

2d  Part.  Relatively  perfect.  A  thing  is  relatively  perfect  if 
it  attains  perfectly  the  exact  end  for  which  it  is  intended; 
but  God  must  make  the  world  do  so;  for  a  wise  being 
makes  his  works  as  suitable  to  their  ends  as  he  can,  and 
God,  Who  is  infinitely  wise  and  powerful,  must  therefore 
make  all  His  works  attain  exactly  the  end  for  which  He 
intended  them. 

118.  Objections:  i.  The  work  of  the  absolutely  perfect 
Being  must  be  absolutely  perfect.  Answer.  No  crea- 
ture can  be  such  that  an  infinite  Creator  could  not 
produce  a  better  one. 

2.  At  least  an  infinitely  wise  and  good  God  could  have 
produced  a  much  better  world  than  this;  therefore 
this  world  is  not  relatively  perfect.  Answer.  He 
could  have  made  one  suited  to  procure  a  much 
higher  manifestation  of  His  perfections,  but  not  one 
better  suited  than  this  to  procure  just  such  an 
amount  of  that  manifestation  as  He  wishes ;  relatively 
to  this  end  the  world  is  perfect. 

3.  The  end  of  the  world  is  the  happiness  of  men. 
Answer.  The  happiness  of  men  is  their  own  intrinsic 
end — i.  e.^  their  end  as  far  as  their  own  tendencies 
are  concerned  ;  but  it  is  not  their  extrinsic  end,  which 
is  the  glory  of  God. 

4.  To  be  relatively  perfect  the  world  should  manifest 
the  goodness  of  God;  but  a  world  in  which  most 
creatures  are  ultimately  unhappy  does  not  manifest 
His  goodness.  Answer.  If  this  reasoning  were  cor- 
rect, it  would  only  follow  that  most  of  God's  free 
creatures  will  ultimately  be  happy,  which  we  do  not 
deny,  because  reason  and  Revelation  leave  us  in 
ignorance  on  this  matter ;  for  all  we  know,  men  may 
be  a  small  portion  of  free  creatures.     Still,  it  is  clear 


70  Cosmology. 


that  the  reasoning  of  the  objection  is  not  conclusive, 
for  the  minor  proposition  is  not  capable  of  proof. 
5.  God  does  not  attain  the  extrinsic  glory  intended ; 
for  many  men,  instead  of  honoring,  dishonor  Him. 
Answer.  God  will  draw  good  out  of  evil ;  the  crea- 
ture will  either  repent  and  glorify  His  mercy,  or  be 
punished  and  glorify  His  justice  for  ever.  St.  Thomas 
writes :  "  The  defect  of  doing  is  made  up  by  suffer- 
ing, inasmuch  as  they  ( the  wicked )  suffer  what  the 
eternal  law  prescribes  for  them  to  the  extent  to 
which  they  fail  to  do  what  accords  with  the  eternal  law" 
(1%  2ae,  q.  93,  art.  vi.).  And  St.  Anselm:  ''God 
cannot  possibly  lose  His  honor ;  for  either  the  sinner 
spontaneously  pays  what  he  owes,  or  God  exacts  it 
of  him  against  his  will.  Thus,  if  a  man  chooses  to 
fly  from  under  the  will  of  God  commanding,  he  falls 
under  the  same  wQl  punishing "  (  Cur  Deus  HomOj 
Nos.  14,  15). 


CHAPTER  III. 
THE   LAWS  THAT   GOVERN   THE  WORLD. 

119.  It  is  evident  a  priori  that  a  wise  Creator  cannot  pro- 
duce a  world  that  should  be  perpetually  a  mass  of  wild  dis- 
order; and  we  know  a  posteriori  that  the  world  displays  the 
most  wonderful  unity  amid  variety,  both  in  the  structure  and 
in  the  operations  of  its  parts.  In  particular,  we  observe  that 
all  material  things  have  well-defined  and  constant  modes  of 
action,  which  we  call  the  physical  or  natural  laws.  The  word 
law  is  here  used  analogically ;  it  strictly  means  a  rule  of  action 
for  moral  beings. 

120.  Now,  some  important  questions  on  this  subject  present 
themselves  to  the  philosopher : 

I.  What  is  the  nature  of  those  laws?  or  whence  are  those 
constant  and  uniform  modes  of  action  ?  There  is  no  effect 
without  a  cause ;  what,  then,  are  the  causes  of  the  physical  laws  ? 
Since  all  things  act  according  to  their  natures,  the  obvious 
answer  is  that  the  natures  of  things  are  the  causes  of  their 
modes  of  action ;  and  the  Author  of  all  nature  is  the  Author 
of  those  laws.  The  physical  laws  themselves  are  the  uniform 
modes  of  action  of  created  natures  or  essences. 

121.  2.  Are  the  modes  of  action  so  necessarily  constant 
that  departures  from  them  are  impossible  ?  It  is  evident  that 
nothing  can  act  except  in  conformity  with  its  nature,  and  there- 
fore departures  from  the  physical  laws  zx^  physically  impossible, 
i.e.^  no  created  power  can  produce  them;  but  they  are  not 
absolutely  impossible,  for  nothing  created  exists   except  as 

71 


72  Cosmology, 


dependent  on  the  power  and  will  of  the  Creator,  and  therefore 
the  Author  of  nature  can  affect  the  action  of  created  things, 
suspending  and  otherwise  controlling  it  for  wise  purposes  of 
His  own.  He  may  either  suspend  the  action  of  a  physical 
law,  or  make  a  creature  for  the  time  being  follow  other  modes 
of  action ;  for  He  can  change  the  very  natures  of  created  things 
and  therefore  all  their  powers.  Or  He  may  let  every  law  con- 
tinue in  action,  but  neutralize  or  counteract  a  force  by  a  stronger 
force  in  a  different  direction.  An  evident  interference  of  God 
with  the  workings  of  physical  agents  is  called  a  miracle. 

12  2.  Thesis  VI.  The  laws  of  nature  are  not  absolutely  im- 
mutable, and  therefore  miracles  are  possible. 

Proof  That  is  not  absolutely  immutable  to  which  God  can 
make  exceptions;  but  God  can  make  exceptions  to  the 
laws  of  nature,  for  He  can  do  all  that  involves  no  contradic- 
tion ;  but  that  God  should  make  exceptions  to  the  laws  of 
nature  involves  no  contradiction.  If  it  did,  the  reason  of  it 
would  be  either,  {a)  That  the  natures  of  material  things  are 
absolutely  necessary  beings,  existing  and  acting  independently 
of  God's  will ;  or,  {b)  That  making  exceptions  to  general  laws 
would  suppose  a  change  of  mind  in  God  with  regard  to  the 
permanence  of  His  own  laws;  or,  {c)  That  such  exceptions 
would  be  unworthy  of  God's  wisdom.  But  these  reasons  are 
invalid ;  because,  {a)  The  natures  of  material  things  exist  and 
act  only  in  as  far  as  God  gives  them  existence  and  action; 
He  may,  therefore,  suspend  their  action  or  produce  effects  that 
shall  neutralize  their  action,  and  that  shall  cause  even  opposite 
results,  [b)  When  God  wills  an  exception.  He  wills  it  from 
eternity,  {c)  It  is  wise,  on  the  part  of  God,  to  reserve  to  Him- 
self means  of  evidently  controlling  His  creation,  and  thus 
manifesting  His  will  to  man.  Now,  miracles  are  such  means 
of  Divine  manifestations,  and  are  therefore  possible  to  God. 

123.  Objections:  i.  Hume  and  others  have  learnedly  proved 


The  Laws  that  Govern  the  World,        jT) 

<at//-/^n  that  miracles  are  impossible.  Answer.  All  their 
arguments  are  easily  refuted ;  even  Huxley  acknowl- 
edges the  possibiHty  of  miracles,  saying  :  "  No  one  is 
entitled  to  say  a  priori  that  any  given  so-called  miracu- 
lous event  is  impossible,  and  no  one  is  entitled  to  say 
a  priori  that  prayer  for  some  change  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  nature  cannot  possibly  avail."  ("Science 
and  the  Bishops,"  Nineteenth  Century^  Nov.,  1887.) 

2.  An  all- wise  Creator  should  have  made  the  world  so 
that  it  needed  not  His  interference.  Answer.  The 
material  world  does  not  need  God's  miraculous  interfer- 
ence ;  but  God  cannot  deprive  Himself  of  the  power  to 
interfere  with  it  when  He  sees  fit  to  do  so ;  for  instance, 
when  He  manifests  His  will  supernaturally  to  His 
intelligent  creatures. 

3.  God  could  manifest  His  will  by  affecting  directly  the 
intellects  of  men.  Answer.  He  could  do  so,  and  does 
so  frequently ;  but  it  is  natural  to  man  to  obtain  his 
knowledge  by  sense  and  reasoning. 

4.  The  physical  laws  flow  from  the  very  natures  of  things, 
therefore  they  cannot  be  suspended  while  their  causes 
exist.  Answer.  The  physical  laws  need  not  cease  to 
exist  during  the  miracle,  but  a  stronger  power  may  pre- 
vent their  effects ;  thus,  our  hands  do  not  cease  to  be 
heavy  bodies  while  our  will  raises  them  up. 

5.  Miracles  only  complicate  the  economy  of  nature,  and 
thus  destroy  the  beauty  of  order.  Answer.  They  in- 
troduce into  the  world  a  higher  beauty  than  that  of 
mere  physical  regularity. 

6.  It  is  an  analytical  principle  that  the  order  of  nature  is 
constant.  Answer.  We  deny  this;  unvarying  constancy 
is  not  contained  in  the  idea  of  order.    It  is  an  analytical 


74  Cosmology. 


judgment  that  there  must  be  order  in  the  works  of  a 
wise  Creator ;  but  order  does  not,  as  we  have  seen,  ex- 
clude all  exceptions.  It  is  the  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends;  now,  miracles  are  well  suited  to  the  ends  for 
which  they  are  wrought. 

7.  If  there  could  be  miracles,  the  physical  sciences  would 
cease  to  give  certainty.  Answer.  If  miracles  were  of 
such  frequent  occurrence  that  we  could  not  distinguish 
their  effects  from  natural  effects,  we  grant;  else  we 
deny. 

8.  Miracles  are,  at  least,  opposed  to  physical  certainty. 
Answer.  Not  at  all :  we  have  physical  certainty  re- 
garding what  must  happen  when  no  miracle  interferes, 
but  we  have  no  physical  certainty  that  no  miracle  ever 
happens ;  on  the  contrary,  we  have  physical  certainty 
of  the  miraculous  facts  when  we  witness  them. 

9.  We  have  physical  certainty  that  a  given  miracle  did 
not  happen,  and  only  moral  certainty  that  it  did 
happen ;  now,  physical  certainty  is  stronger  than  moral. 
Answer.  We  have  no  physical  certainty  that  a  miracle 
did  not  happen,  but  only  that  a  certain  effect  could  not 
proceed  from  natural  causes ;  we  have  moral  certainty 
that  the  miracle  did  happen,  e.  g.,  that  Christ  raised 
Lazarus  from  the  dead:  both  physical  and  moral 
certainty  are  true  in  their  own  lines. 

10.  Miracles  could  answer  no  wise  purpose  unless  they 
could  be  known  to  be  miracles ;  but  they  cannot  be 
known ;  for  any  strange  fact  may  come  from  some  un- 
known law  of  nature.  Answer.  An  objection  that 
proves  too  much  must  be  unsound;  now,  this  objection 
proves  too  much ;  for,  if  it  were  valid,  we  could  form 
no  scientific  induction  whatever  until  we  knew  all  the 


The  Laws  that  Govern  the  World,        75 

natural  laws,  else  what  we  attribute  to  one  law  might 
be  due  to  another,  hidden  law.  We  could  then  never 
predict  any  fact  with  physical  certainty.  With  regard 
to  miracles,  we  need  not  know  all  the  laws  of  nature 
to  form,  e.  g.^  the  certain  judgment  that  a  dead  man 
cannot  return  to  life  by  any  power  of  nature. 

n.  We  do  not  know  the  full  power  of  the  devil;  there- 
fore we  never  know  whether  God  works  the  wonder. 
Answer.  Some  facts  are  evidently  the  work  of  the 
Creator,  e.  g.,  the  restoration  of  life  to  the  dead;  for 
this  imphes  supreme  dominion  over  the  noblest  beings 
of  this  world.  Besides,  the  circumstances  of  the 
miracle  are  often  such  that,  if  it  could  be  from  evil 
spirits,  mankind  would  be  invincibly  led  into  error,  and 
all  means  would  be  taken  away  by  which  the  action  of 
God  could  be  outwardly  manifested  to  the  world: 
thus  God  would  unwisely  deprive  Himself  of  what  is 
evidently  His  sole  right.  For  instance,  if  the  miracles 
of  Christ  and  His  followers  as  a  body  could  be  diaboli- 
cal deceits,  then  God  Himself  would  be  accountable  for 
the  deception  of  the  best  portion  of  mankind. 

12.  The  moral  laws  are  immutable;  therefore  the  physi- 
cal laws  too  must  be  so.  Answer.  There  is  no  parity ; 
it  is  unholy  to  violate  the  moral  law ;  but  to  oppose 
the  action  of  a  physical  law  implies  nothing  that  is 
unworthy  of  God. 

13.  The  mesmeric  fluid  is  capable  of  wonderful  effects ; 
it  may  produce  many  so-called  miracles.  Answer. 
Effects  which  may  be  produced  by  a  mesmeric  fluid 
must  not  be  called  miracles;  but  many  things  are 
falsely  claimed  for  a  mesmeric  fluid — e.  g.,  it  is  not 
possible  that  any  material  fluid  should  produce  acts  of 


76  Cosmology, 


intelligence,  as  when  the  medium  is  made  to  speak  a 
language  never  learned  by  the  person,  and  to  know- 
secrets  unknown  to  all  other  men ;  often  an  invisible 
intellectual  agent  is  present,  distinct  from  all  men  con- 
cerned.    (See  Nos.  172-174.) 
1 24.  Besides,  both  with  regard  to  the  power  of  the  devil 
and  the  strange  effects  claimed  for  mesmerism,  hypnotism, 
etc.,  in  many  cases  it  can  be  clearly  found  out  from  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  concrete  fact  in  question  whether  it  is  the 
work  of  God  or  of  the  devil,  or  may  be  within  the  power  of 
material  nature ;  and  in  all  cases  where  this  cannot  be  dis- 
covered we  must  suspend  our  judgment  and  not  pronounce 
the  fact  to  be  miraculous. 

To  discern  whether  a  certain  effect  may  proceed  from  mere 
physical  or  material  causes,  we  must  observe  whether  the 
effect  is  always  the  same  while  the  circumstances  remain  identi- 
cal. If  not,  then  the  causes  are  not  material,  since  the  same 
physical  causes  must  ever  produce  the  same  physical  effects  in 
the  same  physical  circumstances. 

Since  a  miracle  is  a  manifest  interference  of  God  with  the 
working  of  physical  agents,  it  is  evident  that  we  should  not 
call  an  astonishing  event  a  miracle,  unless  we  know  for  certain 
that  it  is  due  to  God's  interference.  Now,  God  may  interfere 
in  two  ways :  either  directly,  by  Himself,  or  indirectly,  through 
the  ministry  of  His  good  Angels.  When  the  wonderful  event 
produced  implies  the  action  of  creative  power,  it  comes  from 
God  directly ;  for  no  finite  being  can  create,  or  be  the  total 
cause  of  a  new  substance.  Such  acts  are  said  to  be  miracles 
of  the  first  class;  while  miracles  of  the  second  class  are  those 
that  can  be  produced  by  the  instrumentality  of  the  good 
Angels  acting  as  ministers  of  God.  This  supposes  that  the 
Angels  have  certain  powers  over  matter.  Now,  the  devils 
are  of  the  same  nature  as  the  good  Angels,  and  they,  likewise, 


The  Laws  that  Govern  the  World.        "]"] 

have  certain  powers  over  bodily  substances,  which,  however, 
they  cannot  exercise  independently  of  God's  permission. 

125.  How  shall  we  know  whether,  in  a  given  case,  the 
effects  produced  are  not  owing  to  the  action  of  the  demon  ? 
Evidently,  we  must  have  some  test  or  criterion  to  distinguish 
true  miracles  of  the  second  class  from  mere  prodigies  of  Satan. 
If  we  had  no  test,  a  miracle  of  this  class  could  not  be  known 
to  be  from  God,  and,  therefore,  could  not  be  an  undoubted 
sign  of  His  will.  And,  since  men  cannot  readily  discern  in 
most  cases  what  wonders  require  creative  power  and  what 
others  do  not,  God  would  deprive  Himself  of  the  power  of  ex- 
hibiting His  interference  to  men,  if  we  had  no  means  whatever, 
no  reliable  test,  whereby  true  miracles  can  be  discerned  from 
diabolical  deceits. 

The  criterion  is  this:  That  everything  concerned  in  the 
wonderful  event  be  worthy  of  the  holiness  and  the  wisdom  of 
the  Creator  and  His  blessed  Angels.  Hence,  we  know  that  an 
evil  spirit  is  at  work  if: 

1.  The  preternatural  effect  is  produced  in  favor  of  a 
doctrine  ^or  principle  which  is  certainly  known  to  be 
false,  as  being  either  self-contradictory,  or  against 
morality,  or  against  a  well-established  point  of  Reve- 
lation. 

2.  If  the  prodigy  can  answer  no  purpose  worthy  of  God ; 
for  instance,  if  it  were  chiefly  intended  for  the  gratifica- 
tion of  idle  curiosity,  or  for  money-making,  etc. 

3.  If  the  human  agent  who  claims  to  be  the  wonder- 
worker were  actuated  in  such  performances  by  un- 
worthy motives;  for  instance,  by  the  love  of  human 
glory  or  any  inordinate  passion. 

When  the  application  of  this  criterion  leaves  a  reasonable 
doubt  as  to  the  genuineness  of  the  miracle,  we  should  not  pro- 


78  Cosmology, 


nounce  the  effect  to  be  miraculous.  For  while,  before  a  court 
of  justice,  a  man  is  accounted  innocent  until  his  guilt  be 
proved,  the  presumption  being  in  his  favor,  we  claim  no  such 
presumption  in  favor  of  miracles ;  on  the  contrary,  we  accept 
none  as  certain  unless  it  be  demonstrated  beyond  a  doubt 
that  the  wonderful  event  cannot  be  due  to  any  natural  agent, 
nor  to  the  preternatural  agencies  of  the  evil  spirits. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  CONSTITUENT  ELEMENTS  OF  MATTER. 

126.  We  may  consider  matter  as  extended  substance  pos- 
sessed of  different  powers  according  to  its  different  species ;  or  we 
may  consider  it  as  to  its  further  constituent  elements  of  poten- 
tiality and  activity,  whatever  be  its  species.  Considered  in  the 
former  way,  matter  is  divisible  into  homogeneous  particles,  i.  e., 
into  particles  of  the  same  nature  as  the  entire  mass.  Many 
species  of  matter  can  be  further  dissolved  into  chemical  parti- 
cles, which  are  heterogeneous^  i.  e.,  of  different  natures;  thus, 
water  can  be  decomposed  into  oxygen  and  hydrogen.  Oxy- 
gen, hydrogen,  etc.,  are  not  known  to  be  further  resolvable 
into  other  particles ;  they  are  called  simple  elements^  not  as 
if  their  particles  had  no  extension,  but  to  distinguish  them 
from  the  molecules  of  chemical  compounds. 

127.  We  are  now  to  investigate  the  ultimate  composition 
of  bodies,  even  of  molecules  of  matter,  whether  they  be  chem- 
ically simple  or  compound.  The  following  is  the  explanation 
given  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas,  and  by  the  Schoolmen 
generally ;  it  is  called  the  system  of  matter  and  form. 

Every  one  of  the  smallest  particles  into  which  a  non-living 
body  may  be  divided  possesses,  just  like  the  whole  mass,  cer- 
tain powers  or  energies,  e.  g.,  affinities,  attractions,  etc. ;  for 
matter  without  powers  would  be  a  useless  being,  and  a  wise 
God  creates  nothmg  useless.  The  source  of  these  powers,  the 
active  principle  in  matter,  is  called  its  form ;  by  it  a  substance 
is  constituted  such  a  substance,  and  different  from  every  other ; 

79 


8o  Cosmology, 


it  is  therefore  its  substantial  form.  In  living  bodies  the  source 
of  their  energies  is  not  in  each  separate  particle,  but  in  the 
one  life  principle  which  determines  the  species  of  each  plant 
or  animal;  of  the  vital  form  we  shall  treat  in  Psychology 
(Nos.  139,  etc.). 

Besides  the  forms,  which  differ  for  the  different  species  of 
bodies,  there  is  something  which  is  the  same  in  all  material 
substances,  viz.,  the  principle  of  extension ;  it  is  matter  in  its 
first  abstract  entity,  and  may  be  called  the  potential  principle, 
the  prime  matter,  or  materia  prima  of  the  Schoolmen.  It  can- 
not exist  by  itself  without  some  form,  for  all  matter  is  some 
kind  of  matter.  This  potential  principle  thus  informed  by  the 
active  principle  is,  in  its  ultimate  particle  which  we  are  now 
considering,  a  natural  or  physical  unit ;  it  naturally  occupies 
some  space  which  has  extension  in  length,  breadth,  and  thick- 
ness. But  being  a  physical  unit,  though  extended,  the  ultimate 
particle  is  not  physically  divisible  into  smaller  parts.  The 
space,  however,  which  each  particle  occupies  is  indefinitely 
divisible.  For  instance,  when  hydrogen  and  oxygen  unite  to 
constitute  a  molecule  of  water,  their  potential  principle  remains, 
but  their  active  principles  cease  to  exist  as  such  and  are  suc- 
ceeded by  a  new  active  principle,  that  of  water. 

128.  This  form  of  water  is  said  to  be  educed  out  of  the 
potentiality  of  matter — i,  e.,  that  same  prime  matter  which 
before  was  of  the  nature  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  now  becomes 
of  the  nature  of  water ;  before  the  change  it  was  in  potentiality 
to  become  water,  now  it  is  actually  water ;  somewhat  as  a 
cubic  block  of  wax  can  become  a  ball  of  wax.  The  change 
of  a  square  block  to  a  ball  of  wax  is  a  change  of  an  accidental 
.  form,  that  of  one  substance  into  another  is  a  change  of  the 
substantial  form.  The  active  principles  of  the  simple  elements 
do  not,  as  such,  or  formally,  remain  in  the  compound,  yet  they 
may  be  said  not  to  have  perished  altogether;  they  exist  still 


The  Co7istihient  Elements  of  Matter,      8i 

in  the  power  or  virtue  of  the  compound,  which  can  reproduce 
them,  just  as  the  ball  of  wax  can  become  a  square  lump 
again.* 

129.  If  from  a  mass  of  non-living  matter  any  physical  par- 
ticle be  detached,  it  remains  of  the  same  nature  as  the  mass, 
and  has  its  own  potential  and  active  principle,  its  matter  and 
form  ;  but  in  a  living  mass,  an  organized  body,  be  it  plant  or 
animal,  while  the  potential  principle  of  all  the  particles  remains, 
all  the  forms  which  may  have  informed  the  single  particles, 
before  being  taken  into  the  organism,  have  ceased  to  exist  as 
such,  and  are  replaced  by  the  one  active  principle  or  form 
which  is  the  vital  principle  of  the  plant  or  animal.  It  is  the 
form  that  constitutes  any  material  substance  in  its  species; 
from  the  form  proceed  all  its  powers  of  action ;  the  properties 
which  a  body  derives  from  the  potential  principle  are  extension, 
divisibility,  and,  in  general,  whatever  is  common  to  all  matter. 
In  a  crystal  there  appears  to  be  one  principle  of  action  per- 
vading and  thus  unifying  the  whole  mass,  building  up  the 
structure  on  one  plan ;  in  this  crystals  appear  to  agree  with 
living  beings,  though,  as  we  shall  explain  in  Psychology^  they 
differ  from  them  in  many  essential  respects.     (See  No.  140.) 

130.  Two  other  systems  of  explaining  the  constituent  ele- 
ments of  matter  are  advocated  by  other  schools  of  philosophy. 
The  dynamic  theory,  not  unknown  to  the  ancients,  after  being 
remodeled  by  Leibnitz,  owed  its  first  popularity  to  the  further 
improvements  made  in  it  by  Roger  Boscowich,  S.J.,  and  later 
by  Kant.  It  teaches  that  the  ultimate  elements  of  matter  are 
simple  ufiextended  particles,  called  monads  {uoraiy  unit),  all  of 

*  Chemists  claim,  besides,  that  some  of  the  properties  of  the  simple  substances  are  pre- 
served  in  the  compounds,  in  particular  their  chemical  affinities:  so  that  in  a  molecule  or 
atom  of  water  the  affinities  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  continue  in  a  manner  to  exist  They 
add  that  spectral  analysis  shows  that  the  '  spectra  '  of  the  simples  do  not  altogether  van' 
ish  from  the  '  spectra '  of  the  compounds.  (See  Pesch,  Itistitutiones  Philosophic  Naitf 
ralist  No.  132.) 


82  Cosmology, 


which  are  homogeneous,  and  endowed  with  powers  of  attrac- 
tion and  repulsion.  As  each  of  them  occupies  only  a  mathe- 
matical point,  no  number  of  them  could  ever  make  up  any 
bulk,  or  produce  extension,  except  for  their  mutual  repulsion ; 
and  they  are  kept  together  by  mutual  attraction. 

131.  The  atomic  theory  teaches,  as  its  fundamental  truth, 
that  the  ultimate  particles  are  extended  and  yet  indivisible ; 
they  are  called  atoms  (arojuo?,  indivisible).  This  system 
agrees  with  the  scholastic  in  affirming  that  there  are  ultimate 
particles  of  matter  which  are  extended  and  yet  cannot  be 
physically  or  chemically  divided  into  smaller  particles.  But 
it  differs  from  the  scholastic  theory  in  denying  that  the  atoms 
consist  of  a  potential  and  an  active  principle,  the  active  prin- 
ciple constituting  the  specific  difference  of  bodies.  It  gives  no 
satisfactory  reason  why  the  extended  atoms  are  not  divisible, 
since  it  supposes  that  they  are  not  constituted  as  units  by  a 
simple  form  which  demands  a  definite  size  as  well  as  it  de- 
mands definite  powers.  Nor  does  that  theory  explain  satis- 
factorily the  specific  powers  of  bodies,  e.  g.,  of  iron  and  gold. 
Some  writers  suppose  that  the  atoms  differ  specifically,  but 
attempt  no  explanation;  others  suppose  that  the  difference 
consists  only  in  the  figure,  size,  or  motion  of  the  atoms. 

132.  Thesis  VII.  There  are  in  matter  two  substantial  prin- 
ciples^ that  of  extension  and  that  of  specific  action. 

Proof  Bodies  can  undergo  substantial  changes;  but  they 
could  not  do  so  if  there  were  not  two  substantial  principles, 
that  of  extension  and  that  of  specific  action ;  therefore  these 
exist. 

We  prove  the  major :  Bodies  can  undergo  substantial 
changes — e.  g.^  water  is  not  a  mere  mixture  of  hydrogen  and 
oxygen,  but  it  is  a  new  substance  into  which  the  elements  are 
changed.  This  truth  is  proclaimed  by  common  sense,  by  the 
languages  of  all  nations,  and  even  by  the  manner  of  speaking 


The  ComfiniefnE lemenis  of  Matter.      83 


of  those  very  philosophers  who  implicitly  deny  this  fact ;  few 
will  attempt  to  deny  it  explicitly.  In  fact,  all  draw  a  distinc- 
tion between  a  mere  mixture,  e.  g.y  the  atmospheric  air,  and  a 
chemical  compound. 

We  prove  the  minor:  No  substantial  change  of  matter  is 
possible  unless  there  be  two  substantial  principles.  For  in  a 
substantial  change  something  substantial  must  remain,  else 
there  would  be  a  creation  of  the  new  substance,  not  a  change 
from  the  old ;  and  something  substantial  must  go  and  come, 
or  be  exchanged ;  for  if  what  is  exchanged  is  only  accidental, 
^.  g.,  figure,  arrangement  of  parts,  etc.,  then  the  change  is 
accidental  and  not  really  substantial.  Now,  it  is  noticed  that 
extension  always  remains,  and  the  specific  powers  are  changed ; 
therefore  there  are  in  matter  two  substantial  principles,  that  of 
extension  and  that  of  specification. 

133.  It  will  be  noticed,  on  careful  consideration,  that 
neither  the  dynamic  nor  the  atomic  theory  can  satisfactorily 
account  for  truly  substantial  changes  ;  for  both  admit  only  one 
substantial  principle,  which  the  dynamic  calls  simple  and  the 
atomic  extended,  but  which  both  theories  suppose  to  be  per- 
manent ;  so  that  what  is  changed  in  the  formation  of  new 
substances  is  only  the  accidents  of  quantity,  figure,  motion, 
etc.  If  such  were  the  fact,  the  new  bodies  would  not  differ 
substantially  from  their  elements. 

Besides,  the  dynamic  theory  does  not  account  for  ex- 
tension ;  for  no  number  of  simple  monads  can  fill  a  space ; 
and  the  supposition  that  those  monads  possess  attraction  and 
repulsion  does  only  attribute  to  one  principle  two  contrary 
effects,  which  is  anything  but  scientific.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  atomic  theory  does  not  explain  how  the  atoms  can  be 
extended  and  have  certain  figures,  and  yet  cannot  be  separated 
into  parts ;  nor  does  it  account  scientifically  for  the  specific 
differences. 


84  Cosmology. 


It  belongs  to  Chemistry  to  study  the  phenomenal  prop- 
erties of  the  simple  elements,  but  to  Metaphysics  to  go 
back  of  the  phenomenal  and  study  the  inmost  essences  of 
things  material  and  immaterial.  In  doing  so,  the  metaphysi- 
cian must  take  into  account  all  that  the  phenomenal  can 
teach  him.  If  he  is  mistaken  about  the  effects,  he  is  apt  to 
misunderstand  the  nature  of  the  causes.  It  is,  therefore,  not  a 
little  remarkable  that  the  theory  of  matter  and  form,  laid  down 
in  ages  when  the  physical  phenomena  were  so  little  under- 
stood, should  still  to-day  account  more  plausibly  than  any 
other  for  all  the  facts  which  Chemistry,  Biology,  and  other, 
modem  sciences  have  discovered.  And  yet  such  is  the  case, 
as  is  proved  by  Father  Harper  in  his  Metaphysics  of  the 
Schools  (vol.  ii.  b.  v.  c.  ii.  §  4). 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  GENERAL  PROPERTIES  OF  BODIES. 

134.  The  principal  properties  common  to  all  bodies  and  to 

no  other  substances  are  extension^  impenetrability,  figure,  local 
motion,  and  inertia. 

I.  Extension  is  continuous  quantity,  or  that  property  of 
a  body  by  which  it  has  parts  outside  of  each  other  and  so 
united  by  a  common  bond  as  to  constitute  a  physical  unit. 
That  this  property  really  exists  in  bodies  we  know  for  certain 
by  the  testimony  of  our  senses.  Still,  the  essence  of  bodies 
does  not  consist  in  extension,  as  Descartes  supposed ;  for  space, 
too,  has  extension,  and  yet  it  is  not  a  body.  Extension  is  nat- 
ural to  bodies,  but  it  is  not,  therefore,  essential  to  them.  True, 
every  body  has  parts  distinct  from  each  other ;  besides,  quan- 
tity gives  parts  a  tendency  to  be  outside  of  one  another ;  next, 
this  tendency  is  actuated  if  not  divinely  impeded.  But  it  may 
be  divinely  impeded ;  and  when  this  happens,  as  it  does  with 
regard  to  the  Body  of  our  Lord  in  the  Holy  Eucharist,  the  parts 
of  the  body  are  not  outside  of  each  other ;  but  the  sacred  Body 
of  Christ  is  present,  after  the  manner  of  a  spirit,  being  whole  in 
every  part  of  the  species. 

135.  II.  Impenetrability  is  the  property  by  which  one  body 
excludes  another  from  the  place  it  occupies.  It  is  natural  to 
bodies,  and  the  tendency  thus  to  exclude  other  bodies  is  even 
essential  to  bodies ;  still,  its  effects  can  be  suspended  by  the 
Almighty,  as  can  all  action  of  any  created  substance.  In  such 
a  case  two  or  more  bodies  could  occupy  the  same  place,  a^ 

8s 


86  Cosmology, 


when  the  risen  Saviour  entered  the  Upper  Room,  though  the 
doors  were  closed.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  absolutely 
impossible,  because  not  self-contradictory,  that  one  body  should, 
by  reduplication  of  its  relations,  be  in  two  or  more  places  at 
the  same  time. 

136.  III.  Figure  is  an  accident  of  continuous  quantity 
which  results  directly  from  its  limitations ;  for  whatever  is  Umited 
must  have  definite  limits ;  these  definite  limits  to  extension 
constitute  figure.  The  natural  figure  of  a  body  is  determined 
by  its  substantial  form;  for  the  form  gives  to  the  body  every 
determination  that  belongs  to  such  a  species,  though  its  effects 
in  individual  beings  are  influenced  by  present  circumstances. 
Thus,  the  forms  of  metals  determine  the  figures  of  their 
crystals ;  so  with  plants  and  animals ;  still,  circumstances  may 
favor  or  impede  the  action  of  the  form  in  each  individual 
case,  as  when  a  plant  is  dwarfed  in  a  cold  climate. 

137.  IV.  Local  motion  is  the  successive  transition  of  a  thing 
firom  one  place  to  another.  It  supposes  a  subject^  a  term  to 
which  the  subject  tends,  a  force  impelling  it  to  that  term.  If 
only  one  body  existed,  there  would  be  no  such  a  term,  and 
therefore  no  motion  in  the  strict  meaning  of  that  word, 
though  an  impelling  force  might  exist,  and  cause  in  that  body 
a  mode  which  might  analogically  be  called  motion.  Local 
motion,  then,  implies  a  change  of  place ;  but  spirits  are  not 
in  a  place,  in  the  same  sense  that  bodies  are  in  a  place,  and 
therefore  motion  is  not  predicated  of  them  in  the  same  sense. 
Spirits,  as  such,  have  no  necessary  relation  to  matter,  and  may 
have  been  created  before  matter ;  but  place  and  local  motion 
are  properly  accidents  of  matter  only,  and  therefore  cannot 
affect  spirits  except  indirectly,  inasmuch  as  spirits  may  be  in 
union  with  a  body,  either  substantially,  as  the  soul  of  a  living 
man,  or  virtually,  as  when  an  Angel  protects  a  child.  (See  St. 
Thomas,  Sumtna^  i.  q.  Ix.  4,  i*"")     In  this  latter  case  he 


The  General  Properties  of  Bodies,        8  7 

exhibits  his  presence  in  space  and  acts  in  space,  but  is  not 
limited  by  space. 

138.  V.  Inertia  does  not  mean  that  bodies,  as  such,  have  no 
powers  to  act,  but  that  they  cannot  of  their  own  accord  begin 
to  act  or  cease  to  act,  or  make  any  change  in  their  mode  of 
acting.  The  reason  of  this  impotence  lies  in  the  fact  that 
bodies,  as  such,  /.  ^.,  as  mere  material  substances  not  informed 
by  a  vital  principle,  have  no  perceptions,  and  therefore  no 
motives  to  determine  their  actions  in  one  way  rather  than 
another;  therefore  they  can  only  act  uniformly  and  without 
spontaneity  or  power  of  self-determination.  Intelligent  and 
sentient  bemgs,  on  the  contrary,  can  know  a  term  to  which 
they  may  tend,  and  therefore  determine  themselves  to  motion 
or  rest,  or  to  one  motion  rather  than  another.  Intelligent 
beings  may  do  so  freely,  because  they  apprehend  the  term  as 
unnecessary ;  but  those  that  are  merely  sentient,  as  brutes  are, 
act  necessarily  upon  the  stronger  attraction ;  still,  their  actions, 
unlike  those  of  non-sentient  things,  are  determined  by  their 
instinct,  which  is  a  principle  intrinsic  to  themselves. 


BOOK   III. 


PSYCHOLOGY. 


139.  Psychology  is  the  study  of  living  things  (i^vxvi  the 
vital  principle).  Now,  life  consists  in  the  power  of  immanent 
action — i.  e.,  in  action  that  affects  the  agent  alone ;  its  effect  is 
self-evolution  and  self-perfection. 

There  are  three  degrees  of  life :  vegetative,  sensitive,  and 
intellectual  life.  These  rise  in  dignity  above  one  another  as 
they  become  more  independent  of  matter  : 

1.  Vegetative  life  needs  material  organs  and  assumes 
into  itself  material  food ;  still,  it  is  so  far  above  mere 
matter  that  it  controls  the  physical  and  chemical 
powers  of  such  food,  which  it  converts  into  its  own 
substance. 

2.  Sensitive  life  also  needs  material  organs,  and  per- 
ceives only  material  things ;  but  it  assumes  into  itself 
the  images  only  of  the  objects,  not  the  gross  matter,  in 
its  action  of  sense-perception. 

3.  Intellectual  life,  as  such,  needs  no  material  organs, 
nor  even  material  images :  the  soul  can  understand 
things  entirely  immaterial,  and  material  things  in  an 
immaterial  manner,  though,  as  long  as  it  is  substantially 
one  being  with  the  body,  it  understands  its  objects  in 
connection  with  bodily  tJxantasms.      We  distinguish, 


Psychology.  89 


therefore,  all  living  creatures   to   which  our  natural 

knowledge  extends  into  three  classes  or  genera,  viz.: 

plants,  which  have  only  vegetable  life ;  animals,  which 

have  vegetable  and  sensitive  Hfe ;  and  man,  who  has 

vegetable,   sensitive,  and  intellectual  life. 

We  shall  consider:    i.  The  specific  nature  of  plants  and 

animals.    2.  Sensitive  and  rational  cognition.    3.  Sensitive  and 

rational  appetite.     4.  The  nature    of   the   human   soul.     5. 

The  origin  and  the  destiny  of  the  human  soul. 


CHAPTER   I. 

THE    SPECIFIC    NATURE    OF    PLANTS    AND 
ANIMALS. 

140.  Thesis  I.  Living  bodies  cannot  originate  from  non- 
living bodies. 

Proof,  The  effect  cannot  be  superior  to  the  cause ;  now, 
there  is  something  in  the  vital  principle  superior  to  all  the 
powers  of  non-living  bodies,  no  matter  how  these  be  combined 
with  one  another;  viz.,  it  gives  living  bodies  essences  superior 
to  the  essences  of  all  inorganic  bodies.  For  the  essences  of 
things  are  known  by  observing  their  properties  and  operations ; 
now,  all  living  bodies  are  observed  to  have  certain  properties 
and  operations  most  of  which  are  superior  to  those  found  in 
any  non-living  bodies ;  therefore,  all  living  bodies  have  natures 
or  essences  superior  to  those  of  non-living  bodies. 

The  two  classes  differ : 

1.  In  structure.  All  living  bodies,  and  they  alone,  are 
furnished  with  organs — /.  e.,  with  parts  of  peculiar 
structure  suited  to  perform  vital  acts. 

2.  In  figure.  All  living  bodies  have  determined  figures 
proper  to  each  species,  and  these  figures  are  bounded 
by  curved  lines;  while  non-living  bodies  have  no 
determined  figures,  except  crystals,  and  these  are 
bounded  by  straight  lines. 

3.  In  growth.  Living  bodies  begin  with  a  cell,  from  the 
evolution  or  multiplication  of  which  the  whole  organ- 
ism gradually  arises;    this  development  proceeds   by 

90 


specific  Nature  of  Plants  and  Animals.     91 

means  of  nutrition,  or  intussusception  of  food,  which  is 
transformed  into  the  living  substance.  Non-living 
bodies  do  not  arise  from  a  cell ;  and  they  increase  by- 
juxtaposition  of  particles  from  without. 

4.  In  origin.  Living  bodies  never  come  but  from  germs 
produced  by  other  living  bodies ;  for  the  cells  cannot 
be  formed  by  mere  chemical  combinations,  though  all 
the  simple  elements  be  present  in  the  proper  propor- 
tions. 

5.  In  chemical  action.  The  vital  principle  of  plants  en- 
ables them  to  decompose  carbonic  acid  into  its  simple 
elements  of  carbon  and  oxygen,  absorbing  the  carbon 
by  their  leaves,  thus  overcoming  its  strong  affinity  for 
oxygen;  while  animals,  inhaling  oxygen,  which  so 
readily  destroys  dead  matter,  use  it  to  support  their 
animal  life. 

6.  In  unity.  All  the  elements  composing  any  plant  or 
animal  obey  the  vital  principle  which  directs  them  to 
procure  the  preservation  of  the  individual  and  of  the 
species. 

7.  In  duration.  Living  bodies  have  a  limited  period  of 
existence,  while  non-living  ones  are  independent  of 
time. 

Objection.  Fungi  and  maggots  are  generated  by  dead  matter. 
Answer.  They  come  from  living  germs  floating  in  the  air; 
the  leading  scientists  are  agreed  that  there  is  no  spontaneous 
generation,  but  that,  as  nature  is  now,  all  living  plants  and 
animals  come  from  living  germs.  As  to  the -question  whether 
the  Creator  could  possibly  establish  spontaneous  generation, 
see  No.  158. 

141.  Thesis  II.  All  plants  differ  essentially  from  all 
animals. 

Proof.    The  essencesr  of  things  are  known  by  observing 


gi  Psychology. 


their  properties  and  operations.  Now,  all  plants  are  confined 
to  these  three  functions  :  nutrition,  growth,  and  reproduction; 
while  all  animals  exhibit,  in  addition  to  these,  the  power 
of  sensation,  and,  as  a  consequence  of  sensation,  an  appetite 
for  sensible  good,  and  a  shrinking  from  sensible  evil.  There 
is,  besides,  in  all  animals  an  appropriate  power  of  motion, 
which  enables  them  to  move  instinctively  upon  the  apprehen- 
sion of  good  or  evil.  Therefore  all  plants  differ  essentially 
from  all  animals. 

142.  Objections :  ,  i.  Of  some  living  things — e.  g.^  of 
sponges — It  Is  not  certainly  known  whether  they  are 
plants  or  animals;  therefore,  the  difference  be- 
tween them  is  but  slight  and  cannot  be  essential. 
Answer.  The  difference  between  plants  and  animals 
is  the  power  of  sensation ;  though  but  slightly  mani- 
fested, it  constitutes  an  essential  difference ;  so  that  if 
sponges  possess  it,  as  they  seem  to  do,  they  are  animals; 
if  not,  they  are  plants. 

2.  The  sensitive  plant  has  sensation,  as  its  name  indi- 
cates, and  still  it  is  not  an  animal.  Answer,  It  has  no 
sensation ;  its  scientific  name  is  "  mimosa,"  because  it 
mimics  sensation;  its  leaves  are  mechanically  con- 
tracted by  outside  influences,  not  by  its  own  immanent 
action. 

3.  The  sunflower  turns  its  face  to  the  sun,  the  tulip  closes 
its  petals  at  night,  etc. ;  therefore  they  perceive  the  sun, 
the  night,  etc.  Answer.  The  physical  action  of  the 
sun  and  of  the  damp  air  upon  those  plants  produces 
these  mechanical  effects. 

4.  But  many  plants  grow  towards  the  light,  and  growth 
is  not  mechanical  action.  Answer.  The  growth  comes 
from  the  life-principle  In  the  plant,  but  its  effects  are 
modified  by  favorable  influences  on  the  side  of  the 


specific  Nature  of  Plants  and  Animals,      93 

light,  and  by  unfavorable  influences  on  the  opposite 
side ;  this  argues  no  power  of  sensation  in  the  plant. 
5.  It  cannot  be  proved  either  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  that 
animals  feel  and  plants  do  not.  Answer,  {a)  It  is 
known  by  the  judgment  of  common  sense,  {b)  It  is 
proved  scientifically  by  observing  that  all  animals,  even 
the  lowest  species  which  are  certainly  known  to  be 
animals,  have  organs  of  sense,  while  no  plants,  even 
the  highest,  possess  these.  Besides,  animals  have 
motions  which  cannot  be  explained  except  as  conse- 
quent on  the  power  of  sensation,  and  they  give  signs, 
by  cries,  etc.,  of  pleasure  and  pain,  which  no  plants 
ever  do. 

143.  Thesis  IIL  All  the  vital  <icts  of  an  aniTnal  flow  from 
one  vital  principle. 

Proof  1.  Nutrition,  growth,  and  reproduction  in  plants  are 
not  attributed  to  three  distinct  principles,  but  to  one,  the  vege- 
tative principle ;  because  the  effects  are  subordinated  to  one 
another,  and  thereby  show  a  unity  in  the  cause.  A  pari, 
since  all  the  functions  of  life  in  an  animal  are  subordinate  to 
one  another,  and  co-operate  harmoniously  to  one  common 
end,  there  must  be  unity  in  the  cause;  /.  ^.,  there  must  be 
but  one  principle  from  which  proceed  all  the  vital  acts  of 
animals. 

Proof  2.  If  the  animal  were  composed  of  two  vital 
principles,  it  would  be  two  beings ;  for  the  vegetable  would 
not  be  the  animal,  nor  the  animal  the  vegetable,  but  all 
men  judge  the  animal  to  be  one  being  endowed  with  vege- 
tative action,  yet  not  a  vegetable. 

144.  Thesis  IV.  The  vital  principle  in  any  living  body  is 
truly  the  form  of  the  body. 

Proof.  The  form  of  a  body  Is  that  principle  which  makes  it 
be  such  a  body  and  not  a  body  of  another  kind,  which  gives 


94  Psychology, 


it  such  powers  and  actions  and  not  other  powers  and  actions ; 
in  a  word,  which  constitutes  the  body  in  its  species. 

Now,  such  is  the  vital  principle  of  any  living  body.  For,  i.. 
If  the  vital  principle  ceases  to  animate  the  matter,  as  it  does 
in  death,  all  the  specific  powers  and  actions  of  that  body  cease. 
2.  The  mere  matter,  as  separate  from  the  vital  principle,  may 
become  successively  the  food  and  the  very  substance  of  differ- 
ent plants  and  animals,  its  specific  nature  ever  changing  with 
the  vital  principles  that  successively  inform  it.  But  this  sup- 
poses that  the  vital  principle  constitutes  it  in  its  species,  or  is 
its  form. 

145.  Objection.  The  substantial  form  of  a  body  is  simple, 
and  therefore  indivisible ;  but  the  vital  principle  of  some  plants 
is  divisible ;  e.  g.,  a  twig  may  be  cut  off  and  continue  to  live 
by  its  own  life,  the  vital  principle  of  the  tree  being  divided,, 
Answer,  Simplicity  has  different  meanings.  We  grant 
that  all  forms,  as  such,  are  simple ;  they  are  simple  in  two 
senses:  i.  Inasmuch  as  they  are  not  composed  of  matter 
and  form;  2,  inasmuch  as  they  are  not  aggregates  of  parts 
quantitatively  distinct,  as  bodies  are.  Just  in  the  same  senses 
is  the  vital  principle  simple,  for  it  cannot  be  divided  into 
matter  and  form,  nor  into  parts  quantitatively  distinct.  As  to 
the  curious  question  whether  the  principle  of  life  is  ever  divided, 
we  say  that  it  exists  whole  and  entire  in  the  body  and  in  every 
part  of  the  body,  so,  however,  that  it  can  neither  act,  nor  even 
exist,  but  in  an  extended  body,  excepting  only  the  soul  of  man. 
To  animate  a  body,  the  life  principle  requires  a  complete 
organism ;  therefore,  when  the  organism  is  destroyed,  the  vital 
form  ceases  to  be.  Now,  in  many  plants,  and  in  a  few  of  the 
lower  animals,  the  organism  is  so  simple  and  uniform  through- 
out in  its  structure  that,  when  divided,  the  several  parts  may 
still  be  suited  to  the  functions  of  life.  In  such  a  case  the  prin- 
ciple of  life  may  continue  to  animate  the  several  parts ;  but  it 


specific  Nature  ^f  Plants  and  Animals.      95 

is  not  properly  said  to  be  divided ;  rather  the  body  is  divided ; 
for  the  vital  principle  is  whole  and  entire  in  both  parts,  which 
now  become  two  plants.  It  was  before  whole  and  entire  in 
all  portions  of  one  body ;  it  is  now  whole  and  entire  in  all 
portions  of  two  bodies,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  rather  said  to  be 
multiplied  than  divided ;  or,  better  still,  it  is  neither ;  but  the 
animal  or  plant  is  divided.  (See  upon  "  Simplicity," //^j/. 
Phil.  Nat.^  by  Tilmann  Pesch,  S.J.,  No.  211. — Compare  St. 
Thomas's  Summa,  p.  i,  q.  Ixxvi.,  a.  8.)  Thus  the  twig  may 
become  a  distinct  plant ;  thus,  too,  the  segments  of  annulated 
worms,  when  severed  from  the  rest  of  their  bodies,  become 
individual  worms,  this  result  being  accomplished  by  the  divi- 
sion of  the  matter  and  the  multipHcation,  if  you  will,  of  the 
form.  Other  philosophers  maintain  that  the  principle  of  life 
is  really  divided  in  such  cases ;  perhaps  it  is  a  mere  dispute  on 
words. 

1 46.  Theses  V.  and  VI.  The  brute  soul  is  irrational  and  there- 
fore ceases  to  exist  when  the  orgafiism  is  destroyed. 

Proof  I.  It  is  a  judgment  of  common  sense  that  brutes  are 
irrational  or  incapable  of  reasoning,  and  that  their  vital  prin- 
ciples do  not  outHve  their  bodies. 

Proof  2.  I.  That  the  brute  soul  is  irrational  is  proved  scien- 
tifically, {a)  By  induction.  For  it  is  found,  by  an  endless  variety 
of  observations,  that  all  the  acts  of  brutes  can  be  accounted 
for  without  supposing  in  them  the  power  of  reasoning,  of 
drawing  conclusions  from  premises ;  in  other  words,  they  give 
no  signs  of  reasoning,  and  it  would  be  unscientific  to  ascribe 
to  them  a  faculty  of  which  they  give  no  indications.  This 
becomes  the  more  evident  if  we  compare  their  actions  with 
those  of  rational  man.  All  men,  in  the  full  possession  of  their 
faculties,  can  grasp  the  abstract  relation  between  means  and 
ends,  inventing  and  making  new  and  various  means,  e.  g.,  tools, 
to  accomplish  their  designs ;  brute  animals  never  do  so ;  they 


96  Psychology, 


can  only  follow  the  one  beaten  track  to  which  their  specific 
nature  determines  them.  Hence,  too,  a  man  can  improve  him- 
self by  study,  by  exertions  of  his  own  talents ;  brutes  cannot 
do  this ;  they  may  be  taught  various  actions  by  man,  but  they 
cannot  improve  themselves.  Hence,  too,  a  race  of  men  may 
increase  in  knowledge  and  civilization;  brutes  act  now  as  they 
were  always  known  to  act ;  and  when,  by  the  training  of  man 
or  the  change  of  physical  surroundings,  new  ways  of  acting 
are  brought  about  in  some  brute  animals,  it  is  found  by  experi- 
ment that  all  brutes  of  the  same  species  would  act  in  about 
the  same  way  under  those  peculiar  circumstances.  Therefore 
the  effects  can  be  accounted  for  by  reference  to  phantasms 
and  organic  modifications,  without  attributing  to  the  brute 
the  abstract  perception  of  the  relation  between  means  and 
ends. 

That  brutes  are  irrational  is  proved  scientifically,  {h)  From 
the  nature  of  reasoning.  Reasoning  is  absolutely  impossible 
without  universal  concepts ;  for  in  all  reasoning  the  middle 
term  must  be  at  least  once  distributed  or  taken  universally. 
Now,  brutes  never  give  signs  of  having  universal  ideas :  all 
their  actions  can  be  accounted  for  by  means  of  sense-percep- 
tions, phantasms,  and  instinctive  action,  which  will  be  ex- 
plained further  on  (No.  149). 

II.  The  brute  soul  ceases  to  exist  when  the  organism  is  de- 
stroyed. For  it  would  be  unwise  to  keep  anything  in  existence 
which  can  answer  no  purpose ;  but  the  brute  soul,  when  its 
organism  is  destroyed,  can  answer  no  purpose ;  therefore  the 
Creator  does  not  keep  it  In  existence. 

The  minor  h  clear  from  the  fact  that  all  the  functions  of  the 
brute  soul — /.  <?.,  nutntion,  growth,  reproduction,  sensation,  and 
motion — require  bodily  organs.  Besides,  it  is  an  obvious  prin- 
ciple that  the  nature  of  a  being  is  of  the  same  kind  as  its 
actions ;  now,  the  actions  of  the  brute  soul  are  all  bound  up 


specific  Natu re  of  Pla nts  and  Animals,      97 

in  matter,  therefore  the  brute  soul  is  so  too;   and,  therefore, 
it  cannot  exist  without  matter. 

147.  Some  obvious  corollaries  follow  from  this :  i.  That  the 
brute  soul,  unlike  the  soul  of  man,  cannot  exist  by  itself;  it  is 
only  the  substantial  form  of  the  brute  body.  2.  That  it 
needs  no  creation  to  bring  it  into  existence ;  it  is  educed  out 
of  the  potentiality  of  matter,  as  are  the  forms  of  inorganic 
bodies ;  with  this  difference,  that  the  brute  soul,  unlike  those 
forms,  is  not  educed  from  matter  except  by  the  action  of  a 
living  agent  of  the  same  species. 

148.  Objections:  i.  Many  actions  of  brutes  manifest  design, 
the  inteUigent  adaptation  of  means  to  ends;  e.g.^  when 
a  bird  builds  its  nest.  Answer.  This  is  true ;  but  the 
design  is  not  in  the  animal,  but  in  Him  who  made 
the  animal  such  that  it  must  act  in  that  manner — 
u  <f.,  in  the  Creator ;  just  as  the  intelligence  that  guides 
the  hands  of  a  watch  is  not  in  the  watch,  but  in  its 
maker. 

2.  The  watch  does  not  perceive,  while  the  brute  does ; 
there  is  no  parity.  Answer.  There  are  many  cases  in 
which  the  brute  acts  for  a  remote  end  of  which  it  has 
no  more  knowledge  at  the  time  of  its  action  than  the 
machine  has  of  the  purposes  of  its  maker;  as  when  the 
bird  builds  a  nest  for  its  future  offspring,  the  bee  stores 
up  honey  in  summer  for  its  support  in  winter.  The 
intelligence  thus  displayed  is  certainly  not  in  the  brute 
animal. 

3.  But  the  brute  displays  intelligence  in  directing  means 
to  proximate  ends  which  it  presently  apprehends,  as 
when  it  eats  to  satisfy  its  hunger  and  prolong  its  life. 
Answer.  The  future  prolongation  of  life  is  not  intended 
by  brutes ;  they  merely  apprehend  by  sense  the  sensible 
good  of  food  to  satisfy  their  sensible  appetite.    The 


98  Psychology, 


brute  apprehends  things  in  the  concrete ;  there  is  no 
abstraction,  and  therefore  no  reasoning. 

4.  If  a  dog  is  called  by  his  master,  he  will  run  around  by 
a  gate  or  by  a  staircase,  just  as  a  rational  man  would 
do;  here  he  displays  reason  as  well  as  man  does. 
Answer.  We  know  from  other  sources  that  man  has 
reason.  Such  actions  as  the  dog  performs  can  all  be 
explained  by  the  sense-perceptions  and  the  phantasms 
of  the  brute,  together  with  its  appetites  and  instincts, 
which  we  shall  explain  further  on  (No.  149). 

5.  Some  brutes  can  understand  language ;  they  must  there- 
fore have  abstract  ideas.  Answer.  They  merely  associate 
certain  familiar  sounds  with  familiar  phantasms.  The 
parrot  can  even  be  taught  to  utter  articulate  sounds 
associated  with  his  sensible  appetites. 

6.  Darwin  shows  that  some  brute  animals  have  improved 
themselves ;  for  instance,  that  the  dog  has  six  different 
barks  to  express  six  different  feelings.  Answer.  Dar- 
win does  not  prove  that  dogs  have  not  always  possessed 
the  same  accomplishment,  but  have  invented  it ;  if  dogs 
may  always  have  used  the  same  barks,  their  progress  is 
not  proved. 

7.  Some  brutes  learn  to  avoid  traps,  and  one  rat,  for 
instance,  will  avoid  them  more  skillfully  than  others. 
Answer.  The  association  of  phantasms  suffices  to 
produce  this  skill;  and  one  rat  may  have  acquired 
more  of  such  experience  than  another.  Besides, 
animals  of  the  same  species  may  have  a  more  or 
less  perfect  organism,  and,  therefore,  more  skill  in 
animal  actions. 

149.  While  brute  animals  have  not  the  faculty  of  reason, 
they  have  a  power  or  aptitude  for  the  proper  guidance  of  their 
actions  which  supplies  for  them  the  place  of  reason;  it  is  called 


specific  Nature  of  Plants  and  Animals.     99 

Instinct.  It  may  be  defined  as  the  natural  impulse  that 
prompts  animals  to  do  what  is  useful  to  the  individual  and  to 
the  species.  It  is  not  something  superadded  to  the  animal, 
but  it  is  the  sensitive  tendency  of  its  sensitive  nature — for 
instance,  its  inclination  to  eat  when  hungry,  to  rest  when 
fatigued,  etc. 

150.  Instinct  prompts  animals,  not  only  to  embrace  what 
they  sensibly  apprehend  as  present  good,  and  to  shun  what 
they  apprehend  as  present  evil  for  themselves ;  but  also  to  do 
those  preparatory  actions  which  are  naturally  and  sensibly 
connected  with  the  gratification  of  animal  appetites,  such  as 
looking  for  food,  retiring  to  their  lair,  and  even  excavating  a 
hole,  spinning  a  web,  storing  up  food,  building  a  nest,  etc. 

151.  In  all  instinctive  actions  there  is  an  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends,  proximate  and  remote.  The  brute  animal 
organically  apprehends  the  nearer  sensible  ends,  and  such 
connection  between  means  and  ends  as  can  be  represented  by 
phantasms ;  for  instance,  it  perceives  the  sensible  satisfaction 
of  eating  and  resting,  and  the  material  relations  between  itself 
and  its  food  and  lair ;  but  it  does  not  apprehend  the  more 
remote  ends,  such  as  the  future  prolongation  of  Hfe,  the  future 
propagation  of  its  species,  etc.  The  entire  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends,  manifested  in  the  workings  of  animal  instinct, 
is  the  work  of  the  Creator,  who  made  the  nature,  the  powers, 
and  the  tendencies  of  animals  such  as  we  find  them  at 
present. 

152.  We  can  the  more  easily  understand  the  workings  of  in- 
stinct, because  we  experience  them  in  ourselves.  In  brutes, 
however,  they  are  far  more  perfect  than  in  man,  for  they  are 
intended  by  the  Creator  to  be  the  sole  guides  of  their  actions. 
In  man  they  are  to  be  supplemented  by  the  nobler  faculty  of 
reason,  to  which  instinct  is  intended  to  be  subservient.  On 
many  occasions  we  have  nothing  but  instinct  to  guide  us,  as 


loo  Psychology, 


in  early  infancy  and  in  many  animal  functions  throughout  life, 
such  as  breathing,  swallowmg,  sleeping,  closing  our  eyelids  at 
the  approach  of  danger,  withdrawing  our  tongue  before  the 
closing  teeth,  etc.  In  all  such  adaptations  of  means  to  ends 
we  know  that  reason  has  usually  no  part.  On  many  other 
occasions  we  are  conscious  that  we  are  drawn  one  way  by  our 
sensible  appetites  and  another  way  by  our  reason ;  the  latter 
ought  then  to  be  obeyed. 

153.  Thesis  VII.  Plants  and  bi^te  animals  are  intended  for 
the  use  of  man. 

Proof  I.  The  purpose  for  which  an  object  is  intended, 
especially  when  it  is  of  a  complicated  and  delicately  adapted 
structure,  can  be  known  by  examining  its  fitness  to  accom- 
plish a  certain  end  or  purpose ;  else  we  should  have  to  grant 
that  the  striking  adaptation  of  means  to  ends  is  an  effect  with- 
out a  proportionate  cause.  Now,  plants  and  animals  are  most 
delicate  contrivances  of  intricate  structure,  and  they  are  ad- 
mirably adapted  to  the  use  of  man.  Therefore  they  are  made 
for  it. 

Proof  2.  All  things  are  created  for  the  extrinsic  glory  of 
God  (Nos.  113  to  115);  now,  irrational  things  cannot  by 
themselves  glorify  God,  but  only  through  man,  being  in  some 
way  of  use  to  man ;  hence  they  are  intended  for  the  use 
of  man. 

1 54.  Irrational  creatures  may  be  of  use  to  man,  and  thus 
glorify  God  through  man,  in  various  ways :  i.  By  displaying 
to  the  eyes  of  man  the  power,  wisdom,  goodness  of  their 
Maker,  and  thus  prompting  man  to  love  and  praise  God.  2. 
By  supplying  the  bodily  wants  of  man,  and  thus  aiding  him  to 
serve  God.  3.  By  administering  aids  to  his  rational  pleasures, 
thus  inducing  him  to  love  his  God,  and  to  serve  him  cheer- 
fully. 4.  Even  things  which  molest  man,  such  as  the  inclem- 
encies of  the  seasons,  beasts  of  prey,  troublesome  insects,  etc., 


specific  Nature  of  Plants  and  Animals.    loi 

render  service  to  man,  making  him  more  industrious,  cleanly, 
provident,  etc.,  and  enabling  him  to  bear  the  ills  of  life  in  the 
spirit  of  dutiful  submission  to  the  sovereign  will  of  God. 

155.  Objections:  i.  Many  creatures  are  absolutely  useless 
or  even  injurious  to  man.  Answer.  There  are  creatures  of 
wh'.ch  we  do  not  know  the  use  ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that 
they  are  of  no  use.  From  the  fact  that  the  vast  majority  of 
creatures  are  known  to  be  very  useful,  we  should  rather  con- 
clude by  induction  that  the  others  also  answer  a  useful  pur- 
pose. 

2.  Soma  plants  and  animals  are  known  to  be  injurious. 
Answer.  They  may  be  injurious  in  some  respects,  and  yet  be 
very  beneficial  in  other  respects  \  thus,  poisons  become  medi- 
cines in  the  hands  of  science. 

156.  Thesis  VIII.  The  species  of  plants  and  animals  are 
fixed — /.  <f.,  incapable  of  transformatioh. 

Explanation.  By  a  species  we  mean  a  class  of  plants  or 
animals  which  have  characteristic  properties  in  common  and 
can  be  indefinitely  propagated  without  changing  those  charac- 
teristics. A  species  may  indeed  produce  a  variety — /.  ^.,  one 
or  more  individual  plants  or  animals  marked  by  some  striking 
peculiarity  not  common  to  the  species  generally.  A  race 
is  a  variety  perpetuated  through  several  generations.  Thus, 
in  the  canine  species,  we  have  many  races  that  differ  consider- 
ably from  one  another;  still,  all  have  certain  characteristics  in 
common,  which  mark  them  as  belonging  to  the  canine  species. 
By  saying  that  the  species  of  plants  and  animals  are  fixed,  we 
do  not  mean  that  no  new  races  may  arise  and  be  propa- 
gated ;  but  we  here  assert  that  the  changes  will  never  result  in 
the  evolution  of  new  species.  The  crucial  test,  by  which  the 
distinction  of  species  is  known,  is  this :  if  animals  can  be 
paired  together  and  thus  propagate  an  indefinitely  fertile  off- 
spring, they  are  of  the  same  species ;  else  they  are  not.    Thus 


I02  Psychology, 

horses  and  asses  are  known  to  be  different  species,  because, 
although  they  can  by  crossing  generate  the  mule,  still  this  hy- 
brid is  incapable  of  continued  propagation.  It  is  also  important 
to  notice  that  those  scientists  who  maintain  the  evolution  or 
transformation  of  species  as  a  theory  pretend  that  the  new 
organisms  evolved  are  usually  more  perfect  than  the  antece- 
dent species. 

Proof  1.  There  can  be  no  effect  without  a  proportionate 
cause;  but  if  higher  species  were  evolved  from  lower,  the  im- 
proved new  species  would  be  without  a  proportionate  cause. 
For  inasmuch  as  the  new  species  is  more  perfect  than  the  old, 
it  has  no  cause  in  the  old.  The  new  offspring  of  plants  and 
animals  may,  at  the  most,  have  some  accidental  superiority 
over  the  parent  stock,  being  born  and  raised  under  more 
favorable  circumstances,  but  accidental  changes  constitute  no 
specific  difference. 

Proof  2,  By  induction.  Though  scientists  have  now  been 
at  work  for  many  years  in  exploring  lands  and  seas,  in  ex- 
amining the  fossil  remains  of  countless  species  of  plants  and 
animals,  and  in  applying  all  the  inventive  genius  of  man  to 
obtain  and  perpetuate  new  varieties  and  races,  they  have 
never  yet  been  able  to  exhibit  a  single  decisive  proof  that  a 
transformation  of  species  has  ever  taken  place.  Animals  are 
now  as  they  are  represented  on  the  pyramids  or  found  mum- 
mified in  the  tombs  of  Egypt,  as  they  were  before  they  left 
their  fossil  forms  in  the  rocks.  Many  species  have  become 
extinct,  others  are  found  now  of  which  no  very  ancient  speci- 
mens have  been  discovered ;  but  it  cannot  be  proved  that  any 
species  was  ever  evolved  from  any  other. 

Proofs.  That  the  test  of  indefinitely  continued  fertiHty  in 
the  species  is  the  crucial  test  by  which  the  theory  of  evolution 
must  be  judged,  and  that  the  theory  cannot  stand  this  test,  is 
acknowledged  by  its  ablest  advocates.      "  Without  verifica- 


specific  Natu re  of  Plants  and  A  nimals.    103 

tion,"  says  Tyndall,  "  a  theoretic  conception  is  a  mere  fig- 
ment of  the  intellect"  [Fragments  of  Science,!^.  ^6()).  "Our 
acceptance  of  the  Darwinian  hypothesis,"  says  Huxley,  "  must 
be  provisional  as  long  as  one  link  in  the  chain  of  evidence  is 
wanting;  and  as  long  as  all  the  animals  and  plants  certainly 
produced  by  selective  breeding  from  a  common  stock  are 
fertile,  and  their  progeny  are  fertile  with  one  another,  one  link 
will  be  wanting"  [MarCs  Place  in  Nature^  p.  107).  There- 
fore, the  theory  which  contradicts  our  thesis  is  a  mere  figment 
of  the  intellect.     (See  No.  209.) 

157.  Objections:  i.  Paleontology  shows  that  the  fossils 
found  in  the  higher  strata  of  the  earth  belong  to  more 
perfect  species  of  plants  and  animals  than  those  in  the 
lower  strata ;  there  must  have  been  an  evolution  of  less 
perfect  into  more  perfect  species.  Answer.  The  fact 
stated  is  not  found  to  be  true  in  all  cases ;  but  even  if 
true,  it  would  only  show  that  there  is  order  in  the  works 
of  the  Creator,  not  that  the  higher  species  are  evolved 
from  the  lower.    Post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc,  is  a  sophism. 

2.  Anatomy  proves  that  all  the  forms  of  life  are  con- 
structed according  to  a  uniform  type  or  plan,  so  as  to 
constitute  a  regular  system.  Answer.  This,  too,  shows 
that  there  is  symmetry  in  the  works  of  God,  but  not 
that  there  is  evolution  of  species  in  nature ;  you  might 
as  well  say  that  all  Gothic  buildings  are  evolved  from 
one  another. 

3.  Anatomy  also  reveals  the  fact  that  the  more  perfect 
animals  retain  certain  rudimentary  organs  which  are  of 
no  present  use,  and  which  are  mere  remnants  of  a 
former  useful  structure ;  therefore  evolution  has  taken 
place.  Answer.  Anatomy  does  not  prove  that  the  so- 
called  rudimentary  structures  are  of  no  use  to  those 
higher  animals ;  they  serve,  at  least,  for  ornament,  and 


I04  Psychology. 


give  symmetry  to  the  creation.  Darwin  classes  our 
sense  of  smell  and  our  external  ear  among  these  useless 
remnants,  while  it  is  certain  that  they  are  very  useful; 
such  pleadings  exhibit  much  weakness  in  the  theory. 

4.  Geography  shows  that  certain  species  of  plants  and 
animals  are  peculiar  to  certain  climates ;  therefore  the 
influence  of  the  cHmate  must  have  produced  them. 
Answer.  The  wisdom  of  God  has  provided  for  each 
climate  its  appropriate  fauna  and  flora,  usually  by  the 
natural  process  of  variety  of  races,  never  by  the  evolu- 
tion of  new  species. 

5.  Physiology  has  discovered  that  the  embryo  of  a  higher 
animal  species  passes  through  the  forms  of  all  the  lower 
species  in  its  process  of  evolution.  Answer.  The  de- 
velopment of  an  individual  animal  is  one  thing,  and 
that  of  species  from  species  is  quite  another ;  the  one 
fact  does  not  prove  the  other.  Besides,  the  statement 
itself  is  inexact,  and  the  order  of  embryonic  evolutions 
is  different  in  different  species. 

6.  A  worm  becomes  a  butterfly ;  therefore  a  less  perfect 
animal  may  be  developed  into  one  more  perfect.  An- 
swer. Only  those  worms  become  butterflies  which  come 
from  the  eggs  of  butterflies ;  the  species  remains  un- 
changed. 

7.  Even  the  Schoolmen  admitted  the  possibility  of  spon- 
taneous generation — i.e.^  of  the  generation  of  an  animal 
from  brute  matter  only,  without  a  living  germ.  Answer, 
They  admitted  it  as  possible  in  connection  with  a  higher 
influence  proceeding  from  a  heavenly  body,  but  not  as 
resulting  from  the  combination  of  merely  material  ele- 
ments ;  this  higher  influence  might,  in  their  opinion, 
replace  the  living  germ,  thus  showing  that  they  felt 
convinced  that  life  cannot  proceed  from  lower  elements 


specific  Nature  of  Plants  and  Animals.    105 

only,  no  matter  how  combined.  (Pesch,  Inst  Phil. 
Nat^  No.  190.) 

158.  It  may  be  asked  whether  the  Creator  could  have 
established  a  series  of  evolutions  from  less  perfect  to  more 
perfect  species. 

Reason  answers  that  God  can  do  all  that  is  not  self-con- 
tradictory. Now,  such  a  series,  taken  in  one  sense,  would  be 
self-contradictory,  but  not  in  another  sense.  It  is  absurd  that 
a  superior  effect  should  proceed  entirely  from  an  inferior 
cause,  but  not  that  God  should  supply  by  His  own  action 
whatever  perfection  is  added  to  the  effect — /.  <?.,  to  the  new 
generation.  Nor  is  it  evidently  impossible  that  the  Creator 
should  direct  the  evolution  of  a  lower  into  a  higher  species  by 
the  agency  of  second  causes,  wisely  combined  for  that  pur- 
pose. But  it  is  metaphysically  impossible  that  a  merely 
fortuitous  combination  of  causes,  without  a  wise  designer  to 
direct  the  work,  should  build  up  a  most  wonderful  system  of 
development,  running  through  the  whole  vegetable  and  ani- 
mal kingdoms,  such  as  scientists  claim  that  evolution  has 
accomplished.  .  To  say  that  merely  blind  forces  produce  so 
much  beauty  and  harmony,  is  fully  as  absurd  as  to  pretend 
that  a  man  can  compose  a  grand  and  harmonious  poem 
without  knowing  a  word  of  the  language  in  which  it  is 
written.  A  system  that  ascribes  effects  to  totally  inadequate 
causes  is  unscientific. 


CHAPTER    II. 

SENSITIVE    AND    RATIONAL    COGNITION. 

159.  In  our  treatise  on  Critical  Logic  we  have  devoted  a 
whole  chapter  (Ch.  III.)  to  the  explanation  of  the  means  by 
which  certainty  is  obtained,  entering  into  considerable  detail 
on  the  subject  of  sensitive  and  on  that  of  rational  cognition. 
We  have  now  to  examine  the  nature  and  the  workings  of 
those  two  faculties  in  themselves ;  and  we,  therefore,  add  in 
this  place  such  further  details  as  were  omitted  before  because 
they  did  not  affect  the  certainty  of  human  knowledge. 

Article  I.    Of  Sensitive  Cognition. 

160.  Speaking  in  Critical  Logic  [Logic,  No.  142)  of  the 
outward  senses,  we  remarked :  "  Two  very  different  questions 
present  themselves  on  this  subject:  i.  How  far  is  the  testi- 
mony of  our  external  senses  reliable  ?  2  How  do  the  senses 
work  so  as  to  give  us  reliable  testimony  ?  '*  We  then  ex- 
amined the  first  question;  we  are  now  to  present  the 
Scholastic  theory^  which  answers  the  second  query. 

^  161.  How,  then,  is  sense-perception  effected,  whether  it  be 
considered  in  man  or  in  the  irrational  animal  ?  All  animals 
have  at  least  the  sense  of  touch;  perfect  animals  have  the 
same  five  outer  senses  as  man :  the  sight,  hearing,  taste,  smell, 
and  touch ;  they  have  also  the  inner  senses,  viz. ;  the  com- 
mon sense,  imagination,  sensile  memory,  and  power  of  appre^ 
ciation  {Logic,  No.  102).     These  are  not  mere  instruments  of 

106 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition.       107 

a  most  delicate  structure,  but  they  are  living  organs  in  which 
and  by  which  the  animal  exercises  its  faculties.  The  purpose 
for  which  they  are  intended  by  the  all-wise  Creator  is  to 
enable  the  animal  in  different  ways  to  acquire  cognition  of  the 
material  objects  with  which  it  comes  into  immediate  or  me- 
diate contact.  Now,  cognition  impHes  that  an  object  im- 
presses some  likeness  of  itself  upon  the  cognitive  subject,  and 
that  the  subject,  reacting,  expresses  the  object  thus  impressed, 
apprehendmg  it  vitally.  Thus  the  cognitive  subject  perceives, 
not  indeed  a  likeness  of  the  object  but,  by  means  of  the 
likeness,  the  object  itself.  This  process  is  observed  both  in 
all  sensitive  and  in  our  intellectual  cognition. 

162.  Confining  our  attention,  for  the  present,  to  sense-cogni- 
tion, we  notice  two  distinct  steps  in  the  act  of  perception,  i. 
The  object  perceived  must  act  upon  the  subject  perceiving,  by 
impressing  on  it — whether  directly,  as  in  touch,  or  through  a 
medium,  as  in  vision — some  likeness,  image,  or  species  of  itself. 
This  image  is  called  by  the  Schoolmen  the  species  impressed, 
species  impressa.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  sense-cognition  begins 
with  the  action  of  the  object;  and,  as  the  object  cannot  give 
forth  an  image  of  what  it  is  not,  but  only  of  what  it  is,  there- 
fore it  tends  essentially  to  beget  true  cognition  in  the  subject. 

2.  The  subject  perceiving  must  not  be  merely  passive; 
for  then  it  could  not  be  said  to  elicit  the  act  of  perception 
or  sensation ;  it  must,  therefore,  react  vitally  on  the  impression 
received.  And  since  all  cognition  is  an  immanent  act,  the 
sentient  subject  must  reproduce  in  itself  a  vital  image  of  the 
object.  This  vital  image  is  styled  the  species  expressed,  spe- 
cies expressa  ;  and  the  subject's  immanent  act  of  forming  this 
vital  image  is  its  apprehension  or  cognition  of  the  object. 

163.  The  species  impressed  and  expressed  in  sense-percep- 
tion are,  of  course,  the  images  of  material  objects  existing  in 
the  concrete.    Those  objects  are  directly  perceived  by  sense; 


io8  Psychology. 


the  species  are  no  more  noticed  by  the  sentient  subject  than 
the  picture  formed  on  the  retina  of  the  eye  is  noticed  by  us  in 
our  acts  of  vision. 

164.  If  it  be  asked  where  the  sensation  takes  place,  in  the 
sense-organ,  say  the  eye,  or  in  the  brain,  we  answer  that  both 
brain  and  eye  and  connecting  nerves  co-operate  in  the  act  of 
seeing;  all  these  together  constitute  the  complex  organ  of 
sight;  but  the  act  of  seeing  should  be  said  to  be  accomplished 
in  the  eye,  the  act  of  hearing  in  the  ear,  etc. ;  for  thus  only 
can  it  be  properly  said  that  we  see  and  hear  the  outward  ob- 
ject, and  not  the  image  of  the  object,  or  a  modification  of  our 
senses. 

165.  The  imagination,  on  the  contrary,  does  not  act  in  the 
organ  of  the  outer  senses ;  but  its  organ  is  the  brain.  It  exists 
in  perfect  animals,  and  may  perhaps  be  wanting  in  lower  spe- 
cies of  sentient  life,  some  of  which  appear  to  have  no  senses 
but  those  of  touch  and  taste.  The  imagination  is  the  faculty 
by  which  animals  form  to  themselves  organic  images,  called 
phantasms,  either  of  sensible  objects  perceived,  or,  in  man  at 
least,  of  other  objects  never  perceived.  In  the  latter  case  the 
images  result  from  the  combination  of  former  phantasms,  which 
themselves  have  been  ultimately  derived  from  objects  of  sen- 
sation. 

166.  The  sensile  memory  performs  a  threefold  office:  {a)  It 
directly  brings  back  former  phantasms ;  {b)  Indirectly — /.  e., 
through  the  phantasms  reproduced — it  represents  objects  for- 
merly perceived ;  {c)  It  represents  them  as  having  been  for- 
merly perceived. 

167.  There  is  one  sensible  power  of  cognition  to  which  it 
was  not  necessary  to  advert  in  Critical  Logic  since  it  is  not 
one  of  the  means  by  which  men  acquire  certainty ;  we  mean 
the  power  of  appreciation,  the  vis  cestimativa^  of  the  School- 
men.    It  is  the  highest  of  merely  organic  faculties,  because 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition.       109 

it  approaches  the  nearest  to  the  intellectual  power  of  judg- 
ment. Its  action  consists  in  apprehending  certain  concrete 
relations  which  sensible  objects  bear  to  the  sentient  animal. 
By  it  the  lamb,  even  the  first  time  that  it  sees  a  wolf,  appre- 
hends him  as  dangerous  to  itself;  by  it  the  bird  apprehends 
a  straw  as  just  then  suitable  for  its  nest.  Such  apprehensions 
are  often  called  sensible  judgments.  They  differ  from  intel- 
lectual judgments :  {a)  In  always  dealing  with  concrete 
material  things;  [b]  In  apprehending  by  mere  organic  action 
the  relations  existing  between  such  things  and  the  animal 
subject;  {c)  In  absolutely  excluding  all  abstraction. 

168.  In  connection  with  the  imagination,  referred  to  above, 
it  is  appropriate  to  give  here  a  brief  explanation  both  of 
dreams^  which  are  chiefly  the  work  of  the  imagination,  and 
of  sleep,  which  occasions  dreams.  Sleep  is  a  natural  inter- 
ruption of  the  equilibrium  between  the  various  faculties  of 
man ;  for  we  shall  confine  our  remarks  to  the  sleep  of  man. 
It  arises  from  the  exhaustion  of  the  animal  organism,  and 
is  ordained  by  nature  to  restore  that  organism  to  its  former 
freshness.  It  differs  from  disease,  which  is  an  unnatural 
disturbance  of  the  same  equilibrium. 

169.  We  should  not,  then,  imagine  that  sleep  is  a  cessa- 
tion of  vital  action,  but  rather  it  is  a  special  mode  of  vitality. 
In  sleep,  i.  All  the  vegetative  powers  continue  to  act,  but 
more  gently  and   with  more    uniform  motion    than   before. 

2.  The   action  of  the     senses  is  more    or   less    suspended. 

3.  The  sensible  appetites  are  much  relaxed.  4.  The  in- 
tellect may  act,  but  it  is  not  fully  conscious  of  its  opera- 
tions. 5.  The  will  may  act,  but  not  freely;  hence  we  are 
not  accountable  for  its  actions  when  we  are  fully  asleep, 
and  not  fully  accountable  when  we  are  half-asleep.  Sleep 
is  really  a  time  of  repairs  to  the  body;  during  it  the 
machinery  of  the  organism  is  out  of  gear. 


no  Psychology, 


170.  Dreams  are  series  of  phantasms,  reproduced  and 
combined  anew  by  the  fancy,  accompanied  at  times  by 
some  intellectual  activity,  while  the  nerves  of  the  body 
are  relaxed  in  sleep.  Dreams  are  often  started  by  actual 
impressions  on  the  slumbering  senses — for  instance,  by  some 
sounds  or  feelings — and  they  are  greatly  influenced  by  any 
abnormal  condition  of  the  nerves  and  the  blood.  Our  phan- 
tasms are  not  isolated,  but  variously  associated  with  each 
other  by  similarity,  by  congeniahty,  by  having  been  formed 
contemporaneously,  etc.;  and  thus,  when  one  phantasm  is 
aroused,  others  are  thereby  excited,  whether  we  are  awake 
or  asleep.  When  awake,  we  can  to  a  great  extent  regulate 
the  workings  of  our  imagination  by  our  will,  and  we  are 
inclined  to  do  so  in  connection  with  our  sense-perceptions ; 
but  when  we  are  asleep,  our  fancy  has  fiill  play,  and  may, 
for  all  we  know,  be  constantly  moving,  though  it  may  leave 
no  traces  of  its  vagaries.  From  the  nature  of  dreams  just  ex- 
plained it  is  evident  how  foolish  it  is  to  attach  any  significa- 
tion to  them  as  foretelling  future  events,  unless  on  special 
occasions  they  should  be  preternaturally  produced  by  Provi- 
dence for  worthy  and  important  purposes. 

171.  Somnambulism  is  a  dream  giving  rise  to  correspond- 
ing external  actions.  Somnambulists  act  outwardly  in  con- 
formity with  their  imaginations,  but  in  a  strange  manner. 
I.  They  proceed  as  if  they  saw,  while  their  eyes  are  closed 
or  rigid ;  thus  they  will  avoid  obstacles  in  their  way,  yet  they 
really  do  not  see,  but  are  guided  by  their  mere  imagining  of 
the  familiar  places,  and  therefore  they  will  strike  against  ob- 
stacles to  which  they  are  not  accustomed.  2.  They  do  bolder 
and  sometimes  more  ingenious  things  than  when  awake;  for 
they  do  not  reflect  on  danger,  and  all  their  faculties  are 
concentrated  on  one  purpose.  3.  On  awaking,  they  have 
no  recollection  of  their  wanderings. 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition.       1 1 1 

172.  Phenomena  similar  to  those  of  somnambulism  are  pro- 
duced by  the  mesmeric  sleep.  Mesmer  (a.  d.  1733-18 15)  boast- 
ed of  having  invented  an  art  of  healing  diseases  by  means  of 
magnetism,  which  he  excited  by  touching  the  sick  with  a  firm 
will  to  restore  their  health.  One  of  the  means  employed  in 
that  process  is  the  artificial  or  magnetic  sleep.  Seeing  that 
sleep  is  merely  a  natural  disturbance  of  the  vital  powers,  we 
find  nothing  astonishing  in  the  production  of  an  artificial 
sleep  by  natural  means.  Nor  is  it  absurd  to  suppose  that  the 
mesmerizer  may  affect  the  slumbering  faculties  of  the  sleeper 
or  medium,  usually  a  nervous  woman,  and  so  influence  her 
imagination  as  to  direct,  to  some  extent,  her  feehngs  and  her 
outward  motions.  But  the  magnetizer  cannot  do  this  directly 
by  his  will  or  his  intellect ;  these  faculties  are  essentially  in- 
capable of  acting  outside  of  the  soul,  and  the  soul  is  not  out- 
side its  living  body. 

173.  Induction  proves  that  the  souls  of  men  cannot,  in  our 
present  condition,  communicate  or  act  upon  each  other  ex- 
cept by  means  of  the  body,  and  therefore  by  means  of  matter. 
As  long,  therefore,  as  the  effects  claimed  to  be  produced  upon 
the  medium  can  be  the  results  of  material  influence,  those 
effects  may  be  natural ;  but  many  phenomena  of  mesmerism 
are  beyond  the  reach  of  material  causes,  and  therefore  they 
are  preternatural.  For  instance,  it  is  claimed  that  the  person 
magnetized  may  become  possessed  of  new  intellectual  powers, 
such  as  mind-reading  and  the  power  of  seeing  what  is  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  senses ;  or  the  medium  suddenly  possesses 
knowledge  of  things  never  learned,  as  of  the  latent  causes  and 
the  remedies  of  diseases,  or  exhibits  familiarity  with  foreign 
languages,  etc.  It  is  the  part  of  Philosophy  to  trace  effects 
to  adequate  causes.  Now,  some  of  the  effects  attributed  to 
mesmerism,  when  they  are  really  such  as  they  pretend  to  be 
and  not  mere  jugglery,  cannot  have  any  adequate  causes  in 


112  Psychology. 


man,  but  only  in  spirits  distinct  from  the  souls  of  all  those 
visibly  present  on  such  occasions. 

174.  The  same  test  will  apply  to  the  phenomena  of  spiritism; 
namely,  all  clear  exhibition  of  knowledge  or  intellectual  action 
must  be  ascribed  to  an  intellect  as  its  source.  If  this  cannot 
be  the  intellect  of  living  men,  then  the  effects  must  be 
ascribed,  both  in  spiritism  and  mesmerism,  to  the  agency  of 
the  evil  spirits.  For  neither  God,  nor  His  good  Angels,  nor 
the  souls  in  bhss  could  be  supposed  to  put  themselves  at 
the  disposal  of  spiritists  or  mesmerists,  especially  if  we  consider 
the  unworthy  and  often  immoral  means  employed  by  such 
men  in  their  trades.  Nor  can  a  man  claim  control  over  the 
souls  of  the  condemned ;  and,  even  if  he  could,  it  would  be 
unholy  and  unwise  for  any  one  to  make  these  his  advisers  and 
helpers.  But  it  is  perfectly  conformable  to  the  teachings  both 
of  reason  and  of  Revelation  to  conclude  that  the  evil  spirits, 
or  demons,  are  the  agents  of  all  such  effects  in  spiritism  and 
mesmerism  as  cannot  be  attributed  to  human  power.  Spiritism 
is  explicitly  forbidden  in  Holy  Writ :  "  Neither  let  there  be 
found  any  one  among  you  that  seeketh  the  truth  from  the 
dead.  For  the  Lord  abhorreth  all  such  things."  (Deut,. 
xviii.  12.  See  further  Jouin's  Evidences  of  Religion,  pp. 
74,  etc.) 

Article  H.     Rational  Cognition. 

175.  From  the  explanation  given  in  the  preceding  article 
it  is  clear  that  sense-perception  consists  in  the  formation,  by 
the  sentient  being,  of  vital  images  representing  the  material 
objects  perceived.  Now,  a  similar  process  must  be  followed 
by  rational  or  intellectual  cognition :  it  too  consists  in  produc- 
ing an  image  of  the  object  known  ;  not,  however,  an  organic, 
a  material,  but  an  intellectual  image.  For  truth  in  the  mind, 
log'cal   truth,  supposes  that  the  mind  is  made  conformable 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition.       113 

to  the  object  known;  and  it  can  acquire  this  conformity 
in  no  other  way  than  by  conceiving  an  image  of  that  object. 
This  point,  then,  is  common  to  sensitive  and  to  rational  cog- 
nition, that  both  are  accomplished  by  the  formation,  in  the 
subject,  of  vital  images  representing  the  objects.  Another 
point  must  be  common,  viz.,  both  must  derive  the  image  from 
the  object  which  it  represents ;  else  the  cognition  would  not  be 
certainly  true,  or  conformable  to  the  object  known. 

176.  But  a  difference  between  sensitive  and  intellectual 
knowledge  arises  from  the  fact  that,  in  sensitive  knowledge,  a 
material  object  impresses  a  material  image  of  itself  upon  the 
material  organ  of  sense;  but  it  cannot  impress  a  material 
image  upon  the  immaterial  intellect.  The  intellect  cannot 
receive  such  an  image  into  itself.  It  takes,  abstracts  from  the 
material  objects  presented,  or  rather  from  the  sensible  phan- 
tasms of  them,  the  intelligible  notes  of  the  objects;  these  are 
the  immaterial  images,  impressed  on  the  intellect  as  the 
species  impressed ;  and  re-acting,  eliciting  the  vital  act  of  cog- 
nition, the  intellect  forms  the  species  expressed,  thus  complet- 
ing the  act  of  intellectual  apprehension.  The  result  or  term 
of  this  process  is  an  idea :  here,  then,  we  have  the  Scholastic 
theory  which  accounts  for  the  origin  of  ideas. 

177.  The  Schoolmen,  always  careful  to  give  names  to  every 
step  discernible  in  the  analysis  of  any  process,  gave  the  name 
of  intellect  in  action,  intellectus  agens,  to  the  intellect  when 
viewed  as  abstractmg  from  the  phantasms  and  producing 
the  immaterial  image,  and  the  name  of  receptive  intellect, 
intellectus  possibilis,  to  the  same  faculty  viewed  as  vitally  re- 
ceiving that  image. 

178.  It  may  be  asked  whether  all  our  ideas  are  obtained 
by  a  like  process ;  and  if  so,  how  can  we  have  ideas  of 
things  immaterial  ?  Many  philosophers  have  supposed  that 
we  have  some  innate  ideas,  ideas  born  in  us,  such  as  those  of 


1 1 4  Psychology. 


truth,  virtue,  vice,  etc.  Others  have  gone  so  far  as  to  maintain 
that  all  our  ideas  are  inborn,  and  only  awakened,  not  acquired, 
under  favorable  circumstances.  These  are  idle  suppositions, 
devoid  of  all  proof  and,  moreover,  liable  to  the  serious  objec- 
tion that,  if  our  ideas  are  not  derived  from  the  objective  real- 
ity, they  may  be  merely  subjective,  and  our  knowledge  may 
be  an  illusion.  But  our  ideas  are  truly  derived  by  way  of 
likeness  from  the  objects  themselves;  and  therefore  our 
knowledge  is  objective  and  reliable. 

179.  Another  felse  theory  is  that  of  the  Traditionalists, 
who  pretend  that  all  our  knowledge  comes  to  us  by  tradition, 
— /.  e.j  by  the  teaching  of  other  men.  This  is  a  most  unsatis- 
factory theory :  other  men  can  only  use  signs  corresponding 
to  our  ideas,  but  not  put  ideas  into  our  minds.  If  they  give 
us  a  sign  to  which  none  of  our  ideas  corresponds,  the  sign  is 
unintelligible  to  us :  thus,  no  amount  of  explanation  can  make 
a  man  born  blind  understand  the  nature  of  color,  or  the  for- 
mal difference  between  one  color  and  another.  There  re- 
mains a  last  false  theory,  that  of  the  Ontologists,  which  we 
shall  later  on  refute  with  more  detail.     (See  Nos.  187,  188.) 

1 80.  We  must  first  consider  how  we  get  ideas  of  things 
immaterial,  inaccessible  to  the  senses.  We  have  no  intuitions 
of  such  objects — for  instance,  of  virtue,  vice,  j  ustice,  truth,  etc., 
nor  of  spirits,  of  God,  of  our  own  soul,  etc.  How  do  we  get 
our  ideas  of  all  such  things  ?  The  Schoolmen,  in  accord  as 
usual  with  the  ancient  Peripatetics,  or  followers  of  Aristotle, 
clearly  lay  it  down  as  a  maxim  that  there  are  no  ideas  in  our 
intellect  which  we  have  not  derived  from  sense-perception, 
nihil  est  in  intellectu  quod prius  non  fuerat  in  sensu.  This  prin- 
ciple is  true,  but  it  needs  explanation. 

181.  At  first  sight  the  saying  appears  absurd :  we  have  an 
idea  of  spirit,  but  we  have  never  beheld  a  spirit;  how,  then,  can 
we  be  said  to  have  derived  this  idea  from  sense-perception  ? 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition,       115 

Let  us  consider  what  we  mean  by  a  spirit:  we  mean 
an  immaterial  substance  capable  of  thinking  and  willing. 
Now,  by  our  senses  we  perceive  material  substances.  By  our 
power  of  abstraction  we  look  at  substance  only;  we  strip  sub- 
stance of  all  that  is  material  in  or  about  it.  In  conceiving 
a  spirit,  we  affirm  substance  and  deny  matter :  our  idea  of  an 
immaterial  substance  is  partly  affirmative  and  partly  negative; 
but  all  its  elements  are  derived  by  abstraction  from  sense-per- 
ception. But  how  do  we  get  the  ideas  of  *  thought '  and 
'  will '  ?  We  perceive  acts  of  thought  and  will  in  ourselves  by 
our  consciousness.  But  how  is  consciousness  connected  with 
sense  ?  We  could  not  be  conscious  of  our  mental  acts,  if  these 
acts  did  not  exist;  and  they  would  not  exist,  if  sense-perception 
did  not  prompt  our  minds  to  act.  For  no  thought,  and  of 
course  no  volition,  would  arise  in  the  human  soul,  if  sensation 
did  not  call  forth  the  exercise  of  our  faculties.  Thus  we  see 
that  all  the  elements  contained  in  our  idea  of  spirit  are  trace- 
able to  sense-perception ;  the  same  holds  for  all  our  other  ideas. 
In  fact,  if  we  were  to  examine  all  the  ideas  expressed  in  so  in- 
tellectual a  poem  as  Milton's  "  Paradise  Lost,"  we  should  find 
in  it  no  concept  the  elements  of  which  have  not  ultimately 
arisen  fi-om  sensation.  Many  of  those  concepts  are  not  con- 
formable to  an  objective  reality,  because  they  are  not  directly 
formed  from  objects  represented  by  them ;  but  inasmuch  as 
their  elements  are  derived  firom  real  objects,  all  ideas  have  a 
foundation  in  the  reality.  Such  are,  for  instance,  the  con- 
cepts of  Death  and  Sin,  as  Milton  describes  those  creations 
of  his  poetic  mind. 

182.  We  are  now  prepared  to  give  a  connected  and,  as  it 
were,  an  historical  account  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  accord- 
ing to  the  system  of  those  Schoolmen  who  fgllow  St.  Thomas 
most  closely.  We  start  with  the  maxim,  explained  above, 
that  all  natural  knowledge  originates  in  sense-perception.  The 


1 1 6  Psychology. 


mind  of  the  child  is  at  first  Hke  a  clean  tablet,  tabula  rasa,  on 
which  nothing  as  yet  has  been  written  ;  it  has  no  inborn  ideas. 
Its  avenues  to  knowledge  are  its  senses.  If  these  should  be 
so  clogged  by  disease  as  to  be  unfit  for  action,  the  intellectual 
powers  will  never  be  set  to  work ;  in  fact,  we  find  that  persons 
bom  deaf  and  blind  are  apt  to  remain  idiotic.  When  the 
senses  of  any  child  first  open  to  the  outward  world,  it  begins 
to  have  sense-perceptions,  as  brute  animals  have ;  there  is  for 
a  considerable  time  no  sign  of  intellectual  action.  When  the 
brain,  the  organ  of  the  imagination,  becomes  sufficiently 
perfected  to  elaborate  phantasms  suitable  for  intellectual 
use,  the  intellect  becomes  aroused  to  its  specific  activity.  It 
sets  to  work  abstracting  what  is  inteUigible  in  the  object, 
and  forming  an  image  of  the  object's  nature.  It  impresses 
this  abstract  species  upon  the  receptive  intellect,  which  in  turn 
seizes  upon  or  expresses  the  image  in  itself,  and  thus  intel- 
lectually apprehends  or  cognizes  the  object.  For  instance, 
the  hand  seizes  an  orange,  the  eye  sees  it,  the  palate  tastes  it, 
etc. ;  the  phantasms  formed  by  the  imagination  represent  all 
that  is  sensible  in  the  fruit.  The  intellect  goes  deeper;  it 
reads  within  the  reality,  as  its  Latin  name  signifies  {ifitus 
legere,  to  read  within) ;  it  abstracts  and  conceives  the  ideas 
of  *  being,'  '  substance,'  *  accidents,'  in  particular  of  *  size,' 
'  taste,'  '  smell,'  '  color,'  of  *  cause,'  *  effect,'  '  food,'  *  pleasure,' 
etc.,  etc.  All  the  senses,  interior  and  exterior,  are  constantly 
bringing  new  phantasms  to  the  brain ;  the  intellect  is  con- 
stantly abstracting  and  comparing,  conceiving  and  judging; 
inductive  reasoning,  now  fairly  aroused,  contributes  its  share 
to  develop  knowledge ;  and  thus  all  our  ideas  are  gradually 
formed,  having  a  foundation  in  objects  of  sense-perception. 

183.  At  first  these  ideas  are  not  considered  by  us  as  repre- 
senting whole  classes  of  things  :  the  ideas  are  direct,  repre- 
senting the  notes  *  being,'  '  substance,'  *  cause,'  etc.,  which 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition.       1 1 7 

exist  identically  in  each  individual  object  considered ;  but  we 
do  not  yet  reflect  on  the  fact  that  the  objects  are  generically 
or  specifically  identical.  For  instance,  when  I  see  a  rock,  a 
fruit,  a  man,  etc.,  I  apprehend  each  as  a  substance;  this 
apprehension  gives  me  the  direct  universal  concept  *  sub- 
stance.' By  obser\'ution  I  notice  the  identity  of  the  objects; 
but  it  may  be  a  long  time  before  I  reflect  sufficiently  upon  my 
direct  universal  concepts  to  perceive  distinctly  that  they  are 
universal — /.  e.^  that  they  represent  one  thing  common  to  a 
whole  class  of  things.  When  I  do  so  at  last,  I  have  a 
reflex  universal  idea. 

184.  Philosophers  have  warmly  discussed  the  nature  of 
reflex  universals.  The  question  is  a  radical  one ;  errors  on 
this  subject  strike  at  the  root  of  all  our  knowledge.  The 
Nominalists,  such  as  Bain  and  J.  S.  Mill,  maintain  that  uni- 
versals are  mere  names  assigned  to  a  whole  class  of  things, 
because  we  chioose  to  fix  our  attention  on  some  attrib^^tes 
which  resemble  each  other  in  different  objects ;  they  do  not 
suppose  that  anything  is  common  to  such  obiects,  but  only 
that  we  give  the  same  name  to  things  similarly  marked.  They 
would  deny  that  there  is  anything  identical  in  all  men,  in  all 
substances,  etc. ;  simply,  we  classify  things  by  an  arbitrary 
grouping,  and  we  assign  names  to  the  groups.  The  Con- 
ceptualists  admit  more  than  identity  in  the  name ;  but  still, 
they  admit  nothing  identical  in  the  things — ^.^.,  in  animals, 
in  plants,  etc.  They  admit  similarities  so  close  that  we  imagine 
them  identical,  and  thus  we  conceive,  say  a  lion,  by  a  sort  of 
vague  or  blurred  phantasm,  which  will  sufficiently  represent 
any  lion  in  general.  This  is  not  an  idea  at  all,  but  merely  a 
phantasm;  besides,  it  is  essentially  relative,  since  the  word 
animal  vi'^  not  call  up  the  same  phantasm  in  every  mind  ;  thus 
conceptualism  has  led  to  the  modern  theory  of  relativity  of 
all  human  thought.     "  It  is,"  remarks  Rev.  R.  F.  Clarke,  S.J., 


1 1 8  Psychology. 


"  the  central  error  of  modern  Logic,  but  it  has  a  twin  brother 
in  Metaphysics  no  less  subversive  of  truth.  The  radical  and 
fundamental  mistake  of  modern  metaphysicians  consists  in  the 
supposition  that  it  is  possible  for  two  objects  to  resemble  each 
other  without  having  some  fundamefitum  in  re,  something 
truly  and  really  common  to  both  of  them  in  which  this  resem- 
blance has  its  origin."  (See  Amer.  Cath.  Quart.  Review, 
1888,  pp.  52,  etc.) 

185.  Thesis  IX.  The  reflex  universals  are  not  mental  im- 
ages derived  from  universal  objects  physically  existing,  nor  are 
they  mere  names,  nor  mere  fictions  of  the- mind ;  but  they  have 
a  foundation  in  the  reality  of  individual  objects. 

First  part.  Not  images  of  existing  universal  objects,  as  the 
exaggerated  Realists  maintain.  Proof  Every  object  physi- 
cally existing  is  a  concrete  and  singular  object,  while  univer- 
sals are  neither  concrete  nor  singular.  For  instance,  there  is 
no  concrete  physically  existing  being  which  is  a  universal 
"  body,"  a  body  that  is  neither  large  nor  small  nor  middle- 
sized,  neither  white  nor  black,  nor  cold  nor  hot,  etc.  The 
universal  has  no  definite  accidents,  but  everything  physically 
existing  has  definite  accidents.  Therefore  there  exist  no 
physical  universals. 

Second  part.  Universals  are  not  mere  names,  as  the  Nomi- 
nalists pretend.  Proof.  A  mere  name,  or  oral  term,  has  no 
mental  term,  or  concept,  corresponding  to  it ;  but  universal 
names  have  each  a  concept  corresponding  to  them  and  signi- 
fied by  them.  If  they  had  not,  all  the  common  nouns  and 
the  verbs  of  a  language,  and  most  other  parts  of  speech, 
would  be  without  any  certain  signification ;  for  most  words 
express  universals,  and  the  Nominalists  suppose  that  univer- 
sals are  mere  names  to  which  no  definite  concepts  correspond. 
But  it  is  subversive  of  all  certainty  to  maintain  that  nothing 
definite  in  meaning  corresponds  to  most  of  the  words  of  mea 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition,       119 

Third  pari.  Universals  are  not  mere  fictions  of  the  mind,  but 
they  have  a  foundation  in  the  reality  of  individual  things.  It 
is  here  maintained  that  universals  express  some  one  thing 
which  is  the  same  in  many  things  ;  while  the  Conceptualists 
maintain  that  there  is  nothing  the  same,  but  only  something 
similar,  in  all  the  individuals  of  a  class. 

Proof  1.  Similarity  is  impossible  without  something  that  is 
one  in  the  things  similar.  For  similarity  is,  as  Aristotle  de- 
fines it,  "  unity  in  some  quality  " ;  things  are  similar  inas- 
much as,  to  a  certain  extent,  they  agree  or  are  the  same. 
Therefore,  if  all  things  of  a  class  are  said  to  be  similar,  they 
are  really  one  to  a  certain  extent;  now,  the  universal  signifies 
things  by  that  m  which  they  are  the  same — <?.  g.,  animals, 
plants,  etc. 

Proof  2.  If  there  were  not  some  one  thing  common  to  all 
the  individuals  of  a  species,  then  the  concept  could  not  repre- 
sent the  nature  of  that  species,  but  only  something  which  is 
not  the  species,  but  is  mistaken  for  it;  and  thus  all  our  appre- 
hensions of  universals  would  be  founded  upon  mistakes ;  all 
the  words  of  a  language  would  have  a  meaning,  but  a  false 
meaning.  Now,  this  leads  to  universal  Scepticism.  Therefore 
universals  express  some  one  thing  which  is  found  in  all  the 
individuals  of  a  species  or  genus;  therefore  they  have  a 
foundation  in  the  reality  of  individual  things. 

186.  The  now  antiquated  mysticism,  taught  formerly  by 
Plato,  consisted  in  a  very  peculiar  theory  on  the  origin  of  ideas. 
He  supposed  that  the  souls  of  men,  before  being  united  with 
their  bodies,  were  in  another  state  of  existence  in  which  they 
saw  truths  intuitively;  afterwards,  when  united  with  their 
bodies,  the  souls  retain  the  truths  formerly  perceived,  but 
they  are  unconscious  of  their  knowledge  till  sense-perception 
comes  to  awaken  it  anew.  Plato  could  give  no  proof  of 
his  conjectures;     his    only  reason    for  them   was   that   he 


I20  Psychology, 


could  not  in  any  other  way  account   for  the  origin  of  our 
ideas. 

187.  Ontologists  teach:  i.  That  the  human  soul  has  not 
in  virtue  of  its  own  essence  the  power  of  knowing  truth; 
2.  That  this  power  must  be  supplied  by  a  principle  extrinsic 
to  it;  3.  That  this  extrinsic  principle  must  be  immediately 
present  to  the  soul  and  directly  intelhgible,  and  must  be  of 
such  a  nature  that  in  it  all  other  things  can  be  made  intelli- 
gible to  us ;  4.  That  there  can  be  no  such  being  except  God; 
5.  That  our  ideas,  even  our  universal  ideas,  are  not  psycho- 
logical, /.  ^.,  formed  by  our  souls,  but  ontological,  i.  e.,  having 
objective  existence,  being  the  objects  known  to  us.  Still, 
many  O  otologists  allow  that  our  mind  can,  by  means  of 
reflection,  form  to  itself  psychological  ideas,  which  it  can  then 
compare  with  the  ontological,  thus  knowing  them  to  be  con- 
formable to  the  objective  truth. 

188.  Thesis  X.  Ontologism  does  not  properly  account  for 
the  origin  of  our  ideas. 

Proof.  That  theory  does  not  properly  account  for  the  origin 
of  our  ideas,  i.  Which  does  not  give  a  good  explanation  of 
known  facts ;  2.  Which  makes  gratuitous  and  even  false  sup- 
positions ;  3.  Which  leads  to  false  conclusions.  But  such  is 
Ontologism. 

I.  It  fails  to  give  a  good  explanation  of  known  facts :  {a) 
It  is  a  certain  fact  that  our  knowledge  is  intimately  dependent 
on  sense-perception  ;  why  is  this  so,  if  we  see  truth  in  God  ? 
(b)  We  know  all  things  in  connection  with  phantasms :  bodily 
things  by  their  own  images,  and  things  immaterial  by  refer- 
ence to  images  borrowed  from  matter ;  why  is  this  ?  The 
very  terms  applied  to  immaterial  things  are  taken  from  material 
objects,  e.  g.,  incomprehensible,  immaterial ;  an  acute,  sharp, 
dull,  clear  intellect,  etc.  (c)  We  have  no  consciousness,  even 
on  reflection,  that  we  see  God ;  why  is  this,  if  we  see  Him  ? 


Sensitive  and  Rational  Cognition,       121 

2.  //  makes  gratuitous  and  even  false  suppositions :  {a)  That 
actual  finite  beings  are  not  cognoscible  in  themselves;  why  are 
they  not  cognoscible  in  themselves,  if  they  have  their  own  en- 
tity ?  {b)  That  we  see  things  in  God,  and  still  we  do  not  see 
God;  why  is  this  ?  {c)  That  we  know  God  by  species  taken 
directly  from  Him,  and  other  things  by  species  taken  fi-om 
God ;  the  opposite  is  evidently  the  case. 

3.  It  leads  to  false  conclusions ;  for,  as  entity  and  intelligibility 
are  convertible  terms,  if  finite  things  have  not  their  own  in- 
telligibihty,  it  will  follow  that  they  have  not  their  own  entity 
distinct  from  God's  entity,  that  they  are  one  with  God ;  thus 
Pantheism  is  arrived  at  as  a  logical  conclusion  from  Ontolo- 
gism.  In  striving  to  refute  this  argument,  Ontologists  contra- 
dict and  refute  each  other,  and  are  divided  into  a  number  of 
schools:  Malebranche  claims  that  all  things  become  intelli- 
gible to  us  by  means  of  their  archetypes,  which  we  see  in  the 
Divine  essence ;  Gioberti  maintains  that  we  do  not  behold 
the  essence  of  God,  but  His  creative  act,  Ens  creans  existen- 
tias ;  Rothenflue  supposes  that  we  see  God  "merely  as 
being,"  esse  simpliciter,  etc.  Therefore  Ontologism  does  not 
explain  the  matter  properly. 

189.  In  connection  with  the  study  of  ideas  we  must  speak 
briefly  of  the  expression  of  our  ideas  by  words  or  articulate 
language.  A  word  is  an  arbitrary  articulate  sign  of  an  idea ; 
therefore  the  same  word  has  not  the  same  meaning  in  different 
languages.  Hence  words  cannot  of  their  own  force  communi- 
cate our  ideas  to  other  men ;  but  they  are  readily  associated 
with  ideas  so  as  to  become  their  inseparable  companions.  It 
would  be  incorrect  to  say  that  we  cannot  think  without 
words:  in  fact,  we  often  form  ideas,  judgments,  trains  of  reason- 
ing, and  we  experience  feelings  which  we  have  no  words  to 
express,  and  deaf-mutes  have  no  articulate  signs  at  all.  Still, 
thought  without  articulate  language  would  be  far  less  distinct, 


122  Psychology, 


more  embarrassed  in  its  process ;  and  the  minds  of  children 
would  develop  much  more  slowly  and  imperfectly  if  it  were 
not  for  the  use  of  speech. 

190.  As  to  the  origin  of  language,  it  need  not  be  to  us  a 
subject  of  vague  speculation.  We  know  from  the  historical 
account  of  Genesis  that  man  had  a  language  from  the  begin- 
ning, which  he  to  a  certain  extent  elaborated  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Creator  (Gen.  xix.  20);  but  he  was  then,  before 
his  fall,  in  a  state  of  higher  mental  and  bodily  perfection  than 
he  is  now.  The  question  has  often  been  discussed  whether, 
with  none  but  his  present  mental  powers,  man  could  have  in- 
vented a  language.  No  one  doubts  that  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  do ;  it  is  even  difficult  now  to  make  any  decided 
improvement  upon  any  nation's  tongue.  Still,  there  appears 
to  be  no  conclusive  reason  to  deny  that  it  might,  perhaps, 
have  been  gradually  effected.  To  give  a  history  of  the  sup- 
posed development  of  language,  as  Evolutionists  sometimes 
attempt  to  do,  is  an  idle  task,  always  most  unsatisfactory  and 
never  scientific. 


CHAPTER  III. 

SENSIBLE  AND  RATIONAL  APPETITE. 

191.  Appetite,  in  its  widest  sense,  was,  in  the  language  of 
the  Schoolmen,  any  tendency  of  a  being  towards  a  good  suitable 
to  its  nature :  {a)  If  the  being  does  not  apprehend  the  good 
to  which  its  nature  inclines  it,  its  appetite  was  by  them  called 
natural;  such  is  the  tendency  of  a  stone  to  fall  down  to  the 
ground,  of  a  plant  to  grow  and  produce  fruit,  the  result  being 
intended  by  the  Creator,  {b)  If  it  apprehends  the  good  by 
sense,  the  appetite  is  sensible,  {c)  If  by  reason,  it  is  rational 
appetite  or  will.  In  English  we  never  use  the  term  appetite 
except  for  the  tendency  to  sensible  or  to  rational  good. 

192.  The  natural  appetite  of  a  being  tends  to  what  is 
essentially  good  for  that  being  as  a  whole,  and  for  the  species; 
the  sensible  and  rational  appetites  tend  to  the  special  good 
of  sense  and  of  reason ;  they  are  two  distinct  faculties,  differing 
by  their  formal  objects,  viz.,  sensible  and  intellectual  good. 

193.  An  act  is  called  spontaneous  whenever  the  principle 
giving  rise  to  it  is  in  the  agent ;  thus,  all  vital  acts  are  spon- 
taneous. In  a  stricter  sense,  however,  only  the  acts  of  sen- 
sible appetite  are  called  spontaneous  ;  the  acts  of  the  rational 
appetite  or  will  are  termed  voluntary.  Now,  voluntary  is 
not  the  same  as  free ;  thus  we  voluntarily  desire  happiness, 
but  we  are  not  free  to  desire  it  or  not. 

194.  Freedom  is  the  absence  of  constraint.     The  absence 

of  extrinsic  constraint  is  liberty  from  coercion ;    even  brutes 

may   enjoy   this.      The  absence    of   intrinsic   constraint  is 

X23 


1 24  Psychology. 


freedom  from  necessary  action.  This  last  is  freedom  or  liberty 
properly  so  called :  it  enables  our  will  to  choose  for  itself 
between  two  alternatives;  it  is  also  styled  liberty  of  indiffer- 
ence. 

195.  Sensible  appetite  as  such,  whether  in  man  or  brute, 
is  not  truly  free ;  it  is,  indeed,  free  from  extrinsic  constraint, 
but  not  from  intrinsic  necessity.  The  reason  is  that  its  action 
is  organic,  the  heart  probably  being  its  organ ;  and  all  organic 
action  is  subject  to  the  physical  laws  of  the  material  creation. 
When,  therefore,  an  object  is  apprehended  by  sense  as  good, 
or  delectable,  or  when  the  phantasm  of  such  an  object  is 
aroused  in  the  animal,  the  sensible  appetite  must,  by  a  physi- 
cal necessity,  ter.d  to  that  delectable  good.  Brutes,  therefore, 
are  entirely  irresponsible  for  their  appetites. 

196.  But  man  has  an  indirect  power  of  controlling,  to  a 
certain  extent,  the  workings  of  his  sensible  appetites;  and  he  is 
in  duty  bound  to  regulate  them  by  the  law  of  reason,  i  or  good 
order  requires  that  the  superior  faculty  shall  rule  the  inferior. 
Now,  man  can  indirectly  control  his  animal  appetites  in 
various  ways;  i.  He  can  avoid  such  external  objects  as 
would  excite  his  appetites.  2.  He  can  use  in  their  stead  ob- 
jects that  will  affect  him  differently.  3.  Even  when  he  can- 
not change  his  material  surroundings,  he  can  recall  phan- 
tasms of  a  different  tendency.  4.  He  can  with  'raw  his  atten- 
tion from  any  particular  objects  or  phantasms.  5.  He  can 
often,  by  a  powerful  effort  of  his  will,  compel  his  sensible 
appetites  to  a  reluctant  obedience.  6.  He  can  control  his 
members  so  as  not  to  yield  obedience  to  his  animal  ap- 
petites. 

197.  The  essence  of  liberty  consists  in  this,  that,  when 
everything  is  ready  for  action,  the  will  has  still  a  choice  of  its 
own  with  regard  to  the  action.  Man  can  exercise  that 
choice  in  various  ways  :  he  may  choose  to  act  or  not  to  act, 


Sensible  and  Rational  Appetite,         125 

to  take  one  thing  or  its  contrary,  or  to  select  between  things 
not  opposite  to  each  other;  technically  he  has  Hberty  of  con- 
tradicHon,  liberty  of  contrariety,  and  liberty  of  specification. 

198.  Thesis  XL  The  will  of  man  is  free,  not  only  from 
coercion,  but  also  from  tiecessary  action. 

Explanation.  We  do  not  maintain  that  we  are  always  free 
in  every  respect — for  instance,  we  cannot  help  desiring  our 
own  happiness — but  we  are  free  with  regard  to  particular 
means  of  seeking  our  happiness.  The  liberty  of  man  is  true 
liberty,  in  the  meaning  explained  in  the  preceding  paragraph. 

Proof  I.  We  have  a  clear  and  invincible  consciousness 
that  we  often  will  things  when  we  could  restrain  ourselves- 
from  willing  them,  or  could  will  something  different  or  the 
contrary  of  them.  We  experience  this  consciousness:  {a) 
Before  we  make  our  choice,  when  we  notice  that  we  could 
delay  our  choice  and  take  longer  time  to  consider,  or  act  at 
once  without  further  delay ;  even  when  we  are  going  to  act, 
we  know  that  we  can  take  one  thing  or  another,  {b)  In  the 
act  of  choosing  we  distinguish  between  necessity  and  free 
choice;  when  we  choose  freely,  we  are  conscious  that  our 
decision  is  our  own,  of  which  we  assume  the  responsibility, 
and  that  we  could,  if  we  would,  choose  differently,  {c)  After 
our  choice,  we  are  conscious  that  we  have  done  morally  well 
or  ill,  that  we  have  reasons  for  self-reproach  or  for  self- 
approbation.  Now,  consciousness  is  an  infallible  motive  of 
certainty.     [Logic,  No.  116.) 

Proof  2.  We  judge  without  any  fear  of  error  that  others 
also  are  responsible  for  their  choice.  All  men  agree  with 
these  judgments — witness  the  laws,  tribunals,  histories,  etc., 
of  all  nations. 

Proof  3.  When  we  submit  one  of  our  free  acts  to  a  scien- 
tific analysis,  we  understand  that  it  must  be  free.  For  the 
will  is  presented  by  the  intellect  with  the  choice  between 


126  Psychology. 


things  which  ihe  intellect  proposes  as  desirable  in  some  respects 
and  not  desirable  in  other  respects,  and  not  necessary  just 
now.     Our  intellect  does  not  then  compel  the  assent  of  the 
will  to  any  particular  choice ;  still,  our  choice  is  made;  the 
reason,  therefore,  of  the  choice  must  be  in  the  will  itself. 
199.  Objections:  i.  ''The  essence  of  that  which  is  improp- 
erly called  the  free-will  doctrine  is  that,  occasionally 
at     any    rate,    human   volition    is    self-caused — that 
is  to  say,  not  caused  at  all  "     (Huxley,  "  Science  and 
Morals").     Answer.  We  deny  it.     This  is  a  play  on 
the  word  self-caused:    the  act  of  volition  is  not  caused 
by  the  act  of  volition,  which  it  would  be  if  it  were 
self-caused ;  but  the  act  of  volition  is  caused  by  the 
faculty  of  the  free  will.     It  is  true  that  matter  cannot 
determine  the  nature  of  its  action;  but  it  does  not 
follow  that  a  spirit  cannot  do  so.     Rather,  from  the 
fact  that  matter  cannot  determine  its  action,  and  our 
soul  can,  it  follows  that  our  soul  is  not  matter;  to 
avoid  granting  this  logical  conclusion,  Huxley  finds  it 
necessary  to  deny  the  liberty  of  the  will. 
«.  Consciousness  testifies  to  the  existence  of  our  acts, 
not  to  the  manner  nor  the  causes  of  our  acts,  there- 
fore not  to  their    liberty.      Answer.      Consciousness 
often  testifies  to  the  manner  of  the  act  as  well.     Be- 
sides,  we  are   conscious   of  our  acts  by   which  we 
decide  between  different    courses    of  conduct;  i.  e.y 
the  direct  object  of  our   consciousness  is  the  exercise 
of  our  liberty :  we  are  conscious  that  we  make  a  free 
choice. 
3.  We  mistake  spontaneous  action  for  free  action.     An- 
swer.    We  clearly  distinguish  between  free  and  not 
free ;  thus,  we  do  not  call  the  pleasure  free  which  we 
find  in  food,  though  our  perceiving  it  is  spontaneous. 


Sensible  and  Rational  Appetite.         127 

We  cannot  help  choosing  what  we  like  best;  therefore 
we  are  not  free.  Answer.  If  this  means  that  we 
cannot  help  preferring  what  we  prefer,  we  cannot 
choose  and  yet  not  choose  a  thing,  it  is  true,  but  not 
to  the  point.  But  if  it  means  that  we  cannot  help 
choosing  that  which  holds  out  the  stronger  attraction, 
it  is  false ;  if  it  were  true,  no  one  would  be  accounta- 
ble for  his  action,  all  mankind  would  be  in  error  about 
moral  good  and  evil,  our  own  consciousness  would 
deceive  us,  etc. 

If  we  could  choose  what  holds  out  the  weaker  attrac- 
tion, that  choice  would  be  without  a  reason,  but  there 
is  nothing  without  a  reason  for  it;  therefore  we  always 
choose  what  is  more  attractive.  Answer.  The  reason 
for  choosing  what  is  less  attractive  is  not  that  it  is  less 
attractive,  but  it  is  reason  enough  that  it  is  attractive 
at  all,  and  therefore  capable  of  exciting  our  appetite. 

Our  will  always  obeys  our  last  practical  judgment; 
but  our  judgment  is  not  free.  Answer.  Our  judg- 
ment may  be  influenced  by  our  free  will,  as  when  we 
make  ourselves  believe  that  a  thing  is  right  because 
we  like  it;  in  this  case  our  judgment  is  free.  But  if 
the  objection  means  that  our  will  always  obeys  our 
last  practical  judgment,  which  is  entirely  independent 
of  our  will,  the  statement  is  false.  We  know  that, 
when  our  intellect  tells  us  we  ought  to  do  one  thing, 
we  can  still  do  another;  we  can  also  choose  what  we 
judge  to  be  less  useful  or  less  agreeable. 
,  God  knows  what  I  shall  do  to-morrow;  therefore  I 
must  do  it.  I  am  not  free.  Answer.  God  knows  it, 
because  I  will  freely  do  it :  knowledge  is  by  nature 
consequent  on  the  fact  known  and  does  not  in  the 
least  influence  the  fact. 


128  Psychology. 


8.  Statistics  show  that  the  same  average  of  crimes 
occurs  each  year,  therefore  such  things  obey  a  neces- 
sary law.  Answer,  Statistics  may  show  some  remote 
proportion  between  temptation  and  crime;  but  no 
more  than  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  men, 
even  though  free  in  any  single  case,  are  more  inclined 
habitually  one  way  than  another,  and  that  there  is  a 
certain  uniformity  in  the  circumstances  which  tempt 
men  to  the  commission  of  crimes. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN   SOUL. 

200.  Thesis  XII.  The  soul  of  man  is  essentially  a  simple 
being. 

Proof.  Our  soul  takes  in  simple  ideas;  for  instance,  those  of 
truth,  holiness,  justice,  infinity,  being,  etc. ;  but  a  principle 
that  can  take  in  or  conceive  a  simple  idea  is  simple.  For  if  it 
were  composed  of  parts,  then  either,  i,  Each  pari  would 
take  in  the  whole  idea  ;  each  part  would  be  a  soul,  and  every 
man  would  be  not  /  but  we^  which  is  against  the  testimony 
of  consciousness  and  of  common  sense;  or,  2,  Each  part 
would  take  in  a  part  of  a  simple  idea;  but  a  simple  idea  is  not 
an  aggregate  of  parts;  or,  3,  Only  one  part  would  take  in  the 
whole  idea,  the  other  parts  not  apprehending  it ;  then  the  part 
apprehending  the  simple  idea  would  be  the  soul.  If  this  part 
is  simple,  the  soul  is  simple,  as  we  maintain  it  is.  But  if  that 
part  is  itself  compound,  the  same  reasoning  must  again  be 
applied  to  it ;  and  the  absurdities  arising  cannot  be  avoided 
except  by  granting  that  the  principle  which  conceives  simple 
ideas  is  simple,  or  that  the  soul  is  simple. 

201.  Objections:  i.  A  simple  soul  is  unthinkable,  i.  e., 
cannot  be  thought  of,  says  Huxley.  Answer.  It  is 
unimaginable,  not  unthinkable ;  if  we  could  not  think 
of  it,  we  could  not  point  out  the  essential  notes  by 
which  it  is  distinguished  from  all  other  beings. 

2.  Our  intellect  is  affected  by  our  bodily  ailments;  it 
may  be  disorganized,  deranged,  enfeebled,  excited,  etc.; 

129 


130  Psychology, 


therefore  it  consists  of  parts.      Answer.  The  intellect 
itself  cannot   be   deranged,  but  its  co-natural  objects 
are  presented  to  it  by  the  phantasms  of  our  imagina- 
tion.    Now,  our   imagination  can   be  deranged,  for 
it  is  an  organic  power ;  and  in  reality  all  mental  de- 
rangement,   enfeeblement,   excitement,    etc.,   can    be 
traced  to  affections  of  the  imagination. 
3.  Phrenology  shows  that  all  action  of  the  soul  is  modified 
according  to  the  modifications  of  the  brain ;   therefore 
the  soul  is  identified  with  the  brain.    Answer.  Phrenol- 
ogy is  not  founded  upon  certain  principles ;  therefore 
it  is  not  a  science  and  cannot  draw  scientific  conclu- 
sions.    Elevations  in  the  brain  do  not  always  corre- 
spond to   elevations  in  the  cranium,  nor   do   mental 
dispositions  always  correspond  to  special  modifications 
of  the  brain.     Even  if  they  did,  it  would  only  prove 
that  the  action  of  the  soul  is  modified  when  its  organ 
is  affected ;  for  the  brain  is  the  organ  of  the  imagina- 
tion ;  and  the  imagination  exerts  an  extrinsic  influence 
on  the  understanding,  presenting  to  it  the  images  that 
assist  thought. 
202.  Thesis  XIII.      The  soul  of  man  is  spiritual. 
Explanation.  Spirituality   expresses  more  than  simplicity; 
every  spirit  is  simple,  but  a  thing  may  be  simple  without  being 
spiritual;   such   is  the  soul  of  the  brute.     (See  No.  145.)     A 
being  is  spiritual  when  it  can  act  and  exist  without  material 
organs. 

Proof  I.  The  soul  will  actually  survive  the  body,  as  will  be 
proved  further  on  (Nos.  213,  214);  this  supposes  that  it  can 
exist  and  act  without  the  body ;  therefore,  that  it  is  spiritual. 
Proof  2.  The  soul,  even  now,  performs  acts  in  which  matter 
cannot  have  an  intrinsic  share ;  for  instance,  when  we  conceive 
such  ideas  as  virtue,  holy,  honest,  will,  intellect,  God,  angel, 


The  Nature  of  the  Human  Soul,       131 

spirit,  etc. ;  also  when  we  love  spiritual  good,  which  cannot 
affect  any  organism.  In  fact,  all  abstract,  all  universal  ideas 
are  beyond  the  reach  of  matter ;  for  matter  being  essentially 
concrete  and  singular  cannot  represent  any  but  concrete  and 
singular  objects.  Likewise  all  judgments,  reasonings,  volitions, 
every  act  that  is  distinctively  intellectual,  is  inorganic  in  its 
essence ;  the  imagination  does  furnish  it  with  materials  extrin- 
sically,  but  cannot  enter  into  its  specific  action.  Now,  it  is 
evident  that  a  being  acts  according  to  its  nature;  therefore 
the  nature  of  the  intellect  is  spiritual,  distinct  from  matter, 
independent  of  matter  in  its  own  specific  sphere  of  activity; 
therefore  intrinsically  capable  of  acting  and  existing  without 
a  body.  The  argument  may  be  stated  thus  :  An  organic 
faculty — /.  e.^  a  faculty  which  has  matter  as  a  con-cause  of  its 
operations — can  only  perceive  such  objects  as  can  make  a 
material  impression  upon  it;  but  our  intellect  perceives 
objects  which  cannot  make  a  material  impression  upon  it; 
therefore  our  intellect  is  not  an  organic  but  a  spiritual  faculty. 
But  a  faculty  is  necessarily  proportioned  to  the  subject  in 
which  it  resides ;   therefore  the  soul  is  spiritual. 

Proof  3.  No  being  can  tend  to  a  good  which  is  above  its 
nature ;  but  the  soul  tends  to  spiritual  goods,  essentially  above 
all  material  natures ;  therefore  its  nature  is  spiritual. 

Proof  4.  Matter  cannot  act  freely,  as  materialists  grant ; 
but  our  soul  acts  freely,  as  proved  above  (No.  198) ;  therefore 
our  soul  IS  not  matter. 

Proof  5.  Our  soul  is  conscious  of  its  own  acts ;  but  con- 
sciousness supposes  inorganic  action  and  inorganic  being. 
For  an  organ  cannot  inspect  itself,  a  being  dependent  intrin- 
sically on  matter  cannot  double  itself  back  on  its  own  acts; 
therefore  the  acts  of  consciousness  and  the  nature  of  a  con- 
scious soul  are  spiritual. 

203.  Objections:     t.  All     intellectual    action     begins    in 


132  Psychology, 


sense,  therefore  the  soul  is  dependent  on  the  body 
for  all  its  acts.  Answer.  The  soul  is,  in  our  present 
state  of  existence,  extrinsically  dependent  on  the  body 
in  more  than  one  way  viz. :  for  its  communication 
with  the  visible  world,  for  its  phantasms,  and  for  the 
exercise  of  its  faculties  generally;  but  since  matter 
does  not  intrinsically  co-operate  in  its  intellectual  acts, 
there  is  nothing  impossible  in  the  separate  existence 
and  action  of  the  soul,  without  the  extrinsic  aid  of  the 
body. 

2.  The  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body ;  therefore  its  very 
being  is  the  being  of  the  body.  Answer.  Though  it 
makes  one  being  with  the  body,  still  its  being  is  not 
exhausted  by  the  being  of  the  body  ;  in  other  words, 
it  is  the  form  of  the  body,  but  it  is  not  only  the  form 
of  the  body  ;  it  is  more. 

3.  AVhether  the  aid  of  organs  in  the  acts  of  the  intellect 
be  called  intrinsic  or  extrinsic,  it  is  necessary  for  intel- 
lectual action ;  therefore  the  soul  cannot  act  without 
the  body.  Answer.  The  aid  of  phantasms  is  now 
necessary,  because  every  being  acts  dependently  on 
the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  placed;  thus,  when 
we  are  in  a  room,  we  depend  on  the  window  to  see 
objects  outside.  The  soul,  therefore,  being  at  present 
one  being  with  its  body,  must  now  act  in  union  with 
that  body,  using  the  aid  of  that  body  as  far  as  it  can 
aid  the  act  of  intelligence.  Therefore  we  now  think 
of  all  things  in  connection  with  phantasms.  When, 
however,  the  body  will  be  no  more  one  with  the  soul, 
the  latter  can  retain  all  its  intellectual  species  formerly 
acquired ;  it  can  know  its  own  essence  directly,  and, 
by  reasoning  on  all  this,  know  its  Creator  ;  besides,  it 
can  receive  divinely  infused  knowledge,  and  knowl- 


The  Nature  of  the  Human  Soul.       133 

edge  communicated   to  it  by  other  intelligences  in 
manners  suitable  to  its  new  condition. 

204.  Thesis  XIV.  The  intellectual  soul  is  the  only  princi- 
ple of  life  in  man,  and  is  therefore  the  form  of  the  human 
body. 

Explanation.  It  was  proved  above  (Thesis  V.)  that  the  vital 
principle  of  any  living  body  is  truly  the  form  of  that  body; 
if,  then,  we  prove  here  that  the  intellectual  soul  is  the  only 
vital  principle  in  man,  we  thereby  establish  the  fact  that  the 
soul  is  the  form  of  the  body.  Now,  the  intellectual  soul  is 
really  the  only  vital  principle  in  man. 

Proof  I.  Every  man  is  conscious  of  being  a  unit,  which  he 
signifies  by  the  term  *  I ' ;  he  is  conscious,  moreover,  that 
the  same  '  I '  feels,  and  thinks,  and  wills.  Now,  if  there 
were  more  than  one  vital  principle  in  man,  the  intellectual 
soul  could  not  be  conscious  of  all  this  ;  for  vital  prin- 
ciples perform  immanent  actions,  and  one  principle  cannot 
be  conscious  to  itself  of  performing  the  immanent  act  of  an- 
other principle,  conscious  of  doing  what  it  does  not  do. 

Proof  2.  The  more  the  intellect  works,  the  more  the  in- 
ferior vitality  of  a  man  is  relaxed;  on  the  other  hand,  when  the 
lower  functions  of  life  are  most  energetically  exercised,  the 
mind  is  less  fit  for  its  own  activity.  Thus,  while  wrapped  in 
deep  thought,  a  man  scarcely  sees  or  hears;  he  digests  imper- 
fectly. Now,  all  this  cannot  be  explained  except  by  suppos- 
ing that  the  same  principle  performs  the  higher  and  the  lower 
functions  of  human  life. 

Proof  3.  Anatomy  shows  that  the  entire  organism  of  the 
human  body  is  one  unit,  combining  the  organs  of  vegetable 
and  animal  action  into  one  harmonious  whole. 

205.  Corollaries,  i.  The  soul  is  in  every  part  of  the 
body,  acting  in  every  organ  with  a  vitality  appropriate 
to  such  organ ;  seeing  in  the  eye,  hearing  in  the  ear, 


134  Psychology, 


breathing  in  the  lungs,  digesting  in  the  stomach,  mov- 
ing in  the  muscles,  etc. 

2.  All  organic  action  in  man  is  the  action  of  the  com- 
pound soul  and  body;  for  matter  can  do  nothing  ex- 
cept in  virtue  of  its  form. 

3.  The  soul  is  directly  united  with  the  prime  matter  or 
potential  principle,  being  itself  the  active  principle  :  it 
gives  to  the  body  all  its  powers  and  its  very  nature 
of  a  body,  and  such  a  body.  Still,  when  the  soul 
departs  at  death,  the  body  cannot  cease  to  be  a  body 
of  some  kind;  for  the  potential  principle  of  matter 
cannot  exist  without  a  form.  Whether  this  new  form 
be  one  form  for  the  whole  corpse,  a  form  supplied  for 
the  purpose  by  the  laws  of  nature,  or  whether  the 
flesh,  bone,  sinew,  etc.,  have  each  its  own  form,  exist- 
ing before  death  under  the  control  of  the  life  principle 
and  now  acting  independently,  matters  very  little. 
(Pesch,  Inst.  Phil.  A  at,  No.  210.) 

206.  Those  who  do  not  understand  the  Peripatetic  system 
of  matter  and  form  are  greatly  embarrassed  to  explain  how 
body  and  soul  act  on  each  other.  Various  theories  have  been 
imagined,  all  of  them  unscientific.  Plato  supposed  that  the 
soul  is  seated  in  the  brain,  whence  it  rules  the  body  as  the 
rider  does  his  horse.  The  assistance  theory  of  Descartes 
maintains  that  soul  and  body  do  not  act  on  each  other,  but 
God  acts  on  either  one  of  them  whenever  a  modification 
occurs  in  the  other.  Leibnitz's  theory  oi  pre-established  har- 
mony teaches  that  God,  foreseeing  all  that  any  soul  would  do 
in  the  course  of  life,  has  in  his  wisdom  given  to  each  soul  a 
body  so  constructed  that  it  will  automatically  act  just  when 
and  as  the  soul  wills,  though  the  soul  does  not  influence  it  in 
the  least.  The  theory  oi  physical  influence  makes  the  soul 
and  the  body  act  on   each   other   as   two   distinct  beings. 


The  Nature  of  the  Human  Soul.       135 

Giinther  imagined  a  principle  of  animal  life,  called  by  him 
psyche^  which  he  supposed  to  be  substantially  united  with  the 
intellectual  soul.  No  system  can  be  scientific  which  makes 
man  to  be,  not  one  but  two  beings,  each  having  its  own 
activity ;  the  only  theory  in  harmony  with  man's  essential 
unity  is  that  which  views  the  soul  as  the  form  of  the  body. 
The  form  is  not  acted  upon  by  the  body,  nor  does  it  act  on 
the  body;  but  it  is  itself  the  active  principle  of  the  body. 
Thus,  the  soul  is  not  acted  upon  by  the  eye  or  the  ear,  but  the 
living  eye,  the  living  ear  acts,  perceiving  color  and  sound. 
The  whole  question  about  the  interaction  of  body  and  soul 
thus  ceases  to  be  a  question  at  all ;  for  there  can  be  no  inter- 
action where  there  are  not  two  agents  each  having  its  own 
action,  but  the  action  is  common  to  both. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ORIGIN   AND   DESTINY  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL. 

207.  Many  ancient  philosophers,  finding  the  soul  of  man 
so  evidently  and  immeasurably  elevated  above  the  entire 
material  creation,  erroneously  conjectured  that  it,  in  some 
way  or  other,  must  have  emanated  from  the  very  substance 
of  the  Divinity.  To-day  a  very  different  error  has  not  a  few- 
advocates  among  the  votaries  of  the  physical  sciences :  they 
imagine  that  man  may  be  a  mere  evolution  of  the  brute,  and 
the  highest  step  in  a  universal  movement  of  evolution. 

208.  The  most  popular  shape  in  which  this  vagary  has 
found  favor  with  the  modern  pubHc  is  the  Darwinian  theory, 
which  may  be  stated  thus :  All  plants  and  animals,  man  in- 
cluded, are  evolved  from  inferior  species,  and,  as  many  of 
Darwin's  disciples  add,  ultimately  from  unorganized  matter,  by 
means  of  natural  selection.  The  process  of  natural  selection 
is  as  follows :  All  plants  and  animals  tend  to  increase  their 
numbers  in  a  geometrical  progression ;  hence  arises  a  severe 
struggle  for  existe?ice,  in  which  contest  nature  causes  the 
weakest  individuals  and  species  to  perish,  and  the  best-con- 
structed to  multiply,  thus  producing  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 
Consequently,  organic  life  must  ever  be  ascending  in  perfec- 
tion, and  lower  species  have  thus  been  developed  into  higher 
species.  (See  Mivart's  Genesis  of  Sjfedes,pp.  17,  18.)  This 
theory  is  interesting  and  ingenious  ;  but  its  disastrous  conse- 
quences to  morahty,  to  religion,  to  social  life,  and  to  individ- 
ual happiness  for  time  and  eternity  are  so  obvious,  that  noth- 

136 


Origin  and  Destiny  of  the  Human  Soul.   137 

ing  but  the  most  convincing  evidence  of  its  truth  could  possibly 
excuse  those  who  love  to  disseminate  its  noxious  principles. 

209.  And  yet  the  Darwinian  theory,  far  from  being  estab- 
lished beyond  a  doubt,  is  totally  devoid  of  demonstration,  and 
is  a  mere  figment  of  the  intellect.  Charles  Elam,  M.D., 
after  an  accurate  analysis  of  facts  in  three  articles  of  the  Con- 
temporary Review  J  continues  thus  (Dec,  1876,  p.  132) :  **The 
conclusions  which  necessarily  follow  from  the  foregoing  ob- 
servations may  be  briefly  summed  up  in  one  syllogism,  em- 
bracing not  only  Natural  Selection,  but  also  the  larger  theme 
of  Organic  Evolution  generally  : 

"'Without  verification  a  theoretic  conception  is  a  mere 
figment  of  the  intellect '  (Tyndall's  Fragments  of  Science^  p. 
469). 

"  But  the  theory  of  Organic  Evolution  is  an  unverified  con- 
ception. 

"  Therefore  Organic  Evolution  is  a  mere  figment  of  the  in- 
tellect." 

To  prove  the  minor,  we  may  quote  the  rule  laid  down  by 
Huxley,  that  the  only  w:ay  in  which  any  hypothesis  of  progres- 
sive modification  can  be  demonstrated  is  '^  by  observation  and 
experience  upon  the  existing  forms  of  life."  Now,  he  grants 
in  the  same  paragraph  that  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  has 
not  yet  received  such  demonstration.  {Lay  Sermons,  p.  226. 
See  further  Mazzella's  De  Deo  Creante,  Disput.  iii.  art.  i.  §  3.) 

210.  We  have  proved  above  (Thesis  VIII.)  that  the  species 
of  plants  and  animals  are  fixed,  incapable  of  transformation. 
With  regard  to  the  evolution  of  man,  in  particular  from  a 
lower  animal  species,  and  of  the  intellectual  from  the  sensi- 
tive soul — the  main  point  with  which  we  are  here  concerned 
— we  add  the  following  : 

Thesis  XV.  The  gulf  between  brute  and  man  is  absolutely 
impassable  by  any  process  of  evolution. 


138  Psychology, 


Proof.  The  brute  animal  is  entirely  material :  though  it  is 
animated  by  a  simple  soul,  still  that  soul  is  only  the  sub- 
stantial form  of  the  body,  the  principle  of  bodily  action  and 
nothing  more ;  it  can  neither  exist  nor  act  except  in  matter, 
so  that  all  its  life,  all  its  activity  consists  in  material  modi- 
fications of  a  material  organism.  This  much  is  admitted  by 
modern  philosophers  and  scientists  generally,  as  well  as  by 
the  Schoolmen.  Now,  what  is  merely  material  can  never  be 
developed,  whether  by  the  Darwinian  process  or  by  any 
system  of  evolution,  into  a  spiritual  being ;  or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  matter  cannot  possibly  be  evolved  into  a  think- 
ing, a  reasoning  being.  For  all  evolution  is  merely  a  modi- 
fication of  matter ;  but  matter  in  all  its  modifications  remains 
matter;  therefore  evolution  of  matter  cannot  produce  any- 
thing but  matter.  Now,  matter  cannot  possibly  reason;  for 
reasoning  implies  universal  ideas,  since  at  least  its  middle 
term  must  be  distributed  {Logic.  No.  32);  and  matter  cannot 
conceive  a  universal  idea.  For  an  idea  is  an  image  of  the 
object,  and  every  image  in  matter  can  only  be  a  concrete 
image  of  a  concrete  and  singular  thing ;  while  a  universal 
idea  is  an  abstract  image  of  what  is  neither  concrete  nor 
singular,  and  therefore  cannot  possibly  be  imaged  in  matter. 
Therefore  matter  can  never  become  capable  of  reasoning- 
But  our  soul  reasons ;  hence  a  material  being  can  never  be 
evolved  into  the  human  soul ;  or,  the  gulf  between  brute 
and  man  is  absolutely  impassable  by  any  process  of  evolution. 

As  a  fact,  evolutionists  find  it  impossible  to  account,  in 
their  theories,  for  the  spirituality  of  the  human  soul ;  hence 
they  either  deny  this  spirituality,  believe  in  nothing  but 
matter,  and  become  MateriaUsts ;  or  they  reluse  to  draw 
the  logical  conclusions  which  flow  from  their  false  principles, 
and,  to  veil  their  inconsistency,  they  assume  the  sceptical 
position  of  Agnostics. 


Origin  and  Destiny  of  the  Human  Soul.   139 

211.  Thesis  XVI.  The  soul  of  ftian  cannot  originate  except 
by  creation^  i.  e.,  by  being  made  out  of  nothing. 

Proof.  If  it  were  made  out  of  anything,  this  would  be  ma- 
terial or  spiritual.  It  can  be  neither:  i.  Not  material;  for, 
as  we  have  just  proved,  no  change  in  matter  can  fit  it  for  the 
acts  of  thinking.  2.  Not  spiritual ;  for  it  cannot  be  made 
out  of  a  part  of  that  spirit,  since  a  spirit  has  no  parts:  nor 
out  of  the  whole  of  that  spirit,  which  would  then  cease  to  be 
when  the  soul  begins  to  be.  Among  all  the  wanderings  of 
genius,  no  philosopher  has  ever  maintained  that  the  soul  is 
made  out  of  a  previous  spirit  which  then  ceases  to  exist. 
The  human  soul,  therefore,  cannot  be  made  out  of  another 
being;  hence  it  is  created,  made  out  of  nothing. 

212.  As  to  the  question  when  the  souls  of  men  are  created, 
Plato  supposed  that  all  human  souls  lived  before  in  the  stars, 
whence  they  were  banished  for  crime;  others  have  taught  the 
transmigration  of  souls  from  one  body  into  another,  even  into 
brutes,  as  a  punishment  for  their  moral  degradation ;  Leib- 
nitz and  Wolf  pretended  that  all  human  souls  were  created  in 
the  beginning  of  the  world,  but  remained  without  intelligence 
till  united  to  their  destined  human  bodies.  All  such  theories 
are  destitute  of  proof  and  even  of  plausibiHty.  Why  should 
a  soul  exist  before  it  can  do  work  suited  to  its  nature  ?  The 
scientific  answer  is  that  which  is  derived  by  careful  reasoning 
from  known  facts.  The  soul  of  each  man  must  begin  to  exist 
when  its  work  begins.  Before  biology  became  a  science,  it 
was  supposed  that  the  human  soul  was  not  created  till  the 
body  was  sufficiently  organized — first  by  a  previous  vegeta- 
tive, and  next  by  a  merely  animal  soul — to  become  the  fit 
organism  of  that  higher  principle  which  was  to  build  it  up 
into  a  distinctively  human  body.  That  principle  was  the  in- 
tellectual soul.  At  present  it  is  far  more  probable  that  the 
rational  soul  is  created,  and  made  the  substantial  form  of  the 


I40  Psychology, 


body,  from  the  very  moment  of  conception  :  the  infant  of  a 
day  has  already  an  immortal  soul  j  hence  the  wilful  destruc- 
tion of  its  life  is  murder. 

213.  Thesis  XVII.  The  human  soul  does  not  perish  with 
the  body. 

Proof  1.  This  is  one  of  the  most  universal  judgments  of 
common  sense. 

Proof  2.  The  justice  and  the  wisdom  of  God  require  that 
there  shall  be  a  sufficient  sanction  for  the  moral  law — /.  <f., 
that  there  shall  be  such  rewards  for  virtue  and  punishments 
for  vice  as  shall  make  the  good  ultimately  much  happier  than 
the  wicked.  But  such  a  sanction  does  not  exist  in  this  world, 
where  the  virtuous  are  often  oppressed,  despised,  persecuted 
unto  death ;  therefore  it  must  exist  in  a  future  Hfe. 

214.  Thesis  XVIIL     The  human  soul  is  immortal. 

Proof  1.  The  Creator  has  given  us  a  longing  for  a  never- 
ending  existence,  an  endless  happiness;  bwt  He  could  not 
have  done  so  if  our  souls  were  not  really  destined  for  an  end- 
less life.  For  it  would  be  unworthy  of  His  goodness  to  give 
us  a  longing  after  a  great  good,  which  we  could  not  possibly 
attain;  and  it  would  conflict  with  His  truthfulness  to  give  us, 
in  such  natural  desires,  an  implicit  promise  of  immortality,  if 
He  did  not  enable  us  to  attain  it. 

Proof  2.  A  spiritual  being  is  capable  of  acting  and  existing 
for  ever;  in  fact,  immortality  is  natural  to  it,  because,  having 
no  parts,  it  cannot  be  dissolved  or  corrupted  as  to  its  sub- 
stance. Therefore  it  is  natural  for  it  to  exist  till  it  be  anni- 
hilated by  its  Maker.  But  the  Creator  can  have  no  reason 
to  annihilate  it,  as  long  as  it  can  answer  the  purpose  of  its 
existence ;  now,  it  can  answer  that  purpose  for  ever,  by  show- 
ing forth  the  justice,  the  power,  and  the  goodness  of  God, 
and  thus  contributing  to  His  external  glory.  God  makes 
nothing  useless ;  but  the  natural  indestructibility  of  the  soul 


Origin  and  Destiny  of  the  Human  Soul,   1 4 1 

would  be  useless  if  God  should  annihilate  it,  no  matter  after 
how  long  a  period. 

215.  Can  we  prove  that  the  souls  of  the  wicked  shall  suffer 
for  ever,  that  the  pains  of  the  lost  are  eternal  ?  We  can  cer- 
tainly prove  by  reason  :  i.  That  it  is  natural  for  all  spirits  to 
exist  for  ever ;  2.  That  God  is  not  bound  to  destroy  those 
who  He  intended  should  glorify  Him  throughout  eternity ;  3. 
That  a  being  which  freely  fails  to  attain  its  destined  happi- 
ness must  naturally  expect  to  be  disappointed  for  ever,  and 
can  only  blame  itself  for  its  unhappiness;  4.  That  God  is  not 
bound  to  give  new  chances  to  a  free  creature  which  has  with 
full  deliberation  rejected  His  sincere  offers  of  beatitude;  5. 
That  it  is  proper  for  every  immortal  being  not  to  be  in  a  pro- 
visionary  state  for  ever,  but  to  come  sooner  or  later  to  a  defi- 
nite and  final  condition,  and  to  remain  in  the  same  for  eter- 
nity; 6.  That  there  would  be  no  complete  sanction  of  the 
moral  order,  if  the  punishment  of  such  as  will  persevere  in 
their  wickedness  till  the  end  would  not  last  for  ever;  7.  That 
no  motive  but  the  dread  of  eternal  punishment  is  under  all 
circumstances  sufficient  to  restrain  man's  passions.  Hence  it 
is  abundantly  proved  that  reason  itself  appears  to  demand 
eternal  punishment  for  those  who  die  in  a  state  of  rebellion 
against  their  Maker. 

2 1 6.  Those  who  deny  the  spirituality  and,  consequently, 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  are  called  Materialists^  since  they 
admit  nothing  but  matter  in  the  world.  Many  recent  writers, 
anxious  to  disclaim  this  odious  title,  have  invented  the  less 
unpopular  appellation  of  Agnostics.  "I  called  myself  an 
Agnostic,"  writes  Huxley.  "  Surely  no  denomination  could 
be  more  modest  and  appropriate"  {Lay  Sermons^  ^'.  294). 
These  strive  to  evade  the  arguments  of  all  sound  philoso- 
phers by  pretending  that  such  questions  as  concern  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  the  nature  of  the  soul,  its  future  destiny,  etc., 


142  Psychology. 


are  too  deep  for  our  investigations.  Still,  while  pretending 
to  keep  aloof  from  such  matters,  they  are  constantly  alluding 
to  them,  arguing  against  the  great  truths  of  philosophy  in  a 
covert  manner.  They  do  not  prove  their  thesis,  but  they 
take  it  for  granted,  calling  God  the  Unknown,  as  if  no  man 
knew  anything  about  the  necessity  and  the  greatness  of  the 
Creator,  sneering  at  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  as  if  it  were 
a  self-contradiction,  etc.,  etc. 

217.  Thesis  XIX.  Agnosticism  is  destructive  of  all  sound 
Philosophy. 

Proof.  That  system  is  destructive  of  Philosophy  which 
renders  all  the  most  important  inquiries  impossible :  in  par- 
ticular, which  denies  that  we  can  know  anything  certain 
about  the  existence  of  the  soul  as  distinct  from  the  body,  of 
a  future  state,  of  a  wise  and  personal  God,  the  rewarder  of 
good  and  evil ;  and  which,  consequently,  makes  it  doubtful 
whether  there  is  anything  worth  living  for  beyond  the  grati- 
fication of  the  passions.  For  Huxley  himself  admits  that 
"  The  question  of  questions  for  mankind,  the  problem  which 
underhes  all  others,  and  is  more  deeply  interesting  than  any 
other,  is  the  ascertainment  of  the  place  man  occupies  in 
nature,  and  of  his  relation  to  the  universe  of  things.  Whence 
our  race  has  come,  ...  to  what  goal  we  are  tending,  are 
the  problems  which  present  themselves  anew,  and  with  un- 
diminished interest,  to  every  man  born  into  this  world  '^ 
(Man^s  Place  in  Nature^  p.  57). 

Now,  Agnosticism  renders  all  such  inquiries  futile  and  such 
questions  incapable  of  satisfactory  settlement.  The  same 
writer  acknowledges  this:  "Why  trouble  ourselves  about 
matters  of  which,  however  important  they  may  be,  we  do 
know  nothing  and  we  can  know  nothing?  "    {Lay  Sermons, 

P-  145)- 
The  Mental  Philosophy  of  the  Schoolmen,  so  far  briefly 


Origin  and  Destiny  of  the  Human  Soul.   143 

outlined,  answers  all  these  questions  clearly  and  without  hesi- 
tation. Its  voice  comes  to  us  from  the  most  distant  past, 
strengthened  by  the  approving  accents  of  all  intervening 
generations. 

The  advancement  of  true  science,  so  far  from  having 
weakened  its  teaching,  has  strikingly  confirmed,  and  daily 
confirms  more  and  more,  the  truth  of  its  doctrines.  It  alone 
satisfies  the  reason  and  the  heart  of  man. 


BOOK    IV. 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


218.  Natural  Theology  is  our  study  of  God  by  the  light  of 
reason,  without  the  direct  influence  of  supernatural  Revela- 
tion. We  exclude  the  direct,  but  not  the  indirect,  guidance  of 
Revelation  ;  for  no  earnest  investigator  of  truth  will  close  his 
eyes  to  the  bright  Hght  of  Divine  teaching,  and  prefer  to 
grope  his  way  by  the  faint  glimmer  of  unaided  reason.  We 
live  in  the  full  blaze  of  Christian  civilization,  which  it  were 
folly  to  ignore.  We  set  out,  therefore,  in  the  pursuit  of  wis- 
dom, not  as  pagan  sceptics  in  quest  of  the  unknown  cause 
of  this  world,  if  perhaps  there  be  such  a  cause,  but  as  en- 
hghtened  Christians,  who  wish  reverently  to  investigate  what 
our  reason  can  understand  about  a  matter  so  far  above  us, 
viz. ;  the  nature  and  the  perfections  of  the  Creator,  and 
the  relations  in  which  He  stands  to  His  creatures. 

We  shall  consider  :  i.  The  existence  of  God.  2.  His 
essence.  3.  His  quiescent  attributes.  4.  His  operative  at- 
tributes. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   EXISTENCE    OF    GOD. 

219.  We  shall  begin  by  considering  God  as  He  is  most 
obviously  conceived  by  man,  viz.,  as  the  first  and  intelligent 
Cause  of  the  universe^  and  the  Supreme  Lord  to  whom 
we  are  all  responsible  for  our  moral  conduct.  Those  who 
refuse  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  God  are  called 
Atheists  :  practical  Atheists  deny  Him  by  their  conduct,  and 
theoretical  Atheists  in  their  speculations.  Unfortunately  there 
have  been  many  practical  Atheists;  but  those  of  the  theoretic 
kind  have  been  comparatively  few,  and  none  of  them  con- 
spicuous for  virtue.  The  Agnostics  are  a  very  recent 
school  ot  physical  scientists,  rather  than  of  intellectual  phi- 
losophers, wJio  do  not  deny  that  God  exists,  but  pretend 
that  His  existence  cannot  be  validly  demonstrated. 

We  are  to  prove  in  this  chapter  that  the  existence  of  God, 
such  as  He  is  most  obviously  conceived  by  man,  is  absolutely 
certain.  Various  proofs  may  be  given ;  we  select  the  fol- 
lowing, which  we  present  in  bare  outline : 

220.  Thesis  I.  The  existence  of  God  can  be  demonstrated 
by  metaphysical^  physical^  and  moral  arguments. 

Proof  I.  The  metaphysical  argament  considers  God  as 
the  first  efficient  cause  of  this  world ;  it  may  be  thus  pro- 
posed :  the  world  is  a  system  of  contingent  beings ;  but  no 
contingent  being  can  exist  without  a  necessary  being  which 
is  its  first  efficient  cause ;  therefore  a  necessary  being  exista 
which  is  the  first  efficient  cause  of  the  world. 

X45 


146  Natural  Theology, 

We  prove  the  major:  A  contingent  being  is  one  that  may 
exist  or  not  exist  as  far  as  its  own  nature  is  concerned — in 
other  words,  a  being  that  is  not  self-existent.  But  the  world 
is  not  self-existent,  as  was  proved  in  Cosmology  (No.  103). 
Therefore  the  world  is  a  contingent  being. 

We  prove  the  minor  :  There  can  be  nothing  without  a  suf- 
ficient reason ;  hence  a  contingent  being  must  have  a  reason 
for  its  existence.  But  that  reason  is  not  in  the  contingent 
being  itself;  therefore  it  must  be  in  another  being.  This  is 
its  cause ;  for  a  cause  is  a  being  that  influences  the  existence 
of  another  being.  Now,  if  that  cause  is  a  necessary  being, 
then  our  proposition  is  proved;  if  it  be  not  a  necessary  being, 
then  it  is  contingent,  and  therefore  must  have  a  cause,  as  we 
have  just  proved.  Thus  we  must  go  on  reasoning,  till  we 
come  to  a  first  cause  which  is  not  contingent  but  necessary; 
or  we  must  suppose  that  there  has  been  an  infinite  series  of 
contingent  causes  without  any  necessary  cause.  But  besides 
the  fact  that  such  a  series  is  absurd  (because  an  infinite  series 
in  the  past  could  never  have  come  to  a  particular  effect,  since 
the  infinite  can  never  be  passed  through  or  left  behind),  even 
if  it  were  not  absurd,  it  would  be  inadequate  to  produce  such 
an  effect.  For  a  multitude  of  contingent  beings  without  a 
necessary  cause  could  not  have  a  sufficient  reason  for  exist- 
ence; smce  contingency  is  the  want  of  an  intrinsic  reason  for 
existence.  Therefore  no  contingent  being  can  exist  unless 
there  exists  a  necessary  being  which  is  its  first  cause. 

221.  Proof  2.  The  physical  argument,  supposing  it  proved 
that  the  world  is  contingent  (No.  103),  views  God  as  its 
intelligent  cause,  and  proves  His  existence  from  the  physical 
order  conspicuous  in  the  world;  it  is  this :  There  exists  in  the 
world  a  most  wonderful  order,  or  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends :  [a)  to  particular  ends,  as  of  the  eyes  to  see,  of  the 
ears  to  hear,  of  the  tongue  to  suit   various  purposes,  etc.; 


The  Existence  of  God,  147 

{h)  of  all  the  parts  to  a  common  end,  viz.,  to  the  preser- 
vation of  the  whole.  Now,  such  adaptation,  visible  in  the 
world,  requires  intelligence  in  its  cause,  and  even  an  amount 
of  intelHgence  proportionate  to  the  vastness,  the  variety,  and 
the  perfection  of  the  order  produced;  therefore  the  first 
Cause  of  the  world  must  be  intelligent  beyond  all  our  con- 
ception. 

The  minor,  viz. :  order  in  the  effect  requires  intelligence 
in  the  cause :  [a)  It  is  analytically  certain ;  for  a  disposing 
of  means  for  an  end  implies  the  intellectual  perception  of 
the  relation  existing  between  means  and  end,  and  therefore 
it  requires  intellect  in  the  cause,  {b)  It  is  attested  by  the 
common  consent  of  mankind;  for  no  one  could  beHeve, 
e,  g-.,  that  letters  or  type  put  down  at  random  would  produce 
a  grand  poem,  (c)  It  is  always  insisted  on  as  a  certain 
truth,  even  by  the  Agnostics  in  their  scientific  researches; 
for,  when  they  find  any  fossil  which  has  a  regular  shape  or 
mark,  they  claim  it  as  an  undoubted  proof  of  human,  L  e.^ 
intelligent,  workmanship.  Therefore  order  in  the  effect  sup- 
poses inteUigence  in  the  cause. 

222.  Proof  3.  The  moral  argument  proves  that  there  is 
a  supreme  Lord  to  whom  all  men  are  responsible  for  their 
moral  conduct.  It  is  as  follows :  All  men  when  in  the  full 
possession  of  reason,  in  any  part  of  the  world,  in  all  stages 
of  society,  among  all  races,  even  among  newly  discovered 
tribes,  agree  in  the  firm  conviction,  which  acts  as  a  constant 
check  on  their  passions,  that  there  exists  a  supreme  Lord 
and  Master  to  whom  they  are  responsible  for  their  moral 
conduct.  Now,  this  firm  and  universal  judgment  cannot  be 
erroneous ;  else  it  would  show  that  it  is  natural  for  man  to 
judge  falsely,  and  the  human  intellect,  instead  of  being  the 
faculty  of  knowing  truth,  would  be  the  source  of  a  universal 
deceptiorw 


48  Natural  Theology. 

223.  Objections:  I.   Against  the  metaphysical  argument. 

1.  This  argument  is  too  abstruse  to  be  reliable.  Answer. 
It  is,  on  the  contrary,  an  obvious  application  of  the 
analytical  and  common-sense  principle  of  causality: 
everybody  judges  as  readily  that  the  world  must  have 
had  a  first  cause  as  that  a  house  must  have  had  a 
builder. 

2.  Science  must  confine  itself  to  the  tracing  of  physical 
effects  to  physical  causes.  Answer.  Physical  science 
may  do  so,  but  philosophy  must  investigate  the  highest 
causes. 

3  Evolution  can  account  for  all  things  physical.  An- 
swer, Evolution  does  not  even  touch  upon  the  real 
origin  of  the  world,  but  only  on  its  development ;  even 
if  the  theory  of  evolution  were  true,  there  would  still 
have  to  be  a  Creator  of  matter  before  that  matter 
could  begin  to  change  its  forms. 

4.  A  self-evolving  world  might  be  a  necessary  being. 
Answer.  Impossible.  The  series  of  evolutions  must 
have  had  a  beginning,  a  first  stage ;  if  that  stage  were 
necessary,  then  it  could  not  change ;  besides,  the 
world  is  proved  in  Cosmology  (Thesis  I.)  not  to  be 
self-existent. 

5.  Although  every  single  being  in  the  world  were  con- 
tingent, the  whole  collection  might  be  necessary.  An- 
swer. There  can  be  nothing  in  the  collection  which  is 
not  suppUed  by  the  parts,  especially  when  it  is  essen- 
tially excluded  from  the  parts.  Besides,  the  collection 
is  both  finite  and  mutable,  and  a  necessary  being  is 
not  such.    (No.  103.) 

6.  From  the  existence  of  a  contingent  being  we  cannot 
conclude  to  that  of  a  necessary  being ;  for  we  should 
thus  have  more  in  the  conclusion  than  in  the  premises. 


The  Existence  of  God,  149 

viz.,  the  necessary  in  the  conclusion  and  only  the  con- 
tingent in  the  premises.  Answer.  We  have  the  neces- 
sary being  in  the  premises;  for  we  have  in  the  major 
that  everything  existing  must  have  a  sufficient  reason, 
and  in  the  minor  that  only  a  necessary  being  can 
truly  be  the  ultimately  sufficient  reason  of  contingent 
beings. 
7.  There  is  no  proportion  between  a  contingent  and  a 
necessary  being.  Answer,  There  is  no  proportion  of 
entity,  but  one  of  necessary  dependence. 
224.  Objections;  II.  Against  the  physical  argument. 

1.  Not  every  thing  in  this  world  exhibits  the  disposition 
of  means  to  an  end.  Answer,  It  is  enough  for  our 
argument  that  many  things  do. 

2.  But  many  things  are  evidently  out  of  order ;  therefore 
it  is  clear  that  the  Creator  is  not  very  wise.  Answer. 
More  than  enough  order  is  conspicuous  in  the  universe 
to  prove  the  Creator  immensely  wise,  beyond  all  our 
conception.  Besides,  it  cannot  be  proved  that  any- 
thing is  out  of  order  :  a  thing  may  not  be  arranged  in 
the  way  that  we  might  prefer;  and  yet  it  may,  for  all 
we  know,  be  excellently  arranged.  Similarly,  an  igno- 
rant man  may  not  see  the  use  of  all  the  tools  found 
in  an  artist's  studio,  but  it  would  be  foolish  for  him  to 
say  that  they  were  useless. 

3.  But  a  world  created  by  an  infinitely  wise  and  good 
God  should  be  perfect.  Answer.  It  should  be  rela- 
tively but  not  absolutely  perfect.    (No.  117.) 

4.  But  the  order  of  the  world  proceeds  from  the  phys- 
ical laws,  and  these  result  from  the  natures  of  the 
bodies;  thus  there  is  no  need  of  an  intelligent  Or- 
dainer.  Answer.  The  natures  of  bodies  proceed  from 
the    Maker    of   them :    if   they    are    well   suited  to 


T50  Natural  Theology, 

their   ends,   it   is  because  the  Creator  has  so  suited 
them. 

5.  All  the  order  of  nature  may  be  a  mere  accident. 
Answer.  This  would  mean,  in  other  words,  that  the 
most  wonderful  effect  may  be  without  a  sufficient 
cause ;  for  blind  chance  is  not  a  sufficient  cause  ot 
ordtr. 

6.  The  order  of  nature  results  from  evolution  by  means 
of  natural  selection,  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  etc. 
Answer.  If  it  were  true  that  such  evolution  had  taken 
place,  it  would  only  make  the  order  displayed  in  the 
world  more  admirable;  for  he  who  would  make  a 
machine  of  such  a  nature  that  it  should  evolve  a  num- 
ber of  other  machines  in  wonderful  variety,  and  in  an 
ever-increasing  perfection  of  details,  would  thereby 
exhibit  far  more  intelligence  than  if  he  were  to  make 
all  these  machines  separately.  -  Therefore  this  objec- 
tion, whether  true  or  false,  is  not  against  our  thesis. 

7.  An  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end  does  not  require 
intelligence ;  e.  g.,  the  bee  without  intelligence  builds 
its  honey-comb  most  symmetrically.  Answer.  The 
bee  and  all  brute  animals,  in  following  irresistibly  the 
promptings  of  their  instincts,  display  the  wisdom  of 
their  Maker,  just  as  a  machine  displays  the  skill  of  the 
inventor. 

225.  Objections:  III.     Against  the  moral  argument. 

1.  Our  judgments  concerning  our  moral  duties  and  re- 
sponsibiUties  are  due  to  education.  Answer.  They 
may  be  developed  and  perfected  by  education ;  but 
they  are  so  essential  to  man  that  they  are  known  even 
without  education  and  amid  all  varieties  of  education. 

2.  This  sense  of  responsibility  comes  from  some  passion  ot 
other,  e.  g.^  from  an  idle  fear  of  punishment.     Answer, 


The  Existence  of  God,  151 

The  passions  would  rather  prompt  a  man  to  throw  off 
restraint,  to  do  what  he  Hkes,  while  it  is  our  moral 
judgment  that  is  a  constant  check  upon  our  passions. 
As  to  the  fear  of  punishment,  it  is  a  consequence,  not 
a  cause  of  our  sense  of  responsibility. 

3.  The  sense  of  responsibility  simply  results  from  the 
intellectual  apprehension  of  right  and  wrong.  Answer. 
It  also  implies  the  judgment  that  there  is  a  law  obliging 
us  to  do  the  right  and  avoid  the  wrong,  and  that  there 
is  a  Law-giver  who  enforces  this  law,  for  there  can  be  no 
law  without  a  law-giver. 

4.  There  have  always  been  atheists ;  therefore  the  judg- 
ments in  question  are  not  universal  nor  essential  to 
man.  Answer.  We  grant  that  there  have  been  in 
many  ages  practical  atheists ;  there  have  also  been  a 
comparatively  small  number  of  theoretical  atheists, 
who  maintained  for  a  portion  of  their  lives  that  there 
is  no  God.  Some  of  these  may,  perhaps,  have  c'bn- 
vinced  tl^.emselves,  or  may  have  been  convinced  by 
others,  that  the  existence  of  God  was  doubtful ;  but 
history  does  not  tell  of  any  sensible  and  sincere  man 
who  felt  an  habitual  conviction  through  life  that  he 
was  not  responsible  for  his  moral  conduct  to  a  supreme 
Being. 

5.  We  find  learned  men  who  are  really  convinced  that 
man  is  only  matter,  and  therefore  irresponsible  for  his 
acts.  Answer,  From  the  fact  that  such  men  as  Pyrrho, 
Hume,  Fichte,  Berkeley,  etc.,  argued  against  the  cer- 
tain existence  of  bodies,  it  does  not  follow  that  they 
firmly  believed  in  their  own  theories;  so,  likewise, 
it  does  not  follow  from  all  the  theorizing  of  material- 
ists that  they  bona  fide  consider  themselves  as  irrespon- 
sible heaps    of  matter,   unless  it  be   that  abnormal 


152  Natural  Theology, 

surroundings,  or  abnormal  conditions  of  mind  or  heart, 
have  extinguished  in  them  the  ordinary  hght  of  con- 
science. We  do  not  know  whether  such  a  case  is 
possible ;  but  if  it  be,  it  is  not  from  abnormal  states 
that  the  judgments  of  man's  common  sense  can  be 
gathered. 

226.  Some  pretend  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  dJ /m«. 
Now,  t )  reason  a  priori  means  to  reason  from  a  cause  to 
an  effect ;  and  as  God  has  no  cause,  His  existence  cannot 
possibly  be  proved  by  such  a  process.  But  such  theorists 
confound  an  a  priori  argument  with  an  a  priori  judgment  ; 
they  really  mean  that  the  judgment  *  God  exists 'is  a  priori^ 
or  analytical.  This  is  called  the  ontological  argument, 
because  it  pretends  to  prove  the  existence  from  the  very 
essence  of  God.  This  argument  is  specious  but  fallacious, 
and  the  more  to  be  reprobated  because  the  matter  is  so 
important.  For  those  who  see  through  the  fallacy  may  be 
led  to  suspect  that  the  existence  of  God  is  incapable  of 
solid  proof. 

227.  The  ontological  argument  has  been  variously  proposed 
by  well-meaning  men,  such  as  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  and  even 
1  )y  St.  Anselm ;  it  always  comes  to  this  :  "  God  is  the  infinitely 
perfect  Being;  but  the  infinitely  perfect  Being  exists,  else  He 
would  not  be  infinitely  perfect ;  therefore  God  exists."  The 
middle  term  'infinitely  perfect  Being'  is  ambiguous;  in  the 
major  it  is  taken  abstractedly — /.  <?.,  it  is  a  mere  definition  of  the 
abstract  term  *  God ' ;  the  existence  is  not  meant  to  be  asserted 
even  implicitly,  but  only  referred  to  conditionally,  i.  e.,  if 
He  exists.  In  the  minor  the  same  middle  term  is  used  with 
g,  new  meaning,  /.  ^.,  concretely  and,  as  including  existence, 
unconditionally.  It  is  a  trick  of  logic,  which  may  escape 
the  detection  of  many,  but  it  is  nevertheless  a  sophism. 

It  is  true  that  the  existence  of  God  is  immediately  know- 


The  Existence  of  God,  153 

able  in  itself;  it  is  even  the  first  truth  in  the  ontological 
order;  but  it  is  not  immediately  known  to  us,  i.e.,  in  the 
logical  ord^r,  but  it  becomes  known  to  us  by  means  of  an 
obvious  process  of  reasoning  a  posteriori — /.  ^.,  from  the  ef- 
fects to  the  first  Cause, 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD. 

228.  The  essence  of  a  thing  is  that  which  constitutes  it  in- 
trinsically, making  it  what  it  is ;  it  is  the  note  or  notes  with- 
out which  a  thing  can  neither  exist  nor  be  conceived. 

We  shall  consider  in  this  chapter:  i.  The  difference  be- 
tween the  physical  and  metaphysical  essence  of  God.  2.  The 
infinite  perfection  of  His  physical  essence.  3.  The  simplicity 
of  His  physical  essence. 

Article  I.     Physical  and  Metaphysical  Essence 
OF  God. 

229.  The  physical  essence  is  the  essence  viewed  exactly  as 
it  is  in  the  being  itself,  not  introducing  into  it  such  distinctions 
as  do  not  belong  to  it  in  the  objective  reality.  Now,  there 
are  no  real  distinctions  in  the  essence  of  God,  as  we  shall 
show  further  on;  therefore  His  physical  essence  is  simply 
the  sum  total  of  His  perfection. 

230.  But  the  metaphysical  or  notional  essence  of  a  being 
is  its  essence  as  conceived  by  us,  /.  <?.,  as  it  is  traced  out  by 
our  mind,  and  marked  out  in  different  perfections  with  logical 
distinctions,  which  are  not  objectively  real,  though  they  have 
a  foundation  in  the  reality.  The  metaphysical  essence  is 
viewed  as  distinguished  from  the  attributes,  and,  in  a  created 
being,  as  distinguished  from  the  accidents.  In  God  there 
are  no  accidents;  for  He  necessarily  is  all  that  He  is.     Now, 

IS4 


The  Essence  of  God.  155 

the  essence  as  distinct  from  the  attributes  is  conceived  as,  {a) 
so  proper  to  a  being  as  to  distinguish  it  from  every  'other 
being,  and  {b)  so  primary  that  all  the  attributes  flow  from  it. 

231.  The  metaphysical  essence  of  God,  therefore,  must  be 
that  perfection  in  God  which  is  conceived  by  our  finite 
intellect  as,  {a)  so  peculiar  to  God  that  it  distinguishes  Him 
from  all  other  beings,  and  {b)  so  primary  or  principal  that 
all  His  other  perfections  flow  from  it.  Now,  this  perfection 
seems  to  be  self-existence ;  for  {a)  it  distinguishes  God  from 
all  other  beings,  since  a  self-existent  being  can  be  proved  to 
be  necessary,  independent,  infinite — ^in  a  word,  to  be  God; 
and  {b)  it  is  primary  in  Him,  since  from  it  all  His  other  per- 
fections flow  and  can  be  logically  proved. 

232.  We  have  said  that  God's  physical  essence  is  the  sum 
total  of  His  perfection ;  and  we  shall  now  proceed  to  prove 
two  theses  with  regard  to  it :  i.  That  God  contains  all  possi- 
ble perfections  in  an  infinite  degree.  2.  That  there  is  no  real 
distinction  of  any  kind  between  those  perfections. 

233.  Thesis  II.     God  is  infinitely  perfect. 
Explanation.     We  mean  by  a  perfection  any   real   entity, 

anythiHg  which  it  is  better  to  have  than  not  to  have.  A  being 
is  infinitely  perfect  when  it'  has  all  possible  entity  in  the  high- 
est possible  degree.  It  is  clear  at  once  that  God,  being  the 
cause  of  the  world,  must  have  all  the  perfections  that  are 
actually  in  the  world ;  for  there  can  be  no  perfection  in  the 
effect  which  is  not  in  the  cause.  But  besides,  He  must  have, 
we  maintain,  all  perfections  that  are  intrinsically  possible,  /.  ^., 
all  that  imply  no  contradiction.  We  must,  however,  distin- 
guish between /^r^  perfections — /.  ^.,  such  as  imply  no  imper- 
fection, ^.  ^.,  knowledge,  goodness,  justice,  power,  etc. ;  and 
w/lT<?^perfections — /.  <?.,  such  as  imply  some  imperfection,  e.g.^ 
reasoning,  which  implies  that  some  truth  was  first  unknown. 
Now,  we  mean  that  God  has  all  pure  perfections  formally  01 


156  Natural  Theology, 

as  such,  and  the  mixed  He  possesses  eminently,  i.  e.,  in  a  bet- 
ter way,  without  any  imperfections. 

Proof.  Whatever  the  necessary  Being  is,  it  is  that  neces- 
sarily ;  but  God  is  the  necessary  Being ;  therefore,  whatever 
He  is.  He  is  that  necessarily.  Therefore,  if  there  is  any 
limit  to  His  perfection,  that  limit  is  necessary ;  /.  e.,  further 
perfection  is  excluded  by  the  very  nature  of  His  physical 
essence;  in  other  words,  the  entity  or  perfection  of  His 
being  would  exclude  some  further  perfection.  But  no  per- 
fection excludes  other  perfection,  or  is  incompatible  with  fur- 
ther perfection ;  there  can  be  no  contradiction  between  good 
and  good,  entity  and  entity,  but  only  between  good  and  not 
good,  entity  and  non-entity,  perfection  and  imperfection. 
Therefore  no  perfection  can  exclude  any  other  perfection; 
hence  no  perfection  is  excluded  either  in  kind  or  in  degree; 
therefore  God  is  infinitely  perfect. 

234.  Objections:  i.  Our  finite  intellect  cannot  know  the 
nature  of  the  infinite  Being.  Answer,  We  cannot 
know  the  nature  of  the  infinite  Being  adequately,  but 
we  can  know  many  things  about  it;  for  they  are 
applications  of  first  principles — e.  g.,  that  there  can  be 
no  effect  without  a  cause,  that  no  effect  can  be  greater 
than  the  cause,  that  entity  or  good  as  such  is  not 
opposed  to  entity,  but  to  non-entity,  etc. 
2.  The  Holy  Scriptures  warn  man  not  to  search  into 
things  too  high  for  him:  "  He  that  is  a  searcher  of 
majesty  shall  be  overwhelmed  by  glory"  (Proverbs 
XXV.  27).  Answer.  It  is  not  too  high,  but  most 
appropriate  for  man  to  know  his  Creator,  that  he  may 
reverence  Him  as  he  ought :  "  For  the  invisible  things 
of  God  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly 
seen,  being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made : 
His  eternal  power  also   and  divinity;    so  that  they 


The  Essence  of  God,  157 

(the  ungodly)  are  inexcusable  "  (Rom.  i.  20).     But  we 
are  warned  not  to  criticise  the  ways  of  God  when 
they  surpass  our  understanding:    it  is  unreasonable 
for  creatures  to  require  of  the  Creator  that  He  shall  ren 
der  them  an  account  of  His  government  of  the  world 

3.  We  ought  not  to  ascribe  human  perfections  to  God ; 
else  we  make  Him  an  anthropomorphic  God.  Answer, 
Since  all  creation  is  some  representation  of  God's  per 
fections,  there  must  be  an  analogy  between  the  perfec 
tions  of  creatures  and  the  perfections  of  God ;    bu 
there  is  only  an  analogy.     Human  perfections  are  no 
predicated  of  God  univocally,  but  always  with  a  differ- 
ence; and  thus  God  is  not  made  an  anthropomorphic 
or  human  God.     Our  view  of  God  is  true  as  far  as  it 
goes,  but  it  does  not  do  full  justice   to  God;   thus, 
we  say  that  a  picture  is  a  true   representation  of  a 
statue,  though  it  is  unlike  the  statue  in  certain  respects. 

4.  It  is  better,  with  Agnostics,  to  call  God  the  great 
Unknown  than  to  represent  Him  inadequately.  An- 
swer* This  plea  is  not  even  plausible,  though  it  is 
one  of  the  most  specious  pretexts  of  modern  infidel- 
ity. Inadequate  knowledge,  acknowledged  to  be  in- 
adequate, is  better  than  total  ignorance  of  any  great 
truth — it  is  true  as  far  as  it  goes;  but  to  call  Htm 
unknown  of  whom  we  know  so  much  is  a  violation 
of  truth,  a  negation  of  what  we  know.  Besides,  it 
is  most  unjust,  since  it  deprives  the  Creator  of  the 
honor  which  is  due  to  Him  by  His  creatures;  for 
who  will  worship  the  Unknown,  even  though  it  be 
spelled  with  a  capital  U  ?  It  is  also  most  injurious 
to  society;  for  it  throws  doubt  upon  the  final  ac- 
countability of  men,  and  thus  destroys  the  only  ade- 
quate sanction  of  the  natural  law. 


158  Natural  Theology, 


Article  II.    The  Perfect  Simplicity  of  God, 

235.  We  have  seen  that  all  perfections  belong  to  God; 
we  must  now  prove  that  they  are  all  really  one,  not  distinct 
from  one  another  except  in  our  manner  of  conceiving  them  : 
this  is  meant  by  saying  that  God  is  perfectly  simple.     For 
simplicity,  as  explained  in  Ontology  (N ).  90),  is  the  perfec- 
tion which  makes  a  being  identical  with   all    that  is  in  it; 
while  composition,  the  opposite  of  simplicity,  implies  a  dis- 
tinction of  parts.     Composition  is  real  when   the  parts  are 
distinct  from  one  another  in  fact,  in  the  compound  object 
itself;  it  is  logical^  or  mental,  when  the  distinction  is  only 
between  our  concepts.     Now,  we  do  not  pretend  that  there 
is  no  distinction  between    the   various    concepts  which  we 
form  of  God's  perfections,  that  we  do  not  trace  logical  dis- 
tinctions in  Him ;  in  fact,  we  cannot  help  doing  so,  and  our 
mental  distinctions  have  a  true  foundation    in    the   reality. 
For  we  cannot  take  in  all  the  being  of  God  at  a   glance; 
we  learn  His  essence,  as  it  were,  piecemeal  from  what  we 
observe   in    creatures,   whose   perfections   must   have  some 
prototype  in  His  own  nature;    therefore  we  affirm  distinct 
attributes  of  God,  and  we  have  reasons  to  do  so.     But  we 
are  now  to  show  that  the  perfections  of  God  which  corre- 
spond to  our  distinct  concepts  are  not  really  distinct  in  Him; 
they  are  but  the  different  aspects  under  which  we  view  the 
same  reality. 
236.  Thesis  IIL     God  is  absolutely  simple. 
Proof.  That  being   is   absolutely   simple    which   excludes 
every  kind  of  real  composition;    now,  such  is  God;  there- 
fore He  is  absolutely  simple. 

The  minor  may  be  proved  \  \.  In  general.  Any  real  com- 
position must  consist  of  finite  parts,  else  the  parts  would  be 
equal  to  the  whole ;  but  no  union  of  finite  things  can  make 


The  Essence  of  God.  159 

up  an  infinite  being,  as  God  is ;  therefore  He  does  not  con- 
sist of  parts.  II.  In  particular,  God  excludes  all  composi- 
tion. 

I.  Oi physical  parts  : 

{a)  Of  integral  parts ;  for  integral  parts  make  up  quan- 
tity, and  in  the  infinite  being  they  would  have  to 
make  up  infinite  quantity;  but  an  infinite  quantity 
actually  existing  is  absurd. 

{p)  Of  substantial  parts,  such  as  matter  and  form ;  for 
each  part  would  be  finite,  and  no  union  of  finite 
things  can  make  the  infinite. 

(c)  Of  accidental  parts;  for  nothing  can  be  accidental  in 
the  necessary  being. 
2.  Of  metaphysical  parts  ^  viz.  : 

{a)  Of  essence  and  existence  ;  for  existence  is  essential  to 
the  necessary  being. 

{b)  Oi  substance  and  accident ;  for  the  accident  would  be 
something  finite  and  the  substance  something  finite ; 
and  these  two  finite  things  would  constitute  an  in- 
finite being. 

{c)  Oi  power  and  act ;  for  the  infinite  Being  has  essen- 
tially all  perfection,  and  therefore  all  action,  since 
action  is   more  perfect  than  mere    power  of  action. 

{d)  Of  essence  and  attributes ;  for  all  its  attributes  are 
essential,  are  its  physical  essence. 

\e)  Of  some  attributes  and  other  attributes ;  for  if  these 
were  really  distinct  from  each  other,  they  would  be 
finite,  and  finite  things  would  make  up  an  infinite 
being. 

(/)  Oi  genus  and  species/  for  the  genus  and  the  specific 
difference  would  be  finite.  Besides,  God  is  not  in  any 
genus ;  nothing  is  univocally  predicated  of  Him  and 
of  a  creature.     (No.  16.) 


i6o  Natural  Theology, 

(^  )  Of  species  and  individual ;  for  God  is  essentially 
whatever  He  is,  and  therefore  His  very  individuality 
is  essential  to  Him. 

237.  Some  important  corollaries  flow  from  this  thesis: 
I.  That  God  is  a  substantial  act,  b. pure  act  without  potential- 
ity or  power  as  distinct  from  action  or  from  the  reception  of 
any  further  perfection,  one  infinite  act,  embracing  all  the 
objects  of  His  activity.  2.  That  matter,  which  is  essentially 
potential,  cannot  be  God  nor  part  of  God ;  and  therefore 
that  Pantheism,  which  makes  all  things  God,  is  an  absurdity. 
3.  That  the  nature  of  God  is  not  divisible;  and  therefore  that, 
once  we  learn  by  Revelation  that  there  are  three  really  dis- 
tinct Persons  in  God,  we  know  that  they  must  have  the 
same  individual  nature ;  nor  can  there  be  a  real  distinction 
between  the  nature  of  God  and  the  Persons,  but  only  between 
the  Persons  as  such,  so  that  the  Father  is  not  the  Son,  and 
yet  He  is  the  same  being  as  the  Son. 

238.  Objections:  i.  Holy  Writ  attributes  hands  and  feet 
to  God,  as  also  passions,  all  which  supposes  an  organ- 
ism. Answer.  Holy  Writ  usually  presents  God  to  us 
in  figurative  language  wisely  adapted  to  our  manner 
of  understanding,  viz.,  in  connection  with  our  imagi- 
nation. 

2.  Pantheists  argue  that  an  infinite  substance  excludes 
all  finite  substances,  and  therefore  whatever  exists 
must  be  a  part  of  God  Ansutfer.  There  is  no  con- 
tradiction between  the  existence  of  the  infinite  sub- 
stance and  that  of  finite  substances  ;  these  are  not 
to  be  conceived  as  bodies  which  naturally  exclude  one 
another  from  the  place  they  occupy. 

3.  But  if  God  has  all  entity.  He  contains  all  creatures, 
for  these  are  entities.  Answer.  God  contains  all 
entity   eminently,  but    not   the   formal   entities    that 


The  Essence  of  God,  i6i 

constitute  the  creatures.  It  is  proper  to  remark  here 
that  various  modern  theories  are  implicitly  pantheistic, 
making  the  world  the  one  necessary  being.  Now, 
Pantheism  is  not  only  metaphysically  absurd,  as 
proved  in  the  first  chapter  of  Costtiology^  but  it  is  also 
destrucdve  of  morality  among  men ;  for  if  we  are 
God,  or  parts  of  God,  we  certainly  can  do  no  wrong, 
we  are  not  responsible  to  a  supreme  Judge  and  Lord; 
each  of  us  is  fully  justified  in  doing  as  he  pleases. 
With  such  a  doctrine  there  is  an  end  to  all  moral 
obligation,  and  there  would  soon  be  an  end  to 
human  society. 


CHAPTER    III. 
THE   QUIESCENT  ATTRIBUTES   OF  GOD. 

239.  We  have  stated  above  (No.  231)  that  self-existence 
is  generally  held  to  be  the  metaphysical  essence  of  God ;  by 
which  we  simply  mean  that  when  our  mind,  incapable  of 
understanding  the  infinite  being  by  one  concept,  forms  par- 
tial concepts  of  His  perfections  and  strives  to  put  order  in  its 
knowledge,  we  designate  self-existence  as  its  essence,  but 
only  a  quasi-essence — /.  ^.,  as  the  note  from  which  all  the 
other  perfections  discerned  in  God  flow,  after  the  manner 
that  attributes  do  from  the  essence  of  a  created  being. 
These  perfections  or  attributes  of  God  may,  for  convenience' 
sake,  be  classified  under  two  heads — namely.  His  quiescent 
attributes,  those  that  do  not  formally  regard  action,  and  His 
operative  attributes,  which  formally  regard  action. 

We  are  now  to  treat  of  the  former  class,  and  we  shall  con- 
sider in  particular  the  unity,  the  immutabiUty,  the  eternity, 
and  the  immensity  of  God. 

240.  Thesis  IV.     There  can  be  only  one  God, 

Proof  I.  If  there  were  more  gods  than  one,  they  either 
could  or  could  not  will  opposite  effects;  if  they  could  not, 
they  would  not  be  free  and  independent,  not  infinite ;  if  they 
could  will  such  effects,  they  could  not  give  efficacy  to  their 
contradictory  wills,  they  could  not  be  all-powerful.  But  a 
being  that  is  not  every  way  infinite  is  not  God. 

Proof  2.  If  there  were  more  gods  than  one,  there  would 
be  various  infinite  beings ;  but  this  cannot  be.     For,  being 

162 


The  Quiescent  Attributes  of  God,       163 

infinite,  such  gods  would  have  all  perfections,  and  therefore 
everything  that  the  one  had  the  other  would  also  have;  they 
would  then  not  differ  except  numerically.  But  they  could 
not  differ  numerically ;  for  this  would  suppose  that  their  in- 
dividuality would  be  really  distinct  from  their  essence,  since 
the  essence  is  really  separated  in  the  second  god  from  the 
individuality  of  the  first.  But  we  have  seen  that  there  is  no 
real  distinction  between  the  essence  of  God  and  His  in- 
dividuality.   Therefore  there  is  only  one  God. 

241.  Objections:  i.  The  arguments  just  laid  down  would 
prove  as  well  that  there  can  be  but  one  Person  in 
God.  Answer.  They  prove  only  this,  that  everything 
in  God  is  one  individual  Being,  and  such  are  really 
the  three  divine  Persons. 

2.  The  consent  of  nations  was  at  one  time  in  favor  of 
polytheism.  Answer.  Most  nations  considered  the 
so-called  gods  as  subjects  of  one  supreme  Being,  the 
one  only  God. 

3.  One  infinitely  perfect  God  will  not  account  for  the 
evil  that  is  in  the  world.  Answer.  The  creature  is 
the  cause  of  the  moral  evil ;  and,  as  to  physical  evil, 
God  can  cause  it ;  for  He  does  not  owe  His  creatures 
anything,  and  it  is  not  unworthy  of  Himself  to  give 
them  a  finite  happiness  of  mixed  enjoyment  and  suf- 
fering, especially  since  men  can  turn  their  sufferings 
into  merit.  As  for  the  sufferings  of  the  brute  animal, 
they  are  far  less  than  we  often  imagine.  (See  Dublin 
Review,  Jan.,  1888,  "The  Ethics  of  Animal  Suffer- 
ing," Vaughan.) 

4.  But  an  infinitely  perfect  God  could  not  create  a  being 
capable  of  doing  moral  evil.  Answer.  This  we  ab- 
solutely deny :  in  giving  us  a  free  will  God  gives  us 
a  very  good  thing,  and  He  does  so  for  a  very  good 


164  Natural  Theology, 

purpose,  that  we  may  honor  Him  with  it  and  benefit 
ourselves ;  if  we  abuse  His  gift,  He  knows  how  to 
draw  good  out  of  evil,  exercising  His  mercy  in  par- 
doning and  His  justice  in  punishing. 
242.  Among  the  civilized  nations  the  unity  of  God  is  now 
universally  recognized.  In  ancient  times,  though  the  worship 
of  many  gods  was  a  wide-spread  error  among  the  masses,  it 
found  httle  favor  with  the  philosophers,  except  in  the  form 
of  dualism,  which  supposed  two  necessary  beings,  the  one 
all  good  and  the  other  all  evil.  In  the  beginning  of  the 
Christian  era  the  Gnostics  borrowed  that  error  from  the 
Persians,  and  made  it  popular  in  several  parts  of  Europe. 
Afterwards  the  Manichaeans,  and  later  on  the  Albigenses, 
adopted  the  same  absurd  theory.  It  was  revived  in  the  six- 
teenth century  by  the  erratic  Pierre  Bayle,  the  author  of  the 
Historical  and  Critical  Dictionary^  but  it  is  now  universally 
abandoned.  The  only  ground  for  the  theory  was  the  diffi- 
culty of  reconciling  the  existence  of  one  infinitely  good  God 
with  the  presence  of  evil  in  this  world.  They  imagined, 
therefore,  that  evil  proceeded  from  an  evil  being,  which  they 
supposed  could  not  have  been  produced  by  a  good  cause, 
and  therefore  they  considered  it  as  self-existent.  Bayle  con- 
jectured that  the  good  and  the  bad  principles  had  made  a 
compact  to  blend  their  works  with  each  other.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  imagine  a  more  unphilosophic  error.  For  a  being 
all  evil  would  have  no  perfection,  and  therefore  no  entity 
at  all ;  and  a  being  that  would  be  driven  to  make  a  com- 
pact with  the  evil  principle  would  be  either  wicked  or  weak, 
certainly  not  the  infinitely  good  God.  This  is  one  of  the 
many  examples  which  the  history  of  philosophy  affords, 
showing  us  how  self-conceited  theorizers  will  often  refuse 
to  accept  some  well-established  truths  owing  to  some  ap- 
parent difficulties,  and,  rather  than   modestly   acknowledge 


The  Quiescent  Attributes  of  God.       165 

the  limitation  of  their  intellects,  build  up  systems  full  of 
wild  conjectures  and  flat  self-contradictions. 

243    Thesis  V.     God  is  absolutely  immutable. 

h  xt)lanation.  We  maintain  that  there  cannot  be  changes 
intrinsic  to  God ;  there  may  be  extrinsic  changes,  changes  in 
the  relations  between  God  and  creatures,  as  when  the  world 
began  to  exist  and  thus  God  became  its  Creator,  or  when 
Lucifer  fell  and  was  thenceforth  hated,  while  before  he  was 
loved  by  his  Maker :  in  such  cases  all  the  intrinsic  change 
is  on  the  part  of  the  creature. 

Proof,  An  intrinsic  change  supposes  the  removal  of  a  per- 
fection or  entity,  or  the  addition  of  a  perfection,  or  the 
exchange  of  one  perfection  for  another.  But  nothing  of  the 
kind  can  occur  in  God;  for,  since  all  His  perfections  are 
necessary.  He  cannot  lose  them,  and,  having  all,  He  can 
acquire  no  more,  nor  exchange  one  for  another. 

244.  Objections:  i.  God  is  free ;  therefore  He  can  change 
His  mind.  Answer.  He  has  all  the  perfection,  but 
not  the  imperfections  of  free  will ;  now,  the  power 
of  changing  one's  mind  imphes  an  imperfection. 

2,  God  is  influenced  to  change  His  will  by  the  prayers 
of  His  creatures.  Answer.  He  knew  from  eternity 
all  future  prayers,  and  therefore  He  determined  from 
eternity  what  He  would  do  in  consideration  of  those 
prayers.  When  we  delay  to  determine  a  conclusion, 
it  is  either  because  we  are  without  proper  information, 
or  because  we  do  not  know  what  is  best,  or  because 
we  are  sluggish  or  timid;  God  has  no  reason  to 
delay  His  choice. 

3.  If  God  cannot  change,  He  cannot  threaten  and  yet 
pardon.  Answer.  He  determined  from  eternity  to 
threaten  conditionally,  and  execute  His  threat  or  par- 
don according  to  the  circumstances  which  He  foreknew. 


1 66  Natural  Theology. 

Further  difficulties  on  this  point  will  be  answered  further 
on,  in  connection  with  the  liberty  of  God  (No.  256);  others 
were  considered  when  treating  of  human  liberty  (No.  199). 

245.  Thesis  VI.     God  is  eternal. 

Proof.  Eternity,  as  beautifully  defined  by  the  Christian 
philosopher  Boethius,  is  "  the  simultaneously  full  and  perfect 
possession  of  a  life  that  has  neither  beginning  nor  end" — 
Interminabilis  viice  tota  simul  et  perfecta  possessioj  now,  such 
possession  belongs  to  God.     For, 

{a)  Since  God  is  a  self-existent,  and  therefore  a  necessary 
being.  His  life  is  without  beginning  and  without  end; 
because  He  is  immutable,  He  must  possess  His  life 
simultaneously  in  all  its  fulness;  and  because  He  is 
infinitely  perfect,  He  must  possess  it  perfectly. 
{b)  Since  God  is  absolutely  simple,  there  is  in  Him  no 
real  distinction  between  power  and  act,  nor  between 
one  act  and  another;  He  is,  therefore,  one  pure  and 
substantial  act ;  therefore  He  possesses  the  fulness  of 
His  life,  not  as  broken  up  into  moments,  but  simul- 
taneously; and  because  His  existence  is  His  very 
essence,  His  full  enjoyment  of  life  is  without  beginning 
and  without  end. 

246.  Objections;  i.  All  reality  must  be  in  God;  but  time 
is  a  reality;  therefore  it  is  in  God.  Answer.  Every 
pure  perfection  or  reahty  is  in  God  formally;  but 
time  is  not  a  pure,  but  a  mixed  reality,  for  time  is  the 
measure  of  successions  in  finite  beings ;  as  such  it 
implies  an  imperfection  or  limit  of  existence  which,  of 
course,  cannot  be  in  God.  Time  is,  however,  eminently 
in  God;  for  eternity  contains  all  the  perfection  of 
time. 

2.  Eternity,  as  explained  in  the  proof  of  this  thesis, 
would   seem    to   be  full   at   each   moment;   but   we 


The  Quiescent  Attributes  of  God,       167 

co-exist  with  some  of  those  moments :    therefore  we 

co-exist  with   eternity.      Answer,  We   co-exist    with 

God,  who  is  eternal,  but  not  with  the  eternity  of  God. 

For    we  cannot  say  that  eternity  is    full  at  each 

moment,  but  that  it  is  not  divisible    into  moments. 

Eternity  may  be  said  to  co-exist  with  each  moment, 

and  yet   each   moment   does   not   co-exist   with    all 

eternity. 

247.  Thesis  VII.      God  is  omnipresent  and  without  limit. 

Explanation,     i.  The  omnipresence  or  ubiquity  of  God 

means  His  presence  in  all  existing  things,  and  therefore  in 

all  real  space ;  His  immensity  means  His  essential  existence 

without  limit  of  space,  so  that  there  is  no  real  or  possible 

space  outside  of  Him.     2.  Besides,  the  omnipresence  of  God, 

as  implying  a  relation  to  creatures,  cannot  be   predicated 

of  Him  unless  creatures  exist — it  is  a  relative  perfection ;  but 

His  immensity  is  an  absolute  perfection  of  His  being,  and  as 

such  it  had  no  beginning.     3.  God's  immensity  should  not 

be  imagined  as  something  extended  ;  for  whatever  is  extended 

has  quantity  and  therefore  cannot  be  infinite.     But  it  is  with 

the  immensity  of  God  in  respect  to  space  as  it  is  with  His 

eternity  in  respect  to  time :  He  is  whole  and  entire  wherever 

He  is  and  whenever  He  is. 

1st  Part,  God  is  omnipresent.  Proof.  All  creatures  exist 
for  no  other  reason  than  that  God  gives  them  existence 
and  keeps  them  in  existence.  But  He  cannot  act  where 
He  is  not  present  •  for  nothing  can  be  a  cause  where  it 
is  not,  since  there  it  is  nothing,  and  nothing  cannot  pro- 
duce any  effect.  Therefore  God  is  present  in  everything. 
2d  Part,  God  is  unbounded.  Proof  i.  Else  He  would 
have  limits  of  some  kind,  and  therefore  would  not  be 
truly  infinite.  Proof  2.  He  would  not  be  all-powerful  to 
create  if  He  were   confined  to  any  space;   but  He  is  all- 


1 68  Natural  Theology. 

powerful,  therefore  He  is  not  confined  to  any  space.  The 
major  proposition  is  evident;  for  if  He  were  confined  to  any 
space,  He  could  not  create  beyond  that  space,  since  a  being 
cannot  act  where  it  is  not ;  therefore  He  would  not  be  all- 
powerful. 

248.  There  are  three  ways  in  which  God  is  in  a  creature : 
I.  By  His  essence^  i.  <?.,  by  existing  in  that  creature.  2.  By 
His  power,  i.  <f.,  by  working  in  that  creature,  giving  it  exist- 
ence and  everything  it  has.  3.  By  His  presence,  knowing 
the  creature  and  in  some  cases  making  Himself  known  to  it. 
It  is  very  different  with  creatures;  thus,  a  king  may  be 
said  to  be  throughout  his  kingdom  by  his  power,  to  be  pres- 
ent to  his  troops  when  he  reviews  them,  but  he  is  essentially 
or  substantially  confined  to  the  narrow  compass  of  his  body. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  OPERATIVE   ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD. 

249.  The  operative  attributes  of  God  are  those  which 
imply  action;  they  are  His  knowledge^  His  will,  and  His 
power. 

Article  I.    The   Knowledge  of  God. 

250.  Since  God  is  absolutely  simple,  His  knowledge,  sub- 
jectively considered,  cannot  be  made  up  of  different  ideas, 
but  must  be  identical  with  the  one  substantial  act,  which 
constitutes  His  essence.  Objectively  considered.  His  knowl- 
edge may  be  distinguished  according  to  three  classes  of 
objects,  into  which  all  things  that  are  knowable  may  be 
divided:  i.  His  knowledge  of  pure  intelligence  embraces 
His  own  essence,  as  imitable  in  possible  creatures.  2.  His 
knowledge  of  vision  comprises  His  own  essence  in  itself  and 
all  that  is  ever  actualized  in  creatures,  whether  past,  present, 
or  future.  3.  His  conditional  knowledge  regards  all  that 
any  creature  would  do  under  any  circumstances ;  it  is  styled 
scientia  media,  because  it  holds  a  middle  position  between  the 
knowledge  of  actual  and  that  of  possible  beings.  For  in- 
stance, the  assertioai  "If  Caesar  had  not  been  slain,  he  would 
have  assumed  the  royal  purple  "  is  either  true  or  false ;  we  do 
not  know  whether  it  is  the  one  or  the  other ;  but  we  say  about 
all  such  propositions,  "  God  alone  knows."  This  is  what  we 
mean  by  His  conditional  knowledge. 

251.  Thesis  VIIL     God  knows  all  things  possible  and  all 

i6p 


170  Natural  Theology, 

things  actual,  whether  past^  present,  or  future  j  and  even  all 
that  any  free  creature  would  do,  in  any  give?i  case. 

Proof  1,  Direct.  Since  God  is  infinitely  perfect,  He  must 
know  all  truth;  but  there  is  truth  in  any  judgment  that  may 
be  formed  on  any  of  these  matters  or  in  the  contradictory  of 
that  judgment;  therefore  God  must  know  it.  For  instance, 
the  assertion  "  If  Caesar  had  not  been  slain,  he  would 
have  assumed  the  royal  purple '"'  is  true,  or  its  contradictory 
is  true;  now,  all  truth  must  be  known  by  an  infinitely  perfect 
being. 

Proof  2.  Indirect.  If  God  did  not  know  all  these  things, 
He  could  not  govern  His  creatures  with  infallible  wisdom; 
He  might  be  disappointed,  taken  unawares  by  an  unexpected 
free  act  of  man  or  angel ;  He  would  thus  not  be  infinite  in 
wisdom. 

252.  Objections  :  i.  If  God  knows  what  any  person's  will 
would  choose  to  do  in  a  given  case,  it  must  be  be- 
cause He  knows  the  nature  of  that  will  so  intimately 
as  to  see  what  that  will  must  choose  in  a  given  case ; 
therefore  that  will  must  make  that  choice,  owing  to  its 
very  nature;  therefore  it  is  not  free.  Answer.  We 
grant  that  a  will  which  must  act  in  a  certain  fixed  way 
is  not  really  free;  but  that  is  not  the  way  with  our 
will,  nor  with  God's  conditional  knowledge  of  our 
choice  in  a  given  case.  He  knows  what  we  would 
choose,  not  because  we  mtist  so  choose,  but  only 
because  we  would  so  choose ;  for  that  we  would,  is  an 
objective  truth  and  a  knowable  truth. 
2.  That  which  has  no  being  cannot  be  an  object  of 
knowledge,  but  conditional  acts  never  happening 
have  no  being.  Answer,  They  have  no  physical,  but 
they  have  logical  being;  for  judgments  can  be  formed 
about  them,  and  those  judgments  have  truth  or  falsity. 


The  Operative  Attributes  of  God.       171 

3.  What  God  knows  will  happen  must  necessarily  hap- 
pen, and  therefore  it  cannot  be  a  free  act.  Answer, 
The  word  'necessarily'  has  two  meanings:  it  Avill 
necessarily,  /.  ^.,  infallibly,  happen,  for  what  is  future 
is  infallibly  future,  just  as  what  is  past  is  infalHbly  past; 
but  it  will  not  happen  necessarily,  i.  <?.,  without  free- 
dom ;  just  as  our  past  acts  were  free  when  we  did 
them :  knowledge  does  not  destroy  liberty. 

4.  The  explanation  given  makes  God's  knowledge  of 
what  we  would  do  dependent  on  our  choice ;  but  God 
cannot  in  any  way  depend  on  any  creature.  Answer. 
God's  knowledge,  subjectively  considered,  is  inde- 
pendent of  all  creatures,  for  He  does  not  receive  His 
power  of  knowing  from  creatures;  but,  objectively 
considered,  knowledge  necessarily  supposes  the  object 
known,  and  it  argues  no  imperfection  in  God  that  His 
knowledge  of  our  free  acts  supposes  our  free  acts  and 
is  consequent  on  our  acts. 

253.  The  attribute  of  wisdom  may,  in  one  sense  of  the 
word,  be  ranked  with  that  of  Divine  knowledge ;  for  wisdom 
often  means  the  knowledge  of  things  in  their  highest  causes. 
Thus  considered,  all  the  knowledge  of  God  is  properly 
denominated  wisdom ;  for  He  knows  all  things  as  they  stand 
related  to  their  highest  causes.  In  another  and  more  usual 
sense,  as  St.  Thomas  fully  explains  {Contra  Gentes,  c.  i.),  wis- 
dom comprises  both  knowledge  and  action,  and  means  the 
proper  direction  of  things  to  their  highest  ends.  As  such, 
God's  wisdom  is  manifested  by  the  effects  of  His  providence, 
of  which  we  shall  treat  in  connection  with  His  power.  ( No. 
266.) 

Article  II.    The  Will  of  God. 

254.  The  will  of  God  is  not,  like  ours,  a  power  passing 
occasionally  into  acts,  but  it  is  one  act  loving  and  willing 


172  Natural  Theology, 

all  that  is  necessary,  viz.,  His  own  essence,  and  determining 
freely  what  contingent  things  shall  be,  and  what  others  shall 
not  be,  allowing  meanwhile  for  the  free  choice  of  His  intelli- 
gent creatures. 

God's  love  of  creatures  is  nothing  else  than  His  will  to  be- 
stow happiness.  This  will  is  often  conditional,  His  actual 
conferring  of  benefits  being  made  dependent  on  the  free 
acceptance  of  intelligent  creatures,  whom  He  earnestly  de- 
sires to  make  happy.  His  will  viewed  as  antecedent  to  free 
acceptance  is  called  His  antecedent  will ;  viewed  as  taking 
into  account  the  acceptance  or  refusal  of  free  creatures,  it 
is  styled  His  consequent  will.  The  latter  is  always  effica- 
cious; but  the  antecedent  will  may  remain  inefficacious, 
because  the  creature  refuses  to  comply  with  the  required 
conditions.  We  shall  consider  the  will  of  God  under  three 
aspects :  as  free^  as  holy^  and  as  good. 

255.  •I.  Freedom,  or  liberty,  is  the  power  of  choosing  be- 
tween two  or  more  things :  {a)  The  power  of  choosing 
whether  a  thing  shall  be  or  not  be  is  called  liberty  of  contra- 
diction, {p)  The  power  of  choice  between  two  contraries, 
such  as  good  and  evil,  is  liberty  of  contrariety ;  a  defect  is 
implied  in  the  power  of  choosing  evil,  and,  of  course,  it  is 
not  in  God.  {c)  The  power  of  choice  between  one  thing  and 
another  not  contradictory  is  the  liberty  of  specification ;  we 
attribute  to  God  liberty  in  all  its  perfection. 

256.  Thesis  IX.     God  is  free  in  all  His  external  acts. 
Explanation,     By  external  acts  we  mean  all   His  acts  in 

regard  to  creatures ;  and  we  maintain  that  God  from  eternity, 
by  a  single  act  of  His  will,  determines  affirmatively  or  nega- 
tively all  possible  questions  concerning  all  possible  creatures, 
so,  however,  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  free  acts  of  His  free 
creatures.  His  act  of  determining  is  not  free  as  to  its  entity, 
but  as  to  its  term ;    /.  ^.,  He  must  determine  every  question, 


The  Operative  Attributes  of  God.       173 

but  He  can  determine  it  as  He  pleases,  compatibly  with  His 
infinite  perfections. 

Proof  I.  A  well-ordered  will  is  in  conformity  with  a  per- 
fect intellect;  now,  a  perfect  intellect  directs  that  what  is 
necessary  shall  be  willed  absolutely ;  what  is  unnecessary, 
freely.  But  all  created  things  are  unnecessary,  therefore 
God  wills  them  freely. 

Proof  2.  If  God  were  necessitated  to  will  anything  outside 
of  Himself,  this  necessity  would  arise  from  Himself  or  from 
another  being  j  but  it  could  arise  from  neither.  i.  Not 
from  another ;  for  all  other  beings  are  contingent,  and  there- 
fore cannot  necessitate  their  own  existence.  2.  Not  from 
Himself;  for  this  would  suppose  that  there  is  something 
wanting  to  Him,  some  want  to  be  supplied  by  creatmg, 
which  could  not  be  supplied  by  not  creating ;  but  this  can- 
not be,  else  He  would  not  be  infinitely  perfect,  and  His  per- 
fection would  require  a  finite  complement  in  order  to  become 
infinite. 

257.  Objections:  i.  God  cannot  do  wrong;  therefore  He 
is  not  free.  Answer.  The  power  of  doing  wrong 
implies  a  defect  of  the  intellect  or  the  will;  it  is  not 
a  perfection  of  liberty. 

2.  Liberty  supposes  potentiahty,  /.  e.^  something  that 
may  be  or  not  be ;  but  there  is  no  potentiahty  in  God. 
Answer.  It  supposes  potentiality  on  the  part  of  the 
term  or  object  willed,  on  the  part  of  the  creature,  not 
on  the  part  of  the  Creator. 

3.  A  free  act  is  contingent,  for  it  is  not  necessary  ;  but 
God's  acts  are  necessary.  Answer.  God's  act  is 
necessary ;  the  contingency  is  in  the  object  or  term. 

4.  If  God  were  free,  He  could  change  His  decrees;  but 
He  cannot.  A?iswer.  God  can  do  nothing  inconsist- 
ent with  any  of   His  perfections ;  now,  a  change  of 


174  Natural  Theology. 

design  would  suppose  that  He  has  learned  new  motives 
for  deciding,  or  that  He  changed  His  mind  without 
reason.     Besides,  though  the  matter  is  far  above  our 
grasp  to  explain  fully,  there  is  but  one  act  in  God; 
hence  no   change  is  possible,    and  still  that  act    is 
free  with  regard  to  creatures. 
258.  Holiness,  or  sanctity,  means  the  love  of  what  is  right 
or  morally  good,  and  the  hatred  of  what  is  wrong  or  morally 
evil;  viewed  as  an  attribute  of  God,  it  may  be  defined,  the 
immutable  will  of  God  to  act  in  conformity  with  His  per- 
fection, in  a  manner  worthy  of  Himself.     Perfect  sanctity  is 
evidently  essential  to  the  infinitely  perfect  Being. 
*     259.  Thesis  X.     God  is  infiniiely  good. 

Proof.  Goodness  has  various  meanings,  in  each  of  which 
it  is  infinite  in  God.  i.  Goodness,  as  a  transcendental.,  is 
being,  viewed  as  desirable;  in  this  sense  it  is  clear  that  God 
is  infinitely  good,  inasmuch  as  He  is  infinite  being,  and 
therefore  an  infinite  object  of  desire.  2.  Goodness  may  be 
taken  in  the  moral  sense  of  conformity  to  the  law  of  reason; 
it  is  then  synonymous  with  sanctity  ;  it  must  be  perfect  in 
the  infinitely  perfect  Being.  3.  Goodness  is  often  taken  in  a 
relative  sense,  and  signifies  an  earnest  will  to  make  others 
happy ;  it  is  then  often  called  bounty  or  beneficence.  In  this 
sense  it  is  infinite  as  an  attribute  of  God ;  for  it  has  been 
proved  a  priori  that  the  self-existent  Being  is  infinitely  per- 
fect. His  bounty,  however,  is  not  infinite  in  its  manifestations 
or  effects,  for  all  the  works  of  God  must  be  finite  in  finite 
creatures.  Therefore  we  cannot  prove  a  posteriori  that  God 
is  infinitely  bountiful. 

260.  Objections  :  i.  If  God  possessed  infinite  moral  good- 
ness, He  would  manifest  His  hatred  of  sin  by  not 
allowing  sin  to  exist.  Answer.  God,  indeed,  detests 
sin  infinitely  and  forbids  it  absolutely;  but  there  are 


The  Operative  Attributes  of  God.       175 

two  ways  in  which  hatred  of  sin  can  manifest  itself, 
viz.,  by  preventing  its  existence,  and,  without  prevent- 
ing it,  by  repairing  the  evil  with  full  compensation. 
God  often  chooses  the  latter  way;  He  punishes  some 
of  the  guilty  with  endless  punishment,  and  He  has 
Himself  made  an  atonement  of  infinite  merit  for  the 
sins  of  men.  (Nos.  115,  118.)  (See  on  this  matter 
"  A  Sceptical  Difficulty  against  Creation,"  by  Rev.  R. 
F.  Clarke,  S.J.,  American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review, 
April,  1887.) 
2.  If  God  were  infinitely  bountiful,  He  would  make  all 
His  creatures  happy.  Answer,  He  would  seriously 
wish  all  to  be  happy,  we  grant ;  He  would  make  them 
happy  against  their  will,  we  deny.  The  manifestation 
of  His  goodness  must  have  a  limit,  which  it  is  for  Him 
to  determine,  or  to  place,  if  he  so  chooses,  in  the 
determination  of  man's  free  will. 

Article  III.    The  Power  of  God. 

261.  Thesis  XL     God  is  omnipotent. 

Proof,  Omnipotence  is  infinite  power ;  now,  power  is  a 
perfection,  something  which  it  is  better  to  have  than  not  to 
have,  and  the  self-existent  Being  has  all  perfections ;  there- 
fore He  is  omnipotent. 

262.  Objections:  i.  God  cannot  create  all  possible  things 
together,  because  they  would  constitute  an  infinite  num- 
ber ;  therefore  He  cannot  do  all  things.  Answer.  He 
can  do  all  things  ;  but  anything  self-contradictory  is  not 
truly  a  thing.  The  fact  that  all  possible  things  cannot  be 
actualized  together  is  not  owing  to  any  limit  in  God's 
power,  but  to  a  necessary  limit  in  all  finite  things,- 
for  these  cannot  co-exist  without  making  a  number. 


176  Natural  Theology. 

and  an  infinite  number  of  things  actually  existing  is 
absurd. 
2.  God  cannot  create  a  square  circle,  nor  an  infinitely 
perfect  being.     Answer.  Both  these  involve  contra- 
dictions J  for  square  denies  the  roundness  essential  to 
a  circle,  and  a  creature^  by  the  very  fact  that  it  is  a 
creature,  cannot  be  infinitely  perfect. 
263.  Thesis  XII.  The  preservation  of  created  beings  requires 
at  every  moment  the  active  influence  of  God's  power  and  will. 
Explanation.  We  do  not  mean    that   God  need   protect 
every  creature  against  other  creatures  or  against  the  action 
of  the  natural  laws ;  but  that  all  and  any  created  being  would 
cease  to  exist,  if  God  ceased  for  a  moment  actually  to  will 
its  existence,  just  as  the  figure  of  a  body  of  water  would 
at  once  cease  to  exist  if  the  vessel  holding  it  were  destroyed. 
Proof.  The  present  existence  of  a  contingent  being  cannot, 
by  itself,  be  the  cause  of  its  future  existence  j  for  the  cause 
must  contain  the  effect,  and  the  present  existence  does  not 
contain  the  future  existence.     Therefore  another  cause  must 
exist  for  the  permanence  of  that  being.     If  this  other  cause 
be  itself  unnecessary  or  contingent,  it,  too,  will  be  unable  to 
exist   and  act    just  then,  except  in  virtue  of  another  cause 
giving  it   then   and   there    existence    and  power  of  action. 
And  thus  no  contingent  being  could  continue  to  exist  from 
one  moment   to  another,  except  in    virtue  of  an  influence 
not  itself  contingent  nor   dependent,  which  is  nothing  else 
than  the  power  and  will  of  God.     This  may  be  illustrated 
by  reflecting  that  the  strength   of  a  manufactured    article 
depends  on  the  strength,  or  power  of  permanence,  of  the  ma- 
terial of  which  it  is  made.     If  no  material  were  used,  there 
could  be   no   power   of  permanence,   except  as   far  as  the 
maker  continued  to  give  it  existence;  now,  all  creation  is 
not  made    out    of  a    pre-existing    material;    therefore    its 


The  Operative  Attributes  of  God,        177 

preservation    depends    at    any  moment  on    the   active   in- 
fluence of  the  Creator. 

264.  By  a  similar  reasoning  it  may  be  proved  that  God 
not  only  keeps  all  things  in  existence,  but  that  He  actually 
concurs  with  every  act  of  every  creature.  For  creatur^a 
depend  on  God  totally — that  is,  according  to  all  their  entity; 
but  there  is  in  every  act  an  entity  which  is  beyond  the  mere 
power  of  acting ;  therefore  the  act  also,  and  not  merely  the 
power,  must  depend  on  God. 

265.  God's  concurrence  with  a  free  act  of  a  creature  does 
not  in  the  least  interfere  with  its  liberty ;  for  by  the  very  fact 
that  He  makes  the  being  free  He  concurs  with  it  in  acting 
one  way  or  another,  as  the  free  will  chooses.  The  free  act 
is  man's  and  it  is  God's,  but  with  a  difference :  as  a  boat  is 
supported  by  the  water,  propelled  and  directed  truly  by  the 
efforts  of  man,  but  by  means  of  the  water  j  so  human  actions 
proceed  truly  from  man,  but  with  the  concurrence  of  God. 

266.  The  Providence  of  God  is  the  wisdom  whereby  He 
directs  things  to  their  proper  ends. 

Thesis  XIII.  Every  event  in  the  world  is  directed  by  Divine 
Providence. 

Proof  I.  This  is  a  dictate  of  common  sense;  for  all  men 
look  up  to  God  as  the  supreme  Controller  of  every  one's  des- 
tiny, and  all  nations,  even  while  believing  to  some  extent  in 
fate,  as  some  did,  still  prayed  to  God  as  the  Dispenser  of  good 
and  evil. 

Proof  2.  It  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  direct  all  things  to 
their  proper  ends  by  proper  means;  but  God  is  infinitely 
wise,  since  He  is  infinitely  perfect ;  therefore  He  directs  all 
things  to  proper  ends  by  proper  means.  Now,  He  could 
not  do  so  unless  He  directed  every  event  in  the  world; 
therefore  He  directs  every  event  in  the  world. 

267.  Objections :    i.    All  men   agree    that    some    things 


178  Natu7'al   Theology. 

happen  by  accident,  but  accident  means  the  absence  of 
design.  Answer.  All  agree  that  things  happen  which 
are  not  the  result  of  design  on  the  part  of  men;  but 
they  do  not  deny  that  everything  which  happens  is 
willed  or  permitted  by  Almighty  God.  If  God  spe- 
cially and  directly  intends  anything  with  regard  to 
any  creature,  it  is  said  to  proceed  from  a  special  provi- 
dence of  God ;  else  it  is  attributed  to  the  general  provi- 
dence of  God,  who  sees  and  wills  distinctly  all  the 
consequences  of  the  natural  laws. 

2.  At  least  the  events  proceeding  from  human  design 
are  not  directed  by  the  providence  of  God,  e.  g.^  the 
wicked  plots  of  murderers.  Answer,  The  physical 
actions  of  even  the  worst  men  and  the  effects  of  such 
actions  cannot  exist  except  with  the  permissive  will 
and  the  actual  concurrence  of  God;  He  can  and 
does  direct  even  these  to  proper  ends  not  intended  by 
the  evil-doers,  e.  g.,  that  He  may  increase  the  merit 
of  His  martyrs  and  of  the  good  in  general.  Therefore 
Holy  Writ  says:  "We  know  that  to  them  that  love 
God  all  things  work  together  unto  good "  (Rom. 
viii.  28). 

3.  It  were  unworthy  of  God  to  mind  little  things.  An- 
swer. No  more  than  it  is  unworthy  of  a  good  painter 
to  mind  every  detail  of  his  painting.  Besides,  the  most 
perfect  creature  is  as  nothing  compared  to  God,  and 
nothing  is  little  when  viewed  as  directed  by  Him 
to  a  high  purpose. 

4.  If  God  rules  all  events,  men  need  and  can  do  nothing. 
Answer.  This  were  true  if  God  ruled  all  events  without 
regard  to  the  actions  of  men ;  but  not  if,  as  is  the 
case,  He  allows  free  causes  to  act  freely,  knowing, 
meanwhile,  how  to  draw  ultimate  good  from  present  evil. 


The  Operative  Attributes  of  God.        179 

A  wise  Providence  would  punish  crime  and  reward 
virtue;  but  this  is  not  always  done  in  this  world. 
Answer.  It  only  follows  that  it  will  be  done  in  the  next 
world,  where  God  has  an  eternity  to  manifest  His 
goodness  and  His  justice. 

If  there  were  a  Providence,  there  would  not  be  so 
much  misery  and  so  much  inequality  among  men. 
Answer.  Much  of  the  evils  of  life  comes  from  the 
vices  of  men,  which  God  need  not  hinder  for  the  pres- 
ent, but  which  will  be  atoned  for  in  due  time.  Often 
sufferings  and  inequalities  are  part  of  His  grand  design 
of  sanctifying  souls.  Besides,  there  is  no  reason  why 
God  should  treat  all  His  creatures  alike ;  on  the  con- 
trary, the  poet  has  truly  said : 

**  Order  is  heaven's  first  law,  and,  this  confessed. 
One  is  and  must  be  greater  than  the  rest. 
More  rich,  more  wise; 
This  who  denies. 
Denies  all  common  sense.'' 


The  £kd. 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


I.  refers  to  the  Logic ;  II.,  to  the  Mental  Philosophy ;  i,  2,  3,  etc.,  to  the  paragraphs. 


Abstract,  ideas,  1. 11, 122  to  124, 148 ; 

II.  176,  182  ;  number,  38. 
Accident,  one  of  the  predicables,  I. 

13 ;  opposed  to  substance,  II.  49, 

50,  58,  59. 
Accidental  cause,  II.  ^^. 
Act,  pure,  I.  237. 

Action,  II.  so,  55,  63  to  65,  78,  79,  85. 
Actual,  being,  II.  6, 12 ;  division,  91. 
Adaptation  of  means  to  end,  II.  150. 
Aevum,  II.  70. 
Agnosticism,  II.   103,  216,  217,  219, 

234- 

Ambiguous  middle,  I.  57. 

Analogy,  I.  16,  50  to  52  ;  II.  10. 

Analytic,  judgments,  I.  17,  63,  125 
to  127  ;  reasoning,  64  to  66. 

Anatomy,  II.  157- 

Angels,  I.  13  to  16 ;  II.  139,  141  to 
143  :  species  fixed,  II.  155. 

Anselm,  St.,  II.  118. 

Answering  objections,  I.  55, 

Apparent  conflict,  of  reason  and  Rev- 
elation, I.  3;  of  sciences,  68. 

Appetite,  II.  191,  192,  195,  196. 

Appreciation,  power  of,  II.  167. 

Apprehension,  I.  9,  75  to  ^^. 

Argumentation,  I.  22. 

Argumentum  ad  hominem,  I.  54. 

Aristotle,  II.  48,  loi,  127. 

Atheists.  II.  219,  225. 


Atomic  theory,  II.  131,  133. 
Attribute,  I.  13  ;  II.  36  ;  of  God,  239. 
Authority,  I.  152  to  156. 

Beauty,  II.  46,  47. 
Begging  the  question,  I.  58. 
Being,  II.  6 ;  actual,  possible,  real, 

7,8,  12;  logical,  physical,  11;  not 

a  genus,  13  ;  determination  of,  14 ; 

possible,  17  to  27  ;  necessary,  97. 
Belief,  I.  153. 
Berkeley,  I.  144. 
Boscowich,  II.  130. 
Brute,  animals,  I.  148 ;  for  man,  II. 

138,  152 ;  soul,  146  to  148. 

Categorical,  propositions,  I.  21 ;  syl- 
logisms, 23. 

Categories,  II.  48. 

Causality,  limits  to,  II.  85  ;  princi- 
ple of,  86  to  88. 

Cause,  defined,  II.  74 ;  formally, 
materially,  76 ;  material,  formal, 
substantial,  accidental,  final,  jj  to 
79 ;  efficient,  81 ;  first,  second, 
properly,  accidentally,  principal, 
instrumental,  free,  necessary,  mor- 
al, physical,  83;  contains  effect 
formally,  eminently,  virtually,  uni- 
vocal,  84 ;  has  reahty,  85. 

Certainty,  I.   70,   71,   78,  112,  113; 


x8o 


Alphabetical  Index. 


i8i 


elements  of,  84 ;  philosophical,  85  ; 

species  of,   86,   87;    existence  of, 

89  to  99 ;  criterion  of,  165  to  170 ; 

sources  of,  100  to  164. 
Change,  II.  98,  99,  105. 
Chemistry,  II.  128,  133. 
Circle,  exercise  of  the,  I.  69. 
Clear  ideas,  Descartes',  I.  168. 
Cognition,  II.  159  ;  sensible,  rational, 

175,  etc. 
Cognoscive  powers,  sketch  of,  1. 100 

to  III. 

Common  objects  of  sense-perception, 

I.  148. 
Common  sense,  I.   156  to  164 ;  the, 

103;  consent,  159. 
Composition,    II.  91 ;    and  division, 

1.57. 

Comprehension  of  ideas,  1. 16, 20,  25. 

Conception,  concept,  I.  9. 

Conceptualists,  I.  124;  II.  184,  185. 

Conclusion,  I.  24,  25,  29. 

Concrete,  ideas,  I.  11 ;  number,  II. 
38. 

Concurrence  with  second  causes,  II. 
264,  265. 

Condition,  II.  82. 

Conditional  knowledge,  II.  250  to 
253 ;  propositions,  I.  21 ;  syllo- 
gisms, 35. 

Conjunctive,  propositions,  I.  21 ;  syl- 
logisms, 37. 

Consciousness,  I.  iii,  114  to  118. 

Consequence,  consequent,  I.  29,  3a. 

Constructing  syllogisms,  I.  24,  25. 

Contingent  being,  II.  96,  97,  220. 

Copula,  I.  19. 

Cosmology,  II.  4,  100. 

Creation,  II.  106  to  108  ;  purpose  of, 
113  to  115  :  of  the  soul,  211. 

Criterion,  ultimate,  of  certainty,  I. 
165  to  170;  of  a  true  miracle,  II. 
124. 


Criticising  syllogisms,  I.  31,  32. 
Crystals,  II.  129,  140. 

Darwinian  theory,  II.  208  ;  see  "  Evo- 
lution." 

Descartes,  II.  134;  methodic  doubt 
of,  I.  95,  96 ;  clear  ideas  of,  168. 

Determinations  of  being,  II.  14. 

Dialectics,  I.  6,  7. 

Dialectic  syllogism,  I.  49. 

Difference,  specific,  I.  13. 

Dilemma,  I.  41,  42. 

Disjunctive,  proposition,  I.  21 ;  syl- 
gism,  36. 

Distant  action,  II.  85. 

Distinction,  II.  40;  of  the  sciences, 
1.67. 

Distributed  ideas,  I.  16. 

Doubt,  I.  78,  82 ;  methodic,  95,  96. 

Dreams,  I.  147;  II.  168,  170. 

Dualism,  II.  243, 

Dynamic  theory,  II.  130,  133. 

Effect,  see"  Cause." 

Efficient  cause,  II.  81. 

Elements,  of  certainty,   I.  84,  88 ;  of 

matter,  II.  126. 
Eminent  cause,  II.  84. 
Enthymeme,  I.  38. 
Epicherema,  I.  43. 
Equivocal,  cause,    II.  84;  terms,  I. 

16. 
Equivocation,  I.  57. 
Error,  I.  78  to  83. 
Essence,  specific,  I.  13 ;  defined,  II. 

28;    physical,    metaphysical,    30; 

eternal,  31 ;  knowledge  of,  32  ;  of 

God,  228. 
Eternity,  II.  70,  245,  246 ;  of  punish* 

ment,  118,  215. 
Ethics,  1. 1. 

Eucharist,  Holy,  II.  58,  134. 
Evasion,  I.  54. 
Evidence,  mediate,  immediate,  1. 18 ; 


l82 


Alphabetical  Index, 


defined,  167 ;  the  ultimate  criterion 
of  certainty,  169,  170. 

Evil,  II.  45,  241,  242,  267  ;  spirits, 
123  to  125  ;  I.  147. 

Evolution,  II.  156  to  158,  208  to  210, 
226. 

Exemplars,  II.  20,  21. 

Exemplary  cause,  II.  80. 

Exercise  in  reasoning,  I.  69. 

Existence,  II.  33 ;  of  God,  220,  etc. 

Extension,  of  ideas,  I.  16  ;  of  propo- 
sitions, 20 ;  of  predicate,  21 ;  of 
bodies,  II.  127,  132  to  134. 

Extreme  terms,  I.  29. 

Fallacies,  I.  56,  etc. 

Falsity,  I.  73  ;  II.  42. 

Fichte,  II.  102  ;  I.  144,  145. 

Figment  of  reason,  II.  7. 

Figure,  II.  136,  140. 

Final  cause,  II.  ^^  to  79. 

First,  fact,  principle,  condition,  I.  98 ; 
principles,  60,  II.  35 ;  cause,  83. 

Foreknowledge,  II.  199 ;  250  to  252. 

Form,  of  syllogism,  I.  19,  29  ;  of  liv- 
ing bodies,  II.  144,  203  to  206; 
matter  and,  see  "  Matter." 

Formal,  cause,  II.  ^^,  84  ;  objects  of 
sciences,  I.  67 ;  object  of  meta- 
physics, II.  3,  8, 133. 

Free,  will,  the  source  of  error,  I.  81 ; 
cause,  II.  83;  will,  in  man,  194  to 
199 ;  in  God,  255. 

Genus,  I.  13  to  15. 

Geology,  II.  iii. 

Glory,  II.  115,  IS3- 

God,  defined,  II.  219 ;  exists,  220  to 
227 ;  essence  of,  228 ;  perfection  of, 
233, 234  ;  simplicity  of,  235  to  238  ; 
attributes  of,  239 ;  unity  of,  240, 
241 ;  immortality  of,  243,  244 ;  eter- 
nity of,  245,  246 ;  omnipresence, 
ixnmensity  of,  247,  248 ;  knowledge 


of,  250  to  253  ;  will  of,  254  to  257 ; 
holiness  of,  258  ;  goodness  of,  259, 
260  ;  omnipotence  of,  261  to  263  ; 
concurrence  of,  264,  265 ;  provi- 
dence of,  266,  267. 

Goodness,  II.  36,  43  ;  kinds  of,  44. 

Growth,  II.  140,  143. 

Habiliment,  II.  50,  73. 

Harper,  Rev.  Thos.,   II.  14,  41,  133. 

Highest  genus,  I.  14. 

Holiness,  II.  258. 

Hume,  I.  145  ;  II.  53,  123. 

Huxley,  I.  10,  164;  II.  123,  155,199, 
201,  209. 

Hypnotism,  II.  124. 

Hypothesis,  I.  53. 

Hypothetic,  proposition,  21 ;  syllo- 
gism, 34  to  37 ;  impossibility,  II.  96. 

Idea,  I.  9 ;  abstract,  concrete,  11 ; 
singular,  particular,  universal,  12; 
distributed,  16 ;  primary,  119  to 
121 ;  not  innate,  II.  178,  iPo ;  how 
acquired,  180  to  183  ;  of  being  not 
that  of  God,  15,  16 ;  of  infinity,  95. 

IdeaUsm,  I.  144 ;  II.  102. 

Identity,  II.  39,  57. 

Ignorance,  I.  78,  82. 

Imagination,  I.  105  ;  II.  165. 

Immanent  action,  II.  65. 

Immensity  of  God,  II.  247. 

Immutability,  II.  98  \  of  God,  243, 
244. 

Impenetrability,  II.  135. 

Indirect  reasoning,  I.  54. 

Individuality,  II.  41. 

Induction,  I.  44  to  48,  170. 

Inertia,  II.  138. 

Infinite,  II.  92  to  94 ;  idea  of,  95  ; 
perfection,  253. 

Inhesion,  II.  58. 

Inner  sense,  I.  103  to  105,  115  ;  reli- 
able, 139  to  141. 


Alphabetical  Index. 


183 


Instance,  I.  54. 
Instinct,  II.  149  to  152. 
Instrumental  cause,  II,  83. 
Intellect,  I.  107,  112,  113,   148  ;   in 

action,  receptive,  II.  177,  182. 
Intellecturl,  memory,  I.   no,  128  to 

131 ;  life,  II.  139. 
Intelligence  not  in  brutes,  II.  148. 
Intuitions,  I.  152. 
Invincible  error,  I.  80. 
Irrelevant  conclusion,  I.  58. 

Judgment,  I.  17,  18,  108  ;  a  priori,  a 
posteriori,  etc.,  17,  18,  63  ;  specula- 
tive, practical,  79  ;  analytic  is  re- 
liable, 125  to  127  ;  consequent  on 
sense-perception,  142  to  151;  of 
common  sense,  156  to  164. 

Kant,  II.  71,  130, 

Knowledge,  of  possibles,  II.  19,  20  ; 

of  essences,    32 ;  of  God,   250  to 

253;  see  "Cognition." 

Language,  II.  189,  190. 

Laws  of  nature,  II.  119  to  125. 

Leibnitz,  II.  45,  53,  130,  206,  212. 

Liberty,  II.  194  to  199 ;  essence  of, 
197 ;  kinds  of,  255 ;  of  God,  256, 
257. 

Life,  11.  139,  140. 

Local  motion,  II.  137. 

Locke,  II.  34,  53,  57. 

Logic,  I.  2,  5 ;  formal,  material,  crit- 
ical, 6,  70. 

Logical,  order,  I.  61 ;  truth,  falsity, 
73  to  n\  beingi  H.  n;  distinc- 
tion, 40  ;  relation,  62 ;  whole,  91. 

Lunacy,  I.  118,  145. 

Major,  terms,  premises,  I.  23  to  29; 

32,  etc. 
Material,  logic,  I.   6,  70 ;  cause,  II. 

77. 
Materialism,  II-  216. 


Matter,  of  syllogism,  I.  19,  29;  not 
self-existent,  II.  104  to  107;  divisi- 
ble, 126  ;   and  form,  127,  etc.,  144. 

McCosh,  II.  S3. 

Memory,  I.  106,  no;  reliable,  128  to 
131 ;  sensible,  II.  166. 

Mesmerism,  II.  123,  124,  172  to  174. 

Metaphysical,  certainty,  I.  86 ;  es- 
sence, II.  30,  230,  231 ;  truth,  72; 
whole,  91. 

Metaphysics,  I.  i ;  II.  2  to  4;  formal 
object  of,  8,  133. 

Method,  I.  59  to  67. 

Methodic  doubt,  I.  95. 

Middle  term,  I.  29. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  II.  184. 

Minor,  term,  premise,  I.  23  to  29,  32. 

Miracle,  II.  121  to  125. 

Modal  accidents,  II.  59;  distinction, 
40. 

Monads,  II.  130. 

Moral,  truth,  I.  72;  falsity,  73;  cer- 
tainty, 86,  87  ;  II.  123;  cause,  83; 
possibiUty,  18 ;  good,  44^,  45 ;  evil, 

"5. 
Mosaic  account  of  creation,  II.  in. 
Motion,  II.  69,  137. 
MultipUcity,  II.  38. 
Mysticism,  II.  i86. 

Nature,  of  a  being,    II.  34 ;  laws  of, 

119  to  125. 
Natural,  appetite,  II.  191 ;  theology, 

4,  218. 
Necessary,  being,  II.  96,  220;  cause, 

83. 
Negative  argument,  I.  54. 
Nominalists,  I.  124;  II.  184,  185. 
Notion,  1.9.     . 
Notional,  essence,  II,  230,  231. 

Objections,  answers  to,  I.  55. 
Objects  of,  sense-perception,  I.  148. 
Occasion,  II.  82. 


1 84 


Alphabetical  Index. 


Omnipotence,  II.  261  to  263. 
Omnipresence,  II.  247. 
Omniscience,  II.  253. 
Oneness,  see  "  Unity." 
Ontological,  order,  I.  61 ;    proof  of 

God's  existence,  II.  226,  227. 
Ontologists,  II.  187,  188. 
Ontology,  II.  4,  5. 

Operative  attributes  of  God,  II.  239. 
Opinion,  I.  78. 
Order,  I.  61 ;  in  the  world,    II.  122, 

221,  224. 
Organs  of  sense,   I.    102;   action  of, 

II.  195. 
Origin,  of  the  world,  II.  loi ;  of  ideas, 

175  to  184 ;  of  language,  190 ;  of  the 

soul,  207  to  212. 

Paleontology,  II.  157. 
Pantheism,  II.  loi,  103.  237,  238. 
Particular,  ideas,  1. 12 ;  propositions, 

20. 
Passion,  I.  83;  II.  50,  61,  63  to  65. 
Perception,  I.  145  to  148 ;  II.  160  to 

163. 
Perfection,  II.  43  ;  absolute,  relative, 

117;  of  the  world,  117,  118. 
Person,  II.  SS  ;  identity  of,  57. 
Phantasm,  I.  10,  115. 
Philosophic  certainty,  I.,  85, 91. 
Philosophy,   defined,  I.  i ;  divided, 

I ;  important,  4. 
Phrenology,  II.  201. 
Physical,  being,    II.  11 ;  good,   44  ; 

evil,  45  ;   beauty,  46;    certainty,  I. 

86,90,   91;  II.    123;     possibility, 

18 ;  essence,  30,  229,  232  ;  cause, 

74 ;  whole,  91 ;  laws,  119  to  125. 
Physics,  II.  I. 
Physiology,  II.  157. 
Place,  II.  So,  66. 
Plants,  II.  139,  141  to  143;  153  to  154. 

Plato,   II.    lOI,  127,  2X3. 


Porphyrian  tree,  I.  15. 

Positivists,  II.  34. 

Possibility,  intrinsic,  extrinsic,  II.  17; 
moral,  physical,  18. 

Possible  beings,  II.  6,  7,  12, 17  to  27, 
94 ;  knowledge  of,  19,  20,  94,  253 ; 
dependence  of,  on  God,  22  to  27. 

Posture,  II.  50,  72. 

Potentiality,  II.  127,  128. 

Power  of  God,  II.  261,  263. 

Predicables,  heads  of,  I.  13. 

Predicaments,  II.  48. 

Predicate,  I.  19 ;  extension,  compre- 
hension of,  20. 

Pre-established  harmony,  II.  206. 

Prejudices,  I.  83. 

Premises,  I.  23,  25,  29,  60. 

Preservation  of  created  things,  II. 
263. 

Primary  ideas,  I.  119  to  121. 

Prime  matter,  II.  127. 

Principal  cause,  II.  83. 

Principiant,  II.  74. 

Principle,  of  identity,  contradiction, 
excluded  middle,  II.  35;  of  suffi- 
cient reason  and  causality,  86  to  88. 

Probable  reasoning,  I.  49. 

Procession,  II.  74,  75- 

Proper  objects  of  sense-perception, 
I.  148. 

Property,  1. 13. 

Proportion,  II.  47. 

Propositions,  I.  19 ;  kinds  of,  21,  33. 

Providence  of  God,  II.  266,  267. 

Psychology,  II.  4,  139. 

Punishment,  II.  115, 118;  eternal,  215. 

Pure  act,  II.  237. 

Purpose,  of  work,  of  workman,  II. 
112  to  115. 

Pythagoras,  II.  loi. 

Quality,  II.  50,  61 ;  of  proposition, 

I.  30» 


Alphabetical  Index. 


185 


Quantity,  II.  50,  60,  93,  94;  of  prop- 
osition, I,  20. 

Rational,  cognition,  II.  175,  etc. ;  ap- 
petite, 191, 192. 

Real,  being,  II.  7,  8 ;  relation,  62 ; 
distinction,  40. 

Realists,  I.  124;  II.  185. 

Reality  of  causes  and  effects,  II.  85. 

Reason,  I.  109. 

Reasoning,  I.  22;  rules  of  syllogis- 
tic, 32 ;  demonstrative,  probable, 
49 ;  indirect,  54 ;  a  priori,  a  pos- 
teriori, 62,  63;  analytic,  synthetic, 
64  to  66;  gives  certainty,  132  to 
134.  170. 

Redemption,  II.  56. 

Reduplication,  II.  135. 

Reid,  I.  160. 

Relation,  II.  50,  62. 

Retort,  I.  54. 

Revelation,  I.  3;  II.  iii,  118. 

Rules  of  syllogism,  I.  31,  32. 

Sameness,  II.  39. 

Sceptics,  I.  93,  94,  97,  99 ;  II.  85. 

Schoolmen's,  the,  system,  of  matter 

and  form,   II.   127;    of  origin  of 

ideas,  182. 
Science,  I.  5 ;  formal  objects  of  a, 

67. 

Scotus,  II.  loi. 

Self-contradiction,  I.  54. 

Self-existence,  II.  104,  220,  239. 

Sensation,  1. 135, 136  ;  perceives  con- 
crete objects,  137;  is  reliable,  142 
to  147 ;  limits  of  its  reliability,  139 
to  141;  how  effected,  II.  161  to 
163 ;  where  effected,  164. 

Sense,  outer,  1.  loi,  102,  138,  142  to 
151 ;  inner,  103,  104,  138  to  141 ; 
common,  103,  163,  164;  percep- 
tion, II.  160;  objects  of,  I.  148. 

Sensible,  memory,  I.  106,  128;  II. 


166 ;  judgments,  167 ;  appetite,  191 
to  196. 

Sensitive,  cognition,  II.  159  to  167; 
life,  139. 

Simple  apprehensions,  1.8;  truth  of, 
75  to  77. 

Simplicity,  II.  90,  145 ;  of  the  soul, 
200 ;  of  God,  235  to  238. 

Singular  ideas,  1, 12;  propositions,  aa 

Sleep,  II.  168,  169,  172. 

Somnambulism,  II.  171. 

Sophisms,  I.  56. 

Sorites,  I.  39,  40. 

Soul,  the  form  of  the  body,  II.  144, 
204  to  206;  the  human,  is  simple, 
200,  201 ;  spiritual,  202, 203 ;  when 
created,  211,  212;  survives  body, 
213 ;  immortal,  214. 

Space,  II.  67  to  69,  137. 

Species,  1. 13  to  15  ;  Eucharistic,  II. 
134;  of  plants  and  animals  are 
fixed,  156,  157;  impressed,  ex- 
pressed, II.  162,  163. 

Specific  difference,  1. 13  to  15. 

Spinoza,  II.  52,  101. 

Spirits,  II.  66,  137;  I.  147. 

Spiritism,  II.  174. 

Spontaneous,  II.  193. 

Subordinate,  genus,  species,  I.  14. 

Substance,  II.  49,  etc. 

Substantial,  cause,  II.  77 ;  principle, 
132,  144,  145. 

Suffering,  II.  241,  267. 

Sufficient  reason,  II.  86  to  88. 

Supposit,  II.  55, 

Suspicion,  I.  78,  82. 

Syllogism,  I.  23;  construction  of,  24, 
25 ;  abridged  form  of,  27 ;  affinna> 
tive,  negative,  28 ;  parts  of,  29 ; 
valid,  30 ;  rules  of,  31,  32 ;  hypo- 
thetical, 34  to  37. 

Synthetic,  judgment,  I.  V]\  reason- 
ing, 64  to  66. 


i86 


Alphabetical  Index, 


Term,  T.  lo,  i6,  29,  31,  32. 
Thomas,  St.,  I.  91;  II.  41,  108,  no, 

118,  127. 
Time,  IL  50,  70,  71. 
Traditionalism,  II.  179. 
Transcen dentals,  II.  9. 
Transient  action,  II.  65. 
Transubstantiation,  II.  99. 
Trinity,  the  Holy,  II.  74,  237. 
True,  beauty,  II.  47;  good,  44. 
Truth,  I.  72  to  ^^\  II.  36,  42. 
Tyndall,  II.  155. 

Ultimate,  criterion  of  certainty,  I. 
165  to  170 ;  particles  of  matter, 
II.  127. 

Undue  assumption,  I.  58. 

Unity,  II.  36;  kinds  of,  37;  of  God, 
240,  241. 

Universal,  ideas,  I.  12,  13,  122,  224; 
direct,  reflex,  II.  183,  etc. ;  proposi- 
tion, I.  20 ;  major,  25  ;  cause,  II.  84. 


yniverse,  II.  100;  see  "World." 
Univocal  terms,  I.  16. 

Valid,  syllogism,   I.  30;  induction, 

48. 
Vegetable  life,  II.  139, 
Virtual  cause,  II.  84. 
Vital,  principle,   II.  127,  129,  139  to 

148;  acts,  59. 
Voluntary,  II.  193. 

When,  II.  63,  70. 

Whole,  II.  91. 

Will,  II.  181,  192 ;  antecedent,  con* 

sequent,  116 ;  of  man  is  free,  198, 

199 ;  of  God,  254  to  258. 
Wisdom  of  God,  II.  253. 
World,  II.  100:  origin  of  the,  loi  to 

no;  age  of  the,   in;   perfection 

of  the,  117  ;  purpose  of  the,  112  to 

115. 


A  PRACTICAL  INTRODUCTION  TO 

English  Rhetoric: 

Precepts  and  Exercises. 

By  Rev.  Charles  Coppens,  S.J. 


$1.25.      (Discount  is  allowed  U  Schools.) 


Speaking  of  the  "  Rhetoric",  Very  Rev.  Rudolph  Meyer,  SJ.,  said :  "The 
best  thing  I  ever  did  for  education  was  to  urge  Father  Coppens  to  publish  that 
book." 


"  We  have  taken  some  of  the  most  popular  and  approved  text-books  in  use 
in  our  best  schools  and  compared  them  with  this  new  Introduction  to  English 
Rhetoric.  The  result  is  in  every  way— and  in  some  parts  to  an  exceptional 
degree — favorable  to  the  latter. — Ahterican  Catholic  Quarterly  Review. 

We  are  happy  to  add  another  to  the  list  of  text-books  for  Catholic  Schools 
of  which  one  can  write  only  iu  terms  of  unqualified  praise.  Its  author,  the 
Rev.  Charles  Coppens,  S.J.,  is  already  well-known  through  his  admirable 
"Art  of  Oratorical  Composition."  His  two  books,  taken  together,  contain  the 
entire  course  of  rhetoric  as  studied  in  colleges  and  universities.  But  The  Prac- 
tical Introduction  to  English  Rhetoric,  taken  alone,  must  have  a  far  wider 
sphere  of  usefulness,  being  perfectly  adapted  for  the  higher  departments  of 
academies  for  girls,  and  for  the  use  of  the  teachers  themselves  in  the  lower 
departments  of  schools  for  either  sex,  or  in  schools  where  so  extended  a  course 
of  rhetoric  does  not  enter  into  the  plan  of  study.— /^7o/. 


The  book  is  the  result  of  thirty  years  of  work  as  a  professor  of  rhetoric  in 
various  colleges  conducted  by  the  Jesuit  Fathers  in  this  country.  It  is  a  class- 
book,  but  it  would  make  a  useful  and  interesting  book  in  the  library  of  any 
man  who  admires  and  loves  to  cultivate  good  English.  From  the  examination 
we  have  given  the  work  we  feel  justified  in  pronouncing  it  the  best  English 
book  on  rhetoric  that  has  yet  been  -pvLbWshtA.— Michigan  Catholic. 


Thk  Art  ok 


ORATORICAL  COMFOSITIOfi: 

Based  on  the  Precepts  and  Models  of  the 
Great  Masters. 


By  REV.  Charles  Coppens,  S.J. 


$  1  ,25.      {Discount  is  allowed  to  Schools.) 


"It  is  a  clear,  didactic  exposition,  with  such  illustrations  from  modern 
sources  as  will  make  it  practical  under  our  circumstances.  But  it  is  also  a 
text-book,  which  is  saying   something  apart    from   its    general   merits,   as 

teachers  will  understand I,east  of  all  has  Father  Coppens  reason 

to  guard  himself  against  distrust,  for  he  simply  proves  his  strength  by  the 

grasp  he  has  of  the  masters  in  his  profession For  seminaries,  we 

find  here  the  entire  course  from  preparatory  school  to  the  class  of  sacred 
eloquence  in  theology.'^— American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review. 


Father  Coppens  has  been,  over  twenty-five  years,  a  Professor  of  Oratory  in 
the  United  States,  so  that  he  brings  to  this  book  not  only  the  full  equipment 
of  a  master  of  the  art,  but  all  the  invaluable  skill  in  imparting  his  knowledge 
to  be  acquired  only,  and  after  long  trial,  in  the  rostrum  of  the  teacher. 
Father  Coppens'  is  perhaps  the  most  practical  class-book  on  the  speaker's 
art  yet  offered  to  American  schools.  .  .  .  Father  Coppens,  wherever  it 
is  practicable,  lets  the  acknowledged  masters  of  oratorical  composition  speak 
for  themselves,  so  that  his  pupil  is  made  familiar,  and  in  their  own  words, 
with  the  leading  precepts  of  the  great  writers  on  oratory  among  both  the 
ancients  and  modems.— Ca/Ao//c  World. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subjea  to  immediate  recall. 

8Nov'56?W 

REC'D  LD 

OCT  .Si  1956 

18Nov'57HM 

REC'D  LD 

NOV    4  1957 

'■■■" 

^"-°o^^"°  .-P^  ^■'^iB^"^^ 

>r 


YB  23104 


.^^^ 


